By Susan Finder with initial research assistance by Zhu Xinyue
President Zhou Qiang delivering the report
The Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) October 2022 specialized report on foreign-related adjudication work (最高人民法院关于人民法院涉外审判工作情况的报告) provides an overview of the SPC’s and the lower courts’ work related to foreign-related matters over the past 10 years. This blogpost uses the term “adjudication work” to encompass the multiple functions of the SPC (see my U.S.-Asia Law Institute article for a refresher) as well as the lower courts. (My previous blogpost gives a detailed explanation of the significance of specialized reports of the SPC and other institutions to the NPC Standing Committee). The report is intended to showcase the SPC’s work in supporting Xi Jinping era fundamental changes in foreign policy, or as the concluding section words it, “vigorously serving the greater situation of the Party and State’s external policy work” (积极服务党和国家对外工作大局). An analysis of the content of this specialized report provides insights into the role of the SPC and its relationships with other Central institutions as well as the current and evolving concept of “foreign-related rule of law” (涉外法治). Concerning the link between “foreign-related rule of law” and the foreign-related adjudication work of the people’s courts, as President Zhou Qiang said: “the foreign-related adjudication work of the people’s courts is an important part of foreign-related rule of law work (人民法院涉外审判工作是涉外法治工作的重要组成部分).”
I surmise that the NPC Standing Committee requested the SPC submit a specialized report on the SPC’s foreign-related work because the political leadership is prioritizing developing China’s foreign-related body of law and takes the view that SPC expertise is needed to that end. As in any legal system, issues that come before the Chinese courts highlight the gaps in current legislation (broadly defined).
1. Overview of the Report
The report covers all areas of SPC work–criminal, civil and commercial, maritime, intellectual property, administrative, and other areas, as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and other forms of international judicial assistance. Because cases involving Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are considered by reference to the principles for foreign-related cases, the report provides highlights of those developments as well.
Following some background material, this blogpost follows the structure of the report and therefore the blogpost is much longer than usual. A more comprehensive analysis of many aspects is found in my “never-ending article,” currently on its meandering way to publication.
2. Drafting of the Specialized Report
Because most of the cases involving foreign-related matters tend to be in the commercial area generally (incorporating maritime, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards), it is likely that the #4 Civil Division took the lead in drafting the report, worked closely with the International Cooperation Bureau, and involved other divisions and offices of the SPC as needed, including those working on criminal law issues. Although this report appears to be just another anodyne official report, what underlies it is likely to be hundreds of hours of drafting, soliciting data and comments from related offices, including the Research Office (with a department in charge of Hong Kong and Macau issues), comments from the vice president in charge of the #4 Division (it now appears to be Justice Tao Kaiyuan), President Zhou Qiang’s office, and the NPC Standing Committee itself. It is unclear whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Comments also provided input. It incorporated the SPC’s response to a research report on foreign-related adjudication work prepared by the NPC Standing Committee’s Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee (mentioned in the previous blogpost).
3. Summary of the Report
The report highlights the SPC’s work in foreign-related cases in support of related policies. The structure of the report is the usual one for such reports–a long list of accomplishments, followed by a summary of outstanding challenges and suggestions to the NPC Standing Committee for future work. It reveals some previously unknown developments and clearly sets out the official conceptual structure underpinning the SPC’s foreign-related adjudication work and therefore China’s “foreign-related rule of law.” The report takes an inclusive view of accomplishments: judicial interpretations, policy documents, typical and guiding cases, as well as correctly deciding important cases. This blogpost decodes the details in the report, with brief comments and links to some of my earlier blogposts.
a. Selected Statistics
The report provides selected statistics. As I have said when I have spoken on the Belt & Road and the SPC, the number of foreign-related cases heard in the Chinese courts has increased substantially over the past ten years, but even now they constitute a tiny percentage of cases heard in the Chinese courts. The report reveals some of the challenges, as seen officially.
From 2013 to June 2022, Chinese courts heard a total of 384,000 foreign-related (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan-related) cases. These numbers are tiny compared to the large number of cases accepted by the Chinese courts annually. For example, in 2021, that number reached over 33 million cases. The number of first-instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases nationwide increased from 14,800 in 2013 to 27,300 in 2021. The SPC has not released more detailed statistics about the types of civil and commercial cases or foreign-related cases in other areas of law, such as criminal cases.
b. Protecting China’s National Security and Sovereignty
As is usual with SPC official reports and documents, matters relating to national security and sovereignty take a prominent place. The SPC reiterates that its foreign-related adjudication work serves the domestic and external greater situations. This section highlights two areas of service in protection of national security and sovereignty:
protecting China’s investments abroad. Cases so classified include infrastructure-related cases, trade cases, and shipping cases. The principal accomplishment is issuing a judicial interpretation on the hearing of independent letter of guarantee (demand guarantee) disputes and unifying the rules governing such disputes. These developments, which have come through several SPC cases (discussed here) and the end 2021 Conference Summary, have been flaggedonthisblog. A long-pending China International Commercial Court (CICC) case may provide additional guidance.
c. Creating a Legalized International Business Environment
This section is relatively long and highlights much of the SPC’s foreign-related adjudication work in the past 10 years. The focus is on international commercial dispute resolution rather than intellectual property disputes. i. Foreign investment: The courts have supported the revised Foreign Investment Law and Implementing Regulations with two interpretations (including one on the application of the Foreign Investment Law, mentioned here), as well as a policy of centralizing the hearing of such cases, seeking to ensure greater competency. ii. Pilot free trade zones and ports: The courts have supported these policies through several services and safeguards opinions (one general one, discussed in my book chapter, as well as ones on Lingang, Hainan, and new zones in Beijing). The SPC also issued related typical cases and encouraged local courts to establish additional measures to support national free trade zone policy. iii. The courts have supported national policies supporting a competitive market order, and to that end have issued regulations on bankruptcy, normative documents on improving the business environment (including services and safeguards opinions and a conference summary), and established financial courts (see Mark Jia’s related article). iv. Supported national policy concerning economic development and COVID-19 pandemic control (I have a related article that will be published in Italian). The SPC promulgated four guiding opinions (policy documents) on the trial of civil cases related to the Covid-19 pandemic, one of which focused on foreign-related commercial and maritime cases. This document was included in UNCITRAL’s CLOUT database.
v. Respecting international conventions and international practices (customs or usage, by which is meant trade/commercial practices or usages). As mentioned here, the SPC is drafting a judicial interpretation on the application of international conventions and treaties and international practices and has issued related typical cases. vi. Application of (foreign (non-mainland) governing law. Since 2013, the courts have applied foreign law in 542 cases. My draft article discusses related issues briefly. vii. Cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments: Since 2013, the courts nationwide have considered 7,313 cases of applications for recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments from foreign courts. My draft article discusses the evolution of this policy. The report mentions the enforcement of Chinese judgments abroad.
d. Serving national maritime policy
The report underlines that the SPC’s maritime adjudication work directly serves foreign trade shipping and marine development to maintain national [judicial] sovereignty and related national interests. The report mentions that the SPC issued judicial interpretations on maritime litigation jurisdiction, and issued judicial interpretations for hearing cases of compensation for damage to marine natural resources and ecological environment. The SPC and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued regulations on handling public interest litigation cases on marine natural resources and ecological environment, and released related typical cases. The report mentions China’s work on becoming an international maritime justice center (See my article in the Diplomat). Related accomplishments include the SPC expanding the network of maritime courts and their dispatched tribunals and the report highlights that more parties without a jurisdictional link with China have chosen the jurisdiction of the Chinese maritime courts (for a different view from the official one, see Professor Vivienne Bath’s research on parallel litigation involving the Chinese maritime courts).
e. Improving international commercial dispute resolution mechanisms to serve high-quality development of the BRI
According to the report, the SPC is implementing the deployment of the political leadership in this area. Those include:
the CICC and related developments, including: the CICC’s bilingual website, the CICC’s expert committee; two BRI Services and Safeguards Opinions, and typical BRI cases, as well as establishing local international commercial courts. (This blog has discussed these developments in some detail, with more contained in my draft article).
f. Establishing diversified dispute resolution of international commercial disputes
i. The SPC reports that it established a “one-stop” diversified international commercial dispute resolution mechanism, which integrates litigation, arbitration, and mediation. The report mentions the accomplishments of several local courts and the incorporation of arbitration and mediation institutions into the SPC’s (CICC’s (Chinese version)) one-stop platform. ii. Arbitration: The SPC issued judicial interpretations on judicial review of arbitration cases and enforcement of arbitral awards, and introduced a mechanism and reporting system for judicial review of arbitration cases; since 2013, Chinese courts have heard over 110,000 judicial review cases (presumably the vast majority domestic). iii. Mediation: The report describes local developments and accomplishments related to the mediation platform of the people’s courts (see the related white paper).
g. Serving national Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan policy
On the details of SPC and Greater Bay Area policy, please see my earlier blogpost and presentation at a November, 2022 conference held at the Law Faculty of the University of Hong Kong.
This blogpost summarized earlier developments related to Taiwan. The SPC issued judicial interpretations on the recognition and enforcement of Taiwan civil judgments and arbitration awards. The SPC mentioned that the courts have supported national policy on integrating Hong Kong and Macao into Greater Bay Area policy by supporting [Ministry of Justice led policy] to permit lawyers from Hong Kong and Macao to practice in the Greater Bay Area (note, such lawyers must be Chinese citizens). The courts are also supporting the initiatives related to integrating Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan legal professionals (again, foreign professionals registered in these jurisdictions are not included).
f. Improving the quality and credibility of China’s foreign-related adjudication
i. Jurisdiction: the report mentions a notice on jurisdiction on foreign-related cases (flagged in this blogpost) and centralized jurisdiction. ii. Service of process: The SPC amended the judicial interpretation of the Civil Procedure Law to enable more flexible service of process abroad and established a platform with the Ministry of Justice (discussed in this blogpost) to enable more efficient handling of service of process requests from abroad. (There is no mention of greater flexibility in foreign service of process into mainland China.) iii. Determination of foreign law: the SPC established a unified platform for the determination of foreign law (accessible through the CICC website, see the links above), which links to SPC-authorized institutions providing such services. My draft article provides additional details.
iv. Improving cross-border litigation services. This integrates with the SPC’s smart courts policy. One of the major accomplishments mentioned in the SPC’s judicial interpretation on cross-border online litigation. iv. Training foreign-related adjudication talents (涉外审判人才. See my earlier blogpost.
g. Promoting the development of the domestic and foreign-related legal systems
Matters so classified include: vigorously supporting the development of foreign-related legislation (mentioned in this blogpost); application of foreign-related law; and undertaking related research. The foreign-related legislation that the report mentions (Civil Procedure Law and several maritime-related laws), is actually only one small part of what the SPC has done. The application of foreign-related legislation gives the SPC an opportunity to reiterate its accomplishments in issuing judicial interpretations; policy documents; conference summaries; and typical cases. The SPC also mentions its BRI research center and establishing research centers at 15 universities and research institutions.
h. International judicial exchanges to promote the establishment of a community with a shared future of mankind
The SPC includes in this category the following: judicial exchanges in the form of memoranda of understanding and large-scale conferences; international judicial assistance in both civil and criminal matters; participation in the formulation of international rules (negotiating international conventions and bilateral treaties, as mentioned here, as well as providing support to China’s initiatives in various matters, including railway bills of lading (see my student Zhang Huiyu’s article); and “telling China’s rule of law story well.” The latter category includes certain conferences and meetings with foreign judiciaries. I have either been a participant or an observer in some of those “telling China’s rule of law story well” events, such as the CICC international conferences and the 2019 third meeting of the UK-China Joint Judicial Expert Working Group on Commercial Dispute Resolution.
4. Challenges in foreign-related work
The report listed the following challenges: a. Limited ability of some courts to engage in foreign-related adjudication work, as evidenced by the lack of experience of some courts in foreign-related work. When I spoke at a Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre event in October, 2022, my co-panelist Arthur Dong illustrated that with his accounts of how several local courts handled applications for interim measures. b. Ongoing difficult issues: difficulties in service of process, extraterritorial investigation and evidence collection; determining foreign (non-mainland Chinese) law; shortening the trial period for hearing foreign-related cases (also note that at least one CICC case has been outstanding for over two years). c. The “one-stop” diversified international commercial dispute resolution mechanism needs improving and China needs to accelerate the drafting of a commercial mediation law. The need for a commercial mediation law has been discussed within central institutions since at least 2019 (as I have observed). So it seems that the SPC is in line with the view of the Ministry of Commerce that such a law is needed to promote more professional mediation. d. A significant shortage in the number of judicial personnel with foreign-related expertise (discussed here).
5. Future developments
The report emphasized adhering to the leadership of the Party to ensure foreign-related adjudication is politically correct and in line with the deployment of the political leadership. The practical measures (directed towards the NPC Standing Committee) included:
Accelerating the process of amending the foreign-related part of the Civil Procedure Law (this has been accomplished). Incorporating the amendment of the Special Maritime Procedure Law into the [NPC’s] legislative plan; amend the NPC Standing Committee decision establishing the maritime courts, to give maritime courts in coastal cities jurisdiction over certain criminal cases (an issue under discussion since at least 2014);
improving certain matters related to the CICC to resolve certain “bottleneck” issues (unspecified).
At an appropriate time, drafting a commercial mediation law to provide a sufficient legal basis for China’s competitive position in international commercial dispute resolution;
Delegating authority to Guangdong and other courts that hear a large number of cases involving Hong Kong and Macau cases to simplify civil litigation procedures, such as proof concerning the identity of the party and authorization of its representative. (These issues are linked to the fact that China has not yet signed the Hague “Apostille Convention” (see my earlier blogpost) and has not yet created an analogous procedure for Hong Kong and Macau);
Improving training of foreign-related legal personnel through implementing an exchange policy with international institutions. As I have observed, much of the discussion of training foreign-related legal personnel has involved training in China, with minimal foreign involvement.
Concluding comment
As this report has illustrated, the SPC (and the court system) are taking an active part in the evolving project of creating a foreign-related legal system that better reflects both the demands of the political leadership and the practical needs of the users of the Chinese legal system. It should be clear from this analysis that China’s foreign-related rule of law is a work in progress involving a multitude of issues, and that the SPC has a multifaceted and crucial role in its creation.
By Susan Finder, drawing on research by Sun Dongyu (Christopher)
In October 2022, Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang delivered a report to the National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee on foreign-related adjudication work since the 18th Party Congress (党的十八大以来人民法院涉外审判工作情况) (Foreign-Related Adjudication Work Report). Under NPC legislation, this type of report is classified as a specialized report (专项报告). In the New Era, the SPC delivers such reports to the NPC Standing Committee annually. Han Xiaowu, the deputy head of the Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee of the NPC, in an article reviewing the supervisory powers of the NPC Standing Committee, described listening to and reviewing specialized reports as a significant means by which the NPC Standing Committee exercises its supervision authority over other institutions. The SPC has published a collection of these reports issued since the 18th Party Congress, pictured above.
This blogpost provides a dive into the law and practice of these specialized reports, focusing on reports prepared by the SPC. A subsequent post will focus on the content of the Foreign-Related Adjudication Work Report.
Specialized Reports & the Relationship between the NPC and SPC
Most people with basic knowledge about the operation of the Chinese legal system know that the SPC president delivers a report to the NPC annually, every spring. Less known is that the SPC president also gives specialized reports to the NPC Standing Committee, under the Law on Oversight by Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at Various Levels (People’s Congresses Oversight Law). According to the NPC Observer, that law is scheduled to be updated. The details of NPC Standing Committee supervision of the SPC through specialized reports provide one discrete example of how Party leadership of legal institutions is implemented in practice and the interrelationship among state legal institutions.
The People’s Congresses Oversight Law authorizes the NPC Standing Committee to supervise the SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), and the government in several ways, one of which is requiring these institutions to provide specialized reports, as set out in the NPC Standing Committee’s annual plan. Han Xiaowu described them as drawn up according to the work deployment of the Party Center ( 中央的工作部署). Articles 8 and 9 of the People’s Congresses’ Oversight Law provide some basic principles concerning the topics of those specialized reports. It is understood that early in the year, the NPC’s Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee communicates with the SPC (and analogously with the other institutions that the NPC Standing Committee supervises), to set the topic and timing of the specialized report. It is likely that the SPC’s General Office, which is responsible for inter-institutional liaison, is the entity within the SPC that works out the details with the NPC Standing Committee.
A quick search on Wechat reveals that foreign-related adjudication work was part of the overall supervision plan of the NPC Standing Committee in 2022. It meant that the NPC Standing Committee allocated significant time to investigating how Chinese courts hear foreign-related cases. Official reports on Wechat flag that senior NPC Standing leaders went to certain provinces to investigate how local courts heard foreign-related cases as well as understand local developments relating to juvenile procuratorial work. In the summer of 2022. Cao Jianming, vice chair of the NPC Standing Committee (and former senior SPC leader and procurator-general) visited Jiangsu and Guangdong in the summer of 2022, while Hao Mingjin visited Fujian. In each case, according to bureaucratic protocol, senior leaders of the SPC and SPP accompanied the NPC Standing Committee leaders, who in turn had senior NPC Standing Committee staff in attendance.
These visits (described as research/调研) were consolidated into a report provided to the SPC (non-public), as revealed by the Foreign-Related Adjudication Work Report. It also enabled the NPC Standing Committee leaders to monitor how well the SPC and SPP respectively supervise and guide the lower courts and procuratorates in their work, politically and substantively, monitor local developments and the interaction among local institutions. Cao Jianming told senior leaders in Jiangsu that they must adhere to the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, resolutely implement the decision-making and deployment of the Party Central Committee, the work deployment of the SPC and the requirements of the provincial party committee. Cao reiterated principles for which local court leaders need no reminders–that they must thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping’s thoughts on the rule of law, deeply understand the significance of foreign-related rule of law work, focus on researching new situations and new problems, improve systems and mechanisms, and continuously improve the level of foreign-related adjudication work.
The People’s Congresses Oversight Law provides further details concerning specialized reports. It requires the NPC Standing Committee to gather some questions to send to the SPC (or other institution providing a report), presumably intended to highlight issues that the NPC Standing Committee requires to be incorporated in the report. The procedure requires the SPC to send its draft report to the relevant specialized NPC committee 20 days before the formal report is delivered. Presumably, Han Xiaowu was involved in the review of the Foreign-Related Adjudication Work Report. If the SPC amends the draft report, it must be submitted to the NPC Standing Committee at least 10 days before that date, so the revised report can be distributed to the members. The head of the institution must deliver the report, which is discussed by members. The results of the discussions of the reports are forwarded to the SPC (or other reporting institutions), which must respond to them. The issues that the NPC Standing Committee raises with the institution providing the specialized report are made public in summary form. What is occasionally made public is the SPC (or other institution’s) response to the comments of NPC Standing Committee members. As I have not seen the SPC’s response to comments on last October’s report, I presume that the SPC has not yet finalized a response to the comments. Presumably, the #4 Civil Division would take the lead in drafting the response, which would be reviewed by the vice president in charge of that division, and likely by the SPC president. The NPC Observer discusses responses to reports in this blogpost.
Those who have been involved with the specialized report process explain that both institutions see benefits in the NPC Standing Committee requiring specialized reports of the SPC. The NPC Standing Committee sees it as an effective way of exercising its supervision (oversight) authority over the SPC, while the SPC sees it as an effective way to display its competence while providing a forum to raise issues that require the involvement of the NPC Standing Committee. It can also be said to be another way in which Party leadership of the courts (and other institutions) is indirectly implemented.
The specialized report procedure is a less understood way in which the NPC and its Standing Committee supervise (监督 oversees) the SPC and implement Party leadership, and provides an example of how the SPC is institutionally both more and less powerful than other apex courts.
Happy Year of the Rabbit to all followers and readers of this blog! As a few followers know, I moved recently. The disruption is the reason I haven’t posted in such a long time. Because of the move, some of my archives from my many years of researching the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), like Rip Van Winkle, have emerged from hibernation. They include:
the address and work number of a now-retired senior SPC judge. He will remain anonymous, as I am concerned there is no statute of limitations for minor violations of 外事纪律 (foreign affairs discipline) by receiving a foreigner in what he considered shabby premises, and being eminently hospitable. I have never had the chance to tell him that he is partly responsible for my interest in the SPC. I recall visiting him in his danwei-supplied housing (宿舍). He lived in a compound of one-story buildings (平房) next to the main SPC building. Thankfully, security was not as difficult as it would be now, and those buildings were demolished long ago. I recall riding my bicycle from Peking University into the one-story building compound to visit him. He must have recommended that I visit the shop of the People’s Court Press (人民法院出版社门市部) (now around the corner from the SPC main building on 正义路) and that simple recommendation was crucial. Among the books that I purchased during that initial visit were the first few volumes of 司法手册. These volumes, edited by the SPC’s Research Office, pre-dated court or other computer databases of legislation and documents. The assortment of SPC and related documents in those volumes led me down the rabbit hole of researching the SPC.
I fell down that rabbit hole in 1992 or 1993, when I pulled those volumes off my bookshelf and tried to make sense of them. At the time, I was focused on understanding how the SPC operated at the time(and did not read legal Chinese as quickly as I do now) and failed to read some of the historical documents included in those volumes. I can see now that these volumes contain documents issued by the SPC and Party institutions unavailable elsewhere, some relating to the Strike Hard Campaign (严打) of the early 1980’s, others relating to post-Cultural Revolution issues, others relating to divorce policy in the 1960’s, with still others linked to special regulations for foreign-related criminal cases.
Another book I came across was a 1993 volume edited by the editors of the SPC’s Gazette, containing typical cases (典型案例), judicial interpretations (司法解释),, and an assortment of SPC documents that the editors considered useful but were not published in the Gazette. The book was published before the SPC issued its rules on judicial interpretation work so some of the documents included in that volume would not be incorporated in an analogous volume today. When I wrote my first article on the SPC, this book was a crucial source for me. SPC typical cases themselves fill several volumes (I have multiple volumes of a 2009-2021 collection of typical cases published by the People’s Court Press).
I have a large collection of name cards given to me by people in the courts and other institutions, including a friend (now deceased) who was enormously helpful when researching my first SPC article. For some reason, I have a half dozen or more name cards from members of the staff of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. At the time (early 1990’s), I took easy access to people in Party and state institutions for granted and never expected that 30 years later, it would be more rather than less challenging to meet them.
Among the items in my archives are notebooks, with questions that I prepared 30 years ago, to ask a small circle of friends linked to the courts, most as relevant now as then:
What does a 庭长 (division head) do?
What does the Research Office (研究室)do?
Interpretations, litigation, legislation [drafting of judicial interpretations and court rules], administration–which constitutes the bulk of the work of the SPC?
What are opinions (意见)?
Are conference summaries (会议纪要) considered to be interpretations by the courts?
SPC list of winners of the Ram City Cup for judicial reform essays
This post is a lengthy summary/incomplete translation of an article entitled 省级统管后法院经费保障机制再造 (Reconstruction of the Court’s Funding Guarantee Mechanism after Provincial Administration)by Fan Lisi (范丽思), a judge of the Wuhou People’s Court, Chengdu, Sichuan Province. Judge Fan was one of the first prize winners in the 2020 “Ram City Cup” competition for articles on judicial reform, administered by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s judicial reform office. People’s Justice (人民司法) published her article in 2021. Many thanks to Guo Ran, a current Tufts student, and Tina Chen ( 陈雨茗), an Oxford undergraduate for assisting with the translation/summary. I have included some explanations in square brackets []. I have omitted most of the charts/graphics. I welcome corrections to the summary/abridged translation and comments.
Based on her review of data from multiple provinces/directly administered cities, the author shows that the reform of funding the courts at the provincial level (cited as one of the successes of the judicial reforms in several English language academic articles) has been a failure. The reforms make the local courts even more dependent on local financing. She explains why that happened.
I surmise that 2022 will be an even more challenging year for court budgets in many areas, as provincial/local budgets are under greater stress because of testing for Covid-19, decreased income from land sales, and less tax revenue because of lockdown-related downturns in business activity.
She looks at other court financing models abroad and discusses a topic I have rarely seen mentioned in the academic literature about the Chinese courts (certainly in English–I don’t claim to be as familiar with the Chinese academic literature)–separating the judicial and administrative functions. I have had discussions with several persons previously affiliated with the SPC on this issue. She proposes that the SPC establish a finance committee and that local courts establish counterpart institutions. Drawing on her research on Chinese court funding and that of other jurisdictions, she proposes a new model. I cannot claim any expertise on this and will not comment on the practicability of her proposal.
Introduction
The role of the people’s courts in national governance has changed. Judicial authority has transformed into a central power from a local power [司法事权属性已由地方事权转变为中央事权]. The transformation of the courts’ functions requires a mechanism for guaranteeing funding that matches the operation of judicial power. The provincial unified administration reform in 2014 saw the beginning of the current funding guarantee mechanism reform. [This reform was part of the 4th Five-Year Judicial Reform Plan]. But after five years of pilot practice, the provincial unified administration has not achieved its established goals of “de-localization,” “de-administratization” [去行政化] and “balanced judicial supply power (均衡司法供给力).” It is necessary to reflect on the reasons for the failure of the provincial unified management reform, clarify the theoretical components [应然内涵] of the court funding guarantee mechanism, identify the situational variables affecting the choice of reform tools, and “reload “the reform toolbox. Based on provincial unified management, China should build a court funding guarantee mechanism that follows judicial principles [规律] and financial management principles, so as to effectively solve the problem of financial resources for the operation of the judiciary and assist in constructing modern social governance in China based on the rule of law.
Number
Problems that the Reform aimed to resolve
Solution provided by the Reform
Underlying judicial value
1
Who is paying (the money)?
The source of funding is raised to the provincial level of administration, altering from local finance departments to provincial finance departments.
To allow the courts to gain independence economically from local governments, removing localized variants and guarantee judicial independence.
2
Who is responsible for the distribution and management of the money?
The main body of funding is raised to the provincial level. Funding used to be distributed and managed by local financial departments is now subject to provincial financial departments.
To eliminate regional differences within the same province, and to realize the standardization of judicial services through standardizing financing capacity of the courts.
3
How is the total amount of funding determined?
Fixed-base budget: The reform uses the total amount of funds before as the “base;” the base will only be raised but not reduced.
Institutionally secure the “guaranteed amount” of legal funding, overcome the problem of arbitrariness in determining the total amount of funding in the previous years, and establish a benign dynamic growth mechanism of funding
4
To whom is the power of reviewing budgets vested in:
Governmental budgeting department with limited power to review: provincial finance departments delegate the power to conduct initial review of budgets to provincial courts. They will then sum up the subordinate courts’ budgets and conduct initial review of their reasonableness and compliance. Then the provincial finance department will submit them among other departmental budgets to the provincial People’s Congress.
Develop the court’s function of funding management, make use of the higher court’s knowledge of the lower courts, and enable the higher courts to fully participate in the lower courts’ budget filing, review, and coordination processes
I. Benchmarking review: Evaluating the practical effectiveness of provincial unified management
The provincial unified management of court funding attempts to centralize the administration of court funding at the provincial level. Cout funding was previously an obligation of local government on the same administrative level as the local court. The reform aims to break the previous local court fund management pattern, reshaping the relationship between courts, administrative agencies, and Party and government agencies, which has had an impact on the autonomy and fairness of the local courts.
To analyze the success of this reform, the author selected the 2019 and 2020 budget and final accounts data of 1,535 basic-level courts (data from 14 provincial-level jurisdictions: Tianjin, Jiangsu, Guangxi, Hunan, Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, Guizhou, Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanghai, Guangdong, Beijing, Shanxi, Yunnan. She reviewed the following data:
basic-level court department’s budget,
final accounts public statement, and
people’s courts’ financial statistics analysis system
and analyzed key indicators such as :
source of funding,
average cost of each case
average public expenditure per case, and t
growth rate of case-handling operational funds, etc.
A. The reform has not eliminated local court dependence on government at the same level
The study presented the following findings:
(1) Shifting the source of court funding has not completely freed the local courts from depending on local governments.
The current judicial reform centered on withdrawing court funding from the government-led horizontal model of bureaucracy and removing the function of allocating or transferring funds from governments on the same administrative level through institutional reforms, which in turn removes the possibility of the judiciaries colluding with governments on the same administrative level to solicit funding. After the transformation into provincial unified management, the judiciaries’ funding will mainly be composed of provincial finance; governments on the same administrative level will cease to allocate funds to the judiciary.
By examining the funding income structure of the sample courts in 2020, the study found that, out of 741 courts that have been reformed, 249 still relied on funding from governments on the same administrative level, which comprised 43.22% of the courts’ total funding.
In the case of some local courts in Shanxi and Hebei province, the percentage could even reach 87%. Funding from government on the same administrative level compensates for the lack of funding for:
labor costs;
office administration;
facilities procurement; and
general maintenance,
Labor costs are the largest proportion, at 63.05%.
From the above data, it is clear that nearly 33.6% of local courts have not yet completely detached from local governments financially, even after the reform.
B. Raising the funding guarantee to the provincial level has not significantly improved unequal financial supply capacity
Balanced judicial finance is the necessary condition for standardized judicial services. One of the objectives of the provincial unified management reform was to ensure that the public has equal access to judicial services of equivalent quality and quantity within a province, by arranging courts’ funds on a provincial level.
The equalization of financing provision capacity is a sensitive indicator. In order to obtain a concrete observation of this indicator, the author has selected “public expenditure per case” and “cost per case” to reflect, respectively, the ability to finance “administrative affairs” and “enforcement of courts’ decision”….
Suppose we reflect on the tools adopted by the provincial unified management plan. In that case, we could explore the problems in tool selection and application with the existing reform and establish useful precedents for a new funding guarantee mechanism.
C. The policy requirement of a guaranteed minimum funding does not necessarily produce a sustainable dynamic increase in the courts’ funds.
In “Framework Opinions on Several Issues of Judicial System Reform Pilot” (referred to as “Framework Opinions”) issued by the Central Leadership in 2014, it was stated that after the implementation of the provincial unified management reform the total amount of funding must not decrease, however, this minimum requirement does not suggest a sustainable increase in funding. Among the sample courts, 711 courts experienced growth in the number of cases heard in 2018.
Through comparing and analyzing the growth rate of cases heard and the growth of overall funding in handling cases, it was found that in 66.67% of the courts the growth rate of overall case funding was lower than the growth rate of cases heard; among them, 55.13% of the courts even had a decrease in case funding when the number of cases heard had increased; the courts that been reformed had a comparative advantage in terms of the increase of funding in cases. Among the 237 courts that saw equivalent or higher growth in case funding than cases heard, there was almost a fifty-fifty division between reformed and unreformed courts. (See the figure below)
D. The power of provincial courts to manage funds continues to be marginalized.
Under the institutional framework of “One Government, One Committee and Two Courts”, [government, the supervision commission, the courts and procuratorate] judicial independence manifests in the division of labor rather than independent authority from the government.
However, a mode of leading and being led, managing and being managed is formed between the local courts and government on the same administrative level, through the mediation of the fiscal relationship. The provincial unified management reform hopes to rebalance the power constraints between the provincial court and governmental departments, through the practice of restoring an interactive relationship between the courts and government, by developing the courts’ own financial management capacity and transferring the power to manage funds from government to the courts.
But the four management models developed in the process of promoting the reform have been found to be problematic in their own respects: the direct management model (adopted by 57.15% of the reformed courts) tends to marginalize the managing power of provincial courts, and local courts will communicate directly with provincial fiscal departments; in the assisted-management model (adopted by 38.1% of the reformed courts), although the provincial courts are involved in the management process, their role is reduced to that of a megaphone, with no substantial power of their own; the model of entrusting municipal management of court funds does not achieve the reform objective of transferring the fund management power to the provincial courts; the trusteeship model, in which the provincial treasury delegates the daily management of funds to the provincial courts, is only an expedient measure to fill up the absence of the provincial government’s financial management capacity. It is also worth noting that only one province has adopted this model.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the provincial courts have not taken up the power of allocating funds as the reform expected, and have again ended up being marginalized in fund management.
II. real-world problems: dissecting the failure of provincial management reforms
Reason 1: lack of capacity to financially supply at the provincial level inhibits the local courts from becoming financially independent from local governments
The ideal plan, according to the provincial unified management reform is that the local courts should be funded only by the provincial treasury. This is a completely novel expenditure for the provincial budget and can only be financed through increased provincial revenue. However, a comparative analysis of the increase in the courts’ budget against the incremental revenue increase at the provincial level suggests that almost all provincial-level finances are unable to satisfy such a large increase in funding demand: Tianjin, Guizhou, Beijing, and 10 other regions have experienced a reduction in provincial-level revenues compared to the previous year, and it is simply impossible to spare funding for local courts when existing provincial needs remain difficult to satisfy.
Jiangxi, Yunnan, and Guangdong Province have less than 1.8 billion Yuan of increase in revenue to finance their own budgets, which is far less than the funding needs of local and provincial courts. Even in economically developed regions such as Shanghai and Beijing, budgets were further contracted compared to the previous year, with arranged courts’ budget revenue accounting for less than 2% of the provincial budget. The same lack of financial supply capacity can be observed. (See Table 2)
The lack of financial supply capacity on the provincial level has forced the courts to continue fundraising with the local governments. In the process of fundraising, the local courts will now have to communicate on the one hand with the provincial finance department for more funding, and on the other hand with the local government to compensate for the lack. Having to communicate simultaneously on two administrative levels increases the costs of fundraising for the courts. A further difficulty since the reform lies in the fact that, facing the funding applications from the local courts, the local government can decline their requests using the reform as a legitimate excuse, by saying that the courts have now “completed the provincial unified management reform”, increasing difficulties in fundraising, and potentially deepening local courts’ dependence on local governments.
Reason 2:
The reform asked for formal unified management on the provincial level, while failing to bring about substantial unity in expenses, resulting in the continued imbalance of financial supply capacity within provinces. Firstly, provincial unified management suggests standardization, however, in reality, local standard in labor and public funds still persists, while the funding for case-handling remains insufficiently supplemented. Secondly, the reform also demands unity in expenses, i.e. the amount of funding from provincial expenditure to the local courts should be standardized. But the reality is that the provincial finance department simply required local governments to report the total funding allocated to local courts before the reform, and use this figure as a criterion to budget for local courts for the year. Some provinces with limited capacity to guarantee funding even require the local finance departments to transfer this amount upward, before the provincial finance department then transfers the funding to the courts, so as to achieve formal unified management. Provincial finances in this process did not take effective means to coordinate and adjust the funding budgets to balance the substantial expenditure, and the status quo of having huge gaps in financial capacity among the courts within provinces has not been significantly improved.
Reason 3:
There is a tension between the self-expansionary nature of court funding and the principle of necessity, which prevented court funding from increasing alongside the expansion in courts’ capacity to handle cases. The idea of public finance in principal-agent theory conceptualizes the government as a “trust fund” established to serve the public interest of society, whilst recognizing that the government’s natural tendency of self-expansion may create excessive demand for financial power. Therefore, in order to curb the government’s urge to abuse public finance, budgeting should follow the principle of necessity.
The courts, however, while budgeting for their own expenditures, tend to be self-expansionary: justice is the highest normative value of judicial activities; when justice and economic efficiency are in tension, cost-effectiveness has to come second. Fair and just judicial activities must be backed up by adequate and stable financial resources. However, when reviewing court budgets, finance departments usually follow the principle of necessity and reject the demands to increase budgets alongside the expansion of judicial activities, while the courts themselves have no effective means to reject this practice.
Reason 4: The absence of legislation and policies leads to the lack of legitimacy in the expansion of courts’ power to manage funds
It was clearly stated in “Framework Opinions” that it aims at “the establishment of a provincial unified management mechanism”, i.e. the department responsible for managing courts’ funding is the provincial finance department. The revised budget law in 2018 defines the budget as “public actions involving revenue and expenditure”. The statute did not specify for the normative standard of judicial actions involving revenue and expenditure, which suggests that the state has recognized, on a legislative and policy level, the subordinate status of the court budget in relation to the total public budget. The relationship between the finance department and the courts constitutes a de facto managing-and-managed relationship. Although having provincial courts participating in the management of funds allows for the decision-makers to make informed decisions, the whole process is made difficult due to the lack of legitimacy in the expansion of power.
III. Theoretical reflection on the reform’s “toolbox”
A. The normative components and theoretical toolbox of the court funding guarantee mechanism
Before introducing a theory to transform the court funding guarantee mechanism, it is necessary to clarify its normative outlook. The author examined changes in the PRC’s court funding guarantee system since 1949 and its counterparts in Japan, the U.K., and the United States. She concluded that the court funding guarantee mechanism must determine four core issues in varying political and economic environments: the source of funding, the court funding administrator, the method of ascertaining court budgets, and the authority to review court budgets.
1. The source of funding, or who pays the money
Judicial services maintain social order and justice through the resolution of specific disputes. It is both a private product that protects the legal interests of individuals and a public product that provides legal services to the state. Therefore, when ascertaining the source of funding, there are two available sources, namely, the state and the litigating parties. In cases where the state provides court funding, two sources are available–central government finance and local government finance–depending on the financial condition of each government.
Due to the centralized nature of unitary states, central government finance tends to be the funding provider in unitary states such as Japan and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the federal countries tend to fund the court through local government finance. For example, the U.S. state courts are financed by state funds. Some other courts are also funded by the litigating parties. The British civil courts, for example, are funded by the case acceptance fee. Although China is a unitary state, Chinese local courts have historically been funded by local government finance because of the country’s vast territory, significant regional differences, and limited central financial resources.
2. The court funding administrator, or who manages and distributes funding
Generally speaking, whoever pays for the funds naturally controls the allocation and management of the funds, so the funding provider is usually the guarantor of court funding. The central government finance is guaranteed by the central government, and the local government finance is guaranteed by local governments. This one-to-one correspondence is particularly prominent during the historical variations of China’s court funding mechanism.
To prevent undue government interference in judicial fairness, many countries have enacted laws or other institutional arrangements that grant the court funding administrator a high degree of independence from the government that provides court funding. For example, in Japan, the Supreme Court is mainly responsible for funding management; the United Kingdom and the United States have set up an independent judicial administrative department for this purpose. Depending on the funding provider and its dynamic interaction with the court, the author identified four main administrators of court funding–the central government, the local government, the Department of Judicial Administration, and the courts.
3. The method of ascertaining court budgets, or how to determine the total amount of funding
Figuring out the quantity of budgetary funds helps the judiciary to secure the resources necessary for it. To ascertain court budgets, there are three methods to choose from: “fixed amount method”, “fixed percentage method”, and “incremental budget increase method”. The four periods of China’s funding guarantee model all rely on the fixed amount method or its modifications, as it is operationally the easiest; the fixed percentage method is more often used in Latin American countries. However, it is not accepted by the mainstream because one cannot quantitatively test and justify the set percentage; the incremental budget increase method, which is the most responsive to the needs of the courts, is used in the United States and the United Kingdom.
4. The authority to review court budgets, or who has the power to review and revise the court budget during budget declaration and approval
Depending on the level of detail that the executive branch reviews court budgets, there are three types of budget review authority: “government departmental review”, “independent review”, and “government departmental review with limited power”. In the government departmental review model, the court budget is a sub-system of the government budget. The government finance department has the strongest scrutiny and involvement in the courts’ budget. In the independent review model, the courts are relatively independent, and the finance department has the weakest scrutiny of the court budgets. The court budget is filed, reviewed, and revised within the court system or by an independent judicial funding management authority. The government has no substantive right to review or revise the court budgets. In the “government departmental review with limited power” model, the court has a say and could participate in the budget review process, but the ultimate review power still lies within the finance department. The model is a compromise between the first two models, but is essentially more inclined to the government departmental review model.
Summary: By comparing the application of the four major types of guarantee tools during various reform periods and in different political entities, the author concluded that the choice of reform tools in the “toolbox” is closely related to the national financial situation, political institutions and the role and function of judicial power in society. The reform plan of court funding guarantee should fully consider the influence of situational variables including political, economic and judicial power. It should also accurately identify the role and function of courts in the national governance structure. To fill the reform “toolbox,” it should choose the appropriate combination of the above 13 tools.
B. Reflections on the problems with the existing reform
Having clarified the reform’s normative outlook and theoretical toolbox, it is necessary to reflect on the tools adopted by the provincial unified management plan. In this way, we could explore the problems in tool selection and application with the existing reform and set up useful precedents for a new funding guarantee mechanism.
1. Confusions in tool selection: the unclear boundary between judicial authority and administrative authority in the judiciary
The unclear boundary between judicial authority and administrative authority in the judiciary has led to the inappropriate mixing of reform tools for judicial funding and judicial administrative funding. Judicial authority refers to the court’s authority to try and legal supervision on behalf of the state, while the administrative authority in the judiciary refers to the power to manage personnel, property, technical equipment and other administrative affairs of the judiciary for the purpose of supporting judicial authority.
The two kinds of authority are essentially different in forms, functions, and substantive contents. The operation of judicial authority should follow the judicial principles and stress judicial independence; the administrative authority in the judiciary should follow administrative principles and stress subordination within the administrative hierarchy. However, in the provincial unified management reform, the two authorities have been confused as the same court functions. The funds for case handling and court facilities, which represent the operating costs of judicial power, and the personnel and public expenditure funds, which represent the operating costs of administrative affairs, are placed in the same guarantee model. The choice of various reform tools has failed to differentiate between the operation of the two powers.
2. Reflection on the choice of tools: the court’s role and function remain unclear, resulting in the deviation of tool choices from the reform’s values
Historical changes in the court’s funding mechanism have shown a continued evolution of the court’s functions. The court’s role in society and the state determines the Party’s policy arrangement of court funding: if the court serves to resolve specific cases and disputes within its jurisdiction, then the court exercises local affairs; as the judicial responsibility should match with the court’s power of finance, the court should be financed by local government. If the court serves to promote the rule of law in social governance at the national level, then the court should be financed by the central government.
Since the founding of the PRC, the court’s role has shifted from a means to an end to an end in itself; from “a political means to realize revolutionary goals” to “a manifestation of value in improving the political system.” The court’s function has been elevated to the level of “providing the foundation of the rule of law for national development.
Accordingly, the court should be funded by the central government. The provincial unified management plan has been aware of the public service provision function of judicial products. It has also established values such as“de-localization” and “ameliorating the regional divergence in financial supply capability.” Nevertheless, since it still viewed the court’s main role as the settler of specific disputes, the source, and management of court funding remained on a provincial level after the reform, which partially contradicted the reform’s goal of de-localization.
3. Reflection on the application of tools: the insufficiency of financial resources hindered the intended application of tools
The foremost issue of funding reform is to figure out “where the money comes from.” As the leading reformer, the court did not control economic resources. Therefore, when faced with significant financial supply shortages on a provincial level, the reformers sought to avoid the risk of failed reforms. They came up with a compromised but effective method: the courts on each administrative level cooperated with local finances to determine a base amount of funding, which must be no less than the pre-reform amount. The local governments on the same administrative level would then transfer the funding to the provincial treasury, which would then distribute funding to local courts through transfer payments.
This process formally satisfies the requirements of provincial unified management and that the court funding remains no less that the current level. It also seems to push forward the reform. However, the local governments on the same administrative level remained deftly as the actual source of funding. The provincial courts were deprived of the possibility to coordinate the arrangement of provincial funds. The end result of the reform completely deviated from its original intention of shifting the main body of funding guarantee up to the provincial level.
4. Reflection on the implementation of tools: insufficient political resources leads to the lack of internal motivation to enact and push forward the reform tools
The court funding guarantee mechanism reform seems to be a reform within the judiciary. However, because China’s court funding system is decentralized and deeply intertwined with politics, the reform would not only involve a reconfiguration of legal institutions and their respective functions. It would also require adjustments to China’s contemporary legal principles. In practice, both the local financial departments and the provincial financial departments held a passively cooperative attitude toward the reform initiatives, resulting in the initiatives’ weak implementation nationwide compared with other reforms of the judicial system.
The court funding guarantee mechanism reform seems to be a reform within the judiciary. However, because China’s court funding system is decentralized and deeply intertwined with politics, the reform would not only involve a reconfiguration of legal institutions and their respective functions. It would also require adjustments to China’s contemporary legal principles. In practice, both the local financial departments and the provincial financial departments held a passively cooperative attitude toward the reform initiatives, resulting in the initiatives’ weak implementation nationwide compared with other reforms of the judicial system.
IV. Tool Re-selection: the remaking of the court guarantee mechanism around “separation of the judicial and administrative authorities”
Having reflected on the reform toolbox, the author concluded that the new funding guarantee mechanism should abide by the principle of “separation of the judicial and administrative authorities.” Accordingly, it should apply different funding guarantee mechanisms for judicial and administrative fundings in the judiciary. It should also re-select the source of funding, the funding guarantee administrator, and the reviewer of judicial funding budgets. The reform should also establish a dynamic growth mechanism for court funding centered on the average cost per case.
A. A general change of plan: from single-center provincial unified management to a unified management model based on the judicial-administrative separation
Xi Jinping pointed out that “the judicial power is fundamentally a central governmental affair.” According to the principle that the administrative power should match with the financial expediture responsibility [根据事权与财政支出责任匹配的原则], the main body in charge of judicial expenditure should be the central government. The judicial funding should thus be included in the central government budget and managed by the central government management mechanism yet to be established.
On the other hand, as the judicial administration includes judicial personnel, property, legal infrastructure construction and maintenance, and party and political-administrative affairs, it manifests interactions between the local courts and governments. Compared with judicial power, judicial administrative power demonstrates a clear local feature. Therefore, it should continue with the provincial unified management model, with its funding mainly provided by provincial finance and supplemented by the transfer payment from a national and provincial level.
B. Changing the source of judicial funding: establishing a special fund for judicial activities to guarantee stable funding
The central government finance should collect the litigation fee revenue from all courts nationwide and set up a special fund for judicial expense for case-handling. It should also establish five basic rules to fully implement the “separation of revenue and expenditure” requirement – unified revenue collection and expenditure, earmarking, limitation on carryover and balance surplus, managing surplus/shortage, and auditing and supervision – which would, in principle, prohibit mixing judicial funds with administrative funds. In this way, it provides a stable source of revenue for the central finance to guarantee court case-handling expenditure:
Firstly, litigation fees are capital costs charged by the courts in providing judicial products and services to the litigating parties. Its main purpose is to compensate for the material costs of service provision. Therefore, the use of litigation fee revenue to compensate for the cost of case-handling is justified and reasonable. Secondly, the analysis of the sample courts’ financial data shows that the total litigation fee revenue in 2019 was 27,830 billion Yuan, and the total expenditure on case handling and equipment was 22.266 billion yuan. The litigation fees exceed the court’s case-handling expenditure by 0.25 times, so it is realistic to compensate the case-handling cost with the litigation fee revenue.
In addition, it is necessary to clarify that the use of litigation fee income as a source of financial guarantee for central finance does not violate the principle of “separation of revenue and expediture.” Nor does it mean a rollback to the “revenue generation era” at the cost of litigating parties.
Although the litigation fee is collected by the court, it goes directly into the central treasury. The central treasury is responsible for both the management and expediture of litigation fees after collection, not the courts themselves. This solution is thus in line with the principle of “separation of revenue and expenditure.”
Additionally, through reasonable institutional arrangements, the funding distribution is not linked to the local courts’ amounts of litigation fee revenue. The courts at all levels thus lose the original motive to increase allocated funds by generating more litigation fee revenues.
C. Reforming the court funding administrator: setting up an independent professional institution responsible for the management and allocation of funds.
The Supreme People’s Court should set up a judicial fund management committee. The committee should consist of professionals in charge of managing the judicial funds, which should include financial budget management experts, personnel assigned by the Ministry of Finance, and audit experts.
Specifically, the committee should: communicate on behalf of the Supreme People’s Court with the central finance department and the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee; collaborate with the Ministry of Finance to design a set of regulations on judicial fund management and budget filing; be responsible for the budget collection and review of lower courts; be responsible for the budget declaration and responding the questioning of higher administrative institutions; assume internal supervision responsibilities; establish a special inspection system that regularly monitors the exercise of judicial funding.
The provincial courts should set up funding management committees that consist of budgeting, auditing, accounting and other professionals as well as the personnel appointed from the provincial finance departments. The committee should be specifically responsible for communicating with the funding management committee of the Supreme People’s Court, managing and allocating the judicial funds below the provincial level, communicating with the provincial finances, and managing and allocating the judicial administrative funds below the provincial level.
D. Changing the method of determining judicial funding budget: establishing a dynamic budget adjustment mechanism around the average cost per case.
The early stage of the reform: the average cost per case varies from place to place; some courts’ case-handling expenses are intertwined with public expediture of varying amounts; the court financial personnel varies in their professionality; and some financial data lack credibility. To solve the problems, the total amount of funding can be temporarily determined as the sum of the previous year’s case-handling and equipment expenses. The funding can float with the growth or decline in the number of cases handled in the next years.
Trial run phase: Strictly enforce the absolute one-way barrier [单向绝对壁垒] between judicial and administrative funding; constructing IT infrastructure [信息化建设] under the supervision of the Supreme People’s Court, so that the quality control of data information could improve.
Formal operation phase: After 3 to 5 years trial run, the judicial funding should have basically eliminated administrative funding, and the quality of data should have been effectively guaranteed. Then, the government would collect historical funding statistics and local development indicators and determine key elements such as “the average cost per case,” “the proportion of case categories,” “case growth expectation,” and “local economic development indicators.” In this way, the government could construct a system of indicators and a dynamic funding adjustment mechanism around the average cost per case.
E. Inheriting and improving the budgetary framework [预算权归属工作]: establishing a judicial budget system led by the judicial fund management committee.
As a legal basis to modify the court budget status in the existing budgetary model is lacking, the court funding reform must be restrained by the governmental sector budget model. Both judicial and administrative funding should also follow the basic principles in the current budget law. However, the Supreme People’s Court judicial funding management committee and provincial court judicial funding management committees could participate in the design, review, and auditing of budget rules. The committees could set up institutional arrangements such as restricting the finance departments’ right to delete or edit court budgets during the review process. In this way, it could effectively exclude undue interference from the administrative branch.
Conclusion
The funding guarantee proposal based on “the separation of judicial and administrative funding” is a problem-oriented one. It also reflects the strategies adopted by the provincial unified management reform. By transferring the litigation fee to the newly established judicial funds in the central government, the proposal could provide sufficient and stable financial resources for the centralized provision of judicial funding; by decoupling judicial funding from provincial finance, the proposal could reduce the provincial financial burden and effectively alleviate funding shortages; by establishing a dynamic adjustment mechanism for judicial funding, which centers around the average cost per case, the proposal could effectively balance the judicial financial supply capacity nationwide; by establishing judicial funding management committees and other professional organizations to participate in the funding management, the proposal could provide an institutional basis for empowering the courts. The funding guarantee model attempts to solve various problems faced by the current reform from the real-world application perspective and thus has a strong practical value.
By (袁野) Yuan Ye, 4L student, Peking University School of Transnational Law, edited by Susan Finder
As a JD/JM student at the School of Transnational Law (STL) of Peking University, and an LLB student at Xiamen University School of Law, I have had the opportunity to intern in courts at three of the four levels of the Chinese courts in three different cities. One of the tasks that I have often undertaken for the judge to whom I was assigned is searching for similar cases. Most often, my work was first submitted to the judge’s assistant, who thoroughly reviewed my work before he (or more often she) forwarded it to the judge. Similar case search is required by applicable legislation and SPC policy. The search and application of similar cases(“类案”) are now required to ensure the “uniform and proper implementation of laws” during the case hearing (adjudication) process (审判过程) in Chinese courts. ”) Under that cited guidance, the SPC defines the “unified application of the law” to include “various work for promoting the unified and correct application of the law, such as drafting and enacting judicial interpretations and other normative documents, releasing [typical and guiding] cases, implementing a retrieval system for similar cases, and holding professional judges meetings to discuss cases.”
My description of a typical search, research, discussion, and application of similar cases is based on my own experience and that of some of my STL classmates.
I. The (re)search of similar cases
A. Why (re)search similar cases?
During my internship at the Third (#3) Circuit Court of the SPC in 2018, the search of similar cases, at least in my observation, had not yet become required by SPC regulations. [Note that the editor had mentioned that SPC judges (and their assistants) were searching for similar cases in her 2017 article in the Tsinghua China Law Review.] However, some judges and judge assistants, whom I discovered were much more professional than I thought, had already (re)searched and applied analogous “similar” cases to cases under consideration.
For example, in a review report (“审查报告”) [explained in the linked article] of a complicated retrial case handled by my trial team, the judge’s assistant cited several cases that raised the same issues as authority to support her proposed holding. One case that she cited was decided by the 1st Circuit Court, which is opposite to the assistant’s position; and others were from High Courts, supporting her position. The assistant also analyzed in detail the reasoning behind the 1st Circuit case and refuted it, point by point. The whole process of applying “similar cases” was very thorough and professional.
Another good example was that in dealing with a cutting-edge case, a judge in charge (承办法官) asked all interns in the court to search for similar cases from the United States, because he knew, as an SPC judge, that there was no precedent for reference in China. The SPC regulation requiring a search of similar cases was not published until 2020, so why, in 2018, had the judge and his assistant started the search and application of similar cases—even US cases? In my mind, the motivations were quite simple and straightforward: they knew case law is practically useful and even indispensable in adjudication. (The fiduciary duty of asset managers provides a good example.)
Also, an SPC judge and judge’s assistant enjoy a great deal of freedom and discretionary power in deciding cases, so they felt comfortable applying case law in their work. At that time, the ordinary legal community (law schools and students, lawyers, scholars, etc.) was still unfamiliar with case law, not to mention (re)search and use of cases in legal education and research. [Note that in 2016, the editor wrote that lawyers and some judges used case law.] So, when I read that review report, I felt it a great pity, thinking how wonderful it would be if such an excellent application of case law could appear in the final judgment. Because it was the SPC, its judgment applying similar cases would be a good example and strong signal for the legal community: it is time to use case law.
In 2019, during a talk with an SPC judge in the 3rd Circuit, I heard that a leader in SPC, who was a vice president of the 3rd Circuit, required that all judges and their assistants attach a list of similar cases at the end of their retrial review report, to show the results of their case search. I think it is a good illustration of how certain SPC regulations come into being: first some judges engaged in a practice, then more judges joined and created a consensus, and finally leaders approved and made it a formal rule. I believe this is how (re)search of similar cases become a legally required obligation.
As of now, searching for similar cases has become a legal obligation and the scope of cases requiring the search is nearly unlimited. In practice. Few will question the necessity and legality of case research. In other words, as long as making a judgment of the case requires something more than a direct application of statutes, the research of similar cases is then a necessity of legal research rather than a simple internal procedural requirement. Such awareness has become a consensus of many judges and judge’s assistants in Chinese courts, especially those working in developed cities.
B. What is a similar case?
According to Article 4 of Guiding Opinions on Unifying the Application of Laws to Strengthen the Retrieval of Similar Cases published by the SPC in 2020, 7 sets of cases can be searched and used: guiding cases, typical/model cases issued by the SPC, other SPC cases, reference cases issued by High Courts, other High Courts cases, any cases from higher courts and previous cases decided by the court in question[1] These cases form a pyramid of guiding effect, with the Guiding Cases that all courts must follow at the top, and previous cases of a local court at the bottom. It can be derived from this article that, two types of logic apply to the pyramid: one is the logic of administrative levels, from the SPC to district courts; the second is time: cases from more than three years ago are less worth reviewing.
The practice I experienced was similar to the rules encapsulated in Article 4. When searching cases, it is rare to find a similar Guiding Case because there are only 173 Guiding Cases, as of the end of 2021. Then other SPC cases are always first searched. If none are found, people would turn to higher people’s court cases. The search for cases from Intermediate Court or even District Courts is only persuasive when the court is of the same level or lower level. For example, during my internship in the Shenzhen Futian District Court, I felt comfortable looking at cases decided by Shenzhen Nanshan District Court. I would be much less confident to do so if I were in the 3rd Circuit.
Under Article 4, almost all cases judged by Chinese courts may be regarded as “similar” cases, as long as they are “similar” to the one at hand. How should similarity be determined? The legal definition is far from clear.[2] Based on my experience, the similarities can be reflected by a wide variety of factors, including:
The same or similar factual factors. E.g., parties involved, type of transaction, markets, and regulations under which the transactions occurred
The same or similar legal issues. The analogy may be based not only on specific legal reasoning but more often on the applicable legal theory under the Chinese civil law system. For example, a commissioning contract (“委托合同”) is a type of typical statutory contract under the Chinese Civil Code.[3] The search of similar cases to determine the duties of the commissioned party when managing the commissioning party’s assets is conducted under the category of commissioning contract, although the legal reasoning behind is probably fiduciary duty under trust law.
The same or similar procedural factors, such as the same courts, higher courts of this court, courts in the same position, or similar cities (such as the comparison of cases between Beijing Financial Court and Shanghai Financial Court).
I believe that leaving the definition of similarity vague is actually a good choice for Chinese courts to apply similar cases. Not all judges, especially those from lower courts, are familiar with the process of case analogy or distinguishing one case from another. Given this situation, leaving the discretionary power to determine whether a case is similar to the one under consideration would lower the barriers to applying case law.
C. How to (re)search similar cases
The judge in charge of handling the case is called the “承办人”, who bears the legal obligation to search similar cases.[4] But in practice, the search is conducted by the judge’s assistant. If the judge’s assistant has a law student intern, typically, the intern will first do the search for similar cases to consider how best to decide the legal issues that are disputed in the case.
The China Judgments Online (www.wenshu.court.gov.cn) is the recommended database for similar case search, but no one would really care or question which database a similar case comes from. Different people may use different databases. For me, I used China Judgments Online in the 3rd Circuit Court of the SPC most. But later, the connection to this website has gradually become unstable, so I turned to the commercial databases Wolters Kluwer and Beida Fabao (“北大法宝”). To check the original version of a case, I searched China Judgments Online because it is the only official database published by the SPC, from which all other databases crawl data.
The SPC also required that “courts at all levels” increase the efficiency of case search by using AI technology[5] and “all high people’s courts shall…establish a trial case database”[6] Under the ideal scenario, the AI system will “push” similar cases to the judge (assistant) handling the case. For example, Shanghai courts have adopted a “Shanghai court data system for trial assistance” and which has become “a necessary assistant for the judge.”[7] During my internship, I only tried that system a few times and did not rely on it much, because the similar case pushed on the screen is often insufficient or not as accurate as it is supposed to be. And the push of similar cases can only be done on specific computers connected to court’s intranet, which is not always easy and convenient. However, my experience is limited to the courts in which I have interned and the use of AI in similar case searches may become more widespread and convenient.[8]
Several factors are often used as filters when searching cases in a database. In my experience, the one used most often is “案由”, [cause of action] which signals the basic legal relationship between the parties involved. Keywords expressing legal issues under Chinese civil law theory are also very useful, for example, the fiduciary duty is generally expressed as “勤勉尽责” in Chinese civil law, so this word should be used as a keyword.
It is important to note that the structure of Chinese court judgments (and rulings) is basically the same, with each part starting with the same fixed words, making the search of cases easy. For example, the holding’s reasoning always starts with “本院认为”(“this court holds that”), so it is very convenient to check whether a case is useful by locating this keyword first.
II. The use and application of similar cases
The first step after finding similar cases is for the person handling the case to analyze and apply the reasoning of similar cases (if any) to the issues of the case under consideration, or distinguish them. If any party involved has cited a Guiding Case or another similar case previously decided by the SPC in their arguments, the review report or trial report (both the review report and trial report (审理报告) are types of bench memorandum used in the Chinese courts) must then include a response to the cases cited and an explanation of whether to follow the cited case or not. The collegial panel also discusses whether the cases cited by the parties are applicable during their meeting. [9]
If the collegial panel finds that the case under consideration is analogous to a guiding case, the collegial panel is under a legal obligation to apply the guiding case reasoning to the current one.[10] If the judges take the view that the current case should be distinguished from the guiding case, the draft judgment must be submitted to the Professional Judges Meeting (“专业法官会议”) or on some occasions, directly to the judicial (adjudication) committee(“审委会”) to determine (or decide) whether the collegial panel has properly distinguished the guiding case or SPC case.[11]
In my experience, it is rare to see parties citing useful cases as authority to support their position. In my view, lawyers who are capable of using case law account for a small portion of the entire legal market. There’s still a great deal of work to be done to promote the application of case law, both for lawyers and judges.
III. The report, discussion and archiving of similar cases
For almost all cases,[12] it is required that similar cases be listed and explained in the trial report (审理报告 or review report) compiled as a separate report and attached to the case file. In most cases, similar cases are demonstrated by a copy of its full text or by a brief summary or an excerpt of its facts. Usually, the reasoning of similar cases will be fully copied there, but without further analysis of its applicability. In other words, the list or report of similar cases is usually very simple and straightforward. Readers will find it hard to grasp the link to the current case without any explanation from the person handling it.
Later, the list or report is submitted to all meetings at which the case is discussed, such as meetings of the: collegial panel (“合议庭”), professional judges committee (“专业法官会议”), state compensation committee, or the judicial (adjudication) committee (“审委会”).[13] During the oral report of the case, the person handling the case will introduce the similar cases found, either briefly or thoroughly (depending on the case). The introduction is not just to determine the merits of the case, but also for the judges to be aware of the possible political or social implications of the draft holding. For example, if the judge in charge of the case or the collegial panel proposes distinguishing similar SPC cases found or guiding cases, the professional judges committee or other court committees will generally be very cautious in supporting such proposal.
Once similar cases are attached to the case file in the form of an independent report, the report is incorporated into the case auxiliary (secondary) file (附卷, discussed here). As a constituent part of the case file, the similar cases and related report are forwarded wherever the case file goes (appeal or retrial), and ultimately archived. Part of SPC policy is to move to electronic files and electronic archiving of files (now being piloted). Because the similar cases and trial or review report are part of the auxiliary or supplementary file, it means the parties involved have no access to them.
Yuan Ye worked as intern judge’s assistant at the Third Circuit Court of the SPC from February to August 2018; at Shenzhen Futian District Court from May to June 2021, and at Shanghai Financial Court from March to May 2022.
[1] “The retrieval scope of similar cases generally includes: 1. guiding cases issued by the SPC; 2. model cases issued by the SPC and cases in which the judgments made by the SPC have taken effect; 3. reference cases issued by the higher people’s courts of the provinces (autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government) and cases in which the judgments made by such courts have taken effect; and 4. cases in which the judgments made by the people’s court at the next higher level or this people’s court have taken effect. In addition to guiding cases, priority shall be given to cases in the past three years; and where similar cases have been retrieved already in the previous order of precedence, the people’s courts are not required to retrieve more cases.”
[2] Ibid, Article 6: “A judge handing a case shall identify and compare the similarity between the pending case and the retrieval result to determine whether it belongs to a similar case.” No other legal definition of similar cases is provided by laws.
[3] Article 919 of China Civil Code: “A commission contract of mandate is a contract whereby the commissioning party and the commissioned party agree that the commissioned party handles the affairs of the commissioning part.”
[4] Notice by the Supreme People’s Court on the Guiding Opinions on Unifying the Application of Laws to Strengthen the Retrieval of Similar Cases (for Trial Implementation) (“最高人民法院印发《关于统一法律适用加强类案检索的指导意见(试行)》的通知)” Article 3: “A judge handling the case shall retrieve similar cases based on the China Judgments Online (www.wenshu.court.gov.cn), the trial case database, etc., and be responsible for the veracity and accuracy of the retrieval.”
[5] The use of AI has been regarded as a key step to create Smart Courts (“智慧法院”), see Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Accelerating the Construction of Smart Courts(最高人民法院关于加快建设智慧法院的意见)art.14 to art.18.
[6] Circular of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Guiding Opinions on Unifying the Application of Law and Strengthening the Retrieval of Similar Cases (for Trial Implementation) (“最高人民法院印发《关于统一法律适用加强类案检索的指导意见(试行)》的通知”) article 12: “People’s courts at all levels shall actively promote the retrieval of similar cases, strengthen technology research and development and application training, and enhance the intelligence and precision of similar case push. All high people’s courts shall make full use of modern information technology to establish a trial case database and pave the way for the development of a unified and authoritative trial case database nationwide.”
[7] See Artificial Intelligence Makes Judicature More Just, Efficient and Authoritative–the Theoretical Analysis and Practical Exploration of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Field (“人工智能让司法更加公正高效——人工智能在司法领域应用的理论分析与实践探索”), Cui Yadong(崔亚东), ChinaTrial(中国审判), 2017, available with translation at https://law.stanford.edu/china-law-and-policy-association-clpa/articles/. The author is the President and Chief Justice of Shanghai High People`s Court.
[9] Implementing Measures of the Supreme People’s Court on Harmonization of the Application of Laws (Fa [2021] No.289) (“《最高人民法院统一法律适用工作实施办法》”,(法〔2021〕289号))”, Article 8: “For the cases for which similar cases shall be retrieved as provided in Article 6 hereof, the collegial panel shall include the harmonized standards for the application of law for the cases in the content of deliberation. During the trial, where the public prosecution organ, the parties concerned and their defenders or agents ad litem submit the guiding cases or the effective judgments of the Supreme People’s Court of similar cases in support of their claims, the collegial panel shall include whether the submitted cases or the effective judgments and pending cases belong to the similar cases in the content of deliberation.”
[10] Implementing Measures of the Supreme People’s Court on Harmonization of the Application of Laws (Fa [2021] No.289) (“《最高人民法院统一法律适用工作实施办法》”,(法〔2021〕289号))”, Article 9: “If a pending case is similar to the guiding case retrieved in terms of basic merits and legal application, the collegial panel shall make a judgment with reference to the main points (裁判要点) of the guiding case. In the judgment with reference to a guiding case, the guiding case shall be cited as the reason for judgment, but shall not be cited as the basis for judgment. If a guiding case is cited in the reason for judgment, the number of the guiding case shall be indicated.”
[11] Implementing Measures of the Supreme People’s Court on Harmonization of the Application of Laws (Fa [2021] No.289) (“《最高人民法院统一法律适用工作实施办法》”,(法〔2021〕289号)), Article 10: “ Where the proposed judgment results of a pending case are inconsistent with the application of law standards for guiding cases and the judgments of the Supreme People’s Court for similar cases, or the proposed judgment results will form new standards for the application of law, the collegial panel shall suggest submitting the case to the departmental professional judges session for discussion; if the president or chief judge finds that a pending case has any of the aforesaid circumstances, the departmental specialized judges session shall be convened as required to discuss the case. Where it is inappropriate to submit the cases specified in the preceding paragraph to the professional judges session for discussion due to confidentiality and other reasons, they shall be reported to the leader in charge of the People’s Court level by level for approval, and may be directly submitted to the Judicial (Adjudication) Committee for discussion.”
[12] Implementing Measures of the Supreme People’s Court on Harmonization of the Application of Laws (Fa [2021] No.289) (“《最高人民法院统一法律适用工作实施办法》(法〔2021〕289号)”) Article 6: “If a case in handling has any of the following circumstances, the responsible judge shall retrieve similar cases: (1) The case is proposed to be submitted to the judicial committee or the specialized judges session for discussion; (2) The case lacks specific judgment rules, or has not yet reached unified judgment rules; (3) The case is major, difficult, complex and sensitive; (4) The case involves group disputes or raises widespread social attention, which may affect social stability; (5) The case may conflict with judgments of the Supreme People’s Court on similar cases; (6) Relevant entities or individuals allege that the judge has conducted the trial in violation of the law; (7) The Supreme People’s Procuratorate has protested; (8) During the trial, the public prosecution, the parties and their defenders, or agents ad litem submit guiding cases or the effective judgments of the Supreme People’s Court on similar cases to support their claims; and (9) The president or chief judge retrieves similar cases in accordance with the authority for trial supervision and administration. For the retrieval of similar cases, it is allowed to retrieve only the guiding cases released by the Supreme People’s Court and the effective judgments of the Supreme People’s Court.
[13] Implementing Measures of the Supreme People’s Court on Harmonization of the Application of Laws (Fa [2021] No.289) (“《最高人民法院统一法律适用工作实施办法》(法〔2021〕289号)”) Article 7: “For cases for which similar cases shall be retrieved pursuant to the provisions of Article 6 hereof, the responsible judge shall provide an explanation on the retrieval of such cases in the trial report, or prepare a special retrieval report for such cases. The retrieval explanation or report for similar cases shall reflect the retrieval results of such cases objectively, comprehensively, and accurately, and shall be submitted together with the collegiate bench for deliberation or the specialized judges session, the compensation committee, the judicial relief committee, and the adjudication committee for discussion. The retrieval report for similar cases shall be incorporated into the auxiliary file together with the case.”
In early November 2021, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued a new Guiding Opinion regarding Further Improving the Trial Supervision and Management Mechanism for the Four Types of Cases (关于进一步完善“四类案件”监督管理工作机制的指导意见translationhere) (“Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion” or “Guiding Opinion”). Official commentary by the drafters is found here. The “Four Types of Cases” refer to certain types of cases, all politically or socially sensitive, that require special handling within the court system and involvement by the relevant court leadership. The term “Four Types of Cases” originates with the 2015 SPC document “Several Opinions on Improving the Judicial Responsibility System of the People’s Courts,” (2015 Opinion) although special treatment within the Chinese court system for special types of cases is not new, as I described in my (the Monitor’s) 1993 article. This Guiding Opinion illustrates themes newly stressed in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 15 February 2022 article on the socialist rule of law.
While the “Four Types of Cases” are a little-known concept outside of China, they are well known within the Chinese court system and are embedded in other court guidance. The Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion draws together threads of related policy to provide standardized principles on:
Redefined “Four Types of Cases;”
Mechanisms for flagging cases as one of the “Four Types of Cases” at each stage of the court process;
Mechanisms for special treatment of these cases; and
A range of mechanisms for involving more senior judges in the handling of these cases while monitoring their involvement.
The Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion provides insights into the operation of the Chinese judicial system, particularly after the 19th Party Congress and the ongoing transformation of the judicial system and legal system.
This blogpost gives a summary of the background to this Guiding Opinions before examing its details and providing some comments linking to larger themes.
1. Origin of the “Four Types” of Cases
a. The 2015 Opinion
The 2015 Opinion implements the broad principles in the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress decision and 4th Judicial Reform Plan Outline by setting out guidelines for greater autonomy and greater responsibility for judges, known as the “judicial responsibility system.” It contrasts to the pre 4th five-year judicial reform plan period when all court decisions needed to be approved by a person (or committee) in a leadership role in a court. It also requires the preferential use of a random allocation of cases system, while pre-reform, court leaders at various levels designated judges hearing cases.
At the same time, the 2015 Opinion also imposed more responsibility or accountability on frontline judges, while reducing (or eliminating) the involvement of court leaders not involved in the hearing. It gives court leaders (a court president, vice president, and division head) supervisory and management authority. Other guidance prohibits court leaders from involving themselves in cases handled by other judges, with certain exceptions. An exception was made for “major, difficult, and complicated cases” when court leaders could designate collegiate panels to conduct hearings (Article 7). These cases are called the “Four Types of Cases” (四类案件). They refer to the following cases:
Group disputes that may affect social stability;
Ones that are difficult, complex, and have a significant impact on society;
They might conflict with the judgment of the court or a higher-level court; and
Relevant units or individuals report that the judge has violated the law (Article 24).
The 2015 Opinion did not provide any further details about these Four Types. Lower courts issued guidance detailing the meaning and scope of these cases, while the SPC incorporated measures relating to “Four Types of Cases” in documents relating to the judicial responsibility system listed below.
b. Subsequent documents
Pre and particularly post 19th Party Congress, the SPC issued a number of documents related to the judicial responsibility system and the special responsibility of court leaders. At the same time, Party authorities issued documents imposing greater responsibility on Party members in leadership positions. Many of these are collected in a 2021 book edited by the office of the SPC leading small group on the judicial responsibility system and the SPC Political Department. These documents include:
February, 2019 Fifth Five-Year Judicial Reform Plan (5th Judicial Reform Plan): it emphasizes the full implementation of the judicial responsibility system. That system in turn is linked to broader Party initiatives to expand the responsibility of leading Party and government cadres as well as court leaders to cooperate better with Party inspections of various types.
March, 2020 Opinions on Deepening the Comprehensive Reform Supporting the Judicial Accountability System issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee (关于深化司法责任制综合配套改革的意见 full text not available);
Four Types of Cases cases are deemed too complex, sensitive, or important to be handled by a frontline judge or panel of judges alone. The new Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion embeds multiple levels and a range of guidance and supervision as well as penalty provisions for court personnel. The guidance and supervision are aimed at personnel at various levels and roles within a court. It is intended as a practical set of basic principles that consolidates and develops measures that appeared in the guidance listed above. It anticipates local courts issuing more detailed rules to implement it. A 2022 media report by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court on its judicial reform program for 2022 highlights the issuing of detailed rules on the Four Types of Cases as a priority matter. A summary of the definition and scope; identification mechanism, handling and supervision; and liability provisions follows.
Definition and scope
The 2021 Guiding Opinion redefines the Four Types of Cases and their scope, sets out the responsibilities of various persons within a court at different stages of a case, both front line and in a leadership role (court president and division chiefs) According to Article 14, those in a leadership role include the court president, vice presidents, full-time members of the judicial committee, division heads and deputy heads, and others in a supervision and management role. The guidance promotes using a multi-stage mechanism for identifying these cases and flagging them for special handling. Article 2 to 6 go into detail concerning the meaning and scope of “Four Types of Cases”, with changes from the 2015 Opinion. The new “Four Types of Cases” encompass the following types of cases:
They are major, difficult, complex, or sensitive;
They involve mass disputes or cause widespread societal concern, which might affect social stability;
They might conflict with the judgments and rulings of the court or a higher level people’s court in similar cases;
Relevant units or individuals reported that a judge has violated the law in the trial.
The comments below address points 1-3. The first type significantly expands the scope from the original “group disputes that may affect social stability”. The drafters explain this change: “the difficulty and complexity of cases are not necessarily proportional to their social impact”. For example, a divorce case can be complicated and sensitive, yet their impact on regional or national society might be minimal. “Major, difficult, complex, or sensitive” could cover a case in any area of law, in theory.
The second type also changes the definition in the 2015 Opinion significantly, now referring to cases that involve large groups, or cases that cause widespread social concern. Most importantly is that these cases may affect social stability. For example, some types of cases may involve a large number of litigants, such as traffic accidents, but carry little risk of causing further mass incidents or intensifying social conflicts. These cases should not be considered one of the Four Types of Cases.
However, cases that may trigger mass incidents (e.g., labor protests after failure of litigation), risk intensifying social conflicts, or the case may have a “demonstration”, i.e., precedent-setting, effect (e.g., land-taking compensation cases), and may trigger more litigation. This may impact the development of specific industries, or the interest of specific groups, and are all cases that do need careful supervision and management.
Additionally, the SPC is of the view that cases that cause widespread concern and may affect social stability are not limited to group disputes. For example, murder cases are known to stir up public outcries. Additionally, cases involving rape claims have recently also garnered a lot of public attention.
For the third type, the Opinion broadened the scope. First, it changed the wording from “judgment” (判决) to “decision” (裁判). This can be translated as “judgment and rulings.” Second, in addition to a final judgment by a court, it includes other rulings or decisions regarding inadmissibility, objections, suspension or termination of litigation. This suits the more comprehensive process-based type of supervision that is intended and is further discussed below. The conflict with current or prior judgments and rulings is specified to be with decisions of that court or higher courts within the past three years, or are currently being heard, and where it is necessary to unify the application of law.
While the Opinion further details the meaning and scope of the Four Types, the drafters explain that they insist on maintaining a healthy balance between broadness and specificity, so as to allow local courts leeway in determining how to identify a case as one of the Four Types. This recognizes that courts in different regions have different considerations, and that, based on local conditions, different kinds of specific cases require supervision and management.
Article 7 contains additional measures to widen the scope of “Four Types of Cases.” It provides that the oversight and management measures for Four Types of Cases can be applied to other types of cases: effective decisions that are in error and require retrial; cases in which the procuratorate has filed a protest; whether a death sentence (including suspended ones) is intended to be imposed; the amount in dispute is very large; or where a court plans to pronounce a defendant not guilty. This Article is consistent with recent policy to expand the scope of supervision of the exercise of judicial power, most recently emphasized in Xi’s February, 2022 article.
Identification Mechanism, Handling. and Supervision
Article 8 requires local courts to establish mechanisms to cover the entire court process to identify, label, and give a warning concerning Four Types of Cases. This article additionally requires local courts to set rules on the responsibility of internal entities to flag cases and report them, as well as responsibility for the failure to do so. The rest of the article sketches the SPC’s concept of how the Four Types of Cases are to be flagged through the entire court process and who decides any dispute over classification.
Article 9 and 10 address the adjustments and measures that senior court members may make regarding the case, depending upon when the case is flagged as one of “Four Types of Cases.” Regardless of whether a case is designated at the filing stage or not until it has been transferred to a case hearing division, the Opinion requires the case must be heard by a collegial panel rather than a single judge, and a member of the court leadership could serve the presiding judge. The recent Civil Procedure Law reforms mentioned in this earlier blogpost expand the scope of cases that a single judge can hear, but this Guiding Opinion makes clear that a collegial panel must take on responsibility for hearing one of “Four Types of Cases.” These provisions links to previous SPC guidance to senior court leaders on the role they need to fulfill since the judicial reforms. The court leadership can also change the presiding judge and the size and composition of the panel.
Article 10 lists the oversight and management measures that court leaders may take within their authority, such as: requesting reports on the progress of the case, reviewing the case files and trial report, attending trial hearings, submitting the case to a professional judges meeting, to the judicial committee, or even reporting to the court at one level above for guidance. The measures taken are likely to depend on how sensitive, difficult, or otherwise troublesome the case is. I surmise that this system will lead to more such cases discussed by a professional judges meeting or judicial (adjudication) committee meeting so that the decision is made on a collective basis.
Article 10 importantly clarifies the exact measures that constitute permissible supervision and management under the new responsibility system. These measures need to be incorporated into the list of powers and responsibilities based on the court member’s position. All actions and measures need to be in accordance with local procedures and within the scope of authority of the judge exercising supervisory authority. The Opinion specifies that any action that falls within this scope does not constitute undue interference in cases and does not violate provisions about internal interference with judicial processes.
In contrast to previous practice, in which court leader guidance in these types of cases was not generally recorded, Article 11 requires that court leader oversight and management of “Four Types of Cases ” must be recorded in the case file and on the case-handling platform. Note that the recording would not be accessible to lawyers reviewing a court file. The views of court leadership about the case must be announced at a professional judges meeting or judicial committee meeting, Court leaders can request that a collegial panel reconsider their proposed decision, but cannot directly change the panel’s decision without going through permitted procedures. These measures seem to be aimed at preventing improper practices that enable corruption. Those improper practices must have regularly occurred in the handling of “Four Types of Cases.” Article 14 specifies that supervision and administration of “Four Types of Cases” are considered part of the scope of a court leader’s work and therefore will be incorporated into the person’s performance evaluation.
Article 12 contains penalty provisions for both the frontline judges handling the case and the court leadership. Acts that can trigger liability for frontline judges include concealing that a case is a “Four Types of Case” case, failure to obey supervision and management, or causing a serious error in a decision through that conduct with serious consequences.
Court leaders who neglect or improperly perform their oversight and management of a “Four Type of Case” case intentionally or through gross negligence causing errors in decisions and serious consequences bear liability with reference to the provisions and procedures for the management of cadres.
Article 13 addresses using the smart courts mechanism to identify “Four Types of Cases,” remind front-line judges to report the case, and prompt court leaders to supervise and manage the cases.
Concluding comments
In one short document, the Guiding Opinion on the Four Types of Cases captures many themes in internal court administration regulation and in the operation of the Chinese judicial system after the 19th Party Congress as well as the ongoing transformation of the judicial system and legal system.
The Guiding Opinion seeks to protect front-line judges from deciding “Four Types of Cases” autonomously in a way that is considered wrong or inconsistent with policy and legal provisions (non-unified). Consistency of judicial decision-making is a high priority of the SPC recently, consistent with Xi’s article mentioned above: “maintaining the unity of the country’s rule of law is a serious political issue 维护国家法治统一是严肃的政治问题. ” This links to the role of court leaders as well.
The Guiding Opinion consolidates guidance for court leaders, who under the Chinese bureaucratic court system, have special responsibilities under the SPC guidance listed above, as well as more general Party regulations applicable to “#1” leaders, and Party group members in the Zhengfa 政法 (political-legal) system. It imposes greater pressure on court leaders to hear cases, as required by earlier guidance. As discussed earlier, judges in a leadership position spend substantial time on administrative, coordination, and Party matters rather than hearing cases. Guiding the proper handling of one of the Four Types of Cases is also a way for a court leader to display leadership qualities while mishandling it will trigger criticism in an internal judicial or Party inspection (see my chapter on judicial discipline for a discussion of the principal types of inspections.) On incorporating work on “Four Types of Cases” into leaders’ performance evaluation, although the Chinese court slogan (of several years ago) is that judges should be treated more like judges, the Guiding Opinion appears to treat lower court judges analogously to secondary or university students, to be given grades for their class participation.
The Opinion embeds supervision of the activity of court leaders, particularly by the use of the digital(smart courts) case-handling platform. By now, the majority of Chinese courts have a fully online and digital case-handling platform, many of which automatically record these types of supervisory and managerial measures. However, it is unclear how this has changed judicial practice regarding sensitive cases, and whether new informal practices to circumvent this digital system have emerged.
This Guiding Opinion is an important document in understanding the Party leadership’s and the SPC’s vision of the Chinese courts in the New Era. It illustrates themes in what Xi calls in the February, 2022 article “comprehensively deepening reforms in the area of rule of law 全面深化法治领域改革,” therefore a vision of reshaping Chinese law and legal institutions generally. It links to the Party leadership’s vision of whole process supervision (全过程监督), mentioned in Xi’s most recent article, which to this observer has its roots in traditional Chinese concepts of supervision of the bureaucracy. It uses its cutting-edge smart court system towards this end. That would be consistent with themes mentioned recently in an earlier blogpost, that Chinese characteristics have a great deal of weight in the reshaping of the Chinese legal system. It is also consistent with an important statement in Xi Jinping’s February, 2022 article: “the socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics that we want to build must be a rule of law system that is rooted in Chinese culture, based on Chinese conditions and solving Chinese problems, and cannot be misled by Western misconceptions (我们要建设的中国特色社会主义法治体系,必须是扎根中国文化、立足中国国情、解决中国问题的法治体系,不能被西方错误思潮所误导).”
The definition and scope of the “Four Types of Cases” are flexible, so as to accommodate a system in which judges bear lifetime responsibility for their decisions and court leadership bears responsibility for the decisions of their judges, and multiple types of inspections, both Party and court, monitor implementation of campaigns (such as those for the Sao Hei campaign), as well as more general policies. The accountability (responsibility or liability) provisions are broad and linked with the Party’s system for cadres, rather than professional rules. That too is consistent with traditional Chinese law.
The vision of the approach to handling”Four Types of Cases” in the Opinion is holistic, in line with the principles mentioned in the 2021 Opinion on integrating socialist core values into judgment instruments— the organic unity of political, legal, and social effectiveness (政治效果、法律效果和社会效果有机统一 ), because through this process, a judicial decision that best meets that target is likely to be achieved. And this has implications for litigants.
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Many thanks to Straton Papagianneas for translating the “Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion” and drafting an initial version of this blogpost (and responding to several rounds of comments). Many thanks also to an anonymous peer reviewer for perceptive comments on a later draft of this blogpost.
At the end of September, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued Implementing Measures for the Pilot Reform of Improving the Positioning of Four Levels of Courts in Terms of Adjudication Levels and Functions (Four Level Court Reform Pilot Measures). The only translation available seems to be behind Westlaw China’s paywall. A quick summary of its backstory, provisions, and implications as related to the SPC follows below. The impact on the lower courts will be significant, but this reform needs to be analyzed together with other current reform documents to see the larger picture.
Backstory
As the NPC Observer previously wrote, this reform was included in both the 2019 SPC’s fifth five-year court reform plan and the recent Plan for Building the Rule of Law in China (2020–2025). The National People’s Congress Standing Committee granted the authorization for this Pilot Reform in the summer. SPC President Zhou Qiang highlighted the principal reforms in his explanation to the NPC Standing Committee. The Party leadership (the Central Deepening Reform Commission) approved the reform in June, based on submission documents from the SPC. The drafters of the reform stated the proposal (改革方案稿) was based on research and specialist discussions (调研论证, although neither the approval document nor the submissions are available). I surmise that the research draws on earlier work by predecessors of the drafters. The roots of this reform can be seen in the SPC’s fourth five-year court reform plan, for which the SPC issued extended commentary (thankfully for the researcher). SPC research on this issue dates back to the spring of 2012, if not earlier.
This reform is one of many court (and other political-legal system) reforms that the Party leadership approved in January 2019, as part of its Implementing Opinion On the Comprehensive Deepening Reforms of the Political-Legal Sector《关于政法领域全面深化改革的实施意见. That meant that the measures approved in that document became important reform responsibilities (tasks) for the institutions involved (确定的重要改革任务).
The outside analyst of this and another court (and other Chinese legal) reforms is at a disadvantage in seeking to be thorough as might be possible in more transparent jurisdictions. It is not possible to know, for example, what the Party leadership reviews when it considers these submissions (my guess is a detailed executive summary, while responsible aides read more extended reports) and whether the SPC’s submission was approved unchanged.
What It Means for the SPC
The Four Level Court Reform Pilot Measures cover civil, administrative, and criminal cases, with the focus on civil and administrative cases. Among the objectives of the Four Level Court Reform Pilot Measures is to make the SPC a supreme court (with Chinese characteristics), rather than just China’s highest court.
As I wrote in my short article on the U .S.-Asia Law’s website and earlier on this blog, the SPC considers large numbers of retrial applications, primarily in the circuit courts. This document narrows considerably the flow of retrial applications that can be submitted to the SPC, although the new standards incorporate necessary flexibility. (Ironically, I have just written an article on this process).
The intent is for the SPC to focus on a smaller number of more important cases. As stated in Article 1: “the Supreme People’s Court shall focus on supervising and guiding adjudication work at the national level and ensuring the correct and uniform application of the law.”
According to the drafters’ commentary, the intent is for the SPC to focus on (judicial/legal) policy formulation (政策制定) and social governance (社会治理), about which I spoke recently, and is a subject of another forthcoming article. This has been the thinking of the SPC leadership for over five years, if not longer–Judge He Xiaorong, current head of the #2 Circuit Court (and former head of the SPC’s judicial reform office) stated six years ago–when writing about the circuit courts:”
…the center of the work of SPC headquarters will shift to supervision and guidance, primarily trying cases that have a major guiding function in unifying the application of law, that can become guiding cases.”
The drafters of the Four Level Court Reform Pilot Measures state that the intent is to establish a working mechanism in which the Supreme People’s Court judgments are directly transformed into guiding cases and promote relevant judgments to become an important source for optimizing the formulation and content of judicial interpretations, as well as modifying and abolishing judicial interpretations. We will need to wait for further measures from the SPC on this.
Narrowing the Flow of Retrial Cases
The 2021 reforms change the standard of review for civil and administrative cases. The reforms set out a two-branch test: compulsory and permissive jurisdiction. Under Article 14, compulsory jurisdiction includes cases in which:
the higher court’s ruling or judgment was erroneous and the case has guiding significance in the application of law; or
in the past three years, higher people’s courts have unresolved major differences in the application of the law in similar cases for which binding judgments or rulings have been rendered by the SPC or different high people’s courts; or
any other circumstances where the SPC considers it should here the cases.
The language of #3 is familiar language to anyone who spends time reading Chinese legislation.
Article 11 sets forth conditions under which applicants can apply to the SPC for retrial, but the SPC has flexibility in accepting the cases:
applicants consider that the higher people’s court applied the law erroneously, but do not object to the facts determined, principal evidence, and procedures of the higher people’s court, or
if the court’s judicial (adjudication) committee considered the case.
Article 13 authorizes the SPC to remand a case back to the higher people’s court if it considers that there are unclear facts or procedural errors, or alternatively, the higher people’s court erred in applying the law, but the issue does not merit SPC consideration.
Applicants must make an undertaking when applying for reconsideration that they undertake not to object to the above matters, and are directed to focus their application on the disputed issues and the grounds for their argument. At this point, detailed implementing measures have not yet been issued.
Inconsistent Decisions
One issue that the drafters mentioned in their commentary is inconsistent judgments or rulings made by different divisions of the SPC. In practice, that issues relating to the same body of law may be determined by different divisions of the SPC or different teams of SPC judges in the circuit courts and headquarters. They arise either through litigation or court administrative-type procedures. While SPC judges (as I understand it) search for similar cases, it is inevitable that different people have different views on legal issues. An example of this arose recently in the area of arbitration law, in which the SPC’s Intellectual Property Court ruled that the arbitration agreement in a software contract providing for foreign arbitration was invalid, because the dispute lacked a “foreign element,” while the SPC’s #4 Civil Division has upheld arbitration agreements providing for foreign arbitration between two Chinese parties.
In that earlier blogpost I wrote that, unlike some other legal systems, the SPC has not evolved an en banc or enlarged panel of judges, but the Four Level Court Reform Pilot Measures illustrates that someone involved with court reform has looked to other jurisdictions and borrowed but not transplanted the concept. For the avoidance of doubt, borrowing legal concepts from abroad is consistent with Xi Jinping Legal Thought. The Plan for Building the Rule of Law in China (2020–2025) includes among its main principles: “learn from the useful experience of foreign rule of law (借鉴国外法治有益经验).”
Articles 18 and 19 set forth two options for resolving cross-division differences in views on legal issues. Article 18 involves the creation of an enlarged collegial panel with five or more members from different divisions. Consistent with the SPC’s administrative nature, the divisions (circuit courts, or intellectual property court) must apply to the SPC’s Trial Administration Office, which in turn must seek the approval of the SPC President. The President may designate a Justice (SPC Vice President) to sit as the presiding judge. The alternative set out in Article 19 is to apply to the Trial Administration Office to establish a cross-division specialized judges committee (its functions discussed here). I surmise that the second alternative will be used more frequently.
What to expect?
I surmise that there will be a transition period, as the cases accepted under the old retrial system are processed by SPC headquarters and circuit courts. So my guess is that 2022 will see fewer cases than 2021 and 2020, and 2023 will see even fewer cases. I expect that the SPC’s Intellectual Property Court to continue to have a large number of cases (over 3000 in 2020). In 2020, the greatest proportion of their cases were civil and administrative appeals. My uninformed guess is this trend will continue.
It is possible that as a consequence of this reform, the China International Commercial Court will hear more cases than before. But as I said and wrote earlier this year, I surmise that they will continue to pick their cases carefully, focusing on those which raise issues in which existing law and judicial interpretations are unclear and involve issues that frequently arise in practice. These CICC principles are consistent with those in the Four Level Court Reform Pilot Measures.
As for the other divisions of the SPC, my guess is that they will be able to find enough major cases to keep themselves busy while also spending more time on judicial policy and judicial interpretations, not to mention other matters. The principles in this reform do not affect long-standing mechanisms of the SPC, such as death penalty review or the prior review of arbitration-related decisions by the #4 Civil Division. As I hinted in a recent blogpost, I believe that in the next year or two, a great deal of time will be invested in issuing judicial interpretations to fill out the broad principles of the Civil Code, but the interpretations will themselves be issued in a codified fashion.
I was honored to be invited by the New York University School of Law’s U.S. Asia Law Institute to contribute a short essay to their Perspectives blog, entitled Why I Research China’s Supreme People’s Court.
Many thanks to those involved in the entire process, including those who commented on earlier drafts!
3rd meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Conference Combatting Illegal Trade in Wild Plants and Animals
A little-discussed aspect of the work of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is coordinating with other Party and state organs to better serve the greater situation and resolve specific policy issues. At some point, I will set out a fuller description of this distinctive function of the SPC and its background history, but that will need to wait until I have plumbed the SPC’s past regulatory documents and conducted a more complete survey of practices in SPC divisions. I examined one aspect of the way that the SPC coordinates with other departments in a book chapter to be published in the fall of 2021. That chapter focuses on the drafting of criminal procedure judicial interpretations. The “never-ending” academic article that I am writing touches upon one aspect, briefly. This blogpost highlights some formal frameworks for coordination and at least some of what is involved.
Coordination with other central Party and state organs regarding specific legal issues is one of the unrecognized functions of the SPC. It is hard to assess how much coordination work is done in comparison to other functions of the SPC, such as hearing cases or drafting judicial interpretations. Because the Collection of the Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Rules, a handbook for judges, places the principle “establish coordination mechanisms, properly resolve administrative disputes” in the section of general principles of administrative law, I surmise that coordination is a very important function of the administrative division. From my research below and discussions with knowledgeable persons, some judges in the civil and commercial divisions are involved in work under these frameworks, and likely also the Research Office. Some issues involve multiple divisions of the SPC.
My understanding is that coordination with other central Party and state organs is a customary function of the SPC that is being repurposed, in part, in the New Era. For that reason, I surmise that more of this will take place in SPC headquarters in the future. This is based on two factors. The first is that SPC hears most commercial and administrative cases in the circuit courts. Second, coordination with other central organs appears to be an increasingly important part of New Era governance. That was flagged in several statements of Liu Zheng, deputy head of the SPC’s Judicial Reform Office, in a February, 2021 press conference, where the SPC released its report on online mediation. Liu Zheng stated:
promote the improvement of the social governance pattern of joint construction, co-governance and sharing…(促进完善共建共治共享的社会治理格局)
In describing the accomplishments of the SPC in promoting diversified dispute resolution, he stated:
We strengthened our communication and coordination with Central departments (ministries) and commissions, we held three coordination meetings at the ministry level, and established a joint action mechanism (加强与中央部委的沟通协调,3次召开部委层面协调交流会,建立联动机制 ).
At the central Party level, clearly coordination occurs at the level of broad policy through the Central Political Legal Commission and the Building Ping’an (peace and safe)-China Coordination Small-Group about which Li Ling wrote last year. Other coordination occurs through leading small group offices (工作领导小组办公室). I describe one below. This blogpost will focus on State Council Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences because it is through those that much of the more specific coordination occurs. Thankfully for the researcher, State Council transparency is quite good and I found many approval documents for Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences. From my research thus far, the SPC participates in many Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences established by the State Council. I note that some other jurisdictions have Inter-Ministerial Council Conferences as well, not involving the judiciary. In some instances, ministries or commissions of the State Council create coordination mechanisms with the SPC, while the SPC initiates some. Some coordination is done more formally on an as-needed basis, as Liu Zheng mentioned and that requires separate research. It is understood that within the framework of the formal structures, interaction and coordination occur at the staff level.
Leading Small Group Coordination Offices
As mentioned above, the Party Center has established some leading small group coordination offices to coordinate specific central Party and state organs policies and measures. Because of the nature of the matter, the SPC is a member. One example is the following office.
The Pursuit of Fugitive [Officials] Pursuit of Stolen Assets Working Office of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Leading Small Group (中央反腐败协调小组国际追逃追赃工作办公室), established in 2015, of which the SPC is a member. The 2017 judicial interpretation on asset recovery is likely related to the SPC’s work in this group. The SPC is involved in the yearly Skynet operation. Through this office, the SPC participates in related campaigns under this mechanism, such as a 2015 one against offshore companies and underground banks.
Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences
The State Council has established many Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences (部际联席会议), in which other Central-level ministries take the lead (牵头) and the SPC is one of many other Party and state organs involved. For those unfamiliar with Inter-Ministerial Conferences in China, the Office of the Central Staffing Commission has an authoritative explanation (amended Google translate):
The inter-ministerial joint conference is established to negotiate and handle matters involving the responsibilities of multiple departments of the State Council. It is established with the approval of the State Council. The member units communicate in a timely manner and coordinate differing opinions. It is a work mechanism for enabling the smooth implementation of a task (responsibility). It is the highest-level joint meeting system of administrative agencies. The establishment of inter-ministerial joint conferences should be strictly controlled. For matters that can be resolved through coordination between the sponsoring department and other departments, inter-ministerial joint conferences are generally not established. The establishment of inter-ministerial joint conferences must be submitted to the State Council for approval. The lead department shall ask for instructions, clarify the name, convener, lead unit, member unit, work tasks and rules, etc., and submit it to the State Council for approval after approval by relevant departments. After the task of the inter-ministerial joint conference is completed, the lead department shall submit an application for cancellation, stating the establishment time of the inter-ministerial joint conference and the reasons for its cancellation, etc., and submit it to the State Council for approval after the approval of the member units. The newly established inter-ministerial joint conference which is led by the leading comrades of the State Council, may be entitled ” State Council… ” , and the other joint conferences are collectively referred to as ” inter-ministerial joint conferences . ” The inter-ministerial joint conference does not engrave a seal or formally issue documents. If documents must be formally issued, the name of the leading department and the seal of the leading department may be used, or the relevant member units may jointly issue a document.
SPC and Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences
Sometimes the SPC is a founding member of an Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference. In other situations, it is recognized that the expertise of the SPC is needed and the SPC is invited to join after the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference has been in operation for several years. Some examples are:
The Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on the Implementation of the Intellectual Property Strategy of the State Council, headquartered at the China National Intellectual Property Administration, of which the SPC is one of many members. It is directed towards achieving the National Intellectual Property Strategy and unusually, has its own website. A previous version was established in 2008, but that was superseded in 2016 when the State Council revamped the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference, likely to better achieve China’s Intellectual Property Strategy. Justice Tao Kaiyuan is designated as a member of the Joint Conference on behalf of the SPC. The Joint Conference meets from time to time and issues an annual plan, allocating responsibilities to members according to their authority. Among the matters allocated to the SPC in the 2020 plan is promoting three-in-one hearing of intellectual property cases and drafting a Guiding Opinion for Three-in-one Work ( 深入推进知识产权审判“三合一”工作,制定“三合一”工作指导意见。(最高人民法院). ” (For those unfamiliar with Three-in-one hearings,” they refer to integrating jurisdiction over civil, administrative and criminal intellectual property cases. It is understood that discussions occur at staff level to coordinate and promote policies.
The Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Combating Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade (打击野生动植物非法贸易部际联席会议), established in 2016. The SPC (and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)) was invited to join the conference in 2020., which likely means that the organizer, the State Forestry Administration, did not realize that the expertise of the SPC and SPP were necessary. The SPC is one of 27 Central-level organs. It is likely that the 2020 Guiding Opinions on Punishing the Illegal Trade of Wild Animals issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice is a product of this Inter-Ministerial Mechanism.
The Inter-Ministerial Conference on Money Laundering (反洗钱工作部际联席会议制度). The State Council established it in 2004. The People’s Bank of China takes the lead. National Money Laundering Strategies are drafted under its auspices. The role of the SPC is to supervise and guide the trial of money laundering crimes and formulate judicial interpretations in a timely manner in response to relevant legal issues encountered (督办、指导洗钱犯罪案件的审判,针对审理中遇到的有关适用法律问题,适时制定司法解释)It is understood that at a staff level, discussions take place regularly, and the SPC has issued several judicial interpretations as a result.
As mentioned in a blogpost in 2020, in 2017 the State Council approved an Inter Ministerial Joint Conference on the Popularization of Law, with Zhang Jun, then head of the Ministry of Justice, as head and the SPC as one of the parties.
SPC established coordination mechanisms
The SPC establishes coordination mechanisms with other government and Party departments such as:
The family trial method and work joint conference mechanism (家事审判方式和工作机制改革联席会议), established in 2017 with Central Political-Legal Commission consent; and
Under the framework of Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences, specific coordination mechanisms may be established. One likely product of ongoing policy discussions under the framework of the Intellectual Property Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference discussed above was the January 2021 establishment of a mediation coordination mechanism between the SPC and the China National Intellectual Property Administration.
Legal basis
The legal basis of coordination appears to be Article 2 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts in which the courts are called upon to “guarantee the smooth progress of the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Comments
In the New Era, we can expect to see more and more coordination by the SPC, much of it invisible to those of us outside the system. It appears to be a recognition of the technical competence of the SPC in resolving a broad range of technical issues required to be resolved in furtherance of the governance of the country. The State Council and its ministries and commission need the SPC’s expertise to deal with a large variety of legal issues–criminal, civil, administrative, enforcement. The SPC coordinates with other central Party and state organs because it needs them to resolve specific issues. Given China’s state-run governance model, establishing mechanisms to better coordinate and promote national strategies and targets, and better draft policies and measures are considered an efficient way to accomplish governance targets and serve the needs of the Party and country.
photo of professional judges’ meeting in a Qingdao area court
Among the many reforms set out in mentioned in the February, 2019 Supreme People’s Court ‘s (SPC’s) fifth judicial reform plan outline is improving the mechanism of the Professional Judges Meeting, aboutwhich I havepreviouslywritten. Earlier this month (January, 2021), the SPC issued guidance on professional/specialized judges meetings (I have also translated it previously as specialized judges meetings) , entitled Guiding Opinion on Improving the Work System of Professional Judges Meetings (Professional Judges Meetings Guiding Opinion or Guiding Opinion), (关于完善人民法院专业法官会议工作机制的指导意见), superseding 2018 guidance on the same topic. The earlier guidance had the title of Guiding Opinions on Improving the Working Mechanism for Presiding Judges’ Meetings of People’s Court (For Trial Implementation). The meetings are intended to give single judges or a collegial panel considering a case additional thoughts from colleagues, when a case is “complicated,” “difficult,”, or the collegial panel cannot agree among themselves.
This blogpost will provide some background to the Guiding Opinion, a summary of the Guiding Opinions, a summary of a non-scientific survey of judges, and some initial thoughts.
Background to the Guiding Opinion
The Guiding Opinion is a type of soft law that enables the SPC to say that it has achieved on of the targets set out in the current judicial reform plan. According to a recent article by the drafters, they researched and consulted widely among courts, but that does not mean that a survey went out to all judges. It is further evidence that the SPC is operating as Justice He Xiaorong stated five years ago–” after the circuit courts are established, the center of the work of SPC headquarters will shift to supervision and guidance…”
Judicial reform and the Guiding Opinion
The Professional Judges Meeting Guiding Opinion is linked to #26 of the current judicial reform plan outline, discussed in part in this June, 2019 blogpost. I have bold-italicked the relevant phrases:
#26 Improve mechanisms for the uniform application of law. Strengthen and regulate work on judicial interpretations, complete mechanisms for researching, initiating, drafting, debating, reviewing, publishing, cleaning up, and canceling judicial interpretations, to improve centralized management and report review mechanisms. Improve the guiding cases system, complete mechanisms for reporting, selecting, publishing, assessing, and applying cases. Establish mechanisms for high people’s courts filing for the record trial guidance documents and reference cases. Completemechanisms for connecting the work of case discussion by presiding judges and collegial panel deliberations, the compensation commission, and the judicial committee. Improve working mechanisms for mandatory searches and reporting of analogous cases and new types of case. (完善统一法律适用机制。 加强和规范司法解释工作,健全司法解释的调研、立项、起草、论证、审核、发布、清理和废止机制,完善归口管理和报备审查机制。完善指导性案例制度,健全案例报送、筛选、发布、评估和应用机制。建立高级人民法院审判指导文件和参考性案例的备案机制。健全主审法官会议与合议庭评议、赔偿委员会、审判委员会讨论案件的工作衔接机制。完善类案和新类型案件强制检索报告工作机制)
Uniform Application of Law
As for why the uniform application of law is an issue, a quick explanation is the drafting of Chinese legislation often leaves important issues unresolved and leaves broad discretion to those authorities issuing more specific rules. To the casual observer, it appear that the Chinese legislature (NPC) “outsources” to the SPC (and Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) for some issues) the hard job of drafting more detailed provisions. (see Chinalawtranslate.com for many examples and NPC_observer.com for insights about the legislative drafting process). Although the Communist Party’s plan for building rule of law in China calls for legislatures to be more active in legislating (see NPC Observer’s comments), in my view the SPC (and SPP) will continue to issue judicial interpretations, as the NPC and its standing committee are unlikely to be able to supply the detailed rules needed by the judiciary, procuratorate and legal community. Although the general impression both inside and outside of China is that the SPC often “legislates,” exceeding its authority as a court, as I have mentionedseveral times in recent blogposts, the SPC issues judicial interpretations after close coordination and harmonization with the NPC Standing Committee’s Legislative Affairs Commission.
Professional Judges Meeting Guiding Opinion
The Guiding Opinion is linked to the judicial responsibility system, about which my forthcoming book chapter will have more discussion. Professor He Xin addresses that system, among other topics in his recently published academic article.
The Guiding Opinion authorizes certain senior members of a court (court president, vice president, head of division, as part of their supervisory authority (under the Organic Law of the People’s Courts) to chair meetings of judges (who exactly will attend depends on the court- to discuss certain types of cases and provide advice to the single judge or three judge panel hearing a case. (In my informal inquiries, I have found that interns are sometimes permitted to attend, but sometimes not). The types of cases mentioned in Article 4 of the guiding opinions and listed below are not complete, but raise both legal and politically sensitive issues:
ones in which the panel cannot come to a consensus,
a senior judge believes approaches need to be harmonized;
involving a mass (group) dispute which could influence social stability;
difficult or complicated cases that have a major impact on society;
may involving a conflict with a judgment in a similar case decided by the same court or its superior;
certain entities or individuals have made a claim that the judges have violated hearing procedure.
Before the discussion, the judge or judges involved in the case are required to prepare a report with relevant materials, possibly including a search for similar cases, which may or may not be the same as the trial report described in my July, 2020 blogpost,
The guiding opinions sets out guidance on how the meeting is to be run and the order in which persons speak.
Depending on the type of case involved, a case may be further referred to the judicial committee or the matter may be resolved by the meeting providing their views to the collegial panel.
Article 15 of the guiding opinions provides that participating in these meetings is part of a judge’s workload. The guiding opinions provide that a judge’s expression of views at these meetings should be an important part of his or her performance appraisal, evaluation, and provision, and the materials can be edited into meeting summaries, typical cases, and other forms of guidance materials, which can be used for additional points in performance evaluation. One of the operational divisions of the SPC and at least one circuit court has published edited collections of their professional judges meetings, with identifying information about the parties removed.
Comments
From my non-scientific survey of judges at different levels of court and in different areas of law, my provisional conclusion is as follows. Judges hearing civil or commercial cases seem to hold these meetings more often, particularly at a higher level of court. Criminal division judges seem to hold such meetings less often (at least based on my small sample), but the meetings are considered to be useful.
Frequency seems to depend on the court and the division, with one judge mentioning weekly meetings, while others mentioned that they were held occasionally. Most judges that I surveyed considered the meetings useful, because they provided collective wisdom and enabled judges to consider the cases better. One judge noted that it may also result in otherwise unknown relevant facts coming to light.
I would also add my perception that it also gives the judges dealing with a “difficult or complicated case” (substantively or politically) in a particular case the reassurance that their colleagues support their approach, even if the judges involved remain responsible under the responsibility system. This is important when judges are faced with deciding cases in a dynamic area of law with few detailed rules to guide them, or where the policy has changed significantly within a brief time. My perception is that this mechanism provides a more collegial environment and better results that the old system of having heads of divisions signing off on judgments. I would welcome comments from those who have been there.
The Guiding Opinions provide yet another illustration of how Chinese courts operate as a cross between a bureaucracy and a court, from the rationale for holding the meeting to the use of meeting participation as an important part of performance evaluation.
Although the slogan (of several years ago) is that judges should be treated more like judges, the Guiding Opinion appears to treat lower court judges analogous to secondary or university students, to be given grades for their class participation.
What are the implications of this mechanism?
Litigants and their offshore counsel (Chinese counsel would know this) need to know that the result in their case in a Chinese court may be influenced by judges who are not in the courtroom when their counsel advocates orally. Written advocacy should still have an impact on professional judge committee discussions. It appears that counsel is not informed that the case has been referred to a professional judges committee for discussion and it is not possible for counsel to know who is part of the committee and apply for judges to be recused in case of a concern that there has been a conflict of interest.
Would it result in more commercial parties deciding that arbitration is a better option, as they have better control over dispute resolution in their particular case? My perception is that the decision concerning appropriate dispute resolution is based on other factors, and the existence of the professional judges meeting as a mechanism to provide views to judges hearing a case has little impact on that decision. I welcome comments on that question.
__________________________________________
Many thanks to those who participated in the survey and also to those who commented on an earlier draft of this blogpost.
One of the many documents issued late last year in the rush for year-end accomplishments (成就)is the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC’s) latest Five Year Court Training Plan Outline for 2019-2023 (New Training Plan Outline) (2019—2023年全国法院教育培训规划). The question this blogpost will explore is what is new and what has changed in the post-19th Party Congress New Era. As shown below, it is one small example of the impact of the 19th Party Congress on China’s legal and governance system. Competing obligations mean that this blogpost can only provide a few highlights and will focus on training for judges rather than support personnel, although the New Training Plan Outline covers all types of court personnel.
Other objective factors that have changed in the New Era are the number of cases in the courts (the majority of which are civil and commercial cases) and the average number of cases assigned to judges. The numbers released to the public can only provide a general indication, as senior judges in a court (court presidents, vice presidents, and heads of divisions) are required to handle a small number of cases, which means in actual fact a greater burden on front-line judges, who constitute the majority of judges. The provinces and areas with the most developed economies tend to have the most number of cases.
This blog discussed the earlier plan almost five years ago. The outside observer is handicapped by limited transparency about what the National Judicial College (NJC) actually does, although insights into the forthcoming curriculum can be found. Previous versions of the NJC website had some course outlines, but those vanished in one of the website upgrades. In comparison, for example, the Australian National Judicial College publishes the National Judicial Curriculum and the German Judges Academy also has quite detailed information (to the extent this observer can understand it using a combination of high school German + Google translate).
The NJC, for those who aren’t familiar with it, is a separate institutional entity (事业法人) under the SPC, in charge of court training, primarily of judges, but also for other supporting staff. It is closely linked with the SPC’s Political Department (in charge of cadres). It has also hosted some training courses jointly (this was on administrative litigation) with the National Prosecutors College. Fortunately, the NJC website has posted screenshots of lectures (many by outstanding SPC judges) in its cloud classroom, although unfortunately, the lectures themselves are inaccessible. I surmise that any teaching this spring will be at least initially online, as in other Chinese higher educational institutions. As of 30 March, this has provided to be correct, as the NJC website now features reports on training judicial trainers and provincialbranches of the NJC providing training online.
What is new?
Consistent with what I wrote in this blog about Zhou Qiang’s report to the NPC in March of last year (2019) (and other 2019 blogposts), what is different about the New Court Training Plan Outline is the greater emphasis on political issues and Party leadership, although these were evident in the previous plan. The first sentence mentions Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想) and “forging a high-quality court team (队伍) that the Party Center can rely upon and the masses are satisfied with.” It mentions creating a revolutionalized, regularized, specialized and professionalized team (革命化、正规化、专业化、职业化). As explained in an earlier blogpost, “revolutionized” signals absolute Party leadership. The top two goals for training are deepening education in Xi Jinping thought (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想学习教育更加深入) and further solidifying education with a Party nature (党性教育更加扎实).
What do Chinese judges need in the New Era?
The economic and social changes in China raise the competency bar for judges. A more litigious and rights conscious public, the increasingly complex economy and a greater number of cross-border transactions and interactions, (not to mention coronavirus related issues) as well as a smaller number of judges to hear more cases means that judicial training is an important part of preparing Chinese judges for the New Era. Post 19th Party Congress changes in Party policy mean that competency in Party matters is increasingly significant.
The plan does not incorporate training for foreign judges, which the NJC delivers to judges from Belt & Road Initiative jurisdictions and other countries.
Content
The Training Plan stresses ideological, ethical, and professional training, for judges and other judicial personnel. Ideological training is listed first. Judicial training is to focus on active and practical methods, including the case method (no less than 30%), moot courts, and other interactive methods. Even in the New Era, the intellectual influence of exchange and training programs with offshore counterparts (many of those in the NJC leadership had studied abroad) is apparent from the more interactive methods required.
Who’s being trained
The training requirements depend on the seniority of the judicial personnel
Court leadership: the focus is on their political education, as well as administration. The SPC will run a special training session on Xi Jinping New Era thought for a large group of court leaders, with newly appointed ones required to participate in training within a year of appointment. In the next five years, they must participate in a certain minimum number of hours of Party school, cadre education, or judicial training.
The plan also calls for providing different types of training depending on court needs–off-site vs. on-site training, web-based training, circuit teaching (some of the younger SPC judges are sent to courts in western provinces to deliver training).
Special training program for new judges: the judicial training program (apparently drawing from the practice in Taiwan and Japan) for new judges highlighted almost five years ago still has not been put in place. The new plan calls for research into implementing measures for training for newly appointed judges and organizing training for a group that qualifies to take part in unified pre-service training) (研究制定法官职前培训实施办法, 组织符合条件的人员参加统一职前培训).
How will the Plan be implemented?
As I wrote in December, one of the little-discussed aspects of being in a leadership role in the SPC in the New Era ensuring that policies, actions, initiatives, and other decisions hit the target of being politically correct (post 19th Party Congress and post 19th Party Congress 4th Plenum) while being “problem-oriented” (坚持问题导向) that is, addressing relevant practical issues facing the court system. As mentioned then, it is true for the leadership of the NJC as well as other SPC divisions and institutions, as can be seen from one document.
The NJC very usefully (for the outside observer, at least) posted a notice soliciting proposals (from qualified individuals and institutions) for judicial training in 2020 under the new plan. The guide to the proposals sets out the desired content, which must not only be politically correct (a given), but also creative (new training methods or viewpoints), and relevant–focusing on the new and difficult issues facing the courts. The solicitation lists 66 topics in seven categories:
Ideological related training is listed first, of course, with six subtopics which include: Xi Jinping new ideology and strategy for ruling the country by law (listed first); enhancing socialist core values in judgments (see my earlier blogpost on a related topic); political discipline rules as derived from the Party charter, regulations, and discipline.
Professionalism: (four subtopics)–professional ethics and judicial values; judicial work-style and the standardization of judicial acts; anti-corruption issues and countermeasures; outstanding Chinese traditional legal culture and socialist justice (unclear whether this is meant to solicit critical views of Chinese traditional legal culture);
Judicial capacity: this one has twenty-three subtopics, with a good portion also to be found in other jurisdictions: civil, commercial, administrative and criminal justice values and judgment formation; judgment writing and courtroom control; difficult financial cases; while other reflect Chinese characteristics: what to consider when hearing difficult and complicated cases involving the public (涉众型) (these are either criminal or civil cases); protecting property rights and preventing mistaken cases; intellectual property trials and serving the innovative strategy; dealing with zombie enterprises.
General courses: (eight subtopics)—again, a mixture of courses seen elsewhere, and ones with Chinese characteristics: guiding the media; mediation techniques; blockchain, AI and the courts.
Case study courses: (13 subtopics)-–most of the topics are ones found elsewhere in judicial academies, such as financial crimes, juvenile justice, and corporate disputes, but others reflect the New Era, such Xi Jinping New Era thought cases and case pedagogy, cases promoting and applying the “FengqiaoExperience“; and sweeping black and eliminating evil cases.
Discussion courses: Criminal, civil, and administrative law courses.
Judicial reform: only six topics here, including implementing the judicial responsibility system; establishing intelligent courts; separating simple from complicated cases; administrative litigation reform, and promoting a trial based criminal justice system.
On 11 October, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued brief guidance establishing a mechanism for resolving its inconsistent decisions, entitled “Implementing Measures on Establishing a Mechanism for Resolving Differences in the Application of Law (Implementing Measures) (关于建立法律适用分歧解决机制的实施办法). The guidance did not appear in Chinese legal media until the end of October. The intent of the guidance is to create a mechanism to resolve the old problem of inconsistent court decisions concerning the same issue (same cases decided differently 同案不同判) made by Chinese courts and even within the SPC. Widespread use of the SPC’s judgments database has brought this phenomenon to greater public attention. With the explosion in the number of cases in the Chinese courts and in the SPC in particular in recent years, the issue of divergent views within the SPC on the same issue is likely to be occurring even more frequently. The concern about uniformity or consistency of judicial decisions has its roots in the traditional Chinese legal system and is an ongoing topic of discussion among Chinese judges, legal practitioners, legal academics, and law students.
For those with an interest in the details of how the SPC operates, this document does not have the status of a judicial interpretation but the SPC’s judicial committee has approved it, as is evident from the title of the document (measures/办法 and the document number 法发〔2019〕23号 (Fa Fa (2019) #23. Judicial interpretations must have one of four titles and have a document number with Fa Shi 法释. The reason that the SPC judicial committee approved it is linked to Article 7 of the recently released guidance on judicial committees: “the adjudication [judicial] committee of the Supreme People’s Court is to unify law through means such as adopting and drafting judicial interpretations and normative documents (规范性文件), and publishing guiding cases.”
This mechanism has its antecedents in several previous judicial reform documents, and is one that is contained reform measure #23 of the last round of judicial reforms and reform measure #26 of the current round::
#23….Complete and improve working mechanisms for the uniform application of law.
#26 Improve mechanisms for the uniform application of law. Strengthen and regulate work on judicial interpretations, complete mechanisms for researching, initiating, drafting, debating, reviewing, publishing, cleaning up, and canceling judicial interpretations, to improve centralized management and report review mechanisms. Improve the guiding cases system, complete mechanisms for reporting, selecting, publishing, assessing, and applying cases. Establish mechanisms for high people’s courts filing for the record trial guidance documents and reference cases. Complete mechanisms for connecting the work of case discussion by presiding judges and collegial panel deliberations, the compensation commission, and the judicial committee. Improve working mechanisms for mandatory searches and reporting of analogous cases and new types of case. (完善统一法律适用机制。 加强和规范司法解释工作,健全司法解释的调研、立项、起草、论证、审核、发布、清理和废止机制,完善归口管理和报备审查机制。完善指导性案例制度,健全案例报送、筛选、发布、评估和应用机制。建立高级人民法院审判指导文件和参考性案例的备案机制。健全主审法官会议与合议庭评议、赔偿委员会、审判委员会讨论案件的工作衔接机制。完善类案和新类型案件强制检索报告工作机制)
A brief summary of the mechanism is set out, followed by my preliminary thoughts on the mechanism and related issues.
The mechanism
The Implementing Measures, which went into effect on 28 October, provide that if certain SPC entities or lower courts discover that the SPC has issued valid judgments (判决) or rulings (裁定) (the Chinese term is “生效裁判”) which apply the law differently (存在法律适用分歧), or an ongoing case may result in the later decision applying the law differently from that in a previous SPC case, the matter should be brought to the attention of the SPC judicial committee through an application process managed by the Trial Management Office.
Article 1 of the Implementing Measures designates the SPC judicial committee (also translated as adjudication committee 审判委员会) as the institution to resolve and guide differences in the application of law.
Article 2 authorize operational divisions of the SPC (业务部门), the higher people’s courts and specialized people’s courts to submit an application to the SPC’s Trial Management Office which may be eventually considered by the SPC’s judicial committee if either:
there is a discrepancy in the application of law of judicial decisions of the SPC that are already effective (最高人民法院生效裁判之间存在法律适用分歧的);
or there is a difference in the application of law between the conclusions in a case being tried and principles or standards on the application of law already determined in effective decisions of the SPC (在审案件作出的裁判结果可能与最高人民法院生效裁判确定的法律适用原则或者标准存在分歧的).
Article 3 authorizes the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence (CIAJ) to submit an application to the Trial Management Office if it encounters differences in the application of law in effective judgments of the SPC that it encounters during its focused research work on like cases decided consistently (类案同判专项研究).
If the Trial Management Office determines the matter should be accepted (project initiation) (立项), that office is required to refer the matter to the CIAJ, which is required to provide an initial view to the Trial Management Office within five working days. Presumably, they will do little additional research and will focus on reviewing the materials submitted by the entity involved. In some situations, it appears to put CIAJ in the odd position of reviewing its own work. The Trial Management Office forwards the initial view of the CIAJ to the SPC operational division involved for further review and response. The operational division involved may involve experts in needed. The operational division should draft a response (复审意见) in a timely manner to the Trial Management Office, which should submit a request to an SPC leader (presumably the relevant SPC vice president) to place the matter on the judicial committee agenda. Once the judicial committee makes a decision, the entity that applied for a determination is to be informed. The Trial Management Office is required to provide a proposal containing the form and scope of the decision by the judicial committee for approval (提出发布形式与发布范围意见). It can be anticipated that determinations on non-sensitive topics may be made public, while those on more sensitive topics will be distributed either solely within the court system or to a relevant category of judges. Article 11 of the Implementing Measures requires SPC operational divisions, local courts, and specialized courts to make reference and implement (参照执行) the SPC judicial committee’s decision in the course of their work. Presumably that will depend on how widely distributed the determination is.
Some preliminary thoughts
In my view, the mechanism is a microcosm of themes reflecting how the SPC operates. As mentioned above, the SPC decides (either through judgments or rulings) large numbers of cases yearly, and the SPC responds to an unknown number of requests for instructions (请示), mostly on legal issues, which means that in practice that issues on the same body of law may be determined by different divisions of the SPC or different teams of SPC judges. So differences in legal issues may arise either through litigation or court administrative-type procedures. While SPC judges in practice (as I understand it) search for similar cases, it is inevitable that different people have different views on legal issues. Unlike some other legal systems, the SPC has not evolved an en banc or enlarged panel of judges (this description of how France’s highest court operates provides a good example) as the final institution for resolving these issues. Designating the SPC’s judicial committee reflects the traditional administrative way (官本位) that SPC makes major decisions concerning legal issues. As I described in a recent blogpost, the members of the SPC’s judicial committee are its senior leaders.
I surmise that many of the differences in views will be resolved before the matters reach the judicial committee. In comments made on the Implementing Measures, Justice He Xiaorong (head of the #2 Circuit Court) mentions that he has inaugurated a system of enlarged panels of judges that include those with a public law and private law background, and familiar with civil, criminal, and administrative law, to consider cases involving difficult issues. That system will reduce somewhat the pipeline of issues possibly entering this mechanism. For those issues that enter the mechanism, it is possible that opposing views may be harmonized when the operational division of the SPC needs to respond to the points summarized by the CIAJ. I predict that relatively few questions will go to the SPC judicial committee itself. The mechanism may have been designed with that goal in mind or may have that impact.
Additionally, from my reading of the Implementing Measures, the drafting could have benefited from more input from greater input either within the SPC or without, which could have avoided some of the problems I point out below. I surmise that the drafters were so used to the terminology used within the SPC, they did not realize that lack of clarity will confuse the lower courts and the greater legal community, for whom this system may have practical implications. In particular, the Implementing Measures:
do not define what is meant by differences in the application of law (法律适用分歧). Presumably, a major difference in the application of law is intended and the SPC judicial committee (and its gatekeeper, which appears to be the Trial Management Office) will consider carefully which inconsistencies merit a determination by the judicial committee. My understanding is that the judicial committee is reluctant to reverse its determinations on particular legal issues within a short time, as it seeks to provide legal certainty on particular issues through judicial interpretations and other documents. As I described in my 2019 article on the SPC and FTZs, rules or policies included in SPC judicial policy documents may eventually be crystallized in SPC judicial interpretations and eventually codified in national law, but that process is slow and cannot meet the needs of the lower courts, which need to deal properly (politically and legally) with outstanding legal issues pending a more permanent stabilization.
do not define the term “裁判,” which generally refers to judgments (判决) and rulings (裁定). To a casual reader, at least, it is not clear whether it is intended to include responses to requests for instructions (requests for advisory opinions, 请示). As I wrote in a blogpost earlier this year, some responses to requests for instructions are entitled fuhan 复函 and others dafu 答复. The editors (from the SPC) of a two-volume collection of responses described them as ‘usually called quasi-judicial interpretation documents’ (往往被称为准司法解释性文件) and ‘a necessary supplement to judicial interpretations’ (它是对司法解释一种必须的补充). It is not unusual for these responses to conflict with one another, as reasonable people can disagree and multiple institutions within the SPC issue responses on the same or related bodies of law. I have not noticed a document (at least one that was made public–I’d be grateful to be informed otherwise) describing an existing mechanism requiring the drafters of these responses to review related responses issued by other divisions. Differences in the application of law could also arise between an existing response and later judgment, or draft judgment.
do not define what is meant by “业务部门” (operational departments/divisions). Does it include the SPC’s Research Office (which one knowledgeable person described as a comprehensive operational department (综合业务部门)), which often issues responses to requests for instructions? Research into another issue has led to an authoritative answer to this question. The knowledgeable person was citing “chapter and verse” from a 1995 SPC reply:”研究室是一个综合性的审判业务部门 ” (see Reply of the Supreme People’s Court as to Whether the Research Office is an Operational Department (最高人民法院关于人民法院研究室是否属审判业务部门的复函).
are very weak on specific procedures for when a question of law should be referred to this mechanism. Consider, for example, a case that is being considered by one of the divisions of the SPC. 2017 SPC regulations on the SPC’s responsibility system mention professional (presiding) judges meetings (as discussed in a 2017 blogpost and again severaltimesthis year. The Implementing Measures do not specify whether the issue should be reviewed by the division’s professional judges meeting before it is submitted to the Trial Management Office. Presumably that will be the case, as the judicial committee guidance requires it. In Justice He Xiaorong, clarifies that the professional judges meeting is an important institution for resolving differences in the application of law. As a practical matter, will this procedure suspend civil litigation procedures? It is unclear.
do not clarify what will be included in the package of documents that goes to the Trial Management Office. Will it be similar to the documents that go to the judicial committee under its new guidance on judicial committees? It appears that the Implementing Measures are not well integrated with the new guidance on judicial committees. I surmise (please message me if I am mistaken) that the drafting of the Implementing Measures and the guidance on judicial committees was siloed, a frequent problem in the Chinese and other bureaucracies, so that the drafters of the Implementing Measures were unaware of the details of the new judicial committee guidance. As I wrote last month, those contain more specific requirements concerning the content of the report that the judges are required to prepare for the judicial committee, including arguments by both/all parties, prosecution/defense counsel and a clear listing of the issues on the application of law that require discussion and decision by the adjudication committee, the opinions of the professional (presiding) judges meeting. The guidance also requires judges preparing these reports to search for similar or related cases. I surmise that these requirements will be consolidated in practice.
give special authority to the CIAJ in the course of its research work on like cases. It is also possible that CIAJ could encounter major inconsistencies in its other work, such as compiling its Selection of People’s Court Cases (mentioned in my 2017 Tsinghua China Law Review article). Moreover, it is curious that the CIAJ is given this special authority but not an analogous institution in the National Judges College. Article 3 authorizes the CIAJ to submit an application relating to differences in the application discovered in the course of its work, while the Judicial Case Academy of the SPC (under the National Judges College) (see a list of its 2018-2019 research projects) has no such authority, giving the careful reader the impression that the CIAJ led the drafting of the Implementing Measures. It appears to be a version of a phenomenon I described in a draft article, that because the SPC is a large organization, with many entities competing for top leadership attention, policy documents are sometimes drafted with consideration of institutional interests, as a policy document approved by the SPC judicial committee can be seen as representing an undertaking by SPC leadership to the institutional goals of division or entity involved.
2016 meeting of SPC judicial committee, to which NPC, CPCC representatives, and certain experts were invited
On 22 September the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) updated itsguidance to the lower courts on judicial committees (关于健全完善人民法院审判委员会工作机制的意见). (also translated as “adjudication committees”) (审判委员会). For those new to this blog, these committees are made up of certain senior members of a court, and they have special decision-making authority, as detailed below. They decide cases that are too difficult or important for an individual judge or judicial panel to decide, to ensure the optimal substantive result (as seen from the institutional perspective of the courts).
The document is a policy document (explained here), as indicated by its document number 法发〔2019〕20号). Lower courts (and the specialized courts) can issue further detailed guidance, have in the past and will do so. In 2010 the SPC issued guidance on judicial committees (2010 guidance), which I analyzed in this article, Reforming-judicial-committees. The article includes some insights from a number of judges with whom I spoke at the time. Reforming judicial committees has been on the SPC’s agenda since the prior round of judicial reforms, as my 2014 blogpost discusses. I predicted that reform would occur “in the medium term.” There are is a great deal of writing about judicial committees in English and especially in Chinese. My 2014 blogpost links to some of the English language research, and other insights about how judicial committees work can be found in Embedded Courts, the prize-winning book by NG Kwai Hang and He Xin.
The broad consensus on judicial committee reform can be seen in Articles 36-39 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts, as amended in 2018 (2018 People’s Courts Law), but the 2019 guidance sets out more detailed rules.
This blogpost will highlight some of the issues that come to mind in a quick review.
A quick list of what is new follows:
There are some changes in the format of SPC Opinions (意见) so that it is usual for them to begin with a list of basic principles.
As to be expected, Party leadership and related principles are listed at the top of both the 2019 and 2010 guidance. Both stress upholding Party leadership of the work of the people’s courts, with the 2019 guidance referring to “upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over the work of the people’s courts.” This should not at all be surprising, as the phrase has been used repeatedly since the 2019 Political-Legal Work Conference. The Party Regulations on Political-Legal Work use the phrase “Party’s absolute leadership.” As I mentioned earlier this year, Li Ling (of the University of Vienna) sees this as indicating a complete and unambivalent severance from the judicial independence framework.
On membership of judicial committees, The 2018 People’s Courts Law and the new guidance retain the old system of having the court president and vice-presidents, but no longer requires division heads (庭长) to be members, but refers to “experienced”(资深) judges and to the possibility of having full-time members. The SPC already does this. Justices Hu Yunteng, Liu Guixiang, Pei Xianding, and He Xiaorong are full-time members of the judicial committee, which gives them a bureaucratic rank equivalent to being an SPC vice president, with attendant privileges. It is likely that the Central Staffing Commission regulates the number of persons who can be SPC vice presidents. Judging by the SPC website, some SPC judicial committee members are not SPC Party Group members, although of course there is some overlap.
Another innovation in the 2018 People’s Courts Law, repeated in the 2019 guidance, is having specialized judicial committees, to focus on more specialized issues, and to deal with the problem of having non-specialist judges making decisions on issues regarding which they are not familiar. This provision consolidates ongoing practice in both the SPC and lower courts My understanding is that the Shenzhen Intermediate Court was one of the earlier courts to establish specialist judicial committees. The roots of this innovation lie in the 2004-2008 Second Judicial Reform Five Year Plan Outline. (This also illustrates the time it takes for some judicial reforms to be adopted.)
On the functions of judicial committees, new language mentions “sensitive, major, and difficult cases such as those involving national security, diplomacy, or social stability.” That language is new as compared to the 2010 guidance. It is not new to the SPC, as it appears in the SPC’s 2017 judicial responsibility regulations, about which I wrote. I surmise that this is just spelling out what had been the general practice. Most of the other functions are consistent with previous guidance.
The operational language is more detailed than before and gives a glimpse into the bureaucratic nature of the Chinese court system ( a collegial panel or single judge who thinks a case should go to the judicial committee “submit an application and report it up to the court president for approval level by level; and where an application is not submitted, but the court president finds it necessary, they may request that the adjudication committee deliberate and make a decision. The language enabling a court president to designate a case for judicial committee discussion likely represents a consolidation of practice, rather than something new.
Other procedures in the operational section are new, reflecting the new institution of the professional judges committee and much more specific requirements concerning the content of the report that the judges are required to prepare for the judicial committee, including arguments by both/all parties, prosecution/defense counsel and a clear listing of the issues on the application of law that require discussion and decision by the adjudication committee, the opinions of the professional (presiding) judges meeting. In a clear signal about how the SPC sees the importance of case research, it also requires judges preparing these reports to search for similar or related cases.
The 2019 guidance requires judicial committee members with a conflict to recuse themselves (the language is unclear about whether a party can apply to do that). This is new, and reflects many years of criticism of the failure to have a recusal mechanism.
The 2019 guidance also imposes a quorum requirement on judicial committee meetings, both the plenary and specialized committee meetings. Certain outsiders (people’s congress delegates, scholars, etc) may attend, as well as the chief procurator at the same level or his delegate (this latter provision is not new).
Decisions are made by at least half of the members attending and dissenting opinions must be recorded in the case file. It does not mention that dissenting opinions will be mentioned in the judgment issued to the parties and the public. As before, the decision of the judicial committee is binding on the judge or judges who heard the case (principle of democratic centralism).
The 2018 People’s Court Law and new guidance require the decision and reasoning in cases discussed by the adjudication committee to be disclosed in the judgment documents unless the law provides otherwise, so a significant step forward in judicial committee transparency. The lack of judicial committee transparency had been criticized for many years.
Judicial committees at all levels of the courts are now required to create an audio or visual recording of the entire process of judicial committee meetings and keep them confidential. Judicial committee proceedings are required to be incorporated in a court’s caseflow management system. It is not clear from the guidance who or which entity would have access.
Those not involved in judicial committee proceedings (outside leaders, senior judges not involved) are forbidden from involving themselves in judicial committee proceedings. If this didn’t happen in practice, it wouldn’t have been included in this guidance.
Similarly, the language in the 2019 rules on judicial committee members and other maintaining confidentiality and work discipline, and not leaking trial work secrets (I discuss this in my article published earlier this year. If this didn’t happen in practice, it wouldn’t have been included in this guidance.
Although for many years proposals have been made to abolish the judicial committee, I have rarely heard anyone who has worked in the Chinese judicial system agree with that proposal. It seems more likely that the SPC thinking is maintaining the judicial committee system is appropriate for China at this time, given the level of professionalism nationwide, the need to share/avoid responsibility for making difficult decisions, and the greater political environment. This guidance appears to be designed to deal with some of the abuses of the judicial committee system, have greater (but not complete) transparency, incorporate new court institutions, and generally improve how the committees operate.
collection of post 18th Party congress judicial policy documents, edited by the SPC’s General Office
I recently participated in an academic conference in which one speaker discussed Chinese judicial documents (other than judicial interpretations). The speaker’s view was very critical of them, a view shared by a good number of academics in China. A recent law review article published in a US law journal mischaracterized at least some of these documents. I have my own views and understanding of what these documents mean, based on many years reviewing these documents and long discussions with knowledgeable people “who cannot be named” and whose help can only be indirectly acknowledged. I have discussed SPC judicial documents in an earlier blogpost. I also discuss them in my book chapter on judicial transparency, and book chapter on the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) policy document on free trade zones, the Opinions on Providing Judicial Guarantee for the Building of Pilot Free Trade Zones (最高人民法院關于為自由貿易試驗區建設提供司法保障的意見 FTZ Opinion). This blogpost melds excerpts from those book chapters.
It is a fact that the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issues a broad range of documents that guide the lower courts in addition to its judicial interpretations. The SPC creates and transmits to the lower courts new judicial policy in the form of an “opinion” (意见), which is also a type of Party/government document. This same term is used for documents jointly issued by the SPC and institutions not authorized to issue judicial interpretations. This blogpost focuses solely on SPC policy documents.
The SPC classifies opinions as “judicial normative documents” (司法文件 or 司法规范性文件(the title of this Wechat public account) and sometimes judicial policy documents” (司法政策性文件). As I’ve written before, this fuzzy use of terminology is not unusual. An (authoritative) follower has proposed using the English translation “judicial regulatory document” for 司法规范性文件. An authoritative person (who cannot be named), concurred with the follower’s proposal. Those with views on the translation point should use the contact function or contact me by email.
These documents are issued with the identifier “法发” (fafa), indicating that they have been approved by the judicial committee of the SPC or one or more senior SPC leaders. Transparency is better than before (and the SPC has issued documents encouraging greater transparency) but there is no strict publication requirement, unlike judicial interpretations.
The FTZ Opinion is an example of how the SPC supports the Party and government by issuing documents to support important initiatives. This is a subject that I have written about on this blog before. These SPC policy documents signal an evolution of judicial policy, establish new legal rules and direct the lower courts. Lower courts implement these measures in various ways, including in their court judgments or rulings and to further implement SPC judicial policy documents. Local courts may issue implementing guidance, as SPC policy is intended to be a framework under which local courts issue more specific measures to deal with specific local issues.
The FTZ Opinion signals evolving judicial policy to FTZ courts in a number of areas, including on civil and commercial law issues. For example, it states that courts should
support FTZ finance leasing companies and should respect the agreement of cross-border parties regarding jurisdiction and governing law. It states that a finance lease contract shall not be determined to be null and void because relevant procedures had not been performed.
The drafting of these judicial policy documents, such as the FTZ Opinion, follow a drafting process similar to judicial interpretations. The usual practice in drafting judicial interpretations is for the SPC to engage in extensive research and fieldwork, consult with related institutions within the SPC and external institutions when relevant (another academic article stuck in the production pipeline will describe the process in more detail).
The drafting team for the FTZ Opinion engaged in several years of field work, established an FTZ Research Base in Shanghai, held a Judicial Forum for the Pilot Free Trade Zones, solicited the views of experts and local courts, in the areas where FTZs are located. The SPC’s #4 Civil Division, in charge of foreign and cross-border related civil and commercial cases and related issues, took primary responsibility for drafting the opinion. The reason that the #4 Civil Division took the lead was that much of the substantive parts of the FTZ Opinion relates to foreign trade, foreign investment, and cross-border arbitration issues. Earlier Shanghai local court guidance was incorporated into the FTZ Opinion. Once the draft was relatively advanced, it was circulated to other relevant areas of the SPC for comments. As the team of judges who led the drafting focus on cross-border civil and commercial issues, they sought comments on related issues from the Research Office, likely one of the criminal divisions and the administrative division. Consistent with general judicial practice (and SPC rules), the FTZ Opinion was not issued for public comment. The drafting of the FTZ Opinion is one small example of the quasi-administrative way in which the SPC operates.
Rules or policies included in SPC judicial policy documents may eventually be crystallized in SPC judicial interpretations and eventually codified in national law, but
that process is slow and cannot meet the needs of the lower courts. The lower courts need to deal properly (politically and legally) with outstanding legal issues pending a more permanent stabilization of legal rules. This is true for judicial policy documents in all areas of the law, not only in commercial law.
The National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee recently revised theOrganic Law of the People’s Courts (People’s Courts Law, English translation available at Chinalawtranslate.com), the framework law by which the Chinese courts operate. The NPC took the lead in drafting it, rather than the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). It retains the framework of the old law, incorporates legislative changes and many judicial reforms, leaves some flexibility for future reforms, and updates some of the general principles in the old law that apparently are on the dust heap of history (历史的垃圾堆). Some of the principles newly incorporated reflect the reorientation of the Chinese courts, over the past 40 years while others represent long-term goals. Some provisions originally in earlier drafts have been deleted because the NPC Constitution and Law Committee considered that the time was not ripe for incorporating them.
The law contains some oddities, such as using two terms for judges, both “审判员” (shenpanyuan) (used four times) and “法官” (faguan)(used 38 times). None of the official commentary has explained the reason for the mixed terminology. My own guess is that it is linked to the use of “审判员” in the Constitution, but anyone with more insights into this is welcome to provide clarity.
The People’s Courts Law does not stand on its own. It is connected with other legislation, such as the Judges’ Law (amendments under consideration, with the drafting led by the SPC (this 2017 article criticizes some of the disconnects between the two) .the three procedure laws, the Civil Servants Law, as well as with Communist Party (Party) regulations. As the courts are led by the Party, its regulations also affect how the amended People’s Courts Law will operate when it becomes effective on 1 January 2019.
General Provisions
Some of the principles newly incorporated into the law reflect the reorientation of the Chinese courts over the past 40 years towards more civil disputes and an increasing number of administrative disputes, while others represent long-term goals.
Article 2 has relegated some of the dated language from what was previously Article 3 to the dust heap of history–references to the “system of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” “socialist property,” and the “smooth progress of the socialist revolution”). Those have been replaced by language such as “ensuring the innocent are not prosecuted,” “protecting the lawful rights and interests of individuals and organizations,” preserving national security and social order, social fairness and justice, and the uniformity, dignity, and authority of the state’s legal system.
The principle of “ensuring the innocent are not prosecuted” makes its first appearance in the People’s Courts Law. I recommend this new article by a member of the Beijing Procuratorate, (in part) criticizing the poisonous effect of the “declared innocent” performance indicators of procurators on Chinese criminal justice.
On protecting the “lawful interests of individuals and organizations,” rapidly changing judicial policy and inconsistencies between criminal and civil law may mean that what is recognized as valid under civil law may be considered a bribe under criminal law. Additionally, although the People’s Courts Law deletes language that distinguishes among owners of different types of Chinese companies, Chinese criminal law still does (see this chart setting out sentencing guidelines, for example).
Article 6, on judicial fairness, contains language on respecting and protecting human rights. Foreigners may think it is directed at them, but it is more likely aimed at Chinese citizens.
Article 7 calls for the courts to carry out judicial openness, except as otherwise provided by law. It is generally recognized that the courts are much more transparent than before, although specialist analysis in and out of China points out that there remains much to be done.
Article 8 incorporates judicial responsibility systems into the law (a prominent feature of the recent judicial reforms), described by two judges as the “sword of Damocles hanging over judges” (( 法官办案责任追究是时刻悬挂在法官们头上的“达摩克利斯之剑”) and a topic regarding which more dispassionate analysis is making its way into print.
Article 11 has important language about the right of the masses (i.e. ordinary people, that term is alive and well) to know of (知情), participate in (参与·), and supervise the courts (according to law). However, the devil is in the details, as procedures for exercising these rights remain limited and sometimes lacking.
Organization (set up and authority) of the courts
Article 15 mentions some of the specialized courts that have been established over the last thirty years:
Maritime courts, legislation found here; translation of SPC regulations on jurisdiction found here.
Intellectual property courts, legislation found here, a summary of SPC regulations on jurisdiction found here.
Financial courts, see the SPC’s regulations on the Shanghai financial court.
The military courts still lack their own legislation (an earlier discussion of this issue is found here).
Article 19 crystallizes the SPC’s circuit courts (tribunals) into law (SPC regulations on the jurisdiction of those courts found here).
Articles 26 and 27 give courts some flexibility on their internal structure (courts in remote areas with few cases need not establish divisions, while large city courts can have multiple specialized ones. (Earlier blogposts have mentioned establishing bankruptcy divisions, for example.) Article 27 also mentions establishing (or not) comprehensive divisions (the administrative departments of courts, that according to a recent academic article can constitute close to half the headcount in a court and that some court leaders value more highly than operational divisions (the divisions hearing cases).
Trial Organization
This section of the law incorporates the current judicial reforms in several ways, including:
In Article 30, on the operation of collegial panels and requiring the court president to be the presiding judge when s(he) participates in a collegial panel;
Mentioning in Article 31 that dissenting opinions are to be recorded and that members of the collegial panel (or sole judge) are the ones to sign their judgments and the court is to issue it;
Article 34 gives space for eliminating the role of people’s assessors to determine issues of law, linked to Article 22 of the People’s Assessors Law;
Articles 36-39 includes new provisions on judicial/adjudication committees. It consolidates current reforms by crystalizing specialist judicial committees (civil/criminal). An important reform is requiring the views of the judicial committee to be disclosed in the judgment (the view is binding on the collegial panel that has submitted the case. These articles also include related stipulations such as quorum requirements and making judicial committee members responsible for their views and votes. (See previous scholarship on this important institution).
Article 37 incorporates into law previous SPC regulations on judicial interpretations, specifying that they must be approved by the full (plenary) SPC judicial committee while guiding cases can be approved by a specialized committee of the SPC judicial committee.
Court Personnel
This section of the law uses the terminology :”审判员” (shenpanyuan) and “法官” (faguan). It also incorporates the personnel reforms set out in the judicial reform documents in several ways: quota judge system; selecting higher court judges from the lower courts; the roles of judicial assistants and clerks (changed from the old model); other support personnel in the courts; a new career track for judges, including judicial selection committees; preference to hiring judges with legal qualifications;
Article 47 requires court presidents to have legal knowledge and experience. It has long been an issue that court presidents have been appointed more for their political than legal expertise. Under the Chinese court system, an effective court president requires both sets of skills.
It appears that the reform of having judges below the provincial level appointed by the provincial level is not yet in place,
Safeguards for the courts’ exercise of authority
This section of the law links with the Judges Law and the People’s Police Law (in relation to judicial police).
Article 52 gives courts the right to refuse to engage in activities that violate their legally prescribed duties (will this end the phenomenon of judges sweeping streets?);
Article 53 relates to reforms relating to enforcement of judgments (and the social credit system);
Article 55 relates to judicial (and judicial personnel training, both theoretical/(ideological) and professional)–some earlierblogposts have shed light on this topic.
Article 56 indicates that headcount for court personnel is subject to special regulation(人民法院人员编制实行专项管理, distinct from other civil servants.
Article 58 incorporates into the law President Zhou Qiang’s focus on the informatization (including the use of the internet and big data) of the Chinese courts.
Drafting process
The drafting process (the explanation and otherarticles have the details) reflects the drafting of much Chinese legislation (further insights about the process from Jamie Horsley here). The SPC Party Group designated personnel to research specific issues and engage with the drafters. The drafting involved several years of soft consultation by the drafters of relevant Party and government authorities, plus limited public consultations. Among the central Party authorities consulted were: Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Central Organizational Department (in charge of cadres); Central Staffing Commission (in charge of headcount); Central Political-Legal Committee. On the government side: Supreme People’s Court and Procuratorate; State Council Legislative Affairs Office; Ministry of Finance, National People’s Congress Legal Work Committee. Investigations and consultations were also done at a local level.
When I write about the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), like many others writing about Chinese law in English, I face translation issues, as legal concepts are embedded in language. The challenge is to find appropriate legal terminology in English for PRC Chinese legal concepts, an issue that “brother” blogger and creator of the Chinalawtranslate.com blog Jeremy Daum, and more broadly, anyone dealing with the Chinese legal system confronts directly.
He Fan , head of the planning department of the SPC’s judicial reform office, prolific translator of (English language) books on the US courts, particularly the US Supreme Court, has recently written about English translation of Chinese court terminology in hisWechat public account. Earlier, the Chinalaw listserv also hosted a discussion of the translation of some specific Chinese court terms. To bridge the translation worlds, I am summarizing He Fan’s views on the translation of court terms, with my own comments in italics. He Fan’s sources are listed at the end, as are details on how to make comments or corrections.
司法机关: literally translated as “judicial organs,” which in English generally refers to the courts only, but in Chinese sometimes means 公检法 (public security/procuratorate/courts). Foreign journalists often have difficulty understanding this term. He Fan notes that if the term is translated as the “Judicial Branch,” it appears to mean the court system [and to an English speaker implies a system with multiple branches of government];
审判机关: He Fan translates as “Adjudicative Body,” which he says is generally accepted internationally, but in my own experience “judicial organ” is used more frequently.
审判员: he considers “judge” more easily understood (my 1993 article had a discussion of this vs. 法官);
The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China”–He Fan notes that internationally, SPC is the usual abbreviation;
地方各级人民法院: local people’s courts at various levels;
“基层人民法院: He Fan notes several different usages–“primary people’s court”; “grass-roots people’s court”; “basic people’s court”; “district people’s court”–he prefers primary people’s court.
He Fan’s example: 北京市海淀区人民法院:Primary People’s Court of Haidian District of Beijing Municipality of the People’s Republic of China; abbreviated as Haidian Primary People’s Court [I would personally move “Haidian District, to before “Primary/basic level people’s court]
7. 中级人民法院”–usual translation is “intermediate people’s court.”
8. 高级人民法院:,“higher people’s court;,“high people’s court,” or rarely “superior people’s court”–He Fan’s preference is “High Court;”
9. 专门法院: He Fan notes that “Special Court” is sometimes seen but “Specialized Court” is more accurate,and won’t be mistaken for special tribunal。
军事法院: “Military Court”;
海事法院: “Maritime Court”;
“知识产权法院”译为“Intellectual Property Court”;
“金融法院”译为“Financial Court”;
“互联网法院: “Internet Court,” He Fan says some translate it as “Court for Internet,” but the usual translation appears to be Internet Court.
Internal court organizations
In his first Wechat article, He Fan splits internal court institutions into those designated by law and other ones, but this blogpost will disregard that distinction.
独任庭: single judge panel
合议庭: collegial panel;
国家赔偿委员会: “the State Compensation Committee.” I have also seen “State Compensation Commission.”
审判委员会: “Judicial Committee”,or “Adjudication Committee,” He Fan prefers “Adjudication Committee,” as it is less likely to be confused with committees created by the judiciary. My view is that “judicial committee” is used more widely.
庭:He Fan mentions chamber, division, tribunal, or “adjudication tribunal,” but he himself prefers “division,” as he considers it more accepted internationally, so:
立案庭: Case-filing Division;
民事审判庭: Civil Division;
刑事审判庭: Criminal Division;
行政审判庭: Administrative Division;
审判监督庭: Judicial Supervision Division;
速裁庭: Summary Division;
人民法庭: but long-established practice is to translate it as people’s tribunal.
The recently established specialized “tribunals” (审判法庭), such as “深圳金融法庭“ (Shenzhen Financial Tribunal) should be translated as “Shenzhen Financial Court,” so by the same reasoning “最高人民法院第一巡回法庭: The 1st Circuit Court of SPC” (personally I would move “SPC” to before 1st Circuit).
Personnel-related terms
法院干警: literally court cadres & policeman: He Fan believes the term is confusing to foreigners and suggests using “judges, court staff, and judicial personnel.” I have previously translated it as “court officials, (cadres & police)” and discussed the issue of terminology several times.
首席大法, 首席法官: Chief Justice” and “Chief Judge”; 中华人民共和国首席大法官: He Fan states it should be “Chief Justice of the People’s Republic of China” and not “Supreme People’s Court Chief Justice.”
高级人民法院院长: [according to the Judges Law] s/he is a 大法官– “Justice,” but “Chief Judge” of his/her court;
副院长: the practice is to translate it as “Vice President”。“常务副院长: (the #2 in charge), generally translated as “Deputy President”,or “Executive Deputy President” (I personally have seen “Executive Vice President” more often);
庭长: three translations are used–“Chief Judge”;“Director”;“Head of Division.” He Fan’s view is that “Chief Judge” is least desirable, because it is least understandable by the foreign audience and can easily be confused with “court president” and prefers “Director” and for “副庭长”–Deputy Director.” My own writing is not entirely consistent–I have used “division chief” and “chief judge of _ division.”
审判长: the responsible judge on a three-judge collegiate panel. He Fan recommends using “Presiding Judge,” analogizing to the practice of the US federal courts.
高级法官: generally translated Senior Judge (of which there are ranks 1-4), not to be confused with the US federal courts’ “senior judges” (older judges with a reduced caseload).
书记员: He Fan advising translating as “Law Clerk” (my practice has been “clerk”); 法官助理 as “Law Assistant” (my practice has been “judge’s assistant);
司法警察: “Judicial Police;”
人民陪审员: people’s assessor;
技术调查官: “Technical Examination Officer.”
Court administrative offices/personnel
办: “Office”,
局: 用“Department” or “Bureau,” (my own practice is “Bureau.”)
“处”用“Division”.
Such as: “办公厅”“General Office”;“研究室” “Research Office”;“监察局”“Supervision Bureau”;“司法改革办公室”: “Judicial Reform Office”;“国际合作局”: “International Cooperation Bureau”;“外事办”:“International Affairs Office”;“司法行政装备管理局(处)”: “Bureau(Division) of Judicial Administration & Equipment Management” (I would personally put “Bureau or Division at the end of the phrase).
Those who disagree, have comments or have additions to the above list, please contact me at supremepeoplescourtmonitor@gmail.com or use the blog’s comment function.
Senior Judge Jiang Huiling heads the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence (the Institute). He recently published twoarticles in the Chinese legal and professional press (the first of which was published in the Central Political-Legal Committee’s (authoritative) Legal Daily) signaling the phraseology and goals for judicial reform after the 19th Party Congress. As the operation of the Chinese judiciary has an important impact both domestically and internationally (as well as in greater China), post-19th Party Congress judicial reform goals are important.
For those who are not familiar with the Institute, it is the SPC’s in-house think tank. The Institute works on a broad variety of issues, particularly those linked with judicial reforms. Like think tanks elsewhere in the world, the Institute trains post-doctorate fellows and has its own staff. Judge Jiang is among a group of senior judges at the SPC who combines an international perspective (he studied at the University of Montreal, and has been a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, University of Sydney, and Academia Sinica) with profound experience in and understanding about the Chinese court system and how it can be reformed, given its complex bureaucratic nature and the environment in which it operates.
From his articles, it is clear that the new phraseology is “deepen the reform of the judicial system with comprehensive integrated reforms” (深化司法体制改革综合配套改革). The language is found deep in Xi Jinping’s 19th Communist Party Congress Report.
Background for these further reforms
Judge Jiang mentioned that during the summer of 2017, the senior political leadership approved further judicial reform measures (including written instructions from Xi Jinping to the Central Political-Legal Committee, designating Shanghai to take the lead in piloting them, initiating a series of reforms from early November. The Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan required Central approval for major reforms, so this approval should not be surprising. The beginning of this round of judicial reforms was also first piloted in Shanghai, so piloting these further reforms in Shanghai (as further described in this report) is also to be expected and it seems likely that piloting of reforms will continue in other places.
Eleven further reforms & some comments
Judge Jiang sees these further reforms as intended to implement the previous judicial reforms and classifies them into eleven broad areas. The SPC has undertaken research (designating lower courts to do so) in many of these areas (with the results to be released to the public in some form). It appears that those designing judicial reforms have realized that many judicial reforms are linked to deeper issues relating to the Chinese system.
I summarize Judge Jiang’s list and add some of my own comments or queries in italics (which should not be attributed to him):
Optimize how judicial power is allocated within the courts, including the authority to adjudicate and to administer, splitting enforcement authority from hearing cases, allocating authority within offices/divisions of the court, and reallocate the functions of higher and lower courts. The way that courts have been administered has for many years followed the (traditional) Party/state administrative model. Some reforms have been implemented in recent years, but it is unclear how much will it be possible to change this, given long-standing patterns of interaction within a court and between higher and lower courts, as well as current incentives/performance indicators. This appears to be linked to point 19, 24, and other provisions of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan .
Reform judicial administration–what should the model be–centralized administration by the SPC or local administration by each court? Judge Jiang suggests China could consider models already in place outside of China. This is linked to point 62 of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan.
Improve personnel administration, such as selection of judges, retirement, rotation of positions, discipline/punishment, retirement/resignation, education/training, headcount administration, internal institutions, etc. The current model derives from the principle of “the Party manages cadres” and is linked to basic aspects of the Chinese system such as the official ranking system (官本位) and hukou (户口). Many of the matters mentioned (such as resignation, discipline, selection and headcount administration) are now controlled or operated by Party institutions–what flexibility will there be for the courts to innovate? The judicial reforms do anticipate a separate career track for judges (and prosecutors), but it is apparent that the “devil is in the details.” If there is to be cross-jurisdictional rotation of positions, what happens to the schooling of dependents and other practical matters linked with the hukou [household registration] system? An increasing number of legal professionals and judges are women. What impact would a cross-jurisdictional rotation of positions have on women judges? How can lawyers and others outside the system be fit into the official ranking system? Under the current system, more senior judges are senior cadres, often less involved with hearing cases because of their administrative responsibilities. Will later retirement for judges mean more judges in the courtroom? The retirement issue has been under discussion for some years–see this 2015 blogpost for further background.
Reform the system of how judges are “cultivated” (法官养成机制), in particular, look to the practice of other civil law jurisdictions (including Taiwan) in establishing a two year judicial training system, rather than the current practice of entirely selecting judges from within and having them learn on the job, and increase training for serving judges. He mentions improving the system of recruiting lawyers and law professors to the judiciary. (This is related to points 50 and 52 of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan. The two-year training program proposal had been mentioned by Huang Yongwei, president of the National Judicial College, over two years ago. It is linked to judicial education policy documents issued to implement the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Outline, highlighted in this 2015 blogpost). What might be the content of this training program? From the previous policy documents we know it will include ideological, ethical, and professional training, but what will that mean in practice? There have been ongoing exchanges between the Chinese judiciary and the Singapore Judicial College– will the “beneficial experience” of Chinese judges in Singapore have any effect on the Chinese model?
Improve judicial evaluation, i.e. benchmarking of how the Chinese judiciary is doing. Judge Jiang suggests looking to domestic analytical frameworks (by the China Academy of Social Sciences and others), as well as international ones, including the Global Framework for Court Excellence and the World Justice Project, but says there are issues with data and disconnect with Chinese judicial reality.This relates to point 51 and others in the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan. Benchmarking judicial performance remains an ongoing issue, with most Chinese courts in campaign mode to achieve high case closing rates in the run-up to the New Year.
Better use of technology in the judiciary, not only big data but also use of electronic files, judicial “artificial intelligence.” For lawyers involved in cross-border cases, query when this will also imply the use of apostilles rather than the current system of notarization and consularization, as well as a more timely integration of other Chinese court procedures with those prevalent in the outside world. Pilot projects are underway in some areas regarding electronic files.
Improve litigation, including “trial-centered criminal justice reforms,” pre-trial procedures, more detailed evidence rules, separating petitioning from litigation, and the use of people’s assessors. Creating a “trial-centered criminal justice system” at the same time that expedited procedures/Chinese style plea bargaining is being promoted raises many related issues as was recently discussed at a recent conference that I attended, and separating petitioning from litigation requires improvement of legal aid to the poor and better procedures for considering litigation-related petitions (see theseearlier blogposts).
Improve the use of diversified dispute resolution, to involve resources from other social and national resources and the market to resolve disputes, leaving only those most appropriate to be resolved by the courts. This relates to point 46 of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan and related measures described in a 2016 SPC policy document, described here.
Speed up the formation of a legal profession, including reform to legal education, examinations, etc., which Judge Jiang sees as long-term issues. From my own observations in the courts, remarks by serving judges, practicing lawyers, and interactions with recent Chinese law school graduates, reforms to legal education are needed, as is some flexibility in the career path for Chinese legal academics, which stresses a Ph.D. and academic achievements, rather than any experience outside academia.
Establish a rule of law (法治) culture and environment. This, of course, is critical. However, the difficulty of doing so was most recently illustrated in the recent clearing of “low end population” from Beijing and related legal analysis (such as this article, originally published on a Chinese scholarly site.
Improve judicial administration generally, including methods of enforcing the law, legislative drafting, etc. Reforms of a grander scale appear to this observer to be difficult to implement, particularly at this stage.
Finally, Judge Jiang says these are the broad outlines of judicial reform, but they are subject to adjustment along the way.
A draft of the first comprehensive overhaul of China’s court law since 1979 (the organic/organizational law of the people’s courts) is now open for public comment (until 4 October). A translation of the draft is available at Chinalawtranslate.com (many thanks to those who made it possible). A translation of the current law is here and an explanation of the amendments has also been published. The draft is significantly longer than the earlier version of the law (66 vs. 40 articles). It retains much of the framework of the old law, incorporates legislative changes as well many of the judicial reforms, particularly since the Third and Fourth Plenums, and leaves some flexibility for future reforms. As with the current law, Communist Party regulations address (and add another layer to) some of the broad issues addressed in the draft law. Some comments:
Drafting process
The drafting process (the explanation has the details) reflects the drafting of much Chinese legislation (further insights about the process from Jamie Horsley here)–several years of soft consultation by the drafters of relevant Party and government authorities, plus one month of public consultations. Among the central Party authorities consulted were: Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, Central Organizational Department (in charge of cadres); Central Staffing Commission (in charge of headcount); Central Political Legal Committee. On the government side: Supreme People’s Court and Procuratorate; State Council Legislative Affairs Office; Ministry of Finance, National People’s Congress Legal Work Committee. Investigations and consultations were also done at a local level.
General Provisions
Some of the dated language from the 1979 version has been deleted (references to the “system of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” “socialist property,” and the “smooth progress of the socialist revolution.” replaced by “lawful rights and interests of legal persons,” and protection of national security and social order. Although the draft court law deletes language that distinguishes among owners of different types of Chinese companies, Chinese criminal law still does (see this chart setting out sentencing guidelines, for example).
Article 10 of the draft incorporates judicial responsibility systems into the law (a prominent feature of the recent judicial reforms), but a topic regarding which dispassionate analysis is hard to find.
The draft contains clear statements about judicial openness and the right of the masses (i.e. ordinary people, that term is alive and well) to know about the work of the courts (according to law).
Organization of the courts
The draft mentions some of the specialized and special courts that have been established over the last thirty years:
Maritime courts, legislation found here; translation of SPC regulations on jurisdiction found here.
Intellectual property courts, legislation found here, a summary of SPC regulations on jurisdiction found here.
The military courts still lack their own legislation (an earlier discussion of this issue is found here).
Article 15 of the draft crystallizes the SPC’s circuit courts (tribunals) into law (SPC regulations on the jurisdiction of those courts found here).
Article 24 gives space for establishing cross-administrative region courts (the time has not yet been ripe for establishing them).
Articles 26 and 27 give courts some flexibility on their internal structure (courts in remote areas with few cases need not establish divisions, while large city courts can have multiple specialized ones. (Earlier blogposts have mentioned establishing bankruptcy divisions, for example.)
Trial Organization
This section of the draft law incorporates the current judicial reforms in several ways, including:
In Articles 30-31, on the operation of collegial panels and requiring the court president to be the presiding judge when s(he) participates in a collegial panel;
Mentioning in Article 32 that the members of the collegial panel are the ones to sign their judgments and dissenting opinions are to be recorded;
Article 34 gives space for eliminating the role of people’s assessors to determine issues of law;
Article 37 incorporates into law previous SPC regulations on judicial interpretations and guiding cases, specifying that they must be approved by the SPC judicial committee;
Article 40 contains provisions imposing liability on members of the adjudication/judicial committee for their comments and their votes. It also incorporates into the law SPC regulations on disclosing the views of the judicial committee in the final judgments, except where the law provides it would be inappropriate;
Article 41 also incorporates into the law the specialized committees mentioned in judicial reform documents (briefly discussed in priorblogposts).
Court Personnel
Article 42 requires court presidents to have legal knowledge and experience. It has long been an issue that court presidents have been appointed more for their political than legal expertise.
It appears that the reform of having judges below the provincial level appointed by the provincial level is not yet in place,
This section of the draft court law incorporates the personnel reforms set out in the judicial reform documents in several ways: quota judge system; selecting higher court judges from the lower courts; the roles of judicial assistants and clerks (changed from the old model); other support personnel in the courts; a new career track for judges, including judicial selection committees; preference to hiring judges with legal qualifications;
Safeguards for the courts’ exercise of authority
Article 56 gives courts the right to refuse to engage in activities that violate their legally prescribed duties (with this end the phenomenon of judges sweeping streets?);
Article 57 relates to reforms relating to enforcement of judgments (and the social credit system);
Article 59 relates to threats to judges’ physical safety and personal dignity, that occur several times a year in China, and have been the subject of SPC regulations;
Scope for further reforms for judicial personnel management (including salary reform!) are included in this section.
Article 60 reiterates the principle that judges may only be transferred, demoted, dismissed according to procedures specified by law (Party procedures to which most judges are subject,are governed by Party rules.)
Article 62 relates to judicial (and judicial personnel training)–some earlierblogposts have shed light on this topic.
Article 64 incorporates into the draft law President Zhou Qiang’s focus on the informatization (including use of the internet and big data) of the Chinese courts.
Etc.
My apologies to readers for the long gap between posts, but several long haul trips from Hong Kong plus teaching have left me no time to post.
In a blow to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s efforts to bolster its prestige and that of the Chinese judiciary, a ruling recently published on the SPC’s court database reveals that Ms. Zuo Hong, formerly a judge (with division level rank) in the SPC’s Trial Supervision Tribunal was convicted of accepting bribes. The published ruling omits her full name and that of others involved in the case.
The initial judgment by the Beijing Eastern District People’s Court (District Court), dated 10 March 2016, from which she appealed was upheld by the #2 Beijing Intermediate People’s Court on 31 May 2016. Because the amounts involved were small (approximately RMB 70,000, particularly in comparison to many of the other corruption cases that have come to light in the last two years), her one and a half year sentence was suspended for two years. Although she avoided a jail term, she will be unable to draw on her state pension and cannot be involved directly in the legal profession.
The facts, according to the ruling (which summarizes Zuo’s confession and witness statements of others involved in the case):
The then Judge Zuo received as gifts US dollars (USD) and a BV bag (men’s style) from Judge Hui of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court, Trial Supervision Tribunal (USD $6000) and Mr. Yang, Deputy General Manager of Zhongxia Construction Group (Zhongxia, a Shaoxing, Zhejiang-based private company) (bag and USD $2000). (It appears that the bag was originally intended for Judge Hui.)
Judge Hui and Mr. Yang were classmates. Judge Zuo, who was contacted by Judge Hui, involved herself in a private lending case in the Shaanxi Higher People’s Court in which a Zhongxia subsidiary was a party (the related judgments are listed in this article). The SPC had ruled on the Zhongxia subsidiary’s re-trial petition and remanded to the Shaanxi Higher People’s Court for further proceedings. During 2014, Judge Zuo traveled to Xian four times on the matter, where she met with Judge Hui and Mr. Yang. Judges Zuo and Hui met with their contacts at that court to set out Zhongxia’s position and to have those views conveyed to the judges directly involved. According to the judgment, the Shaanxi judges met with Judges Zuo and Hui because she was from the SPC and given the hierarchical relationship, it was awkward to refuse to meet. The case was further discussed by the collegiate panel and judicial committee and eventually remanded to the Xian Intermediate Court for retrial on the basis that the facts were unclear.
According to this article, the case came to the attention of the Supervision Bureau of the SPC in January, 2015, when its personnel were investigating other cases and her iPhone and BV bag came to their attention. In April, 2015, the Supervision Bureau opened an investigation file for her case. Judge Zuo cooperated with the Supervision Bureau’s investigation and handed over the money and bag to investigators. Her case was transferred to the procuratorate on 12 June 2015, when she was taken into custody. She was arrested at the end of that month.
On 1 February 2016, the Communist Party Central Political-Legal Committee designated her case as one of seven typical cases of leadership interference in the judicial process. By that time she had been expelled from the Communist Party under its disciplinary procedures. At the end of August 2015, Ms. Zuo was formally removed from office.
Comments
It appears from Judge Zuo’s case that the Central Political-Legal Committee’s need to issue a set of typical cases of leadership interference to scare judges and other members of the political-legal establishment into compliance trumped respect for the formalities of the operation of the criminal justice system. (It is unclear whether the Central Political-Legal Committee considered the impact of that lack of respect on retaining highly qualified judges (and on other legal professionals)). (This blogpost highlighted the first set of these cases). It is likely that the Central Political-Legal Committee relied on the Party disciplinary decision in her case (see a description here) to make a determination that her case should be made public.
Senior court personnel involving themselves in cases, whether motivated by friendship or bribes, is an ongoing problem. What the two judges did is prohibited by SPC 2015 regulations and previous SPC rules. It is likely that Judge Hui has also been punished for his role in this. It seems unlikely that the Shaanxi judges were punished, as the case does not show that the internal advocacy did not affect the eventual outcome.
The case also illustrates that structural aspects of the court system have left space what is now considered “improper interference” by senior judges and were previously common practice. It also shows that internal court procedures in this case seem to have operated to blunt that interference.
The trial supervision procedure had been one of the soft spots for “improper interference,” although reforms of the trial supervision procedure under the 2015 judicial interpretation of the Civil Procedure Law (and further 2015 SPC trial supervision regulations) should diminish abuses. Chinese law had given trial supervision judges relatively broad discretion in deciding whether to re-open a case, which is important because China has a two instance system. (Current reforms require the application for re-trial to be sent to the opposing party and permit the reviewing judge to hear arguments from both sides). Judge Zuo is only one of many trial supervision judges who has been convicted of bribery. (See recent cases in Liuzhou, Shanxi, and Putian.)
As Professor Li Yuwen of Erasmus University has previously written (and which I quoted in an earlier blogpost):
judicial corruption cannot be divorced from its social context…It is unrealistic to expect judges to operate completely outside the social environment, especially in the absence of a workable system to reduce the incidence of judicial corruption…certain shortcomings of the court system leave the door open for corruption. For instance, the flexible use of the re-trial system [trial supervision] leads to the easy re-opening of cases if influential people wish to interfere in a case.This not only diminishes the finality of a case but also creates opportunities for using personal networking to change a court’s judgment.
Furthermore, the relatively law judicial salary makes judges an easy target for corruption…In modern-day China, a profession’s income is too often linked to the profession’s social status. Judges’ low salaries are not conducive to building self-respect amongst the profession and, moreover, they constitute a major ground for fostering judicial corruption.
How low was Zuo Hong’s salary, that she thought it worth her while to risk her freedom and career for USD $8000?
In the past year, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has issued several policy documents that contain the same phrase: serve the nation’s major strategy (服务国家重大战略). When SPC President Zhou Qiang gave his report to the National People’s Congress (NPC) in March, 2016, one section addressed this topic.
Provided service for the country’s major strategies. Issued opinions on the people’s courts providing judicial service and protection for the construction of One Belt, One Road, the development of coordinated development of Beijing-Tianjin, and Hebei, and the development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt, appropriately tried related cases, promoted the coordinated development of geographic areas.
What, if anything, does serving the country’s major strategies mean for the Chinese courts? This blogpost briefly looks at one of the policy documents cited by President Zhou Qiang to find out.
What are the documents?
The titles of these three are similar:
Opinion of the SPC on Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees for One Belt One Road (OBOR Opinion)最高人民法院关于人民法院为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的若干意见;
Opinion of the SPC on Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees for the Development of the Yangtze River Economic Belt (最高人民法院关于为长江经济带发展提供司法服务和保障的意见)(8 March 2016 )(Yangtze River Opinion); and
Opinion of the SPC on Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees for the Coordinated Development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Region 最高人民法院关于为京津冀协同发展提供司法服务和保障的意见 (18 February 2016)(Beijing/Tianjin/Hebei Opinion) .
What are the country’s major strategies?
A Rand Corporation report set out a definition of the fundamental purposes of China’s national strategy:
the fundamental purposes of China’s national strategy (guojia zhanlue) (1) to safeguard China’s national territory and sovereignty, (2) to guide national construction and social development, (3) to strengthen national power, and (4) to ensure continued national prosperity….China’s national strategic objectives (guojia zhanlue mubiao) constitute those fundamental strategic principles, concepts, and priorities guiding not only foreign and defense policy but also critical domestic realms concerned with national construction and internal order. These objectives include the attainment of great power status in the economic, technological, social, and military realms…, and the development or maintenance of capabilities to defend against any internal or external threats to China’s political stability, social order, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
Beijing/Tianjin/Hebei Opinion
It was drafted to support the Beijing/Tianjin/Hebei regional integration plan because the economic integration plan will “inevitably produce a large number of legal disputes, particularly trans-regional legal disputes.” The SPC research office seems to have taken the lead on drafting it, because its head appeared at the press conference to explain it.
The Opinion stresses the following types of cases, in the following order:
Criminal law: punish crimes that may effect social stability and regional integration: intellectual property rights infringement; embezzling corporate funds, illegal fund raising; market manipulation etc. (the priority crimes);
Commercial law: priority cases include those involving company relocation; regional logistics centers; relocation of regional markets, including leases, labor disputes; reorganization or bankruptcy of companies with outdated technology; construction of industrial parks and promotion of companies with high quality technology;
Cases involving people’s livelihood, particularly those involving public services, education, medical and health; social protections; promoting entrepreneurship, equal education, etc.
Cases involving financial innovation and safety: those include private lending, internet financing, protecting the rights and interests of creditors and financial consumers;
Expanding the protection of intellectual property:
Environmental cases: focus on environmental civil/commercial and administrative cases;
Focus on administrative cases related to regional development; and
Focus on major projects and construction projects related to regional integration.
The Beijing/Tianjin/Hebei Opinion also establishes greater coordination among the three courts, including a mechanism chaired by the SPC, exchange of judges, and calls for work on centralization of certain types of cases in certain court.
The Opinion calls for the lower courts to focus on the overall regional integration plan and promote the use of “diversified dispute resolution,” and pre-filing mediation, especially in policy-oriented, sensitive cases, where the local Party Committee, government, and other departments must be relied upon to resolve issues. ( 特别是对于政策性、敏感性强的案件,要紧紧依靠当地党委、政府及有关部门依法解决).
(The phrase “policy-oriented, sensitive case” was helpfully described by another judge as it is a concept used often within the Chinese judiciary. Although it is a not a formal legal term, it refers to the following categories of cases: those that affect a larger group of people than the parties involved; involve issues of widespread concern; require the adjustment of certain long-term government policies; and have political implications. Those include cases involving a large number of people, special groups (such as migrant workers, well-known enterprises, offshore entities), ones that can cause social conflict, including bankruptcy, labor disputes caused by restructuring, employee relocation compensation cases, land acquisition and resettlement compensation. Cases involving political, ethnic and religious issues are also included.)
Policy documents serving major government strategies
As a central government institution, the Court must do its part to support national major strategies. To inform the lower courts of the priority issues, projects, and matters, the SPC issues policy documents, which are the court system’s version of policy documents issued by other Party and state organs. Each of the three national major strategies raises a set of legal issues. Some of those legal issues are relevant to the function of the courts in hearing cases, while others relate to the function of the SPC as a “quasi-legislator,” as when it issues judicial interpretations. They often relate to forthcoming initiatives or sometimes long-term issues for the SPC, as in the case of the OBOR Opinion. However, these documents also signal that some issues, projects, and matters are more important than others, and ultimately does not contribute to public trust in the judiciary.
Some thanks in order
My thanks to a Hong Kong solicitor for criticizing the Hong Kong courts for lacking the “spirit of service” during a recent symposium on the mainland (bringing this issue to my attention) and a (mainland) academic for expressing to me his doubts that the SPC’s OBOR Document had any significance whatsoever.
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