Rights of the Child

Hannah Lu[1]

As of this writing, there have been eight school shootings in the United States since 2018 started[2] and there have been 290 school shootings in the United States since 2013[3]. Between the years 2013-15, 85 of these shootings have occurred at K-12 schools.[4]

In November 1989, practically every member of the United Nations signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), a human rights treaty that sets out the civil, political, economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children. I learned about this treaty when I was in primary school in Hong Kong.  196 members of the United Nations are party to the convention. The United States is not.

CRC Article 3 states

“in all action concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institution courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration”.

Article 19:

“State’s parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s), or any other person who has the care of the child.”

The United States (while it has not ratified the treaty, it remains a signatory) is in violation of these articles through its negligence to properly and adequately protect children from gun violence while they are at school. [Editor’s note: this assumes these articles are now part of customary international law, so that the United States is bound by these principles although it has not ratified the CRC.] The failure to pass any gun reform legislation on both a federal and state level is not just a failure on the part of the government to its children but a violation of their human rights. The negligence and inability to pass gun reform legislation mean that the United States has both failed to consider the best interests of its children but also that it has failed to protect them from physical and mental violence. The State Department’s website says that “the protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment of the United States over 200 years ago”[5]. The question now is when will the United States address those foundational rights?

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[1] Class of 2018, New York University, Tisch School of the Arts (and daughter of the Monitor).

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/school-shootings-in-america-2018-how-many-so-far

[3] https://everytownresearch.org/school-shootings/

[4] https://everytownresearch.org/reports/analysis-of-school-shootings/

[5] https://www.state.gov/j/drl/hr/

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Supreme People’s Court & the new campaign to “sweep away black & eliminate evil”

Screen Shot 2018-01-31 at 11.21.40 AMLast week, China announced the latest campaign to “sweep away black and eliminate evil,” saohei chu’e (扫黑除恶),“Concerning the Carrying Out of a Special Action to Sweep Away Black and Eliminate Evil” (关于开展扫黑除恶专项行动的通知) (full text not yet released) with Xinhua news reporting that it reflects it reflects the leadership’s  outlook on security and people-centered governance thought.  The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is an integral part of the campaign and was one of the institutions (along with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice) that issued a guiding opinion (办理黑恶势力犯罪案件的指导意见) on how the campaign is to be carried out (text not released, but mentioned here). As previously discussed on this blog (and in a forthcoming article), there is no transparency requirement for guiding opinions and other “judicial normative documents” that are not judicial interpretations.  What has been made transparent (in a quick dive into the Wechatosphere) is that the SPC is both clarifying the criminal law issues to the legal community and signalling through releasing typical cases and other actions that lower authorities should not use the campaign to confiscate the property of private entrepreneurs.

  1. Clarifying the legal issues

Although the commentators in this Voice of America program weren’t aware of it, there is a body of (confusing) legislation, partially described in this book chapter (somewhat outdated).  The authoritative (because it is published by the five criminal divisions of the SPC)  Reference to Criminal Trial (刑事审判参考), had published a special issue (issue #107) on organized crime law last summer. (For those of us who read more quickly in English, the editors have helpfully compiled an English translation of the table of contents. (see below)

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In his 29 January Wechat posting on his 说刑品案 (“Speak About Criminal Law, Evaluate Cases”) Wechat account, its editor, Judge Yu Tongzhi (于同志), a judge in the #2 Criminal Division and one of the editors of Reference to Criminal Trial, set out 20 Q & A’s with guidance on the legal issues (derived from last summer’s issue).

Judge Yu described the posting as to “coordinate” (配合) with this campaign, but is the author’s way of saying that the law on these issues is confusing and all involved, whether they are judges, prosecutors, public security or defense lawyers need an authoritative steer through the forest of law, judicial interpretations, and other guidance.   As is apparent from the photo above, the guidance includes a 2015 conference summary on organized crime, guiding cases (指导案例)(not to confused with those guiding cases (指导性案例 issued by the SPC itself), authoritative commentary on the 2015 conference summary, major cases, and discussions by judges of difficult legal issues. The guidance posted often illustrates answers with examples from the guiding cases and cautions that standards should not be improperly expanded, such as the definition of a “gang member.”  He does not include a summary of the law on property seizure, the subject of one of the articles in issue #107.

Some of the organized crime legal issues are analogous to those in other jurisdictions and last year one of the SPC websites published a long article analyzing this area of law (and its problems), suggesting that China look to US RICO legislation.

The first of the 20 questions is:

  1. What’s the connection between the 2015 and 2009  conference summaries on organized crime?

Don’t be surprised if you haven’t heard of either conference summary, as neither one seems to have been incorporated in any of the major translation databases.  As to what conference summaries are, Conference summaries are what the SPC entitles “judicial normative documents”  (there are a number of titles for these) and often address new issues or areas of law in which the law is not settled.   “Conference summaries” are also a form of Communist Party/government document.

The relationship is addressed in the article on the application of the 2015 conference summary by several heads of SPC criminal divisions in issue #107.  Their view is that the two conference summaries should be read together, which the later one taken as an elaboration of the first, with newer provisions superseding the older ones.

The campaign & private entrepreneurs

The second signal that the SPC is sending is that the “sweep away black and eliminate evil” campaign should not be used to abuse private entrepreneurs.  On 30 January, the SPC issued seven typical cases on protecting private property rights and the rights of entrepreneurs, one of which involves a case that occurred during the 2008 “strike black” campaign.  As summarized in China Daily,  the Liaoning Public Security Department arrested Liu Hua and Liu Jie in a 2008 criminal investigation and seized 20 million yuan (about 3.16 million U.S. dollars) in funds from their company, Beipeng Real Estate Development Co. Ltd. in Shenyang. In 2014, a local court in Benxi convicted the two and the company of illegal occupation of farmland but exempted them from criminal punishment. Liaoning Public Security refused to return the seized funds and related financial documents were not returned.  SPC Vice President Tao Kaiyuan SPC Vice President Tao Kaiyuan acted as the chief judge, and the SPC’s State Compensation Committee ruled the Liaoning Public Security Department should return the funds with  interest. Judge Hu Yunteng and the  #2 Circuit Court  were involved in this as well. Company counsel’s detailed account of this case (highly recommended!) found here. Judge Zhu Heqing, Deputy head of the #3 Criminal Division, discussed in the article mentioned above in #107 the problems with the law and practice of property seizures, such as the lack of a definition of “organized crime related property” (涉黑财物) and related seizure procedures, as well as the lack of procedures to require the return of property improperly seized.

Some thoughts

As the document on implementing this campaign has not been released, we cannot know whether it includes performance targets that will lead local authorities to “round the usual suspects up.” What is apparent from the Wechat posting and much more from issue #107, is that the law is this area is unclear, lacks procedures for protecting the property of the entities involved (not to mention the entrepreneurs), and can be easily abused by local authorities.  As we know from the case above and other cases, entrepreneurs will then spend years seeking the return of their property.  The SPC must coordinate with this latest campaign while protecting the rights of entrepreneurs, and avoid a new set of mistaken cases.

 

 

 

 

Supreme People’s Court & Supreme Court Justice Roberts’ 2017 year-end report

download-2Chief Justice John Roberts of the United States Supreme Court may be surprised to learn that a translated version of his 2017 year-end report on the federal courts was recently published by the People’s Court Daily, as it has been for the past twelve years. It was republished by Wechat and Weibo sites affiliated with the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and other prominent Wechat public accounts and legal websites. What significance does the report have?

The translators that bring the year-end reports to Chinese readers are Mr. Huang Bin (formerly of the SPC’s China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence and now of the National Judicial College, a former Yale Law School visiting scholar) and Ms. Yang Yi (China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence, a former Columbia Law School visiting scholar).

Two subjects in Justice Roberts’ 2017 report are likely to resonate with Chinese readers. The first is how the federal courts dealt with national disasters in 2017 (introductory comments in some of the Wechat versions mention that China has only scattered legislative provisions related to emergency measures for the courts). The second is sexual harassment and Justice Roberts’ request to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to organize a working group to review the code of conduct for the federal judiciary, guidance to employees on issues of confidentiality and reporting of instances of misconduct, and rules for investigating and processing misconduct complaints.

The #Metoo movement has not yet explicitly affected the Chinese courts. However, it is likely that Chief Justice Roberts’ acknowledgment that existing rules and structures for dealing with sexual harassment complaints are inadequate that resonates with Chinese women judges and judicial support staff, who make an increasingly large percentage of the Chinese judiciary. It seems likely (confirmed by discrete inquiries) that sexual harassment occurs in Chinese courts as well.

More broadly, what relevance does Justice Robert’s report and others on the US federal and state judiciary have for the Chinese judiciary after the 19th Party Congress, when in October, 2017 Communist Party Central Committee policy on the training of judges and prosecutors lists first resolutely opposing erosion by the mistaken Western rule of law viewpoint” (坚决抵制西方错误法治观点侵蚀)? To the careful observer, the publication of these reports and other articles on specific issues in SPC publications means that the senior and lower levels of the Chinese courts have an ongoing interest in what the US federal and state courts are doing and look to commonalities and takeaways (despite the vast differences in the two systems).

Another example of the Chinese courts looking to commonalities with the US courts occurred earlier this month (January) when the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence published a Chinese summary of the National Center for State Courts’ 2017 survey on public confidence in the state courts. The article appears to be a republication of an article previously published internally and reflects the concern of the Chinese judiciary with public trust.

The takeaways, that is referring to or borrowing foreign legal concepts or models to reform China’s judicial system remains politically sensitive. In Party General Secretary and President Xi Jinping’s 19th Party Congress speech, he called for the continuation of judicial reform:

We will carry out comprehensive and integrated reform of the judicial system and enforce judicial accountability in all respects, so that the people can see in every judicial case that justice is served.

 Earlier in 2017, when visiting the China University of Political Science and Law, Xi Jinping cautioned that Chinese legal reform does not mean wholesale adoption of foreign law and institutions:

China shall actively absorb and refer to successful legal practices worldwide, but they must be filtered, they must be selectively absorbed and transformed, they may not be swallowed whole and copied (对世界上的优秀法治文明成果,要积极吸收借鉴,也要加以甄别,有选择地吸收和转化,不能囫囵吞枣、照搬照抄).

What a careful observer notices from monitoring SPC media is that those involved with reform of discrete areas of Chinese legislation and judicial practice continue (in the pre/post 19th Party Congress era) to look at US federal/state law (and other foreign law) structures and practices, including: use of mediation in federal appeals cases; bankruptcy practicereform of Chinese nuclear safety legislation to broaden the scope of information released to the public, that is in specific areas that do not involve basic principles of the Chinese courts.

 

 

 

Supreme People’s Court Monitor’s 2017 year-end report

 

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SPC court handbooks & monthly bulletins from the 1980s & 1990s

A change in this year-end report, with some stories as well as thank yous.

In 2017, the Supreme People’s Court Monitor published 41 posts and had over 33,000 page views, from 155 jurisdictions, primarily from:

  • United States;
  • Hong Kong;
  • (mainland) China; and
  • Australia.

with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Singapore trailing.

Since founding almost five years ago:

Views: 108,990
Jurisdictions: 183
Posts: 212

Most followers use Twitter to follow the Monitor.Although Twitter is not accessible in mainland China without a VPN, 26% of the Monitor’s Twitter followers are based there.

Thank yous

Thank you to:

  •  the booksellers (likely long retired) who sold me the SPC court handbooks & bulletins in the 1990s, opening for me a door into the world of the Chinese judiciary;
  • my colleagues and students at the School of Transnational Law, Peking University (Shenzhen);
  • my fellow bloggers Jeremy Daum (Chinalawtranslate.com), Wei Changhao (npcobserver.com, Mark Cohen (Chinaipr.com), and Eugene Fidell (globalmjreform.blogspot.com);
  • the law schools and other institutions around the world, that have listed my blog as a Chinese law resource;
  • law and political science professors who have recommended the Monitor to students and many others in other institutions who have provided support in various ways;
  • journalists and scholars writing about the Chinese judiciary who have cited the Monitor;
  • organizers of conferences and other events in Beijing, Shanghai, Leiden, Cologne, Hong Kong, and Sydney. One Shanghai event attracted several “mature students” from the local authorities, apparently interested to know more about the challenges Chinese students could face studying law in the US;
  • Certain members of the Chinese legal community:
    • judges and others currently or formerly affiliated with the SPC and local courts, who helped me understand the Chinese court and legal system in countless ways;
    • lawyers, arbitrators and other legal professionals who have done the same;
    • administrators of the Wechat public accounts who published my articles; and
    • those who had the fortitude to read early drafts of articles and give frank comments, particularly the person who asked the classic question “what are you trying to say?!”  (The much-improved article will be published this year.)

Finally, thank you very much to the East Asian Legal Studies program of Harvard Law School for supporting the Monitor.  I hope their example will lead to the greater recognition of the importance of understanding the Chinese legal system (with its many special characteristics).

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    School of Transnational Law, 29 December

 

 

Supreme People’s Court reports on its bankruptcy accomplishments

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The warm sun and shopping mall Christmas decorations were not what drew Supreme People’s Court (SPC) President Zhou Qiang and a large group of senior court and other government leaders to Shenzhen on Christmas Day–it was a rare national bankruptcy trial work conference. It sends signals about the importance of bankruptcy post 19th Party Congress.

This appears to have been one of the last official activities of Grand Justice Du Wanhua, who has taken the lead in promoting bankruptcy work in the courts (see earlier blogposts) and is a classmate of President Zhou Qiang. Du, who turns 64 in January, is retiring.  Takeaways from the conference include:

  • some statistics;
  • the latest political/professional policy on bankruptcy;
  • some informed comments on where the challenges are (with some of my further comments in italics).

Statistics

The Chinese courts accepted 8984 bankruptcy & compulsory liquidation cases in 2017 (through 21 December), heard by 97 bankruptcy divisions (up from 6 in 2016, a consequence of a 2016 SPC notice, described here).  The courts concluded 4404 bankruptcy cases through November.

Reforms aimed at speeding up cases moving from enforcement to bankruptcy proceedings are showing some initial success, with the Guangdong courts handling over 43,000 in the second half of 2017, of which 10,000 were handled by the Shenzhen courts.

Latest bankruptcy policy statements

President Zhou Qiang conveyed the macro policy on bankruptcy.

  • adhere to problem orientation (必须坚持问题导向) (one of the current political slogans);
  • if at all possible, merge or reorganize, less bankruptcy liquidation 尽可能多兼并重组,少破产清算 (the current policy);
  • Explore establishing a simplified procedure and a pre-reorganization system (简易破产程序、预重整制度) (this idea, a borrowing of pre-packaged administration from US/English law has been discussed by academics and others for some years, but this prominence seems to be new.  Pre-packaged administration is a bankruptcy/insolvency procedure under in which a company arranges to sell all or some of its assets to a buyer before appointing an administrator to facilitate the sale. It involves a company’s institutional creditors agreeing to it, so it is understandable that would be an attractive idea in China);
  • intermediate courts in larger cities and economically developed areas should establish bankruptcy divisions or collegial panels (this follows from an announcement in 2016, discussed here);
  • use informatization to improve the hearing of bankruptcy cases (信息化建设提高破产审判质效).

Du Wanhua had more specific signals to the lower courts.

  • improve professionalism;
  • improve the bankruptcy administrator system, promote establishing a bankruptcy administrator society, bring in a competitive system;
  • improve the enforcement to bankruptcy system,  accelerate cases that can’t be enforced transferred to bankruptcy proceedings;
  • use reorganization as much as possible through the market and legal methods to save companies in trouble;
  • establish a normalized government/courts unified coordinated system (要建立常态化的“府院破产统一协调机制”), protect the rights of each party on an equal basis;
  • use informatization.
  • handle carefully bankruptcy cases involving debts that are mutual/joint guarantees, guide financial creditors to convert the debt into equity or other methods that simplify the debtor relationship and enable the company to survive;
  • handle carefully the consolidated bankruptcy of affiliated companies, balance the conflicts between the rights and interests of each party.
  • improve cross-border bankruptcy trial work.

 On problems facing bankruptcy courts

Professor Li Shuguang of the China University of Political Science & Law, one of the preeminent Chinese bankruptcy law scholars, who attended the conference, had informed comments, citing the following challenges for the bankruptcy courts:

  1. The relationship between the courts and government when hearing bankruptcy cases needs to be resolved. (Despite the official talk of a united approach by courts & government, discussed above, it remains a challenge. For some local color, see this excerpt from an article by a team of Zhejiang bankruptcy judges on real estate developer bankruptcy:

If a real estate developer is having a crisis, government will involve itself first, and only if administrative measures don’t work, will they think of judicial measures. This creates problems in transitioning from administrative to judicial procedures. For example, how should a court treat the legal authority of the creditor settlement arrangement of the special work team formed by government to deal the crisis? Once the company goes into bankruptcy procedures, government hasn’t withdrawn completely, and on the one hand, all sorts of bankruptcy matters require coordination and cooperation by many government departments, and on the other hand government will give instructions and suggestions about bankruptcy work, considering the needs of the local economy, stability, and other interests.

3.  Many local courts are afraid to accept bankruptcy cases and even establish unreasonable barriers to for local protection–new systems need to be put in place.

4.  On bankruptcy administrators, there need to be more detailed rules on selection, oversight, administration, operation. [I can testify to this, based on the questions raised on one of my Wechat chat groups about bankruptcy administrators and the many articles published on bankruptcy law-related Wechat public accounts.] 

5. Professor Li asks how Chinese bankruptcy law can be reformed to effectively rescue companies, to enable courts to identify salvageable companies, properly protect the rights of creditors and shareholders.  More detailed rules are needed on preferences in bankruptcy.  These are ongoing issues for Chinese bankruptcy courts, as the current system protects local government interests.

6.  There exist a group of specific issues related to bankruptcy liquidation, such as how to expand the pool of assets available to the creditors, balance the interests of various creditors, deal with the relationship between creditor committees (under the bankruptcy law) and financial institution creditors committee (these committees were put in place from 2016, see more details here).  This also relates to issues of transparency and procedure, particularly what information will be available to members of the creditor committee, and at what point. An important area where legal infrastructure is lacking, as discussed in this Wechat article.

Among those issues is how to protect the interests of consumers who have purchased property from a bankrupt real estate developer.  This is an important practical issue for all involved (including local governments) because an increasing number of real estate developers are going into bankruptcy.  A recent Wechat article analyzes a 2015 SPC ruling that requires the bankruptcy administrator to perform the purchase and sale contract where payment has been made in full.  In practice, courts take different approaches to variations on this scenario.

7.  He echoes Du Wanhua on issues related to consolidation of bankruptcy cases involving corporate affiliates and the transfer of cases from enforcement to bankruptcy, raising the problem of the courts performance indicators.

8. Professor Li opens up the issue of “informatization,” so that it becomes a platform collecting and analyzing bankruptcy data, and information sharing mechanism for all involved.  This comment echoes my own experience that the electronic platform is not helpful for a researcher seeking access to bankruptcy documents, as few are accessible, not even those that are otherwise publicly available. Some bankruptcy judges have responded to my discrete inquiries that little information is available because it is possible to set access restrictions on information.)

9.  He raises the increasingly prominent issue of cross-border bankruptcy, in which judges lack legislation and experience to deal with these issues, and suggests that at an appropriate time harmonization of Chinese cross-border bankruptcy standards with international ones.  By this, he is likely referring to the UNCITRAL model law on cross-border insolvency.  These issues are ongoing ones for the professional community in Hong Kong and increasingly in the rest of the world, see this law firm alert. This has been a frequent topic of academic analysis.

Finally, Professor Li states (what is clear from the comments above) that bankruptcy legislation is inadequate–the judicial interpretations the SPC has issued. deal with only a small portion of the outstanding issues and there isn’t time to draft a long judicial interpretation.  As judges are hearing bankruptcy cases, large numbers of technical issues have arisen [I can testify to this, based on the questions raised on one of my Wechat chat groups.]  SPC academic journals and academic studies address specific issues, see these articles. Professor Li suggests that a “conference summary” be issued based on this conference and input from bankruptcy court professionals. (A conference summary is explained in this blogpost.)

Quick comment

Finally, this area of law is a microcosm of issues facing the Chinese courts, whether it is the requirement for the SPC and lower courts  to reflect current Party/government policy in what they do, relationship between the courts and government, issues with judicial professionalism, large number of technical issues but a lack of legislation, related issues that affect the ordinary person, consideration of foreign law models, and the disconnect between international and Chinese practice.

Judicial reform post-19th Party Congress

 

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Judge Jiang speaking at an academic conference

 

Senior Judge Jiang Huiling heads the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence (the Institute). He recently published two articles in the Chinese legal and professional press (the first of which was published in the Central Political-Legal Committee’s (authoritative) Legal Daily) signaling the phraseology and goals for judicial reform after the 19th Party Congress. As the operation of the Chinese judiciary has an important impact both domestically and internationally (as well as in greater China), post-19th Party Congress judicial reform goals are important.

For those who are not familiar with the Institute, it is the SPC’s in-house think tank. The Institute works on a broad variety of issues, particularly those linked with judicial reforms. Like think tanks elsewhere in the world, the Institute trains post-doctorate fellows and has its own staff. Judge Jiang is among a group of senior judges at the SPC who combines an international perspective (he studied at the University of Montreal, and has been a visiting scholar at Yale Law School, University of Sydney, and Academia Sinica) with profound experience in and understanding about the Chinese court system and how it can be reformed, given its complex bureaucratic nature and the environment in which it operates.

From his articles, it is clear that the new phraseology is “deepen the reform of the judicial system with comprehensive integrated reforms” (深化司法体制改革综合配套改革). The language is found deep in Xi Jinping’s 19th Communist Party Congress Report.

Background for these further reforms

Judge Jiang mentioned that during the summer of 2017, the senior political leadership approved further judicial reform measures (including written instructions from Xi Jinping to the Central Political-Legal Committee, designating Shanghai to take the lead in piloting them, initiating a series of reforms from early November. The Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan required Central approval for major reforms, so this approval should not be surprising.  The beginning of this round of judicial reforms was also first piloted in Shanghai, so piloting these further reforms in Shanghai (as further described in this report) is also to be expected and it seems likely that piloting of reforms will continue in other places.

Eleven further reforms & some comments

Judge Jiang sees these further reforms as intended to implement the previous judicial reforms and classifies them into eleven broad areas.  The SPC has undertaken research (designating lower courts to do so) in many of these areas (with the results to be released to the public in some form).  It appears that those designing judicial reforms have realized that many judicial reforms are linked to deeper issues relating to the Chinese system.

I summarize Judge Jiang’s list and add some of my own comments or queries in italics (which should not be attributed to him):

  1. Optimize how judicial power is allocated within the courts, including the authority to adjudicate and to administer, splitting enforcement authority from hearing cases, allocating authority within offices/divisions of the court, and reallocate the functions of higher and lower courts.  The way that courts have been administered has for many years followed the (traditional) Party/state administrative model.  Some reforms have been implemented in recent years, but it is unclear how much will it be possible to change this, given long-standing patterns of interaction within a court and between higher and lower courts, as well as current incentives/performance indicators.  This appears to be linked to point 19, 24, and other provisions of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan .
  2. Reform judicial administration–what should the model be–centralized administration by the SPC or local administration by each court?  Judge Jiang suggests China could consider models already in place outside of China. This is linked to point 62 of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan. 
  3. Improve personnel administration, such as selection of judges, retirement, rotation of positions, discipline/punishment, retirement/resignation, education/training, headcount administration, internal institutions, etc.  The current model derives from the principle of “the Party manages cadres”  and is linked to basic aspects of the Chinese system such as the official ranking system (官本位) and hukou (户口).  Many of the matters mentioned (such as resignation, discipline, selection and headcount administration) are now controlled or operated by Party institutions–what flexibility will there be for the courts to innovate?  The judicial reforms do anticipate a separate career track for judges (and prosecutors), but it is apparent that the “devil is in the details.”  If there is to be cross-jurisdictional rotation of positions, what happens to the schooling of dependents and other practical matters linked with the hukou [household registration] system? An increasing number of legal professionals and judges are women. What impact would a cross-jurisdictional rotation of positions have on women judges? How can lawyers and others outside the system be fit into the official ranking system?  Under the current system, more senior judges are senior cadres, often less involved with hearing cases because of their administrative responsibilities.  Will later retirement for judges mean more judges in the courtroom?  The retirement issue has been under discussion for some years–see this 2015 blogpost for further background.
  4. Reform the system of how judges are “cultivated” (法官养成机制), in particular, look to the practice of other civil law jurisdictions (including Taiwan) in establishing a two year judicial training system, rather than the current practice of entirely selecting judges from within and having them learn on the job, and increase training for serving judges. He mentions improving the system of recruiting lawyers and law professors to the judiciary. (This is related to points 50 and 52 of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan. The two-year training program proposal had been mentioned by Huang Yongwei, president of the National Judicial College, over two years ago.  It is linked to judicial education policy documents issued to implement the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Outline, highlighted in this 2015 blogpost).  What might be the content of this training program?  From the previous policy documents we know it will include ideological, ethical, and professional training, but what will that mean in practice?  There have been ongoing exchanges between the Chinese judiciary and the Singapore Judicial College–  will the “beneficial experience” of Chinese judges in Singapore have any effect on the Chinese model?
  5. Improve judicial evaluation, i.e. benchmarking of how the Chinese judiciary is doing.  Judge Jiang suggests looking to domestic analytical frameworks (by the China Academy of Social Sciences and others), as well as international ones, including the Global Framework for Court Excellence and the World Justice Project,  but says there are issues with data and disconnect with Chinese judicial reality.  This relates to point 51 and others in the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan. Benchmarking judicial performance remains an ongoing issue, with most Chinese courts in campaign mode to achieve high case closing rates in the run-up to the New Year.
  6. Better use of technology in the judiciary, not only big data but also use of electronic files, judicial “artificial intelligence.” For lawyers involved in cross-border cases, query when this will also imply the use of apostilles rather than the current system of notarization and consularization, as well as a more timely integration of other Chinese court procedures with those prevalent in the outside world. Pilot projects are underway in some areas regarding electronic files.
  7. Improve litigation, including “trial-centered criminal justice reforms,” pre-trial procedures, more detailed evidence rules, separating petitioning from litigation, and the use of people’s assessors. Creating a “trial-centered criminal justice system” at the same time that expedited procedures/Chinese style plea bargaining is being promoted raises many related issues as was recently discussed at a recent conference that I attended, and separating petitioning from litigation requires improvement of legal aid to the poor and better procedures for considering litigation-related petitions (see these earlier blogposts).
  8. Improve the use of diversified dispute resolution, to involve resources from other social and national resources and the market to resolve disputes, leaving only those most appropriate to be resolved by the courts. This relates to point 46 of the Outline of the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan and related measures described in a 2016 SPC policy document, described here.
  9. Speed up the formation of a legal profession, including reform to legal education, examinations, etc., which Judge Jiang sees as long-term issues.  From my own observations in the courts, remarks by serving judges, practicing lawyers, and interactions with recent Chinese law school graduates, reforms to legal education are needed, as is some flexibility in the career path for Chinese legal academics, which stresses a Ph.D. and academic achievements, rather than any experience outside academia.
  10. Establish a rule of law (法治) culture and environment.  This, of course, is critical. However, the difficulty of doing so was most recently illustrated in the recent clearing of “low end population” from Beijing and related legal analysis (such as this article, originally published on a Chinese scholarly site.
  11. Improve judicial administration generally, including methods of enforcing the law, legislative drafting, etc.  Reforms of a grander scale appear to this observer to be difficult to implement, particularly at this stage.

Finally, Judge Jiang says these are the broad outlines of judicial reform, but they are subject to adjustment along the way.

 

 

 

 

December update on judicial review of arbitration

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photo of Beijing traffic, December 2017

The latest buzz within the Chinese international commercial legal community on Belt & Road related legal developments appears not to have surmounted the Great Wall of the Chinese language. The buzz is that a comprehensive judicial interpretation relating to arbitration is on route to promulgation.

On 4 December the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued a news release that its judicial committee had approved a judicial interpretation on judicial review of arbitration in principle, entitled Provisions on Some Issues Related to the Trial of the Judicial Review of Arbitration (Judicial Review of Arbitration Interpretation) (最高人民法院关于审理仲裁司法审查案件若干问题的规定).  “Approval in principle”  (原则通过) is not mentioned by the SPC’s 2007 regulations on judicial interpretations but is one of the SPC’s long-established practices.  It means that the judicial committee has approved it, subject to some “minor” amendments. Minor amendments are more than typographical errors and relate to specific substantive matters.  However, the news release did not specify what those “minor” issues were or set a deadline for issuing the interpretation. In December of last year (2016), the SPC’s judicial committee also approved in principle the #4 Company Law interpretation, but that interpretation was not formally issued until August of this year. This observer surmises (without any basis in facts or rumors) that the interpretation will be promulgated before Chinese new year so it can be one of the 2017 accomplishments of the SPC’s #4 Civil Division (but then again, that may be overly optimistic.

The new interpretation will focus on the issues that courts frequently encounter when arbitration-related cases come before them, dealing with gaps in current judicial interpretations (and likely the outdated Arbitration Law, (The Arbitration Law is also the subject of discussions among practitioners, academics, and others.)  The interpretation will incorporate new provisions on the types of cases, case acceptance, jurisdiction, procedure, the application of law and other questions.  It appears that it will incorporate the provisions described in the Notice concerning some questions regarding the centralized handling of judicial review of arbitration cases (the subject of the last blogpost).  It is hoped that the new interpretation will provide for a hearing procedure when cases involving the SPC’s prior approval procedure.

For those not familiar with the intricacies of China’s judicial review of arbitration issues, a 1995 SPC circular sets out a prior approval procedure, requiring local  court rulings to refuse to enforce foreign-related/”greater China”/foreign arbitration awards to be submitted for eventual review by the SPC.  It is currently an internal administrative type procedure, with no explicit option of a hearing.

The SPC announcement described the drafting of the Judicial Review of Arbitration Interpretation as having begun in 2016.  This blog reported in late 2014 that Judge Luo Dongchuan, then head of the SPC’s #4 Civil Division, mentioned that a new judicial interpretation on the judicial review of arbitration-related issues will go into the Court’s judicial interpretation drafting plan in 2015 and that the SPC intends to reform jurisdiction in judicial review of arbitration issues, to consolidate them in specialized courts.

A follow up post will describe the latest buzz on the Belt & Road international commercial tribunal.

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