Tag Archives: judicial reform documents

Update on the Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Reform Office

four judicial reform books edited by the Judicial Reform Office

Although no formal announcement has been made in the Chinese press (of which I am aware), it appears that sometime during the last six months, more likely before early June (2023), the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s Judicial Reform Office, or more formally the office of the SPC’s leading small group for judicial reform (最高人民法院司法改革领导小组办公室) ceased to exist as a separate entity.  Its work has been assumed by the Research Office.    The leading small group that the Judicial Reform Office supported appears to have been disbanded as well. This post provides some comments on the office, some fragments concerning its history, an explanation of the nature of the office and leading small groups, and evidence for reaching the conclusion that the office no longer exists.

Over the past 10 years, this blog has discussed or cited statements or documents issued, reports drafted, and books published by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s Judicial Reform Office.  As is visible from the photo above, I have a collection of books edited by that office, many of which I have not yet cited in this blog or my other writings. Some books contain documents, others set out authorized commentary,  and others are collections of analytical essays for the most part written by lower court judges.  I had intended to draw on some of these materials when writing something more detailed about the drafting of judicial reform measures, setting out my understanding of the drafting process.  A number of our Peking University School of Transnational Law students have interned in the Judicial Reform Office.  I will now need to wait until I am able to gather enough information about how the new system operates before writing a current and historical description.  

The offices of leading small groups are not permanently established, although this one had been in existence for almost twenty years. It is not unusual for them to be abolished and their duties assumed by permanent institutions. The temporary nature of the office may explain why published structure charts of the SPC have never mentioned the Judicial Reform Office.  The SPC has other such offices, but this one appears to be the most well-known.   Leading small group offices exist in analogous form at the local level as well. 

For those who are not aware of the system of “leading small groups,” many exist throughout the Chinese Party and government system to deal with cross-institutional matters, often involving participants from multiple Party and/or state institutions.  There seems to be a growing English language scholarly literature on multi-institutional leading small groups, mostly behind publishers’ paywalls, but this detailed summary of leading small groups and affiliated offices by Alice Miller is helpful to those without university library access.  The summary explains that “leading small group general offices have dedicated office space, a roster of personnel, and an operating budget for administrative expenses. Although they cannot implement anything on their own, they can levy work on other offices.”   My forthcoming (“neverending”) article has a description of the SPC’s Judicial Reform Office levying work on (assigning work to) other SPC offices, divisions, and institutions. 

The Judicial Reform Leading Small Group and its supporting office were established in 2006.  Although I have not been able to find the document approving its establishment, I assume that it was established to draw together a team of people to focus on judicial reform matters and to coordinate matters across multiple SPC entities,  with the lower courts, and with the related Party bureaucracies. The Judicial Reform Leading Small Group had a predecessor entity entitled the SPC Judicial Reform Research Leading Small Group (最高人民法院司法改革研究领导小组). The China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence provided institutional support for the predecessor entity.  I assume that the establishment of the SPC’s Judicial Reform Leading Small Group and its predecessor are linked to the 2003 establishment of the Party’s Central Judicial System Reform Leading Small Group (中央司法体制改革领导小组), which has (had?) members from multiple Party and state institutions. That Leading Small Group also has (had) an affiliated office (中央司法体制改革领导小组办公室).  I have not seen public mention of the Party’s Central Judicial System Reform Leading Small Group in the past year or more, so I assume it has been disbanded and its functions subsumed by some part of the Central Political-Legal Committee/Commission.

Prior to 2003, judicial reform research at the SPC was conducted and coordinated by the Research Office.  That office often deals with SPC cross-institutional matters, such as the transition to the Civil Code. So this development appears to be an instance of the SPC either going back to the “good old days” or as a former SPC judge  recently wrote about the end of a piloted judicial reform, “restoring the original condition (恢复原状).” 

 During the March 2023 meeting of the National People’s Congress, He Fan, previously mentioned on this blog,  spoke to the press about judicial reform, as a responsible person of the Judicial Reform Office (最高人民法院司法改革领导小组办公室负责人). In September of this year, public statements concerning judicial reform (in this case, the termination of the piloted reform of the four levels of the courts) were issued by a responsible person of the Research Office.  A related document issued in June (2023) did not mention the Judicial Reform Office or the Judicial Reform Leading Small Group.  When He Fan spoke at Fudan University Law School in September, he was described as a vice director of the Research Office and the former responsible person of the Judicial Reform Office (最高人民法院研究室副主任、原司法改革办公室负责人何帆博士).  So I surmise from this that sometime between March and June, the Judicial Reform Office was abolished and its responsibilities and personnel were transferred to the Research Office. 

I will be monitoring this change (to the extent possible).   Questions that come to mind include the following.  What will being located in the Research Office mean for judicial reform matters?    Will the staff take on additional tasks in addition to judicial reform matters? What will this mean for the analysis of the impact of prior judicial reforms?   What will this mean for the drafting of the sixth judicial reform plan outline?  Will this mean more or fewer staff resources?  When the plan is issued, will we on the outside of the Chinese court system notice the impact of this bureaucratic change?  And as several highly knowledgeable persons have asked me in recent weeks, how should the judicial reforms of the last ten years be objectively assessed?

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Many thanks to the knowledgeable persons who contributed to this blogpost. Those with additional information or corrections should contact me. My apologies to my patient followers for the long gap between blogposts. but I have spent much of the last two months revising my “endless” long article for publication, as it needed to be updated to reflect recent changes.  This change requires an additional update. I plan to do several more analytical blogposts in the upcoming months, but use more of my time putting together my research, as highlighted earlier this year.  

Dean Jiang Huiling on Chinese Judicial Reform

On 7 January 2022, Dean of Tongji University’s School of Law and Professor Jiang Huiling gave a guest lecture in my School of Transnational Law class.  We were honored to hear Dean Jiang provide his unique perspective and insights on over 20 years of Chinese judicial reform and his insights on future developments. He has been involved with Chinese judicial reform starting from the first plan in 1999 (see also more about his background here).  This blogpost summarizes his presentation. I have inserted my occasional comments in italics. If a point is not more fully elaborated, it means he did not do so.

He spoke on the following six topics:

1. Brief History of Chinese Judicial Reform
2. How Judicial Reform Actions  Are Taken
3. From the 4th to the 5th Judicial Reform Plan
4. Strategic Move: From Judicial Reform to “Zhengfa” (政法) Reform
5. Technical Measures: Rule of Law
6. Future Direction

1. Brief History

Dean Jiang went briskly through the history of judicial reform, commenting that in the first judicial reform plan, the focus was on raising public and professional awareness about the judiciary。 The second one, in which the Central Government greatly supported the SPC to undertake work mechanism (工作机制) reforms, not touching on structural reforms such as the status of judicial personnel. He noted that there was great progress during the second judicial reform plan. He called the third judicial reform plan a test before the New Era, and said that a decision had been taken to de-localize the judiciary and change the status of the judges and prosecutors, but at the end, there wasn’t internal confidence that the legal profession and society would accept such changes.  He called the fourth judicial reform plan a structural, systematic, and radical change to the judicial system, especially the decision that judges would not be treated as ordinary civil servants.  Dean Jiang characterized the fifth judicial reform plan as comprehensive and supplementary, and part of the Zhengfa reforms (as he further explained in the latter part of his presentation).

What were the lessons learned?

  • Right (科学) concept of the judicial system (universal and with Chinese characteristics)–that the legal profession and the leading party accepted the value of the rule of law and the importance of the judiciary;
  • Theoretical preparation–although he thought scholars had not done enough;
  • Consensus for change–the judiciary is regarded as and is a bureaucracy–there is that consensus among both court leaders, who are legal professionals and with a Party role, and ordinary judges, who are legal professionals;
  • Common achievements of human civilization–that means learning from other countries–China had done so not only in science and technology but also in law and democracy. Chinese judicial  reformers had benefited from the open policy–he himself was an example; and
  • Critical role of strong leadership–legal professionals could not initiate fundamental changes themselves–it needed court and political leadership to do so–he quoted General Secretary Xi Jinping on the ability to do what could not have been done before.

2. How Judicial Reform Actions are Taken

Dean Jiang rapidly made the following six points:

  1. Judicial awareness and enlightenment;
  2. Negative case matters;
  3. Reform for branches and reform for all (parochialism);
  4. Top-down design and comprehensive reform–the court system is part of the political system and reform has to be done by the Central Government;
  5.  Coordination with other departments–in China, unlike in other countries, some matters require coordination with other departments, such as the Ministry of Finance;
  6. A group of devoted experts–both within the judiciary and among academics.

3. From the 4th to the 5th Judicial Reform Plan

Dean Jiang mentioned that the two plans are connected, but that significant differences exist in the value or orientation of the two plans. The fourth one made radical (revolutionary) changes to the judicial system. The fifth one is a new phase, and comes after the completion of the fourth one, which made the following fundamental changes:

  1. Structural changes–delocalizing the judicial system
  2. Status of the judges and prosecutors
  3. Changes to the internal operation of the judiciary
  4. Improvements to the guarantees for judges and prosecutors.

Although these reforms are not completed, these were the focus of their work in the judicial reform office of the SPC and of the Central Government.

The 4th judicial reform plan focused on the following:

1. Separation of administrative region and judicial jurisdiction area–delocalization, as Xi Jinping said, the judicial power is a central power, uniform application of law, so that the law is not applied in favor of one locality;
2. Judiciary-centered litigation system–“in the real world in China, the judiciary does not always have the final say”–and in the past the public security and prosecutors had the final say rather than the judges. The reform to have personnel and financing of courts at the provincial level is part of this reform;
3. Optimization of internal power allocation–as a court is a bureaucracy with different entities with different functions, and the leaders have different functions from ordinary judges;
4. Operation of hearing and adjudicatory power
5. Judicial transparency;
6. Judicial personnel–this is basic but very important; and
7. Independence of the court–this is basic but very important.

The 5th judicial reform plan:

  1. Party’s leadership 
  2. Work for the country’s overall task and situationsubject of one of my forthcoming articles
  3. Litigation service–treat litigants properly and give them judicial services– the courts have public funds to pay for legal representation if people do not meet the standard for legal aid
  4. Judicial transparency–“always on the way”
  5. Responsibility-based judicial operation
  6. Court’s organization and function–reforms in that area (he referred to the recent repositioning of the four levels of the court system, among others)
  7. Procedural system
  8. Enforcement reform
  9. Court personnel system reform–better training of judges
  10. Smart court–using technology

The bolding above reflects his stress on those points in his presentation.

Dean Jiang mentioned that the Central Government put the court system into a bigger picture, but that the prior reforms were needed to make the judicial system more professional.  It is for this reason that the Central Government mentions the phrase “judicial reform” much less than before.

The bigger picture is involving the court system more in the development of the whole country. This reflects a change in China’s overall policy, and we Chinese legal professionals need to understand this.

Comparing the 4th and 5th Reform Plans:

  • Similar, but different;
  • Duplicated, but deepening and supplementary;
  • To those unfinished tasks, less emphasis

He said these should be seen in the context of the national plan for achieving the rule of law, and from 2035, China will have achieved rule of law and be a modernized, democratic country–the second 15-year plan will be about rule of law.  He thinks that the timing is insufficient.

4. Strategic Move: From Judicial Reform to “Zhengfa” (政法) Reform

1. Before 2012, judicial work mechanism reform
2. From 2013,Judicial system reform
3. From 2017,Comprehensive supplementary reform of the judicial system
4. From 2019, Promoting Comprehensive
Reform in Zhengfa Area
5. From 2020,Xi Jinping rule of law thoughts

On point 4 above, that relates to a comprehensive document adopted in 2019 [Implementing Opinion On the Comprehensive Deepening Reforms of the Political-Legal Sector 关于政法领域全面深化改革的实施意见, not publicly available but mentioned previously on this blog], of which judicial reform plays only a small part.  From 2020, Xi Jinping rule of law thoughts plays an important guiding role in the role of law. He said all law students and legal professionals should read it because it will have an important impact on the building of rule of law in China.

Structure of the new arrangement:

  • Breadth: From the judiciary to other related areas
  • Depth: From judicial system reform to broader systematic innovation–the latter means is moving from judicial system reform to areas previously little discussed, such as Party leadership and the role of the Political-Legal Commission, and the relationship between the Party and the law.
  • Goal: From fair, efficient, and authoritative judicial system to modernization of Zhengfa work system and capability—that is, that the judicial system is to be part of a modernized governance system and governance capability [国家治理体系和治理能力现代化–from the Decision of the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress]. That is the goal for the next 30 years. It means the rule of law in the future will have a major part to play as part of modernized governance, and the courts will have an even more important role to play in supporting this modernized state governance (this is in my draft article). It may not be apparent from the English words, but it is a change.
  • Method: From branch-driven to Central Committee-driven–how to get there? He says this wording is not quite accurate as the 4th Judicial Reform Plan was also Central Committee driven, but because the Central Government put the project of the rule of law into the modernization of state governance, it has a different method for treating reform in the legal area, but he thinks that change of method is only an improvement.
  • Nature: Chinese style and self-owned brand–when you read English language literature on building a fair and independent judicial system from abroad you will see many common points. In the current arrangement–in the Zhengfa reforms, Chinese characteristics have a great deal of weight and also in the reconstruction of the legal system. Although China has learned a great deal from other countries, China has to go on its own way, since it has its own history, political situation and historical stage and there is a change in the international situation. China has changed its position in the world. He is getting accustomed to this new way of judicial reform and it will be more difficult for foreigners to understand it.

The change of emphasis can be seen from the VIP (very important research projects of 2021), which are all more general than before:

No. 67. Practice and Experiences of the Party Comprehensively Promote Law-based governance
No. 68. Socialist Legal Theory with Chinese Characteristics
No. 69. Spirit of Socialist Rule of Law
No. 70. Constitution-centered Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics
No. 71. Promoting Comprehensive
Reform in Zhengfa Area

Dean Jiang described the 2019 document mentioned above as containing the following areas of reform.

Seven Areas of Zhengfa Reform:

  1. Party’s leadership of the Zhengfa work–that is the Chinese situation
  2. Deepening reforms of Zhengfa institutions–not only the courts and the prosecutors, but changing the overall structure of Zhengfa institutions
  3. Deepening reform of systems of law implementation–we combined  Legislative Affairs Office (of the State Council 法制办) into the Ministry of Justice [MOJ]–that’s an important change
  4. Deepening reform of social governance system–the Zhengfa Wei important for social governance–one of the most popular words is “governance“–how to support social stability, social development; innovative spirit, people’s lives;
  5.  Public Zhengfa service system–public legal service is part of Zhengfa service–all the political-legal organs will work together to provide efficient high-quality services for the people-人民为中心–Xi Jinping says all our work needs to be people-centered;
  6. Zhengfa profession management reform–no major change here
  7. Application of IT technology–no major change here–continued application of IT in the Zhengfa area

These are seven areas of Zhengfa reform, based on the prior judicial reforms, but now going to a new stage. Governance is a crucial word.

5. Technical Measures

This is what he has devoted his life to before.

  • Law is a profession, and the judicial system is the carrier of law and justice.
  • Law is also science of law.
  • Rule of law is one of the most technical way of state governance.
  • Rule of law will have no efficacy without the joint efforts of other institutions.

He listed 10 legal issues for consideration for reference and research, as these are the most important topics:

  1. Structural reform: local judicial power, or central judicial power–at the present time, the Central Government cannot manage all those 200,000+ judges and prosecutors, and at first stage, the provincial level is taking that over, but he is not sure of the final judicial model
  2.  Organizational reform: bureaucratic or judicial, especially the internal organs–this is a more technical reform, including internal and external organs, different tiers of the court and branches of the judiciary, including the procuracy;
  3. Functions of the four tiers of court:  their role and function–cylinder, or cone (his metaphor of 20 years ago)–should the SPC concentrate on judicial interpretations and a small number of cases, and does not need 400 judges–this relates to the pilot program of late last year on the repositioning of the four levels of the Chinese court; the local courts will focus on factual issues;
  4.  Personnel reform: Profession, or ordinary public servant–this is still an ongoing issue, and in his view, some continental European countries have not resolved this issue either. Although there are improvements, judges and prosecutors feel that it is not sufficient, given their new role in society, and the importance of their work. He agrees, having been a former judge.
  5.  Procedural reform: Court-centered litigation system, fair trial, simplification of procedure–how to make things fairer, and given the more than 10% annual increase in cases, a big burden on judges in particular, how to simplify procedure. This links to the recent amendments to the Civil Procedure Law, which focuses on simplification of procedures and giving online procedures the same status as offline.
  6.  Adjudication committee: advisory, or adjudication–there is a great deal of discussion about it–it is the highest decision-making body in a court (see this blogpost).
  7. Judicial responsibility system: The hearing officer makes the decision, and decision-maker takes the responsibility–司法责任制–this is another tricky one–this is required by the Central Government, a step forward towards the rule of law, instead of having a judge’s boss approve his decision (because the court is bureaucracy)–for China, this is a step towards the rule of law, but there is still a long way to go.
  8.  Supervision over “four types of cases”–that means for most cases, judges take responsibility for their cases, but for difficult, controversial, and possibly having an impact on social stability–because junior judges have different capacities from the more senior–for those four types of cases, the court president and senior court leaders are involved to oversee or supervise (see translation of guidance here, commentary to come)–he has not found useful academic papers on this point;
  9.  ADR (Diversified dispute resolution): this is a traditional topic–optimizing the allocation of resources of dispute resolution
  10. Judicial administration: local government loses its administrative power, but what internal administration;
  11. Judicial democracy: lay judge system–different from common law jury (but China can learn from the common law jury–having them focus on factual rather legal issues)–the law has changed, but academic work is insufficient.
  12. Judicial transparency–this is an old issue, to make the judiciary more transparent to the parties and the public.

These are the major issues in the next five years. These technical legal issues are very interesting and need legal scholars to look at them to support the Zhengfa reforms.

6. Future Direction

  1. Xi Jinping rule of law thoughts–inevitable guideline–some of political and strategic, but it provides some guidelines for basic principles;
  2.  Rule of law-driven first;
  3. Politics driven and guarantee–politics should be a consideration but it should not be unbalanced.  Political role of the rule of law-leading the legislative institutions.  Guarantee means guaranteeing the executive implementation of law, supporting the judiciary, and being a model of a law-abiding citizen; This will be very important in putting judicial reform forward;
  4. To complete those halfway reforms–judicial personnel reforms;
  5.  More rethought and theoretical guide–scholars criticize the judiciary for having an insufficient theoretical basis;
  6.  Dealing with the other judicial civilizations–we never stopped, especially in technical areas, and for our legal professionals, that has never stopped. We need to work together for all of humanity.

Some questions about Chinese judicial reforms answered

law professors Fu Yulin and He Haibo (©Southern Weekend)
law professors Fu Yulin and He Haibo (©Southern Weekend)

An article on the judicial reforms in the 25 September edition of  Southern Weekend (南方周末) is now making its way across Chinese social media, featuring an interview with Peking University Law professor Fu Yulin and Tsinghua University law professor He Haibo. The article  addresses some of the questions many inside and outside of China have been asking:

  • What is the status of the judicial reform pilot projects outside of Shanghai?
  • What is the status of some of the issues mentioned in the judicial reform documents?
  • Why haven’t China’s judicial reform documents been made public?

 

Some background

The two principal judicial reform documents approved by the highest political authorities are:

  •  the Fourth Five Year Plan Judicial Reform Outline, a summary of which was issued on 9 July (blogpost analysis here and here).
  • the Shanghai Judicial Reform Pilot Project Work Plan(上海市司法改革试点工作方案). A detailed description of how the Shanghai authorities will implement this (上海市司法改革试点工作方案>实施意见) has been released by both the Shanghai and national press (an English translation available here).

The published reports on the Fourth Five Year Plan Judicial Reform Outline have mentioned that pilot projects would be implemented in Guangdong, Hubei, Jilin, Qinghai and Hainan, but no outlines of those pilot projects have surfaced.

What is the status of those judicial reform plans?

According to Southern Weekend, drafts for judicial reform plans for Guangdong, Hubei, Jilin, Qinghai, and Hainan are basically finished and have been submitted to the Central Political Legal Committee. They are awaiting approval.

What is the status of some of the issues mentioned in the judicial reform outlines?

 Judicial selection committees

According to  Southern Weekend, it is unresolved under the judicial reforms, who will select judges and how they will be selected. Plans for all five pilot plans designate the the head of the provincial political legal committee as the head of judicial selection committee, with the judicial selection committee to be based at the provincial political legal committee. The reforms in Shanghai are the exception, where the judicial selection committee will be based in the Shanghai Higher People’s Court.  The two law professors interviewed suggest that the provincial people’s congress would have been more appropriate (for the other five pilot plans), but they state that the people’s congresses in these locations did not want to take on that role. (And one comment on the article was that the Party, after all, selects people’s congress members.)

The law professors stressed the need for legal professionals to be members of judicial selection committees. One noted that in China, the principle of “the Party manages cadres” (党管干部) cannot be avoided and suggested that judicial selection committee and Party organization department clearance could run parallel.

It seems that the tension between Party involvement and professionalism in judicial selection remains an issue.

Quota system for judges

The quota system for judges refers to establishing quotas on the numbers of judges in relation to other personnel within the judicial system.  As described in these articles, the plan in Shanghai is to limit judges to 33%, with administrative and support staff constituting 55% and 15% respectively. The  framework in Shanghai has been widely discussed and criticized in the Chinese legal press and on social media, particularly for its impact on younger judges, who note that they would not fit the judicial criteria and would be made “obsolete.”

Professor Fu echos criticism made by judges and others in the press that imposing a rigid quota system for the number of judges was inappropriate.  She pointed out that at the basic level, having a system with fewer than 40% judges was unworkable, given that the Chinese courts at the basic level had to deal with large number of minor offenses.  The reason was that China had not yet established separate courts to deal with minor offences [the Supreme Court Monitor notes that pilot projects for these courts are underway in some areas]. Another issue is the many responsibilities that Chinese judges have in addition to hearing cases and how a smaller number of judges will be able to hear cases as well as carry out their other responsibilities (research, compiling judicial statistics, promoting the courts).

 Why haven’t the current judicial reform documents been made public?

The professors note that they themselves have not seen the judicial reform documents either. They suggest that policies for many issues have not been worked out, but that the uncertainty about the direction and content of the reform policies has a negative effect.

The upcoming plenum

It seems likely that the upcoming fourth plenary session of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central Committee, on rule of law, in October will give us more certainty about the direction and content of the judicial reform policies.  In the meantime, the issues and their implications give us all much to think about.