Educating Chinese Judges for New Challenges in the New Era

National Judges' College
National Judges’ College

One of the many documents issued late last year in the rush for year-end accomplishments (成就)is the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC’s) latest Five Year Court Training Plan Outline for 2019-2023 (New Training Plan Outline) (2019—2023年全国法院教育培训规划).  The question this blogpost will explore is what is new and what has changed in the post-19th Party Congress New Era. As shown below, it is one small example of the impact of the 19th Party Congress on China’s legal and governance system. Competing obligations mean that this blogpost can only provide a few highlights and will focus on training for judges rather than support personnel, although the New Training Plan Outline covers all types of court personnel.

Other objective factors that have changed in the New Era are the number of cases in the courts (the majority of which are civil and commercial cases) and the average number of cases assigned to judges.  The numbers released to the public can only provide a general indication, as senior judges in a court (court presidents, vice presidents, and heads of divisions) are required to handle a small number of cases, which means in actual fact a greater burden on front-line judges, who constitute the majority of judges. The provinces and areas with the most developed economies tend to have the most number of cases.

This blog discussed the earlier plan almost five years ago.  The outside observer is handicapped by limited transparency about what the National Judicial College (NJC) actually does, although insights into the forthcoming curriculum can be found.  Previous versions of the NJC website had some course outlines, but those vanished in one of the website upgrades. In comparison, for example, the Australian National Judicial College publishes the National Judicial Curriculum and the German Judges Academy also has quite detailed information (to the extent this observer can understand it using a combination of high school German + Google translate).

The NJC, for those who aren’t familiar with it, is a separate institutional entity (事业法人) under the SPC, in charge of court training, primarily of judges, but also for other supporting staff. It is closely linked with the SPC’s Political Department (in charge of cadres). It has also hosted some training courses jointly (this was on administrative litigation) with the National Prosecutors College. Fortunately, the NJC website has posted screenshots of lectures (many by outstanding SPC judges) in its cloud classroom, although unfortunately, the lectures themselves are inaccessible.  I surmise that any teaching this spring will be at least initially online, as in other Chinese higher educational institutions. As of 30 March, this has provided to be correct, as the NJC website now features reports on training judicial trainers and provincial branches of the NJC providing training online.

What is new?

Consistent with what I wrote in this blog about Zhou Qiang’s report to the NPC in March of last year (2019) (and other 2019 blogposts), what is different about the New Court Training Plan Outline is the greater emphasis on political issues and Party leadership, although these were evident in the previous plan. The first sentence mentions Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) and “forging a high-quality court team (队伍) that the Party Center can rely upon and the masses are satisfied with.”  It mentions creating a revolutionalized,  regularized, specialized and professionalized team (革命化、正规化、专业化、职业化). As explained in an earlier blogpost, “revolutionized” signals absolute Party leadership. The top two goals for training are deepening education in Xi Jinping thought (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想学习教育更加深入) and further solidifying education with a Party nature (党性教育更加扎实).

What do Chinese judges need in the New Era?

The economic and social changes in China raise the competency bar for judges.  A more litigious and rights conscious public, the increasingly complex economy and a greater number of cross-border transactions and interactions, (not to mention coronavirus related issues) as well as a smaller number of judges to hear more cases means that judicial training is an important part of preparing Chinese judges for the New Era. Post 19th Party Congress changes in Party policy mean that competency in Party matters is increasingly significant.

The training plan

The training plan is linked to the 5th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan Outline, the Communist Party Central Committee’s five year training plan for national cadres, a special document for outstanding young cadres (关于适应新时代要求大力发现培养选拔优秀年轻干部的意见), the Court’s regulations on judicial training (to be amended),  as well the Court’s 2013 policy document on creating a new judicial team (队伍) in the new situation. Team (队伍 (or work team) derives from “classical” Party terminology (as Stanley Lubman highlighted in a 2014 article)).

The plan does not incorporate training for foreign judges, which the NJC delivers to judges from Belt & Road Initiative jurisdictions and other countries.

Content

The Training Plan stresses ideological, ethical, and professional training, for judges and other judicial personnel. Ideological training is listed first. Judicial training is to focus on active and practical methods, including the case method (no less than 30%), moot courts, and other interactive methods.  Even in the New Era, the intellectual influence of exchange and training programs with offshore counterparts (many of those in the NJC leadership had studied abroad) is apparent from the more interactive methods required.

Who’s being trained

The training requirements depend on the seniority of the judicial personnel

  • Court leadership: the focus is on their political education, as well as administration. The SPC will run a special training session on  Xi Jinping New Era thought for a large group of court leaders, with newly appointed ones required to participate in training within a year of appointment. In the next five years, they must participate in a certain minimum number of hours of Party school, cadre education, or judicial training.
  • The plan also calls for providing different types of training depending on court needs–off-site vs. on-site training, web-based training, circuit teaching (some of the younger SPC judges are sent to courts in western provinces to deliver training).
  • Special training program for new judges: the judicial training program (apparently drawing from the practice in Taiwan and Japan) for new judges highlighted almost five years ago still has not been put in place. The new plan calls for research into implementing measures for training for newly appointed judges and organizing training for a group that qualifies to take part in unified pre-service training) (研究制定法官职前培训实施办法, 组织符合条件的人员参加统一职前培训).

How will the Plan be implemented?

As I wrote in December, one of the little-discussed aspects of being in a leadership role in the SPC in the New Era ensuring that policies, actions, initiatives, and other decisions hit the target of being politically correct (post 19th Party Congress and post 19th Party Congress 4th Plenum) while being “problem-oriented” (坚持问题导向) that is, addressing relevant practical issues facing the court system.  As mentioned then, it is true for the leadership of the NJC as well as other SPC divisions and institutions, as can be seen from one document.

The NJC very usefully (for the outside observer, at least) posted a notice soliciting proposals (from qualified individuals and institutions) for judicial training in 2020 under the new plan. The guide to the proposals sets out the desired content, which must not only be politically correct (a given), but also creative (new training methods or viewpoints), and relevant–focusing on the new and difficult issues facing the courts. The solicitation lists 66 topics in seven categories:

  1. Ideological related training is listed first, of course, with six subtopics which include: Xi Jinping new ideology and strategy for ruling the country by law (listed first); enhancing socialist core values in judgments (see my earlier blogpost on a related topic);  political discipline rules as derived from the Party charter, regulations, and discipline.
  2. Professionalism: (four subtopics)–professional ethics and judicial values; judicial work-style and the standardization of judicial acts; anti-corruption issues and countermeasures; outstanding Chinese traditional legal culture and socialist justice (unclear whether this is meant to solicit critical views of Chinese traditional legal culture);
  3. Judicial capacity: this one has twenty-three subtopics, with a good portion also to be found in other jurisdictions: civil, commercial, administrative and criminal justice values and judgment formation; judgment writing and courtroom control; difficult financial cases; while other reflect Chinese characteristics: what to consider when hearing difficult and complicated cases involving the public (涉众型) (these are either criminal or civil cases); protecting property rights and preventing mistaken cases; intellectual property trials and serving the innovative strategy; dealing with zombie enterprises.
  4.  General courses: (eight subtopics)again, a mixture of courses seen elsewhere, and ones with Chinese characteristics: guiding the media; mediation techniques; blockchain, AI and the courts.
  5.  Case study courses: (13 subtopics)-most of the topics are ones found elsewhere in judicial academies, such as financial crimes, juvenile justice, and corporate disputes, but others reflect the New Era, such Xi Jinping New Era thought cases and case pedagogy,  cases promoting and applying the “Fengqiao Experience“; and sweeping black and eliminating evil cases.
  6. Discussion courses: Criminal, civil, and administrative law courses.
  7. Judicial reform: only six topics here, including implementing the judicial responsibility system; establishing intelligent courts; separating simple from complicated cases; administrative litigation reform, and promoting a trial based criminal justice system.

Supreme People’s Court wields the Criminal Law “Big Stick” in the Anti-Coronavirus Battle

Screenshot 2020-02-12 at 4.28.12 PM
Press conference at the Central-Political Legal Commission announcing the Opinions

As this blog has often commented, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) must serve the greater situation and deal with practical legal issues, so that the SPC itself and its senior leadership are correct, politically and professionally. One of those ways is by providing properly calibrated guidance to subordinates at the SPC, the lower courts and other related authorities that provide appropriate political signals.  Some guidance is politically more important than others. In recent days (early February 2020), the SPC has done so through the following documents:

This blogpost will give a quick introduction to the first document.  Its importance can be seen from the photo above, of the press conference at the Central Political-Legal Commission on 10 February, at which the Punishing Crimes and Violations of Obstruction Opinions was released and explained to select members of the press. That document was issued with the participation of the Commission on Comprehensive Governance of the Country by Law (Comprehensive Governance Commission, further explained here), Party Central Political-Legal Committee, SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Fu Zhenghua, Minister of Justice and deputy head of the Comprehensive Governance Commission spoke first. Representatives from the other institutions also spoke.

The National Health Commission, SPC, SPP, and MPS issued the second document.

Both of them guide those in the criminal justice system to properly wield the “Big Stick” of the criminal law (and related administrative offenses) in the anti-coronavirus battle. The first document sends signals to the political leadership that the political-legal institutions are doing their part to fulfill the objectives that General Secretary Xi Jinping set in his 3 February speech

It is necessary to maintain a high-pressure situation, severely crackdown on illegal and criminal activities that disrupt social order, such as using the epidemic to drive up prices, hoarding, and looting, and severely crack down on the production and sale of counterfeit drugs, medical equipment, and medical and health materials. It is necessary to pay close attention to and resolve promptly all kinds of emerging problems, and to prevent all kinds of contradictions from overlapping and forming a chain reaction. (要保持严打高压态势,依法严厉打击利用疫情哄抬物价、囤积居奇、趁火打劫等扰乱社会秩序的违法犯罪行为,严厉打击制售假劣药品、医疗器械、医用卫生材料等违法犯罪行为。对各种苗头性问题,要密切关注、及时化解,严防各类矛盾交织叠加、形成连锁反应。)

What these documents are

The Punishing Crimes and Violations of Obstruction Opinions and the Ensuring Positive Medical Order are intended to provide guidance on certain violations of the criminal law and other related administrative offenses.  They do not create new legal rules but signal to the lower criminal justice institutions how the relevant criminal (and public security administration penalty) laws should be applied in the politically sensitive anti-coronavirus battle.  As a technical matter, both documents are classified as judicial document/judicial regulatory documents /judicial normative documents/judicial policy documents (司法文件, 司法规范性文件, 司法指导性文件, 司法正常性文件)(which I have written about previously).

As I have mentioned before, the SPC editors of a collection of those documents commented that “although judicial guidance documents are not judicial interpretations and cannot be cited in a court judgment document as the basis of a judgment, it is generally recognized that they have an important guiding impact on the trial and enforcement work of the courts at every level.” Titles included in the collection include “Opinions” (意见), “Decisions” (决定), Summaries” (纪要), “Notifications” (通知) Speeches (讲话), etc..

Some local high courts are starting to issue complimentary local guidance, with more detailed provisions, with the Jiangsu Higher People’s Court one of the early movers.

Section 1

The document is divided into several sections.  The first one, analogous to the opinion I analyzed recently, gives the political background, calling for the raising of the readers’ political stance, the strengthening of their “four consciousnesses,” the upholding of “four self-confidences,” and the implementation of the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions and Party central policies and arrangements.

Section 2

The second section of the Punishing Crimes and Violations of Obstruction Opinions (which appears to have been primarily drafted by the SPC, judging by the document reference 法发〔2020〕7号, indicating it is from the SPC), is the substantive part of the document. It is further divided into 10 subsections, nine of which describes a particular type of crime that is to be strictly punished according to law. They include:

  • crimes of resisting epidemic prevention and control measures; violence against medical personnel,
  • making or selling fake protective goods, supplies, or medicines;
  • fabricating or spreading rumors etc.

The first nine subsections describe one or more illegal acts that may occur. One example is subsection three, on the production or sale of shoddy prevention and protection goods or supplies or the production or sale of fake or shoddy medicines used in preventing the coronavirus. The Opinions state that where the requirements of the Criminal Law are met, the act should be punished as the crimes of production and sale of shoddy goods or medicines.  So it is giving prosecutors and judges a steer on how the Criminal Law should be applied but does not in itself create new law.

Subsection 10 gives guidance on how the law is to be applied. If the acts listed in subsections 1-9 do not constitute a crime (based on existing criteria), the public security authorities are to impose public security administrative punishments under the Public Security Administration Penalties Law.  The Opinions point to the following provisions:

false information disrupting public order; disrupting order at a unit or public venue; provocation; refusing to implement decisions and orders in an emergency; obstructing the performance of public affairs; breaking through police lines or instruments; striking others; intentional harm, insulting others, fraud, illegally digging or gathering gravel near railways, stealing or destroying public facilities near roads, destroying railway facilities and equipment, intentionally destroying property, looting public or property, and so forth; or the relevant departments are to give administrative punishments.

Importantly, when crimes or violations of the Public Security Administration Penalties Law occur during the period of epidemic prevention and control, it should be considered as an aggravating factor )(for punishment purposes). The stated purpose is to deter bad conduct  “to lawfully embody the requirements of the crackdown policy, to forcefully punish and deter violations and crimes, to preserve the authority of the law, to preserve social order, and to preserve the security of the people’s lives and their physical health.”

For those in the criminal justice charged with enforcing these provisions, they need to refer to relevant judicial interpretations and other guidance (or in the case of public security officials, their regulations and other relevant documents)–the Opinions do not set out the elements of the relevant crimes.

Since this document was issued, some of the professional Wechat accounts on criminal law issues have published authoritative commentary pointing out practical problems with the legislation (law and judicial interpretations). The deputy head of the SPP’s research office published this (on the crime of obstructing contagious disease efforts), while a local procurator (nationally recognized) wrote this on several of the crimes (including refusal to comply with quarantine or leaving quarantine without permission). Judges and prosecutors (procurators) are concerned about making “mistakes,” as the responsibility system imposes expansive responsibility (described by two judges as “the sword of Damocles” over judges’ heads).

Section 3

The third section relates to the relationship among the institutions involved, principles to be followed and gives apparently mixed signals which need to be understood together.

  • Promptly investigate cases;
  • Strengthen communication and coordination;
  • Safeguard procedural rights;
  • Strengthen publicity and education;
  • Emphasize safety in handling cases.

The first is directed to the public security authorities, directing them to promptly investigate cases but also be civil, while the last subsection concerns the personal safety of those in the criminal justice system. The second subsection encourages the criminal justice authorities to communicate and coordinate better but cautions the public security organs to pay attention to the comments and recommendations by the procuratorate. It requires the authorities to focus on public opinion guidance in cases that have caught the attention of the public.  Subsection three is one that contains apparently mixed signals, on the one hand emphasizing that defendants have the right to legal counsel, but at the same time,  all levels of judicial administrative organs should strengthen guidance and oversight of lawyers’ defense representation. The fourth subsection illustrates some ongoing techniques of the Chinese justice system, in using typical/model cases to educate the public and deter them from criminal or illegal behavior, and voluntarily comply with the law and the authorities. The document says explicitly: “the broader public should be guided to obey discipline and law, to not believe and spread rumors, and to lawfully support and cooperate with epidemic control work.”