Category Archives: Communist Party and the Courts

Supreme People’s Court’s Specialized Report on Foreign-Related Adjudication Work

By Susan Finder with initial research assistance by Zhu Xinyue

President Zhou Qiang delivering the report

The Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) October 2022 specialized report on foreign-related adjudication work (最高人民法院关于人民法院涉外审判工作情况的报告)  provides an overview of the SPC’s and the lower courts’ work related to foreign-related matters over the past 10 years. This blogpost uses the term “adjudication work” to encompass the multiple functions of the SPC (see my U.S.-Asia Law Institute article for a refresher) as well as the lower courts. (My previous blogpost gives a detailed explanation of the significance of specialized reports of the SPC and other institutions to the NPC Standing Committee). The report is intended to showcase the SPC’s work in supporting Xi Jinping era fundamental changes in foreign policy, or as the concluding section words it,  “vigorously serving the greater situation of the Party and State’s external policy work” (积极服务党和国家对外工作大局).  An analysis of the content of this specialized report provides insights into the role of the SPC and its relationships with other Central institutions as well as the current and evolving concept of “foreign-related rule of law” (涉外法治). Concerning the link between “foreign-related rule of law” and the foreign-related adjudication work of the people’s courts,  as President Zhou Qiang said: “the foreign-related adjudication work of the people’s courts is an important part of foreign-related rule of law work (人民法院涉外审判工作是涉外法治工作的重要组成部分).”  

I surmise that the NPC Standing Committee requested the SPC submit a specialized report on the SPC’s foreign-related work because the political leadership is prioritizing developing China’s foreign-related body of law and takes the view that SPC expertise is needed to that end.  As in any legal system, issues that come before the Chinese courts highlight the gaps in current legislation (broadly defined).  

1. Overview of the Report

The report covers all areas of SPC work–criminal, civil and commercial, maritime, intellectual property, administrative, and other areas, as well as the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, and other forms of international judicial assistance.  Because cases involving Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are considered by reference to the principles for foreign-related cases, the report provides highlights of those developments as well. 

Following some background material, this blogpost follows the structure of the report and therefore the blogpost is much longer than usual.  A more comprehensive analysis of many aspects is found in my “never-ending article,” currently on its meandering way to publication.

2. Drafting of the Specialized Report

Because most of the cases involving foreign-related matters tend to be in the commercial area generally (incorporating maritime,  recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards), it is likely that the #4 Civil Division took the lead in drafting the report, worked closely with the International Cooperation Bureau,  and involved other divisions and offices of the SPC as needed, including those working on criminal law issues.  Although this report appears to be just another anodyne official report, what underlies it is likely to be hundreds of hours of drafting, soliciting data and comments from related offices, including the Research Office (with a department in charge of Hong Kong and Macau issues), comments from the vice president in charge of the #4 Division (it now appears to be Justice Tao Kaiyuan),  President Zhou Qiang’s office, and the NPC Standing Committee itself. It is unclear whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Comments also provided input.  It incorporated the SPC’s response to a research report on foreign-related adjudication work prepared by the NPC Standing Committee’s Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee (mentioned in the previous blogpost).

3. Summary of the Report

The report highlights the SPC’s work in foreign-related cases in support of related policies. The structure of the report is the usual one for such reports–a long list of accomplishments,  followed by a summary of outstanding challenges and suggestions to the NPC Standing Committee for future work.  It reveals some previously unknown developments and clearly sets out the official conceptual structure underpinning the SPC’s foreign-related adjudication work and therefore China’s “foreign-related rule of law.”   The report takes an inclusive view of accomplishments: judicial interpretations, policy documents, typical and guiding cases, as well as correctly deciding important cases.  This blogpost decodes the details in the report, with brief comments and links to some of my earlier blogposts.

a.  Selected Statistics

 The report provides selected statistics. As I have said when I have spoken on the Belt & Road and the SPC, the number of foreign-related cases heard in the Chinese courts has increased substantially over the past ten years, but even now they constitute a tiny percentage of cases heard in the Chinese courts.  The report reveals some of the challenges, as seen officially.

From 2013 to June 2022, Chinese courts heard a total of 384,000 foreign-related (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan-related) cases. These numbers are tiny compared to the large number of cases accepted by the Chinese courts annually. For example, in 2021, that number reached over 33 million cases. The number of first-instance foreign-related civil and commercial cases nationwide increased from 14,800 in 2013 to 27,300 in 2021.  The SPC has not released more detailed statistics about the types of civil and commercial cases or foreign-related cases in other areas of law, such as criminal cases.  

b.  Protecting China’s National Security and Sovereignty


As is usual with SPC official reports and documents, matters relating to national security and sovereignty take a prominent place.  The SPC reiterates that its foreign-related adjudication work serves the domestic and external greater situations.  This section highlights two areas of service in protection of national security and sovereignty:

  • striking at crime: and

The crimes mentioned are harmonized with the priorities seen in other official reports and documents, so that national security, particularly political security is listed first.  The crimes are similar to those listed in the 2020 Guiding Opinions on Services and Safeguards of the People’s Courts on Further Expanding Opening-Up to the World (Open Policy Guiding Opinion 最高人民法院关于人民法院服务保障进一步扩大对外开放的指导意见).  Accomplishments listed include the 2017 Provisions on Several Questions Concerning the Application of the Procedure of Confiscating Illegal Gains in Cases Where the Criminal Suspects or Defendants Absconded or Died and the 2021 comprehensive judicial interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law (my book chapter concerns its drafting), which contains basic principles relating to foreign-related cases.  

  • protecting China’s investments abroad. Cases so classified include infrastructure-related cases, trade cases, and shipping cases. The principal accomplishment is issuing a judicial interpretation on the hearing of independent letter of guarantee (demand guarantee) disputes and unifying the rules governing such disputes. These developments, which have come through several SPC cases (discussed here) and the end 2021 Conference Summary, have been flagged on this blog. A long-pending China International Commercial Court (CICC) case may provide additional guidance. 

c. Creating a Legalized International Business Environment

This section is relatively long and highlights much of the SPC’s foreign-related adjudication work in the past 10 years. The focus is on international commercial dispute resolution rather than intellectual property disputes. 
i. Foreign investment: The courts have supported the revised Foreign Investment Law and Implementing Regulations with two interpretations (including one on the application of the Foreign Investment Law, mentioned here), as well as a policy of centralizing the hearing of such cases, seeking to ensure greater competency.
ii. Pilot free trade zones and ports: The courts have supported these policies through several services and safeguards opinions (one general one, discussed in my book chapter, as well as ones on Lingang, Hainan, and new zones in Beijing). The SPC also issued related typical cases and encouraged local courts to establish additional measures to support national free trade zone policy.
iii. The courts have supported national policies supporting a competitive market order, and to that end have issued regulations on bankruptcy, normative documents on improving the business environment (including services and safeguards opinions and a conference summary), and established financial courts (see Mark Jia’s related article).
iv. Supported national policy concerning economic development and COVID-19 pandemic control (I have a related article that will be published in Italian).  The SPC promulgated four guiding opinions (policy documents) on the trial of civil cases related to the Covid-19 pandemic, one of which focused on foreign-related commercial and maritime cases.  This document was included in UNCITRAL’s CLOUT database.

v.  Respecting international conventions and international practices (customs or usage, by which is meant trade/commercial practices or usages).  As mentioned here, the SPC is drafting a judicial interpretation on the application of international conventions and treaties and international practices and has issued related typical cases.
vi. Application of (foreign (non-mainland) governing law.  Since 2013, the courts have applied foreign law in 542 cases. My draft article discusses related issues briefly.
vii. Cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments: Since 2013, the courts nationwide have considered 7,313 cases of applications for recognition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments from foreign courts.  My draft article discusses the evolution of this policy. The report mentions the enforcement of Chinese judgments abroad.

d. Serving national maritime policy


The report underlines that the SPC’s maritime adjudication work directly serves foreign trade shipping and marine development to maintain national [judicial] sovereignty and related national interests. The report mentions that the SPC issued judicial interpretations on maritime litigation jurisdiction, and issued judicial interpretations for hearing cases of compensation for damage to marine natural resources and ecological environment. The SPC and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued regulations on handling public interest litigation cases on marine natural resources and ecological environment, and released related typical cases.
The report mentions China’s work on becoming an international maritime justice center  (See my article in the Diplomat).   Related accomplishments include the SPC expanding the network of maritime courts and their dispatched tribunals and the report highlights that more parties without a jurisdictional link with China have chosen the jurisdiction of the Chinese maritime courts (for a different view from the official one, see Professor Vivienne Bath’s research on parallel litigation involving the Chinese maritime courts). 

e. Improving international commercial dispute resolution mechanisms to serve high-quality development of the BRI


According to the report, the SPC is implementing the deployment of the political leadership in this area.  Those include:

the CICC and related developments, including: the CICC’s bilingual website, the  CICC’s expert committee; two BRI Services and Safeguards Opinions, and typical BRI cases, as well as establishing local international commercial courts. (This blog has discussed these developments in some detail, with more contained in my draft article).

f. Establishing diversified dispute resolution of international commercial disputes 

i. The SPC reports that it established a “one-stop” diversified international commercial dispute resolution mechanism, which integrates litigation, arbitration, and mediation.  The report mentions the accomplishments of several local courts and the incorporation of arbitration and mediation institutions into the SPC’s (CICC’s (Chinese version)) one-stop platform.  
ii. Arbitration: The SPC issued judicial interpretations on judicial review of arbitration cases and enforcement of arbitral awards, and introduced a mechanism and reporting system for judicial review of arbitration cases; since 2013, Chinese courts have heard over 110,000 judicial review cases (presumably the vast majority domestic). 
iii. Mediation: The report describes local developments and accomplishments related to the mediation platform of the people’s courts (see the related white paper). 

g. Serving national Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan policy

On the details of SPC and Greater Bay Area policy, please see my earlier blogpost and presentation at a November, 2022 conference held at the Law Faculty of the University of Hong Kong.

This blogpost summarized earlier developments related to Taiwan. The  SPC issued judicial interpretations on the recognition and enforcement of Taiwan civil judgments and arbitration awards.
The SPC mentioned that the courts have supported national policy on integrating Hong Kong and Macao into Greater Bay Area policy by supporting [Ministry of Justice led policy] to permit lawyers from Hong Kong and Macao to practice in the Greater Bay Area (note, such lawyers must be Chinese citizens). The courts are also supporting the initiatives related to integrating Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan legal professionals (again, foreign professionals registered in these jurisdictions are not included).

f. Improving the quality and credibility of  China’s foreign-related adjudication


i. Jurisdiction: the report mentions a notice on jurisdiction on foreign-related cases (flagged in this blogpost) and centralized jurisdiction.
ii. Service of process: The SPC amended the judicial interpretation of the Civil Procedure Law to enable more flexible service of process abroad and established a platform with the Ministry of Justice (discussed in this blogpost) to enable more efficient handling of service of process requests from abroad. (There is no mention of greater flexibility in foreign service of process into mainland China.)
iii. Determination of foreign law: the SPC established a unified platform for the determination of foreign law (accessible through the CICC website, see the links above), which links to SPC-authorized institutions providing such services.  My draft article provides additional details. 

iv. Improving cross-border litigation services.  This integrates with the SPC’s smart courts policy.  One of the major accomplishments mentioned in the SPC’s judicial interpretation on cross-border online litigation.  
iv. Training foreign-related adjudication talents (涉外审判人才.  See my earlier blogpost.

g.  Promoting the development of the domestic and foreign-related legal systems

Matters so classified include: vigorously supporting the development of foreign-related legislation (mentioned in this blogpost); application of foreign-related law; and undertaking related research.  The foreign-related legislation that the report mentions (Civil Procedure Law and several maritime-related laws), is actually only one small part of what the SPC has done.  The application of foreign-related legislation gives the SPC an opportunity to reiterate its accomplishments in issuing judicial interpretations; policy documents;  conference summaries; and typical cases.  The SPC also mentions its BRI research center and establishing research centers at 15 universities and research institutions.

h. International judicial exchanges to promote the establishment of a community with a shared future of mankind

The SPC includes in this category the following: judicial exchanges in the form of memoranda of understanding and large-scale conferences; international judicial assistance in both civil and criminal matters; participation in the formulation of international rules (negotiating international conventions and bilateral treaties, as mentioned here, as well as providing support to China’s initiatives in various matters, including railway bills of lading (see my student Zhang Huiyu’s article); and “telling China’s rule of law story well.”  The latter category includes certain conferences and meetings with foreign judiciaries.   I have either been a participant or an observer in some of those “telling China’s rule of law story well” events, such as the CICC international conferences and the 2019 third meeting of the UK-China Joint Judicial Expert Working Group on Commercial Dispute Resolution.  

4. Challenges in foreign-related work

The report listed the following challenges:
a. Limited ability of some courts to engage in foreign-related adjudication work, as evidenced by the lack of experience of some courts in foreign-related work.  When I spoke at a Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre event in October, 2022, my co-panelist Arthur Dong illustrated that with his accounts of how several local courts handled applications for interim measures.
b. Ongoing difficult issues: difficulties in service of process, extraterritorial investigation and evidence collection; determining foreign (non-mainland Chinese) law;  shortening the trial period for hearing foreign-related cases (also note that at least one CICC case has been outstanding for over two years).
c. The “one-stop” diversified international commercial dispute resolution mechanism needs improving and China needs to accelerate the drafting of a commercial mediation law.  The need for a commercial mediation law has been discussed within central institutions since at least 2019 (as I have observed). So it seems that the SPC is in line with the view of the Ministry of Commerce that such a law is needed to promote more professional mediation.
d. A significant shortage in the number of judicial personnel with foreign-related expertise (discussed here).

5. Future developments

The report emphasized adhering to the leadership of the Party to ensure foreign-related adjudication is politically correct and in line with the deployment of the political leadership.
The practical measures (directed towards the NPC Standing Committee) included:

  •  Accelerating the process of amending the foreign-related part of the Civil Procedure Law (this has been accomplished). Incorporating the amendment of the Special Maritime Procedure Law into the [NPC’s] legislative plan;  amend the NPC Standing Committee decision establishing the maritime courts, to give maritime courts in coastal cities jurisdiction over certain criminal cases (an issue under discussion since at least 2014);
  • improving certain matters related to the CICC to resolve certain “bottleneck” issues (unspecified). 
  • At an appropriate time, drafting a commercial mediation law to provide a sufficient legal basis for China’s competitive position in international commercial dispute resolution;
  • Delegating authority to Guangdong and other courts that hear a large number of cases involving Hong Kong and Macau cases to simplify civil litigation procedures, such as proof concerning the identity of the party and authorization of its representative. (These issues are linked to the fact that China has not yet signed the Hague “Apostille Convention” (see my earlier blogpost) and has not yet created an analogous procedure for Hong Kong and Macau);
  • Improving training of foreign-related legal personnel through implementing an exchange policy with international institutions. As I have observed, much of the discussion of training foreign-related legal personnel has involved training in China, with minimal foreign involvement.  

Concluding comment

As this report has illustrated, the SPC (and the court system) are taking an active part in the evolving project of creating a foreign-related legal system that better reflects both the demands of the political leadership and the practical needs of the users of the Chinese legal system.  It should be clear from this analysis that China’s foreign-related rule of law is a work in progress involving a multitude of issues, and that the SPC has a multifaceted and crucial role in its creation.

Supreme People’s Court Monitor’s Archives

Happy Year of the Rabbit to all followers and readers of this blog! As a few followers know, I moved recently.  The disruption is the reason I haven’t posted in such a long time.  Because of the move, some of my archives from my many years of researching the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), like Rip Van Winkle, have emerged from hibernation.   They include:

  1. the address and work number of a now-retired senior SPC judge.  He will remain anonymous, as I am concerned there is no statute of limitations for minor violations of 外事纪律 (foreign affairs discipline) by receiving a foreigner in what he considered shabby premises, and being eminently hospitable.  I have never had the chance to tell him that he is partly responsible for my interest in the SPC.  I recall visiting him in his danwei-supplied housing (宿舍). He lived in a compound of one-story buildings (平房) next to the main SPC building.  Thankfully, security was not as difficult as it would be now, and those buildings were demolished long ago. I recall riding my bicycle from Peking University into the one-story building compound to visit him. He must have recommended that I visit the shop of the People’s Court Press (人民法院出版社门市部) (now around the corner from the SPC main building on 正义路) and that simple recommendation was crucial. Among the books that I purchased during that initial visit were the first few volumes of 司法手册.   These volumes, edited by the SPC’s Research Office, pre-dated court or other computer databases of legislation and documents.  The assortment of SPC and related documents in those volumes led me down the rabbit hole of researching the SPC. 
  2. I fell down that rabbit hole in 1992 or 1993, when I pulled those volumes off my bookshelf and tried to make sense of them.  At the time, I was focused on understanding how the SPC operated at the time(and did not read legal Chinese as quickly as I do now) and failed to read some of the historical documents included in those volumes.   I can see now that these volumes contain documents issued by the SPC and Party institutions unavailable elsewhere, some relating to the Strike Hard Campaign (严打) of the early 1980’s, others relating to post-Cultural Revolution issues,  others relating to divorce policy in the 1960’s, with still others linked to special regulations for foreign-related criminal cases.
  3. Another book I came across was a 1993  volume edited by the editors of the  SPC’s Gazette, containing typical cases (典型案例), judicial interpretations (司法解释),, and an assortment of SPC documents that the editors considered useful but were not published in the Gazette. The book was published before the SPC issued its rules on judicial interpretation work so some of the documents included in that volume would not be incorporated in an analogous volume today. When I wrote my first article on the SPC, this book was a crucial source for me.  SPC typical cases themselves fill several volumes (I have multiple volumes of a 2009-2021 collection of typical cases published by the People’s Court Press).  
  4. I have a large collection of name cards given to me by people in the courts and other institutions, including a friend (now deceased) who was enormously helpful when researching my first SPC article.  For some reason, I have a half dozen or more name cards from members of the staff of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. At the time (early 1990’s), I took easy access to people in Party and state institutions for granted and never expected that 30 years later, it would be more rather than less challenging to meet them.
  5. Among the items in my archives are notebooks, with questions that I prepared 30 years ago, to ask a small circle of friends linked to the courts, most as relevant now as then:
    1. What does a 庭长 (division head) do?
    2. What does the Research Office (研究室)do?
    3. Interpretations, litigation, legislation [drafting of judicial interpretations and court rules], administration–which constitutes the bulk of the work of the SPC?
    4. What are opinions (意见)?
    5. Are conference summaries (会议纪要) considered to be interpretations by the courts?
    6. How do NPC representatives supervise the SPC?

 

Decoding the Supreme People’s Court’s Services and Safeguards Opinions

I recently published a short article on the Perspectives blog of the  New York University School of Law U.S. -Asia Law Institute, with the same name as this post, linked here.  The Perspectives blog has posted a PDF version, and I am reposting it here for the convenience of some blog readers. I have finished a long version of the article which I am now amending. The research on which this article is based draws on discussions with many persons who cannot be thanked by name and others who will be whenever the longer version is published. I particularly appreciate those knowledgeable persons who have shared their insights with me over the many years it has taken to write the longer version.

About a year ago, I published an article on the same blog, entitled Why I Research China’s Supreme People’s Court.   The PDF version is available here.

Many thanks to Katherine Wilhelm, Executive Director of the U.S. -Asia Law Institute, for her skillful editing of both articles.

Why & How the Supreme People’s Court is Providing Services and Safeguards for the Unified Market Policy

Press conference, at which representatives from the SPC’s Research Office, Civil Division #2 and #3 spoke, as well as the SPC spokesperson

In the middle of July (2022), the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued another document providing “judicial services and safeguards” to another major government policy initiative, this one on the work to create a unified market, entitled Opinions on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for Accelerating the Construction of a Unified National Market (SPC Unified Market Opinion 最高人民法院关于为加快建设全国统一大市场提供司法服务和保障的意见). (See bilingual version here). It implements the April 2022 Communist Party Center and State Council Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of a Unified National Market.  The SPC also released ten   typical/model/exemplary cases.  These cases provide guidance to the lower courts through specific examples phrased in current political language.   The document and cases are a shining example of the long series of “judicial services and safeguards opinions” that the SPC has issued since 2015. The SPC issued the first one with that title in the Xi Jinping New Era to anticipate legal issues created by the then-new (or relatively new) Belt & Road Strategy.

The SPC Unified Market Opinion reveals a great deal about what is on the agenda of the SPC as well as deeper trends in the development of the Chinese courts in the New Era.  A  summary of what the SPC’s Unified Market Opinion covers and reveals follows, with some comments on what it says about larger trends.

I.  What Does the SPC’s Unified Market Opinion Cover?

The SPC Unified Market Opinion covers many aspects of the work of the courts. only some of which are discussed in this overly long blogpost.  Therefore the SPC’s Research Office took the lead in drafting it, along with the #2 Civil Division, focusing on domestic commercial matters and the #3 Civil Division, focusing on intellectual property matters. For that reason, representatives from those offices spoke at the press conference, along with Justice Yang Wanming, who must have been the SPC leader responsible.  However, it is clear from the document that many other entities within the SPC contributed to the drafting, particularly the #4 Civil Division, which focuses on cross-border commercial matters, including arbitration, maritime, trade and investment issues.  The International Cooperation Bureau, which has substantive responsibilities in addition to its duties under China’s foreign affairs system clearly contributed to it as well.

It is consistent with other judicial services and safeguards opinions for the document to serve as a “package” for judicial measures, broadly understood. Many of the measures are not new to the regular reader of SPC documents, indicating that the problem is important and the related issue has not gone away.

Japanese wrapping cloth, photo ©japanobjects.com

the classic multitool, the Swiss Army Knife

In the SPC’s bureaucratic language contained in the SPC’s press release, the document “coordinates the precise efforts in all areas of the judiciary” (统筹司法各领域精准发力” ). In plain language, it means that measures across all relevant areas of law for which the SPC is involved are incorporated. It also means that different types of measures are included in the package, including relevant administrative matters.

The function of coordinating with Party and state institutions, about which I wrote last year is described in the press release as “coordinating all forces to implement comprehensive policies 统筹各方力量综合施策.”  Oddly enough, at least one well-known Chinese scholar who has written about the Chinese courts doubted that this is a judicial function.  From these points, it can be seen that this document is a multifunctional tool.

II.  What is On the SPC’s Agenda?

For those of us seeking to monitor what is on the SPC’s judicial interpretation agenda since the SPC stopped publishing its annual agenda,  the SPC Unified Market Opinion has a great deal of useful information.  The document also flags forthcoming judicial policies and related administrative matters that the SPC leadership has approved and a great deal of guidance for the lower courts.  For cross-border matters, because I am more familiar with the SPC’s judicial policies, I will go into greater detail.  In several other areas, I will flag forthcoming judicial interpretations and other important matters.

A.  Cross-border commercial matters

As relates to cross-border commercial matters, Articles 5 and 16 of the SPC Unified Market Opinions signal many matters to the careful reader.

  1.  Judicial interpretations on the ascertainment of laws and application of international treaties and international practice and possibly others are on the agenda. I surmise that they are at an early stage because it says “research shall be conducted.”  It would not be surprising if one or more of the SPC’s Belt & Road Research Bases would be tasked with providing research.  If that is so, given the usual gap between academic research and the requirements of the Chinese courts, it will be some time before drafts of these judicial interpretations are circulating within the court system and among selected experts.
  2.  Another topic on the judicial interpretation agenda, seemingly again at an early stage, is one on jurisdiction over foreign-related civil and commercial cases tried by the courts of first instance.  I surmise that this is linked to last year’s reforms to the four levels of the Chinese courts and is likely to involve centralized jurisdiction over cross-border cases (foreign and Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan), as has been the trend thus far.
  3. One sentence flags developments related to service of process and possibly collection of evidence, although the latter is not specifically mentioned.  It calls for judicial assistance to be strengthened [improved], foreign-related service mechanisms to be improved, and work to commence on a  unified electronic platform for the service of process abroad.   As mentioned earlier, Greater Bay Area policy documents have included this.  Chinese Civil Procedure Law permits electronic service of process from China, although no mention is made of being more flexible in the service of process from abroad to China.   The latter matter would involve the Ministry of Justice, which is designated as the Central Authority under the relevant Hague Conventions.
  4. Another early stage project is  “promoting the construction of a system for the extraterritorial application of Chinese laws to legally protect the lawful rights and interests of enterprises and citizens that go global.” So I believe that we will eventually see more Chinese legislation providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction (or what is called in Chinese discourse, “longarm jurisdiction”), and likely eventually judicial interpretations.  This language suggests that the SPC takes the view that its expertise is needed in the drafting of such legislation because its judges would be able to thoroughly consider what type of system will not cause further decoupling of interactions between China and the outside world.
  5. There is language about improving the operation of the China International Commercial Court, the expert committee, and the affiliated one-stop platform.  It appears from the language that some procedural rules are needed.
  6. Article 5 has a long reminder to lower court judges on “correctly applying” foreign investment law, foreign (non-mainland Chinese) law, international treaties and practice, as well as equally treating domestic and foreign-funded companies.  So it appears that additional training is needed for lower court judges if the Chinese courts are to become a preferred jurisdiction for international commercial dispute resolution, as the political leadership would like the Chinese courts to be.
  7. Article 16 focuses on improving the connection between domestic laws and international rules., highlighting improving domestic rules as well as foreign-related ones (as addressed in at least one blogpost last year).  Much of Chinese legislation is domestically focused and is inconsistent with international practice.  The Construction Law’s prohibition on subcontracting is one example, that often arises in dispute resolution in BRI projects.  As this article explains, Chinese general contractors often subcontract part of their projects to other Chinese companies in Chinese law-governed contracts (regardless of the requirements of local law), in violation of Chinese law.  It also mentions modernizing China’s foreign-related adjudication system and capacity, which I understand to be a signal that the SPC would like to see changes to the foreign-related section of the Civil Procedure Law as well as resources allocated to the training of judges hearing foreign-related cases (see last year’s blogpost for further details).
  8. Two of the model cases concern foreign-related matters–one on foreign investment law, the other on maritime law, the latter signaling the accomplishments of the Chinese courts in resolving disputes at source and mediating to conclusion a dispute with a foreign arbitration clause.

B. Other Areas of Law

When read together, the other provisions of the SPC Unified Market Opinion can be seen as an assessment of the state of legality and the economy after ten years of documents issued by the political leadership as well as SPC (and other institutions).  The impact of multiple campaigns, regulatory and otherwise, and the grip of government on the economy is visible.   Many new and forthcoming developments are visible as well, such as the implementation of Chinese government undertakings concerning climate change and the challenge of new forms of employment.

Abuse of Administrative and Prosecutorial Power

Articles 3 and 4, entitled  “helping the implementation of unified market entry” and “enhancing equal protection of property rights” provide guidance to lower courts on trying cases related to abuses of administrative power that harm business, the misuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition. property, and the abuse of prosecutorial power that transforms a business dispute into a criminal case.  The language “it is imperative to improve the mechanism for petition and retrial, etc. of enterprise-related property right cases and refine the mechanism for effective prevention and correction of wrongful convictions” signals that the many documents issued to protect the interests of private entrepreneurs have not been effective and that the campaign (now normalized) to sweep out organized crime and get rid of evil (saohei 扫黑除恶) has likely resulted in another group of persons wrongfully convicted. That section and one of the model cases also signal that the protection of private property rights in criminal cases continues to be a problem.

Bankruptcy

Article 6 focuses on bankruptcy (insolvency) law. In addition to a long list of guidance, it mentions the SPC facilitating (推动) amendments to the Bankruptcy Law and legislation on individual bankruptcy.    SPC President Zhou Qiang has received delegations from the NPC working on the drafting of the Bankruptcy Law several times, and it is likely that staff-level interactions occur much more often.

Another matter to note in that article is the establishment of the normalized  “government-court interaction” coordination mechanism (常态化“府院联动”协调机制).  SPC judges who have spoken about this mention that the coordination mechanism faces many barriers, but it is a fact that in the Chinese context, bankruptcy cannot proceed without the assistance of local governments.

Quickly mentioned

Article 7 is on enforcement, and mentions that the SPC will cooperate (presumably with the NPC Standing Committee and its Legislative Affairs Commission) on efforts relating to the Civil Compulsory Enforcement Law and amend or otherwise issue a judicial interpretation to enforce it.

Article 8 is on unifying the urban and rural land markets.  In addition to a great deal of guidance, it mentions that to adapt to the adjustments of land supply policies, the standards for the hearing cases involving disputes over the assignment and transfer of the right to use state-owned land shall be unified. It does not specify the form that the unification will take.

Article 9 relates to the securities and financial markets.  In addition to a great deal of guidance, it mentions that the SPC will improve rules (审 理规则)  for hearing new types of cases:  private equity investment, entrusted wealth management, asset securitization, and cross-border financial asset transactions, among others. It flags that the SPC will research legal issues concerning digital currency and mobile payment (I surmise possibly looking to the academic sector for initial research),

Article 10 focuses on the unification of the data and technical market, flagging that judicial safeguards will be provided for the data element market driven by data and the SPC will focus on improving judicial protection of data property rights.

Article 11 relates to energy and the environment.  Those focusing on these issues would be able to write an entire article on this article–I would only mention that the SPC plans to research judicial policy support for achieving the target of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality.

Article 12 focuses on the judiciary and business environment, mentioning work on establishing an indicator system consistent with China’s national conditions and international standards; issuing judicial interpretations and judicial policies providing services and safeguards for the business environment, and cooperating with relevant functional departments (unspecified有关职能部门), in promulgating an implementation plan for building a business environment under the rule of law.

Article 13 is devoted to creating a good faith transaction environment.  At least three points to be noted: the issuance of the judicial interpretation of the Contract Part of the Civil Code, work on deep integration of socialist core values with the work of the courts; and exploring paths for better integrating the social credit system with the work of the courts.

Article 14 focuses on regional market integration and Article 15 on improving the linkage of rules between the mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, (and mentioned less, Taiwan). The last blogpost explored Greater Bay Area judicial policy in depth.

Article 18 focuses on labor issues, reminding judges that employment discrimination cases should be tried properly but not mentioning the drafting of a judicial interpretation. It flags that the SPC will do research related to a judicial interpretation concerning labor disputes of employees in new business forms.

Article 20 focuses on providing better protection for the consumer.  It mentions improving e rules for hearing cases involving online consumption, mechanisms for trying consumer disputes, work on establishing a  collective litigation system for consumer cases plus a related public interest litigation system and cooperation mechanism with consumer protection authorities.

Article 21 is a long paragraph on anti-monopoly law, so much in this area can be anticipated. It mentions “strengthening” judicial regulation over monopoly by platform enterprises, improving rules for making judgments in competition cases and eventually issuing a judicial interpretation on anti-monopoly civil litigation.  The article on intellectual property law, Article 19, appears to be a summary of current policies.

Article 22, on supervising and supporting market regulators also deserves standalone analysis.  It mentions amending and improving the judicial interpretations relating to public disclosure of government information and cooperating with the procuratorate to  push market regulatory departments to improve their regulatory system  through administrative public interest litigation cases and judicial recommendations. The courts will communicate and cooperate more with the market regulators to unify administrative and judicial rules.

Article 23 focuses on criminal and other violations of market order. On the agenda in this area is a future judicial interpretation on hearing tax-related criminal cases. It also mentions intensifying the punishment of tax evasion by making use of dual contracts and by high-net-worth individuals in culture and entertainment fields. As could be anticipated the judiciary will collaborate with the taxation and public security authorities on tax matters.

Article 24 summarizes SPC policy in support of epidemic prevention and the economy.  I have a forthcoming short article on this topic.

Implications for the Courts

The concluding section (Articles 25-29) of the SPC Unified Market Opinion focuses on the courts themselves. The message from the SPC is that this document is important and that lower court leaders should regard it as an important political task.  This section summarizes recent litigation-related reforms, SPC efforts to unify the application of law, smart courts, and diversified dispute resolution.

III. What Does It Signify About Larger Trends?

I surmise that the SPC issued this document in July so that it could be included in its forthcoming mid-term report to the NPC Standing Committee about the piloting of the reforms to the four levels of the courts. That reform means a shift in focus of the work of the SPC, especially SPC headquarters, to judicial policy, judicial interpretations, and guidance of the lower courts as well as reducing the number of cases the SPC considers.  It is meant to illustrate to the members of the NPC Standing Committee the many contributions the SPC makes when focused on judicial policy, interpretations, and guidance of the lower courts. For that reason, it also appears designed “to welcome” the upcoming 20th Party Congress by showing the relevance of the SPC and the court system to promoting the development of the economy and socialist rule of law (with Chinese characteristics).

Assuming that the mid-term report is approved and the reform of the four levels of the Chinese courts continues to be implemented,  we will see more of such relatively comprehensive judicial services and safeguards opinions promoting the multiple functions of the Chinese courts. These will strengthen the centralizing role of the SPC, or as I have mentioned often in this blog, strengthen the firm guiding hand of the SPC.

 

Supreme People’s Court’s 2022 Pre-“Two Sessions” Accomplishments

In the period between 1 January and today (2 March 2022), the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued quite a few judicial interpretations, judicial documents, and typical cases.  This blogpost focuses on one judicial interpretation; several Greater Bay-related interpretations and documents; and several sets of typical cases issued since the beginning of the year.   Apologies to readers that I do not have time to analyze any of this properly-I am doing the first of many major revisions of an academic article,  for submission.

Judicial interpretations: General Part of the Civil Code

In late February, the SPC issued the Interpretation of the General Part of the Civil Code (最高人民法院关于适用《中华人民共和国民法典》总则编若干问题的解释).  I had previously surmised that it would be finalized before the National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting in March.  It went into effect on 1 March 2022.  An SPC press release is found here, with background information on drafting, mentioning that the drafters had completely accepted the views of the Legislative Work Commission (LAC) in the drafting process, for reasons previously discussed.  I surmise in the meeting rooms in which the draft interpretation was discussed, there was a robust exchange of views. A more recent article, published after this blogpost was originally written), that I recommend to those with an interest (Understanding and Application of the General Part), has more detailed information about the drafting.

As discussed earlier, the drafters solicited views within the court system and among some of the leading Beijing law schools.  The press release highlighted the importance of integrating socialist core values into the interpretation. Commentary by a responsible person of the Research Office of the SPC here. That office led the drafting of the General Part, as flagged in this blogpost. The authoritative person (perhaps Judge Guo Feng, but unknown), mentions the integration of socialist core values into the General Part of the Civil Code, as is required by the ongoing SPC plan and a multi-institutional Party document that has not been made public. The “Understanding and Application of the General Part) was written by Judge Guo Feng, Chen Longye (mentioned here), and Liu Ting, a judge’s assistant, whom I surmise was seconded to the Research Office from the Nantong (Jiangsu) Intermediate People’s Court. Therefore I assume that the authoritative person quoted in the earlier press release was in fact Judge Guo.

The article by Judge Guo and colleagues details the many entities that saw the draft of the  interpretation: relevant entities within the SPC; all the higher people’s court; as well as the Central Publicity Department (中宣部), Central Political-Legal Commission (中政委),the office of the Central Governing the Country According to Law Commission (中央依法治国办), the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (最高人民检察院), Ministry of Public Security (公安部)、Ministry of Justice (民政部)、State Administration of Market Regulation (市场监管总局),  China Law Society (中国法学会), China Academy of Social Sciences (presumably the Law Institute), the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and others. They twice sought comments from the LAC in writing(两次书面征求全国人大常委会法工委的意见)–this means through formal institution to institution communications.

As I wrote in an earlier blogpost, it appears that the SPC is both “serving the greater situation” by implementing in the courts the Party’s plan to integrate socialist core values in plans to legislate and amend legislation(社会主义核心价值观融入法治建设立法修法规划) [the new plan, entitled  关于建立社会主义核心价值观入法入规协调机制的意见(试行)] while at the same time seeking to deal with many of the difficult legal issues that face it.

The General Part covers the following issues: capacity for civil rights and capacity for civil conduct, guardianship, declaration of disappearance and declaration of death, civil legal acts, agency, civil liability, statute of limitations, and supplementary provisions. Professor Wang Liming’s highly authoritative commentary, posted on an SPC Wechat account, is found here.   Professor Yang Lixin has also published an authoritative article. I recommend this version, with red highlighting by now-former SPC judge Xiao Feng of the important points of Professor Wang, Yang, and Shen Weixing, dean of Tsinghua University Law School and Professor Yu Fei of China University of Political Science and Law.

Greater Bay Area Judicial Assistance and Judicial Policy

The SPC issued several Greater Bay related documents since 1 January, listed below, which relate to SPC policy on developing civil judicial assistance with the Hong Kong and Macau Special Administrative Regions:

1.Mutual Assistance Arrangement between the SPC & the Macau SAR in Arbitration Procedures (最高人民法院关于内地与澳门特别行政区就仲裁程序相互协助保全的安排);

Important background found in the press conference, in which Judge Si Yanli and others involved in negotiating the Arrangement spoke. My earlier blogpost explains why Arrangements are approved as judicial interpretations, although they do not fit the formal jurisdiction of one: “Judge Si mentioned that for the Supplementary Arrangement to be effectively implemented on the mainland, it must be transformed into a judicial interpretation.” Those following legal developments in the two SARs should note the following language in the press conference: “the Outline of the Greater Bay Area and the Hengqin Plan both propose to promote the convergence of rules and coordination of mechanisms in the Greater Bay Area of Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Macao. Inter-regional judicial assistance is an important way to reflect Chinese characteristics, highlight the advantages of “two systems” and achieve convergence of legal rules and mechanisms.  《大湾区纲要》《横琴方案》均提出要推进粤港澳大湾区规则衔接、机制对接。区际司法协助是体现中国特色、彰显“两制”优势,实现法律规则衔接、机制对接的重要途径”。This theme is further developed in two January, 2022 policy documents linked below.

2. Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in Matrimonial and Family Cases by the Courts of the Mainland and of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 最高人民法院关于内地与香港特别行政区法院相互认可和执行婚姻家庭民事案件判决的安排. The SPC and Hong Kong Department of Justice held a useful seminar to explain its provisions, at which Judge Si Yanli spoke, among others.  I expect that the law firms focusing on family law matters will follow up with detailed client alerts.

3. Opinions on Supporting and Guaranteeing the Comprehensive Deepening of the Reform and Opening-up of Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone 关于支持和保障全面深化前海深港现代服务业合作区改革开放的意见, linked to the Central Committee and State Council’s September, 2021 document on Qianhai/Hong Kong and Opinions on Supporting and Guaranteeing the Construction of Hengqin Guangdong-Macao Deep Cooperation Zone 关于支持和保障横琴粤澳深度合作区建设的意见, linked to the Central Committee & State Council’s September document on Hengqin/Macau.  It is unclear to me whether the SPC solicited the views of the two SARs on these documents. As mentioned above, it mentions national policy to achieve convergence of legal rules and mechanisms in the Greater Bay Area and mentions several aspects of that policy that is relevant to dispute resolution.   Among those are (numbers are from the points in the relevant Opinion):

4. Expanding the jurisdiction of the Qianhai court, including permitting it to take cases when the parties have agreed on the jurisdiction of the Qianhai, but there is no connection to the dispute. This appears to be another piloting (the SPC’s Lingang Opinion has a similar provision) of a possible future amendment of the Civil Procedure Law to abolish the closest connection rule for cross-border jurisdiction (see Professor Vivienne Bath’s research on this issue);

5. Work on (加强) establish an inter-regional judicial assistance system with Chinese characteristics, consider an electronic platform for civil and commercial judicial assistance in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area;

8. Explore the establishment of a unified qualification recognition system for Hong Kong and Macao mediators to practice in the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area.  The lawyer qualification system requires that the lawyer be a Chinese citizen, consistent with Chinese legislation. Query whether the same requirement will be imposed on mediators. This would be disadvantageous for Hong Kong mediators who are not Chinese citizens.  

I highly recommend Judge Si Yanli’s recent academic article on Greater Bay judicial assistance issues for those with an interest in this topic.

It is my hope that someone can undertake further analysis of these documents.

SPC Typical Cases

Perhaps because General Secretary Xi Jinping has said “one case is better than a dozen documents (习近平总书记强调, “一个案例胜过一打文件”),  in the run-up to the “Two Meetings,” the SPC has issued quite a few typical cases. Typical cases are intended to guide the courts and the general public.

  1. Nine typical cases on protecting the rights of juveniles 未成年人权益司法保护典型案例, well worth further analysis, with several involving family education orders to parents and one involving failure of a hotel to verify the identity and contact information of a juvenile couple that checked into a hotel room (where they had sex);
  2. Ten typical cases on solid waste pollution人民法院依法审理固体废物污染环境典型案例, seven criminal cases, two civil cases, and one administrative case. Three involve public interest litigation, two by the procuratorate and one by a civil society organization;
  3. The third set of Belt & Road-related cases 最高法发布第三批涉“一带一路”建设典型案例.  The cases are not necessarily specifically connected with the Belt & Road but involve Chinese cross-border commercial, maritime, and arbitration issues.  One China International Commercial Court (CICC) case is included, a case on an infrastructure payment guarantee, as is the Brentwood case.   The SPC’s comments on the CICC case are consistent with my comments published earlier on this blog about the role of CICC in providing soft precedents for the Chinese courts: “the principle of attribution has an exemplary guiding role for the resolution of similar disputes in the future (该归责原则对今后类似纠纷案件的解决具有示范指导作用).”
  4. Accompanying the release of the General Part judicial interpretation was the first set of  Civil Code typical cases The typical cases are not limited to illustrating the General Part but relate to different parts of the Civil Code, also stressing socialist core values.
  5. A first set of typical cases of the courts providing services and safeguards to the free trade zones 人民法院服务保障自由贸易试验区建设典型案例.  The cases are intended to guide the lower courts and general public, and  as the introduction states illustrate the “achievements of the people’s courts in actively creating a business environment that is ruled by law, internationalized, and convenient.”  For those interested, see my earlier article on the SPC and free trade zones, available on
  6. SSRN
  7. The second batch of cases in which the people’s courts promote socialist core values 第二批人民法院大力弘扬社会主义核心价值观典型民事案例.  These cases are worth further analysis for what they show about the treatment of the elderly, among other social issues.

Guidance on the Special Handling of Four Types of Cases & Its Implications

Four Types of Cases

By Susan Finder and Straton Papagianneas

In early November 2021, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued a new Guiding Opinion regarding Further Improving the Trial Supervision and Management Mechanism for the Four Types of Cases (关于进一步完善“四类案件”监督管理工作机制的指导意见translation here) (“Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion” or “Guiding Opinion”).  Official commentary by the drafters is found here.  The “Four Types of Cases” refer to certain types of cases, all politically or socially sensitive, that require special handling within the court system and involvement by the relevant court leadership. The term “Four Types of Cases” originates with the 2015 SPC document “Several Opinions on Improving the Judicial Responsibility System of the People’s Courts,”  (2015 Opinion) although special treatment within the Chinese court system for special types of cases is not new, as I described in my (the Monitor’s) 1993 article.  This Guiding Opinion illustrates themes newly stressed in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s 15 February 2022 article on the socialist rule of law.  

While the “Four Types of Cases” are a little-known concept outside of China, they are well known within the Chinese court system and are embedded in other court guidance.  The Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion draws together threads of related policy to provide standardized principles on:

  1. Redefined  “Four Types of Cases;”
  2. Mechanisms for flagging cases as one of the “Four Types of Cases” at each stage of the court process;
  3. Mechanisms for special treatment of these cases; and
  4. A range of mechanisms for involving more senior judges in the handling of these cases while monitoring their involvement.

The Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion provides insights into the operation of the Chinese judicial system, particularly after the 19th Party Congress and the ongoing transformation of the judicial system and legal system.

This blogpost gives a summary of the background to this Guiding Opinions before examing its details and providing some comments linking to larger themes.

1. Origin of the “Four Types” of Cases

a. The 2015 Opinion

The 2015 Opinion implements the broad principles in the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress decision and 4th Judicial Reform Plan Outline by setting out guidelines for greater autonomy and greater responsibility for judges, known as the “judicial responsibility system.” It contrasts to the pre 4th five-year judicial reform plan period when all court decisions needed to be approved by a person (or committee) in a leadership role in a court.  It also requires the preferential use of a random allocation of cases system,  while pre-reform, court leaders at various levels designated judges hearing cases.

At the same time, the 2015 Opinion also imposed more responsibility or accountability on frontline judges, while reducing (or eliminating) the involvement of court leaders not involved in the hearing. It gives court leaders (a court president, vice president, and division head) supervisory and management authority. Other guidance prohibits court leaders from involving themselves in cases handled by other judges, with certain exceptions. An exception was made for “major, difficult, and complicated cases” when court leaders could designate collegiate panels to conduct hearings (Article 7). These cases are called the “Four Types of Cases” (四类案件).  They refer to the following cases:

  1. Group disputes that may affect social stability;
  2. Ones that are difficult, complex, and have a significant impact on society;
  3. They might conflict with the judgment of the court or a higher-level court; and
  4. Relevant units or individuals report that the judge has violated the law  (Article 24).

The 2015 Opinion did not provide any further details about these Four Types. Lower courts issued guidance detailing the meaning and scope of these cases, while the SPC incorporated measures relating to “Four Types of Cases” in documents relating to the judicial responsibility system listed below.

b.  Subsequent documents 

 Pre and particularly post 19th Party Congress, the SPC issued a number of documents related to the judicial responsibility system and the special responsibility of court leaders.  At the same time, Party authorities issued documents imposing greater responsibility on Party members in leadership positions.  Many of these are collected in a 2021 book edited by the office of the SPC leading small group on the judicial responsibility system and the SPC Political Department. These documents include:

  1.  April, 2017 Opinions on Implementing the Judicial Responsibility System and Improving the Trial Supervision & Management Mechanism (for Trial Implementation);
  2. July, 2017 Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Implementation of the Judicial Accountability System (for Trial Implementation (最高人民法院司法责任制实施意见(试行)), the subject of this blogpost; 
  3. December, 2018 SPC Opinions on the Further and Full Implementation of Judicial Responsibility Systems.  
  4. January, 2019, Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Political-Legal Work (with a section on the Party Group of political-legal institutions);
  5. February, 2019  Fifth Five-Year Judicial Reform Plan (5th Judicial Reform Plan): it emphasizes the full implementation of the judicial responsibility system. That system in turn is linked to broader Party initiatives to expand the responsibility of leading  Party and government cadres as well as court leaders to cooperate better with Party inspections of various types.
  6. March, 2020 Opinions on Deepening the Comprehensive Reform Supporting the Judicial Accountability System issued by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee (关于深化司法责任制综合配套改革的意见 full text not available);
  7. 2020 SPC  Opinions on Deepening the Comprehensive Reform Supporting the Judicial Accountability System. This document sets out the principles to be incorporated in the Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinions.
  8. January, 2021 Guiding Opinion on Improving the Work System of Professional Judges Meetings, which supersedes 2018 guidance, Guiding Opinions on Improving the Working Mechanism for Presiding Judges’ Meetings of People’s Court (For Trial Implementation). See my 2021 blogpost.
  9. It also links to the political-legal education rectification campaign. 

2. New 2021 Guiding Opinion

Four Types of Cases cases are deemed too complex, sensitive, or important to be handled by a frontline judge or panel of judges alone.  The new Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion embeds multiple levels and a range of guidance and supervision as well as penalty provisions for court personnel. The guidance and supervision are aimed at personnel at various levels and roles within a court.  It is intended as a practical set of basic principles that consolidates and develops measures that appeared in the guidance listed above. It anticipates local courts issuing more detailed rules to implement it.  A 2022 media report by the Shanghai Higher People’s Court on its judicial reform program for 2022 highlights the issuing of detailed rules on the Four Types of Cases as a priority matter.  A summary of the definition and scope; identification mechanism, handling and supervision; and liability provisions follows.

Definition and scope

The 2021 Guiding Opinion redefines the Four Types of Cases and their scope, sets out the responsibilities of various persons within a court at different stages of a case, both front line and in a leadership role (court president and division chiefs) According to Article 14, those in a leadership role include the court president, vice presidents, full-time members of the judicial committee, division heads and deputy heads, and others in a supervision and management role. The guidance promotes using a multi-stage mechanism for identifying these cases and flagging them for special handling. Article 2 to 6 go into detail concerning the meaning and scope of “Four Types of Cases”, with changes from the 2015 Opinion. The new “Four Types of Cases” encompass the following types of cases:

  1. They are major, difficult, complex, or sensitive;

  2. They involve mass disputes or cause widespread societal concern, which might affect social stability;

  3. They might conflict with the judgments and rulings of the court or a higher level people’s court in similar cases;

  4.  Relevant units or individuals reported that a judge has violated the law in the trial.

The comments below address points 1-3. The first type significantly expands the scope from the original “group disputes that may affect social stability”. The drafters explain this change: “the difficulty and complexity of cases are not necessarily proportional to their social impact”. For example, a divorce case can be complicated and sensitive, yet their impact on regional or national society might be minimal.  “Major, difficult, complex, or sensitive” could cover a case in any area of law, in theory. 

The second type also changes the definition in the 2015 Opinion significantly, now referring to cases that involve large groups, or cases that cause widespread social concern. Most importantly is that these cases may affect social stability. For example, some types of cases may involve a large number of litigants, such as traffic accidents, but carry little risk of causing further mass incidents or intensifying social conflicts. These cases should not be considered one of the Four Types of Cases.

However, cases that may trigger mass incidents (e.g., labor protests after failure of litigation), risk intensifying social conflicts, or the case may have a “demonstration”, i.e., precedent-setting, effect (e.g., land-taking compensation cases), and may trigger more litigation. This may impact the development of specific industries, or the interest of specific groups, and are all cases that do need careful supervision and management.

Additionally, the SPC is of the view that cases that cause widespread concern and may affect social stability are not limited to group disputes. For example, murder cases are known to stir up public outcries. Additionally, cases involving rape claims have recently also garnered a lot of public attention. 

For the third type, the Opinion broadened the scope. First, it changed the wording from “judgment” (判决) to “decision” (裁判). This can be translated as “judgment and rulings.” Second, in addition to a  final judgment by a court, it includes other rulings or decisions regarding inadmissibility, objections, suspension or termination of litigation. This suits the more comprehensive process-based type of supervision that is intended and is further discussed below.   The conflict with current or prior judgments and rulings is specified to be with decisions of that court or higher courts within the past three years, or are currently being heard, and where it is necessary to unify the application of law.

While the Opinion further details the meaning and scope of the Four Types, the drafters explain that they insist on maintaining a healthy balance between broadness and specificity, so as to allow local courts leeway in determining how to identify a case as one of the Four Types. This recognizes that courts in different regions have different considerations, and that, based on local conditions, different kinds of specific cases require supervision and management.

Article 7 contains additional measures to widen the scope of “Four Types of Cases.” It provides that the oversight and management measures for Four Types of Cases can be applied to other types of cases: effective decisions that are in error and require retrial; cases in which the procuratorate has filed a protest; whether a death sentence (including suspended ones) is intended to be imposed; the amount in dispute is very large; or where a court plans to pronounce a defendant not guilty. This Article is consistent with recent policy to expand the scope of supervision of the exercise of judicial power, most recently emphasized in Xi’s February, 2022 article.

Identification Mechanism, Handling. and Supervision

Article 8 requires local courts to establish mechanisms to cover the entire court process to identify, label, and give a warning concerning Four Types of Cases. This article additionally requires local courts to set rules on the responsibility of internal entities to flag cases and report them, as well as responsibility for the failure to do so. The rest of the article sketches the SPC’s concept of how the Four Types of Cases are to be flagged through the entire court process and who decides any dispute over classification. 

Article 9 and 10 address  the adjustments and measures that senior court members may make regarding the case, depending upon when the case is flagged as one of “Four Types of Cases.” Regardless of whether a case is designated at the filing stage or not until it has been transferred to a case hearing division, the Opinion requires the case must be heard by a collegial panel rather than a single judge, and a member of the court leadership could serve the presiding judge.  The recent Civil Procedure Law reforms mentioned in this earlier blogpost expand the scope of cases that a single judge can hear, but this Guiding Opinion makes clear that a collegial panel must take on responsibility for hearing one of “Four Types of Cases.” These provisions links to previous SPC guidance to senior court leaders on the role they need to fulfill since the judicial reforms. The court leadership can also change the presiding judge and the size and composition of the panel. 

Article 10 lists the oversight and management measures that court leaders may take within their authority, such as: requesting reports on the progress of the case, reviewing the case files and trial report, attending trial hearings, submitting the case to a professional judges meeting, to the judicial committee, or even reporting to the court at one level above for guidance.  The measures taken are likely to depend on how sensitive, difficult, or otherwise troublesome the case is.  I surmise that this system will lead to more such cases discussed by a professional judges meeting or judicial (adjudication) committee meeting so that the decision is made on a collective basis.

Article 10  importantly clarifies the exact measures that constitute permissible supervision and management under the new responsibility system. These measures need to be incorporated into the list of powers and responsibilities based on the court member’s position.  All actions and measures need to be in accordance with local procedures and within the scope of authority of the judge exercising supervisory authority. The Opinion specifies that any action that falls within this scope does not constitute undue interference in cases and does not violate provisions about internal interference with judicial processes.

In contrast to previous practice, in which court leader guidance in these types of cases was not generally recorded, Article 11 requires that court leader oversight and management of “Four Types of Cases ” must be recorded in the case file and on the case-handling platform. Note that the recording would not be accessible to lawyers reviewing a court file. The views of court leadership about the case must be announced at a professional judges meeting or judicial committee meeting,  Court leaders can request that a collegial panel reconsider their proposed decision, but cannot directly change the panel’s decision without going through permitted procedures.  These measures seem to be aimed at preventing improper practices that enable corruption.  Those improper practices must have regularly occurred in the handling of “Four Types of Cases.” Article 14 specifies that supervision and administration of “Four Types of Cases” are considered part of the scope of a court leader’s work and therefore will be incorporated into the person’s performance evaluation.

Article 12 contains penalty provisions for both the frontline judges handling the case and the court leadership. Acts that can trigger liability for frontline judges include concealing that a case is a “Four Types of Case” case, failure to obey supervision and management, or causing a serious error in a decision through that conduct with serious consequences.

Court leaders who neglect or improperly perform their oversight and management of a “Four Type of Case” case intentionally or through gross negligence causing errors in decisions and serious consequences bear liability with reference to the provisions and procedures for the management of cadres. 

Article 13 addresses using the smart courts mechanism to identify “Four Types of Cases,” remind front-line judges to report the case, and prompt court leaders to supervise and manage the cases.

Concluding comments

In one short document, the Guiding Opinion on the Four Types of Cases captures many themes in internal court administration regulation and in the operation of the Chinese judicial system after the 19th Party Congress as well as the ongoing transformation of the judicial system and legal system.

The Guiding Opinion seeks to protect front-line judges from deciding “Four Types of Cases” autonomously in a way that is considered wrong or inconsistent with policy and legal provisions (non-unified).  Consistency of judicial decision-making is a high priority of the SPC recently, consistent with Xi’s article mentioned above: “maintaining the unity of the country’s rule of law is a serious political issue 维护国家法治统一是严肃的政治问题. ” This links to the role of court leaders as well.

The Guiding Opinion consolidates guidance for court leaders, who under the Chinese bureaucratic court system, have special responsibilities under the SPC guidance listed above, as well as more general Party regulations applicable to “#1” leaders, and Party group members in the Zhengfa 政法 (political-legal) system.  It imposes greater pressure on court leaders to hear cases, as required by earlier guidance.  As discussed earlier, judges in a leadership position spend substantial time on administrative, coordination, and Party matters rather than hearing cases.  Guiding the proper handling of one of the Four Types of Cases is also a way for a court leader to display leadership qualities while mishandling it will trigger criticism in an internal judicial or Party inspection (see my chapter on judicial discipline for a discussion of the principal types of inspections.) On incorporating work on “Four Types of Cases” into leaders’ performance evaluation, although the Chinese court slogan (of several years ago) is that judges should be treated more like judges, the Guiding Opinion appears to treat lower court judges analogously to secondary or university students, to be given grades for their class participation. 

The Opinion embeds supervision of the activity of court leaders, particularly by the use of the digital(smart courts) case-handling platform. By now, the majority of Chinese courts have a fully online and digital case-handling platform, many of which automatically record these types of supervisory and managerial measures. However, it is unclear how this has changed judicial practice regarding sensitive cases, and whether new informal practices to circumvent this digital system have emerged. 

This Guiding Opinion is an important document in understanding the Party leadership’s and the SPC’s vision of the Chinese courts in the New Era. It illustrates themes in what Xi calls in the February, 2022 article “comprehensively deepening reforms in the area of rule of law 全面深化法治领域改革,” therefore a vision of reshaping Chinese law and legal institutions generally. It links to the Party leadership’s vision of whole process supervision (全过程监督), mentioned in Xi’s most recent article, which to this observer has its roots in traditional Chinese concepts of supervision of the bureaucracy.  It uses its cutting-edge smart court system towards this end. That would be consistent with themes mentioned recently in an earlier blogpost, that Chinese characteristics have a great deal of weight in the reshaping of the Chinese legal system.  It is also consistent with an important statement in Xi Jinping’s February, 2022 article: “the socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics that we want to build must be a rule of law system that is rooted in Chinese culture, based on Chinese conditions and solving Chinese problems, and cannot be misled by Western misconceptions (我们要建设的中国特色社会主义法治体系,必须是扎根中国文化、立足中国国情、解决中国问题的法治体系,不能被西方错误思潮所误导).”  

The definition and scope of the “Four Types of Cases” are flexible, so as to accommodate a system in which judges bear lifetime responsibility for their decisions and court leadership bears responsibility for the decisions of their judges, and multiple types of inspections, both Party and court, monitor implementation of campaigns (such as those for the Sao Hei campaign), as well as more general policies.  The accountability (responsibility or liability) provisions are broad and linked with the Party’s system for cadres, rather than professional rules.  That too is consistent with traditional Chinese law.

The vision of the approach to handling”Four Types of Cases” in the Opinion is holistic, in line with the principles mentioned in the 2021 Opinion on integrating socialist core values into judgment instruments— the organic unity of political, legal, and social effectiveness (政治效果、法律效果和社会效果有机统一 ), because through this process, a judicial decision that best meets that target is likely to be achieved.  And this has implications for litigants.

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Many thanks to Straton Papagianneas for translating the “Four Types of Cases Guiding Opinion” and drafting an initial version of this blogpost (and responding to several rounds of comments). Many thanks also to an anonymous peer reviewer for perceptive comments on a later draft of this blogpost.

 

 

 

 

 

Dean Jiang Huiling on Chinese Judicial Reform

On 7 January 2022, Dean of Tongji University’s School of Law and Professor Jiang Huiling gave a guest lecture in my School of Transnational Law class.  We were honored to hear Dean Jiang provide his unique perspective and insights on over 20 years of Chinese judicial reform and his insights on future developments. He has been involved with Chinese judicial reform starting from the first plan in 1999 (see also more about his background here).  This blogpost summarizes his presentation. I have inserted my occasional comments in italics. If a point is not more fully elaborated, it means he did not do so.

He spoke on the following six topics:

1. Brief History of Chinese Judicial Reform
2. How Judicial Reform Actions  Are Taken
3. From the 4th to the 5th Judicial Reform Plan
4. Strategic Move: From Judicial Reform to “Zhengfa” (政法) Reform
5. Technical Measures: Rule of Law
6. Future Direction

1. Brief History

Dean Jiang went briskly through the history of judicial reform, commenting that in the first judicial reform plan, the focus was on raising public and professional awareness about the judiciary。 The second one, in which the Central Government greatly supported the SPC to undertake work mechanism (工作机制) reforms, not touching on structural reforms such as the status of judicial personnel. He noted that there was great progress during the second judicial reform plan. He called the third judicial reform plan a test before the New Era, and said that a decision had been taken to de-localize the judiciary and change the status of the judges and prosecutors, but at the end, there wasn’t internal confidence that the legal profession and society would accept such changes.  He called the fourth judicial reform plan a structural, systematic, and radical change to the judicial system, especially the decision that judges would not be treated as ordinary civil servants.  Dean Jiang characterized the fifth judicial reform plan as comprehensive and supplementary, and part of the Zhengfa reforms (as he further explained in the latter part of his presentation).

What were the lessons learned?

  • Right (科学) concept of the judicial system (universal and with Chinese characteristics)–that the legal profession and the leading party accepted the value of the rule of law and the importance of the judiciary;
  • Theoretical preparation–although he thought scholars had not done enough;
  • Consensus for change–the judiciary is regarded as and is a bureaucracy–there is that consensus among both court leaders, who are legal professionals and with a Party role, and ordinary judges, who are legal professionals;
  • Common achievements of human civilization–that means learning from other countries–China had done so not only in science and technology but also in law and democracy. Chinese judicial  reformers had benefited from the open policy–he himself was an example; and
  • Critical role of strong leadership–legal professionals could not initiate fundamental changes themselves–it needed court and political leadership to do so–he quoted General Secretary Xi Jinping on the ability to do what could not have been done before.

2. How Judicial Reform Actions are Taken

Dean Jiang rapidly made the following six points:

  1. Judicial awareness and enlightenment;
  2. Negative case matters;
  3. Reform for branches and reform for all (parochialism);
  4. Top-down design and comprehensive reform–the court system is part of the political system and reform has to be done by the Central Government;
  5.  Coordination with other departments–in China, unlike in other countries, some matters require coordination with other departments, such as the Ministry of Finance;
  6. A group of devoted experts–both within the judiciary and among academics.

3. From the 4th to the 5th Judicial Reform Plan

Dean Jiang mentioned that the two plans are connected, but that significant differences exist in the value or orientation of the two plans. The fourth one made radical (revolutionary) changes to the judicial system. The fifth one is a new phase, and comes after the completion of the fourth one, which made the following fundamental changes:

  1. Structural changes–delocalizing the judicial system
  2. Status of the judges and prosecutors
  3. Changes to the internal operation of the judiciary
  4. Improvements to the guarantees for judges and prosecutors.

Although these reforms are not completed, these were the focus of their work in the judicial reform office of the SPC and of the Central Government.

The 4th judicial reform plan focused on the following:

1. Separation of administrative region and judicial jurisdiction area–delocalization, as Xi Jinping said, the judicial power is a central power, uniform application of law, so that the law is not applied in favor of one locality;
2. Judiciary-centered litigation system–“in the real world in China, the judiciary does not always have the final say”–and in the past the public security and prosecutors had the final say rather than the judges. The reform to have personnel and financing of courts at the provincial level is part of this reform;
3. Optimization of internal power allocation–as a court is a bureaucracy with different entities with different functions, and the leaders have different functions from ordinary judges;
4. Operation of hearing and adjudicatory power
5. Judicial transparency;
6. Judicial personnel–this is basic but very important; and
7. Independence of the court–this is basic but very important.

The 5th judicial reform plan:

  1. Party’s leadership 
  2. Work for the country’s overall task and situationsubject of one of my forthcoming articles
  3. Litigation service–treat litigants properly and give them judicial services– the courts have public funds to pay for legal representation if people do not meet the standard for legal aid
  4. Judicial transparency–“always on the way”
  5. Responsibility-based judicial operation
  6. Court’s organization and function–reforms in that area (he referred to the recent repositioning of the four levels of the court system, among others)
  7. Procedural system
  8. Enforcement reform
  9. Court personnel system reform–better training of judges
  10. Smart court–using technology

The bolding above reflects his stress on those points in his presentation.

Dean Jiang mentioned that the Central Government put the court system into a bigger picture, but that the prior reforms were needed to make the judicial system more professional.  It is for this reason that the Central Government mentions the phrase “judicial reform” much less than before.

The bigger picture is involving the court system more in the development of the whole country. This reflects a change in China’s overall policy, and we Chinese legal professionals need to understand this.

Comparing the 4th and 5th Reform Plans:

  • Similar, but different;
  • Duplicated, but deepening and supplementary;
  • To those unfinished tasks, less emphasis

He said these should be seen in the context of the national plan for achieving the rule of law, and from 2035, China will have achieved rule of law and be a modernized, democratic country–the second 15-year plan will be about rule of law.  He thinks that the timing is insufficient.

4. Strategic Move: From Judicial Reform to “Zhengfa” (政法) Reform

1. Before 2012, judicial work mechanism reform
2. From 2013,Judicial system reform
3. From 2017,Comprehensive supplementary reform of the judicial system
4. From 2019, Promoting Comprehensive
Reform in Zhengfa Area
5. From 2020,Xi Jinping rule of law thoughts

On point 4 above, that relates to a comprehensive document adopted in 2019 [Implementing Opinion On the Comprehensive Deepening Reforms of the Political-Legal Sector 关于政法领域全面深化改革的实施意见, not publicly available but mentioned previously on this blog], of which judicial reform plays only a small part.  From 2020, Xi Jinping rule of law thoughts plays an important guiding role in the role of law. He said all law students and legal professionals should read it because it will have an important impact on the building of rule of law in China.

Structure of the new arrangement:

  • Breadth: From the judiciary to other related areas
  • Depth: From judicial system reform to broader systematic innovation–the latter means is moving from judicial system reform to areas previously little discussed, such as Party leadership and the role of the Political-Legal Commission, and the relationship between the Party and the law.
  • Goal: From fair, efficient, and authoritative judicial system to modernization of Zhengfa work system and capability—that is, that the judicial system is to be part of a modernized governance system and governance capability [国家治理体系和治理能力现代化–from the Decision of the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress]. That is the goal for the next 30 years. It means the rule of law in the future will have a major part to play as part of modernized governance, and the courts will have an even more important role to play in supporting this modernized state governance (this is in my draft article). It may not be apparent from the English words, but it is a change.
  • Method: From branch-driven to Central Committee-driven–how to get there? He says this wording is not quite accurate as the 4th Judicial Reform Plan was also Central Committee driven, but because the Central Government put the project of the rule of law into the modernization of state governance, it has a different method for treating reform in the legal area, but he thinks that change of method is only an improvement.
  • Nature: Chinese style and self-owned brand–when you read English language literature on building a fair and independent judicial system from abroad you will see many common points. In the current arrangement–in the Zhengfa reforms, Chinese characteristics have a great deal of weight and also in the reconstruction of the legal system. Although China has learned a great deal from other countries, China has to go on its own way, since it has its own history, political situation and historical stage and there is a change in the international situation. China has changed its position in the world. He is getting accustomed to this new way of judicial reform and it will be more difficult for foreigners to understand it.

The change of emphasis can be seen from the VIP (very important research projects of 2021), which are all more general than before:

No. 67. Practice and Experiences of the Party Comprehensively Promote Law-based governance
No. 68. Socialist Legal Theory with Chinese Characteristics
No. 69. Spirit of Socialist Rule of Law
No. 70. Constitution-centered Socialist Legal System with Chinese Characteristics
No. 71. Promoting Comprehensive
Reform in Zhengfa Area

Dean Jiang described the 2019 document mentioned above as containing the following areas of reform.

Seven Areas of Zhengfa Reform:

  1. Party’s leadership of the Zhengfa work–that is the Chinese situation
  2. Deepening reforms of Zhengfa institutions–not only the courts and the prosecutors, but changing the overall structure of Zhengfa institutions
  3. Deepening reform of systems of law implementation–we combined  Legislative Affairs Office (of the State Council 法制办) into the Ministry of Justice [MOJ]–that’s an important change
  4. Deepening reform of social governance system–the Zhengfa Wei important for social governance–one of the most popular words is “governance“–how to support social stability, social development; innovative spirit, people’s lives;
  5.  Public Zhengfa service system–public legal service is part of Zhengfa service–all the political-legal organs will work together to provide efficient high-quality services for the people-人民为中心–Xi Jinping says all our work needs to be people-centered;
  6. Zhengfa profession management reform–no major change here
  7. Application of IT technology–no major change here–continued application of IT in the Zhengfa area

These are seven areas of Zhengfa reform, based on the prior judicial reforms, but now going to a new stage. Governance is a crucial word.

5. Technical Measures

This is what he has devoted his life to before.

  • Law is a profession, and the judicial system is the carrier of law and justice.
  • Law is also science of law.
  • Rule of law is one of the most technical way of state governance.
  • Rule of law will have no efficacy without the joint efforts of other institutions.

He listed 10 legal issues for consideration for reference and research, as these are the most important topics:

  1. Structural reform: local judicial power, or central judicial power–at the present time, the Central Government cannot manage all those 200,000+ judges and prosecutors, and at first stage, the provincial level is taking that over, but he is not sure of the final judicial model
  2.  Organizational reform: bureaucratic or judicial, especially the internal organs–this is a more technical reform, including internal and external organs, different tiers of the court and branches of the judiciary, including the procuracy;
  3. Functions of the four tiers of court:  their role and function–cylinder, or cone (his metaphor of 20 years ago)–should the SPC concentrate on judicial interpretations and a small number of cases, and does not need 400 judges–this relates to the pilot program of late last year on the repositioning of the four levels of the Chinese court; the local courts will focus on factual issues;
  4.  Personnel reform: Profession, or ordinary public servant–this is still an ongoing issue, and in his view, some continental European countries have not resolved this issue either. Although there are improvements, judges and prosecutors feel that it is not sufficient, given their new role in society, and the importance of their work. He agrees, having been a former judge.
  5.  Procedural reform: Court-centered litigation system, fair trial, simplification of procedure–how to make things fairer, and given the more than 10% annual increase in cases, a big burden on judges in particular, how to simplify procedure. This links to the recent amendments to the Civil Procedure Law, which focuses on simplification of procedures and giving online procedures the same status as offline.
  6.  Adjudication committee: advisory, or adjudication–there is a great deal of discussion about it–it is the highest decision-making body in a court (see this blogpost).
  7. Judicial responsibility system: The hearing officer makes the decision, and decision-maker takes the responsibility–司法责任制–this is another tricky one–this is required by the Central Government, a step forward towards the rule of law, instead of having a judge’s boss approve his decision (because the court is bureaucracy)–for China, this is a step towards the rule of law, but there is still a long way to go.
  8.  Supervision over “four types of cases”–that means for most cases, judges take responsibility for their cases, but for difficult, controversial, and possibly having an impact on social stability–because junior judges have different capacities from the more senior–for those four types of cases, the court president and senior court leaders are involved to oversee or supervise (see translation of guidance here, commentary to come)–he has not found useful academic papers on this point;
  9.  ADR (Diversified dispute resolution): this is a traditional topic–optimizing the allocation of resources of dispute resolution
  10. Judicial administration: local government loses its administrative power, but what internal administration;
  11. Judicial democracy: lay judge system–different from common law jury (but China can learn from the common law jury–having them focus on factual rather legal issues)–the law has changed, but academic work is insufficient.
  12. Judicial transparency–this is an old issue, to make the judiciary more transparent to the parties and the public.

These are the major issues in the next five years. These technical legal issues are very interesting and need legal scholars to look at them to support the Zhengfa reforms.

6. Future Direction

  1. Xi Jinping rule of law thoughts–inevitable guideline–some of political and strategic, but it provides some guidelines for basic principles;
  2.  Rule of law-driven first;
  3. Politics driven and guarantee–politics should be a consideration but it should not be unbalanced.  Political role of the rule of law-leading the legislative institutions.  Guarantee means guaranteeing the executive implementation of law, supporting the judiciary, and being a model of a law-abiding citizen; This will be very important in putting judicial reform forward;
  4. To complete those halfway reforms–judicial personnel reforms;
  5.  More rethought and theoretical guide–scholars criticize the judiciary for having an insufficient theoretical basis;
  6.  Dealing with the other judicial civilizations–we never stopped, especially in technical areas, and for our legal professionals, that has never stopped. We need to work together for all of humanity.

Supreme People’s Court’s 2021 Year-End Accomplishments

Photo from the “look back meeting” described below

Apologies to readers for the long gap between posts–I have been focusing on yet another academic article and am finding that even so-called “short articles” take much longer than anticipated, especially when the topic reveals more and more complexities than were apparent when I submitted the abstract to the journal months ago.

So instead of any involved analysis, I’ll list some of the year-end (from December) accomplishments of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) with some brief notes. Another aspect of the SPC being a cross between a Party-state organ and a court is that it needs to meet year-end goals and submit year-end reports. The SPC’s judicial reform leading group recently discussed and approved its year-end report (最高人民法院司法改革领导小组2021年工作总结报告).  The judicial reform leading group is headed by President Zhou Qiang. Other members include Justices He Rong, Ma Shizhong (head of the Political Department), He Xiaorong, and Shen Liang. The Judicial Reform Office presumably drafted by the report. It is likely a constituent part of the SPC’s year-end report to go to the Party leadership, before the annual Central Political-Legal Work Conference.

Another aspect of the SPC being a cross between a Party-state organ and a court is that it is inspected by Party inspection groups and is a focal point of campaigns on the education and rectification of political-legal organs.

Among the SPC’s year-end accomplishments are the following.  For the avoidance of doubt, judicial interpretations, judicial documents, and typical cases are all means by which the SPC guides the lower courts. I will have more to say about this topic in the unfinished academic article mentioned above.

Judicial interpretations

  1. Online Mediation Rules of the People’s Courts (人民法院在线调解规则).  Online mediation is an important focus of the SPC, as could be seen from this white paper on Diversified Dispute Resolution from early 2021 and from other efforts of the SPC to promote resolving disputes at their source, as consistent with the deployment of the Party Center (党中央关于“将非诉讼纠纷解决机制挺在前面”的重大部署要求.  The responsible person of the SPC’s Case Filing Division (presumably the head) pointed out that these rules “had created an online diversified dispute resolution model with Chinese characteristics that differed from ADR or ODR” )形成了有别于ADR和ODR的中国特色在线多元纠纷解决模式). His statement appears designed to be more politically correct than accurate. It is clear that the SPC follows government policy in using “diversified dispute resolution” rather than “alternative dispute resolution,” (ADR)  but the English language abbreviation”ODR,” according to my research, is intended to be a general term to capture all sorts of online dispute resolution and not meant to promote one particular model of online dispute resolution. The underlying implication is that “ODR” reflects a “Western” approach. However other (mainland) Chinese government departments use “ODR” without issue.  Additionally, the Hong Kong government uses the term “ODR” to refer to its online dispute resolution platform, eBRAM.
  2. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Endangering Food Safety (最高人民法院 最高人民检察院关于办理危害食品安全刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释). As a joint judicial interpretation, it was approved by the judicial (adjudication) committee of the SPC first and next by the Procuratorial Committee of the SPP.
  3. Several Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Application of Prohibition Order Preservation Measures in Eco-environmental Infringement Cases(最高人民法院关于生态环境侵权案件适用禁止令保全措施的若干规定) –relating to injunctions to stop environmental pollution, either before or after a party has filed suit.  We can expect more and more SPC interpretations and documents related to environmental pollution.
  4. Relevant Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Issues concerning Applications for Verification of Arbitration Cases under Judicial Review 最高人民法院关于仲裁司法审查案件报核问题的有关规定. This decision by the SPC updates the 2017 provisions of the same name, adding one article and a clause in another. The new Article 3  requires higher people’s courts to submit draft rulings in judicial review of arbitration matters in domestic arbitration (non-foreign, Hong Kong, Macau or Taiwan-related) if the higher court intends to concur with a lower court ruling that the arbitral award violated social public interest.   The new second clause of Article 4 requires the higher people’s court to submit the matter to the SPC within 15 days.
  5. Several Provisions on the Compulsory Enforcement by People’s Court of Company Shareholding (最高人民法院关于人民法院强制执行股权若干问题的规定). This appeared on the 2019 judicial interpretation agenda, so it has slipped by two years. The provisions apply to enforcing judgments or rulings against shareholder equity in either limited liability companies or companies limited by shares, but not including companies limited by shares that are listed.
  6. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Disputes over Compensation for Personal Injury in Railway Transport
    最高人民法院关于审理铁路运输人身损害赔偿纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释  This interpretation concerns persons injured in railway transport accidents, excluding accidents on passenger trains.

On the “coming attractions” discussed in some earlier blogposts, the SPC’s judicial committee (adjudication committee) spent many hours on 30 December 2021 discussing the draft judicial interpretation of the General Part of the Civil Code.  When I wrote last about the draft of the General Part, I noted that Judge Guo Feng, deputy head of the Research Office,  mentioned that the General Part (1) interpretation is scheduled to be submitted to the SPC’s judicial (adjudication) committee before year-end.  That means that Judge Guo (and likely one or more of the principal drafters) were in the room to discuss the draft article by article.  The judicial committee finally decided to approve the draft “in principle.”  Approval in principle” (原则通过), as discussed here, is not mentioned by the SPC’s 2007 regulations on judicial interpretations but is one of the SPC’s long-established practices. It means that the judicial committee has approved it, subject to some “minor” amendments. Minor amendments are more than typographical errors and relate to specific substantive matters.  So it is likely that after the SPC amends the provisions that the judicial committee  considered needed more work, a quasi-final draft will go back to the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC LAC)’s Legislative Affairs Commission  because SPC guidance provides that “liaison with the NPCSC LAC must be timely, and after major revisions to the judicial interpretation draft after consulting with the NPC LAC, the view of the NPCSC LAC  should be solicited again.”  I expect that the draft of the General Part judicial interpretation will be finalized before the National People’s Congress meeting, so that the report can mention this accomplishment.

As I have mentioned many times in the course of 2021, we do not know what was on the SPC’s 2021 judicial interpretation agenda. Those of us outside the System can only hope that the 2022 agenda will be released and that the judicial reform agenda will continue to be released.

Judicial documents (incomplete list)

  1. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court and the Ministry of Justice on Providing Legal Aid for Defendants in Death Penalty Review Cases 最高人民法院 司法部关于为死刑复核案件被告人依法提供法律援助的规定.  These are joint regulations issued by the two institutions and therefore are classified as “judicial documents,” as discussed here.  These provisions establish a mechanism for the Ministry of Justice to appoint legal aid lawyers to defendants whose cases are being submitted to the SPC for death penalty review.  If a defendant appoints his or her own lawyer), then the legal aid lawyer stops providing services.
  2. Provisions on Judges’ Disciplinary Work Procedures (for Trial Implementation)《法官惩戒工作程序规定(试行).  I will follow up with analysis at some point as I published a book chapter on judicial discipline at the beginning of 2021.  These provisions do not change the conclusion in my chapter.
  3. Opinions on Strengthening the Substantive Trial of Sentence Reduction and Parole Cases (关于加强减刑、假释案件实质化审理的意见).  This is another multiple institution document, intended to tighten up procedures for sentence reduction and parole cases.  They are in part a response to a 2020 tragedy in Beijing, in which a prisoner whose sentence was commuted killed one man and injured two more.  The incident further revealed that the corruption discussed in this 2015 blogpost continues to exist.
  4. Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Studying and Implementing the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Amending the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China.”最高人民法院关于认真学习贯彻《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改〈中华人民共和国民事诉讼法〉的决定》的通知.  This notice and the amended Civil Procedure Law are of practical importance to tens of thousands of Chinese judges and litigants in the Chinese courts, individuals and entities, domestic and foreign.  The notice signals that the SPC is working on amendments to the Civil Procedure Law judicial interpretation (the previous version plus commentary was published in two volumes). This reform relates to the reorienting of four levels of the courts, will increase the number of cases heard with one judge, promotes mediation and smart courts.
  5. and  6. Two Judicial Services and Safeguards Opinions, one on  Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for Promoting the Development of the West in the New Era and Forming a New Pattern and  Opinions on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for Promoting the High-quality Development of the Central Region in the New Era(最高人民法院关于为新时代推进西部大开发形成新格局提供司法服务和保障的意见( and 关于为新时代推动中部地区高质量发展提供司法服务和保障的意见.  Related to these two is a document from November 2021– Conference Summary of the Work Promotion Meeting Serving and Safeguarding Ecological Protection and High-quality Development of the Yellow River Basin.最高人民法院服务保障黄河流域生态保护和高质量发展工作推进会会议纪要.  That document in turn relates to a  2020Judicial Services and Safeguards Opinion. These are part of a large number of documents providing judicial services and safeguards for Party Center strategies and initiatives, particularly related to regional integration.  The article I have temporarily set aside to write this blogpost discusses the purposes and impacts of these documents.  I have previously written about these documents often, such as these quick analyses of their structure and purposes.  Both  Opinions link to Party Center-State Council documents. More analysis to come when I am able to finish the last five pages of the “short academic article” mentioned above.

Reshaping the judiciary

In the fall of 2021, the Party Center launched the second round of the rectification and education of national political-legal organs, with a leading group leading and an office assisting in implementing the campaign. The SPC was one of the focal points (along with other central organs). Just before Christmas, the SPC held a “looking back” meeting to discuss what was revealed and progress made in response.  The SPC established a leading small group and office to handle matters properly.  (For those interested in further details, please see this webpage.) President Zhou Qiang noted in his work report that the SPC has effectively rectified a batch of stubborn diseases (one of the targets of this inspection) and resolutely eliminated a batch of black sheep (literally, a group of horses that harm the masses) (一批害群之马).  The same phrasing is reported from the Ministry of Justice and other political-legal institutions at both the central and local levels. Related to  the rectification and education campaign are several new SPC opinions. Those include one strengthening the judicial responsibility system, and creating a new court team  关于在加快推进司法责任体系改革和建设中进一步加强人民法院队伍建设的意见 and another on enforcement.  The SPC has issued another related opinion found here, on the “four types of cases.”   Perhaps unrelated to stubborn diseases and black sheep is decisions by some SPC judges to continue their careers elsewhere.

Finally

I wish all readers a happy and healthy new year, both “Western” and Chinese.  I also hope that this year brings us, located in and out of mainland China, opportunities to gather together to discuss legal developments in China from different perspectives quietly, without rancor or blame, but with mutual respect.

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I would like to express my appreciation to two anonymous peer reviewers of a previous draft of this blogpost. Special thanks to the person who caught a significant error in the draft.

 

Why I Research China’s Supreme People’s Court

I was honored to be invited by the New York University School of Law’s U.S. Asia Law Institute to contribute a short essay to their Perspectives blog, entitled Why I Research China’s Supreme People’s Court

 Many thanks to those involved in the entire process, including those who commented on earlier drafts!

What’s on the Supreme People’s Court’s financial law agenda?

Justice Liu Guixiang Speaking

This year, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has not released its judicial interpretation agenda to the general public, so observers concerned about what the SPC is doing in specific areas of law must be attentive to what SPC leaders mention in either speeches in major conferences or articles in the media.  Justice Liu Guixiang, a member of the judicial committee with deputy ministerial status, spoke in early September at the 4th Annual  Conference on Serving Small and Medium Sized Investors .  His speech was one of many leader’s speeches  (visible in the link领导人讲话) delivered at this conference sponsored by the China Association for Public Companies, Securities Association of China and other securities industry associations. (For the careful listener (or reader) his speech provides insights on what can be expected from the SPC in the near future in the area of financial law.  It is linked to  China’s development of its securities market and dealing with the increasing number of financial fraud cases and civil disputes. Some of what he told the audience illustrate, in the area of financial and securities law,  how the SPC operates in the New Era.  Those include:

  1. the SPC plans to issue a new conference summary on financial trials (金融审判座谈会纪要) before the end of the year, to unify trial standards. This is linked to government policies on the prevention and resolution of financial risks;
  2. the SPC plans to amend the 2003 interpretation
    Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Trying Cases of Civil Compensation Arising from False Statement in Securities Market, as it is outdated, particularly the requirement of an administrative penalty before investors can file suit. The interpretation is inconsistent with the amended Securities Law;
  3. the SPC will guide the lower courts on the hearing of securities group cases  (证券集体诉讼制度), particularly focusing on financial fraud, providing better relief to investors, and assisting to stabilize the market in its transition to a registration based listing system.  He stressed that the SPC would require lower courts to apply the principle of harmonizing standards for fault and administrative penalties in financial fraud cases, distinguishing different types of fault, and “striking hard” in cases of intentional financial fraud (要求人民法院在处理财务造假等案件中,基于“过错与处罚相一致”原则,区分过错类型,依法严厉打击故意造假行为过错与处罚相一致);
  4.  The SPC will provide guidance to the local courts on strictly applying new rules (in the Civil Code and the SPC’s judicial interpretation) on guarantees provided by listed companies and will also provide further guidance on the bankruptcy (and reorganization ) of listed companies.  
  5. The SPC will cooperate further with relevant government organs and other institutions to further develop non-litigation solutions to securities disputes. One example Justice Liu likely had in mind was the recently promulgated notice jointly issued by the General Office of the SPC and the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) on establishing an online system for linking the CSRC’s electronic platform with the SPC’s mediation electronic platform, to enable mediated settlements within the securities and future mediation systems to become enforceable through judicial confirmation online (在线申请司法确认或出具调解书等诉调对接工作) This August 2021 document is entitled Notice on Establishing a Linkage Between Mediation and Litigation “General to General” Online Securities and Futures Disputes Mechanism  最高人民法院办公厅 中国证券监督管理委员会办公厅关于建立“总对总”证券期货纠纷在线诉调对接机制的通知.  That document, which implements the Party Center’s concept — social governance pattern of co-construction, co-governance and sharing (建立共建共治共享社会治理格局)includes a joint meeting system between the two institutions and affiliated organizations, with the CSRC’s Investor Protection Bureau and the China Securities Small and Medium Investor Service Center Co., Ltd. taking an important part. The linkage between mediation and litigation is part of diversified dispute resolution. It calls for analogous linkage at the local level between offices of the CSRC and the courts. The SPC has issued other documents previously,  particularly the Supreme People’s Court and the China Securities Regulatory Commission of Issuing Opinions on Comprehensively Advancing Establishment of Diversified Resolution Mechanism of Securities and Futures Disputes. The SPC’s 2021  bilingual report on its diversified dispute resolution reforms (2015-2020) provides more details on this and other reforms.
  6. Finally, Justice Liu called for promoting the securities representative litigation mechanism (mentioned in Article 95 of the Securities Law and further developed in a 2020 judicial interpretation, Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning Representative Actions Arising from Securities Disputes). The Shanghai Financial Court has taken the lead in these cases. What Justice Liu means is using the results in representative litigation to resolve outside of the courts other similar securities & futures disputes, particularly group disputes. This is an example of implementing the SPC’s diversified dispute resolution policies. This mechanism is can also be characterized as linking to the Party Center’s current policy of mediating first and resolving disputes at their source to reduce the quantity of litigation  (党中央关于“将非诉讼纠纷解决机制挺在前面,从源头上减少诉讼增量), as discussed in greater detail in the bilingual report.

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Those with more specialized knowledge in Chinese securities law should provide corrections or comments by using the blog’s comment function.

The 996 typical cases

Document heading for the 996 typical cases

On 26 August 2021, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) along with the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued a second set of typical (典型 model/exemplary cases). As I have explained before, these are summaries or edited versions of cases, not original labor arbitration or court decisions. These are on overtime labor and personnel disputes (人力资源社会保障部、最高人民法院联合发布超时加班劳动人事争议典型案例) that I’ll call the “996 typical cases,” a central level institutional response to the widespread use of 996 overtime work in the technology sector and elsewhere. The cases themselves are entitled “the second set of typical personnel and labor disputes cases (劳动人事争议典型案例(第二批). The version that the SPC published on its two websites (court.gov.cn and chinacourt.org) lacks the document headers that accompanied the release of the cases. That version had the mutually agreed statement about the cases (joint statement) and the cases themselves. Thankfully for this analysis, the Inner Mongolian Higher People’s Court released a version that includes the headers. The comments below focus not on the rules embedded in the typical cases, but on the SPC’s use of typical (model or exemplary) cases.  These cases are:

  • a product of institutional joint cooperation, as memorialized in a 2017 document mentioned in the joint statement;
  • a typical use of typical cases in the New Era; and
  • Used by the labor arbitration tribunals under the MHRSS system and the courts to unify legal standards.

Institutional joint cooperation

The 996 typical cases are a product of cooperation between the MHRSS and the SPC, as memorialized in the policy documentOpinions of the MHRSS and the SPC on Strengthening the Building of a Mechanism of Connection between Arbitration and Litigation of Labor and Personnel Disputes,  (No. 70, MHRSS)(《关于加强劳动人事争议仲裁与诉讼衔接机制建设的意见》(人社部发〔2017〕70号).  Two quick comments on the cooperation are as follows.

  1. More such cooperation can be predicted in general.  Greater cooperation between the SPC and other government and Party departments is a feature of the New Era, as I mentioned earlier this year. Coordination with other central Party and state organs is a customary function of the SPC that is being repurposed, in part, in the New Era. Coordination with other central organs appears to be an increasingly important part of New Era governance.  Therefore, the statement accompanying the cases stated the following:

In recent years, the MHRSS and the SPC have actively guided the implementation of the “Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of a Cohesive Mechanism for Labor and Personnel Dispute Arbitration and Litigation” , and the cohesion mechanism for adjudication and adjudication has been realized… In the next step, the two departments will continue to jointly develop guidelines, publish cases, and strengthen information comparison, and continue to promote the convergence of adjudication procedures and the unification of the application of law, so as to better achieve an efficient and orderly connection between arbitration and justice, and realize labor disputes. The dispute resolution is an organic unity of political, legal and social effects.

2.  As can be seen from the statement above, we can expect further cooperation between the MHRSS and the SPC in the form of joint guidelines, more typical cases, and information sharing.  All of these are flagged in the 2017 Opinion mentioned above.

What we can see from the document numbers of the 2017 Opinion, the first set of joint typical labor cases and the 996 typical cases is that they all have an MHRSS document number.  (See analysis of the first set of cases here.)That means both the Opinion and the typical cases are an initiative of the MHRSS that required concurrence by the SPC. The Opinion  sets out the agreement between the two institutions:

The departments of HRSS shall positively and voluntarily strengthen communication and coordination with the people’s courts. The people’s courts shall specify that a tribunal [division] or office [庭室] is uniformly responsible.

So we can see from this language that at each level of court, a division (tribunal) or office (likely to be the Research Office) is responsible for liaising with the HRSS authorities.  At the level of the SPC, it is understood to be the Civil Division #1, which is responsible for labor-related issues among many other civil law issues, and within that division, a group of people (likely judges with special competence in labor issues) was involved with liaising with the MHRSS to agree upon a draft version of the statement and the typical cases.  Given the administrative nature of the SPC and previous practice, it seems likely that what was agreed upon at the staff level was reviewed by the head or deputy head of the Civil Division #1 and approved by the SPC vice president in charge of the Civil Division #1. It is likely the cases were cleared at an analogous senior level at MHRSS as well.

As to why these particular cases, it is likely that they are scenarios that regularly occur in the labor arbitration tribunals and the courts, but where decisions are inconsistent because the law is unclear.

Use of Typical Cases in the New Era

The release of the 996 typical cases is a typical use of typical cases in the New Era.  As discussed in further detail last year,  this is part of popularization of law (普法教育), an old development repurposed in the post 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress New Era. I first wrote about typical cases in 1993:

 

 

The release of these 996 typical cases is linked to the popularization of law responsibility system set out in this document: General Offices of the Party Central Committee and State Council Opinions on a Popularization of Law Responsibility System of State Organs Regarding “whoever enforces that law, explains the law.” (中共中央办厅 国务院办公厅印发《关于实行国家机关“谁执法谁普法”普法责任制的意见》Section 6 calls for judge, procurators, administrative enforcement personnel, and lawyers to establish a “using cases to explain the law” system.

Therefore MHRSS personnel are encouraged to use cases to explain the law, and the 2017 Opinion encourages MHRSS personnel to cooperate with the SPC in doing so. The message to the general public as set out in the joint statement is:

On the one hand, it reminds employers of the risks of illegal activities and promotes the regulation of labor according to law; on the other hand, it clarifies the expectations of workers’ rights protection and guides workers to protect their rights in a rational way.

Releasing these cases also hits another target for those involved: fulfilling their obligations under the current Party history study and education campaign: “I do real things for the masses”(“我为群众办实事,” therefore in the first sentence of the joint statement).

 996 Typical Cases Used to Unify Legal Standards

What the SPC’s version of the 996 typical cases omitted (likely unintentionally) is guidance from the two institutions on how the 996 typical cases are to be used:  “local [labor] arbitration agencies and people’s courts,  shall refer to it in handling cases.”

Last year’s guidance on case searches clarifies that the lower courts must search  SPC typical cases when doing a similar case search and that these cases are not binding, but for reference, or quite persuasive. These cases will provide guidance to both labor institutions and courts, providing a more unified standard on these overtime issues.  It will also indirectly pressure employers to amend their labor handbooks and change other labor practices to be consistent with these cases.

Concluding thoughts

These cases are not expected to completely resolve the overwork culture in Chinese companies. They are intended to set a clearer standard for the labor arbitration commissions and courts to apply (and lawyers or other advocates to meet), as well as to reduce the number of cases in which courts overturn labor arbitration commission determinations related to overtime and overwork. They also provide societal guidance (社会导向)by providing a timely signal to companies and Chinese society on these issues. They also evidence that the SPC is “strengthening judicial safeguards of people’s livelihood” (加强民生司法保障). Most importantly it shows that the MHRSS and the SPC are doing “real things for the masses.”

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Many thanks to those who commented on an earlier version of this blogpost.

Integrating socialist core values into court judgments

On 18 February 2021,  the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued the Guiding Opinions on Deeply Promoting the Integration of  Socialist Core Values into the Analysis and Reasoning of Adjudicative Instruments (关于深入推进社会主义核心价值观融入裁判文书释法说理的指导意见 the SCV Guiding Opinion).  This Guiding Opinion is intended to guide the way SPC  and lower court judges write their court judgments and rulings (and any other judicial document issued to the public) to better incorporate the use of socialist core values and for those judgments to be better understood by the general public. 

For close observers of the SPC and the Chinese court system, the SCV Guiding Opinion came as no surprise.  That this Opinion would be issued was clear from phrases in several Party and SPC documents issued in recent years.  The SCV Guiding Opinion is important not only for what it says about the use of socialist core values in judgments and also for its guidance to judges on the analysis and reasoning in court judgments, rulings, and other documents.  

This blogpost is not intended as an extended academic analysis of socialist core values and the law, of which there are several excellent ones by Sue Trevaskes and Delia Lin.  It will address some more modest questions, such as:

  • what it says, including what it requires of SPC and lower court judges;
  • the documents linked to the SCV Guiding Opinion
  • how the SCV Guiding Opinion should be classified & whether it is binding or persuasive;
  • what a quick sampling of judgments containing socialist core values uncovers,
  • the vision of the court system portrayed by the SCV Guiding Opinion.

I have italicized my comments.

Summary of the SCV Guiding Opinion

The background for the SCV Guiding Opinion is that it is part of what is required by the Party Center to integrate socialist core values into the legal system and to promote their use in national governance.  This has been a theme in writings of Xi Jinping about the law, the Party  Plan on Building the Rule of Law in China (2020–2025), previous Party documents, and related SPC documents.  Some of those background documents are listed in a later section of this blogpost.

Article 1 provides that the underlying principles of the SCV Guiding Opinion are:

  1. a fusion of law and morality, which is linked to their fusion in traditional legal thought ( 法治与德治相结合); 
  2. people-oriented (以人民为中心), meaning that judgments should be clear to ordinary people and serve the purpose of educating them; and
  3. the organic unity of political, legal, and social effectiveness (政治效果、法律效果和社会效果有机统一 ), because by strengthening the guiding role of socialist core values it will enhance the legal, social, and rational recognition of judicial judgment.

The summary below highlights some of the principal points for Chinese judges.

Article 4 specified the types of judgments in which the use of socialist core values should be increased:

  1.  Cases involving national interests, major public interest, and widespread public concern;
  2. Cases involving epidemic prevention and control, emergency rescue and disaster relief, protection of heroes, brave actions for righteousness, legitimate defense,  and other such cases may trigger social moral evaluation;
  3. Cases involving the protection of vulnerable groups such as the elderly, women, children, and the disabled, as well as groups that have major disputes and may cause widespread concern in the society;
  4.  Cases involving public order and good customs, customs, equality of rights, ethnic religions, etc., where the parties to the litigation have major disputes and may cause widespread concern in the society;
  5. Cases involving new situations and new issues that require in-depth interpretation of legal provisions, judicial policies, etc., to guide social trends and establish value orientation;
  6. Other analogous cases.

What this means is that in cases where there is a great deal of public concern, judges should seek to use socialist core values.  Some of these, especially with national interest, major public interest, types of cases that attract Party leadership attention, or wide public concern are likely to be those in which the higher levels of the courts, or local political-legal commissions provide their views.

A significant part of the SCV Guiding Opinion contains guidance to lower court judges. I surmise that the guidance is directed towards less experienced and educated judges. My understanding is that more sophisticated judges, who are highly knowledgeable about political matters in addition to being technically highly competent, would consider the guidance unnecessary.

Articles 5-6 address judgment drafting.  These provisions relate to the  2018 SPC Guiding Opinions on Strengthening and Standardizing the Analysis and Reasoning in Adjudicative Instruments. Article 5 gives Chinese judges rules of interpretation generally in cases involving socialist core values., directing them to first look to a normative legal document (law or judicial interpretation) as the basis for judgment, the legislative intent, and supplement it with socialist core values.  Article 6 gives directions to judges in civil and commercial cases where there is no normative legal document as the direct basis for the judgment. Judges should use socialist core values ​​as the guide and custom and the most similar legal provisions as the basis for the judgment; if there is no most similar legal provision, judges should make judicial decisions in accordance with the spirit of the legislation, legislative purposes, and legal principles, and make full use of the core socialist values ​​in the judgment documents to explain the basis and reasons for the judgment.  It is this principle that has attracted dry comments from some of the legal professionals with whom I am acquainted.

Article 7 gives guidance to judges in cases involving multiple socialist core values, directing them to consider the spirit of the legislation, legal principles, provisions, and law and legal provisions to balance and select the relevant principles and values.   Article 8 directs judges to respond, if possible, orally in court, to the use of socialist core values by parties in court.

Article 13 directs judges handling cases that fall into one of the Article 4 categories, to emphasize socialist core values, in situations in which cases are discussed in professional judges committees or judicial (adjudication) committees.

Article 14 encourages socialist core values to be included in judicial training, particularly that related to the Civil Code, and Article 16 encourages competitions to find the best judgments that cite socialist core values.

Flagging the SCV Guiding Opinion

Several recent Party and SPC documents flagged the SCV Guiding Opinion.  Among them are:

  • the April 2020 Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Thoroughly Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress to Advance the Modernization of the Judicial System and Judicial Capacity– (最高人民法院关于人民法院贯彻落实党的十九届四中全会精神推进审判体系和审判能力现代化的意见)–improve and promote the in-depth integration of socialist core values ​​into the supporting mechanisms for trial and enforcement (完善推动社会主义核心价值观深度融入审判执行工作配套机制). My blogpost on that document briefly mentioned socialist core values;
  • the 2020 Plan on Building the Rule of Law in China (2020–2025), mentioned above
  • the 2019 5th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan Outline; and
  • the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress.

This Guiding Opinion can be considered the progeny of the SPC’s 2015 Opinions on Cultivating and Practising Socialist Core Values at People’s Courts. 最高人民法院关于在人民法院工作中培育和践行社会主义核心价值观的若干意见, after which the SPC issued typical cases, both discussed in Sue Trevaskes’ and Delia Lin’s academic articles linked above. Their articles also discuss other related documents. As I wrote in 2018, the SPC issued a five-year plan, never made public, to incorporate socialist core values into judicial interpretations.

How to Classify the SCV Guiding Opinion

As to which basket of SPC documents the SCV Guiding Opinion should be placed, that relates to the catalog that I set out in a November 2020 blogpost on the SPC’s soft law. I classified a number of the SPC’s documents into different categories.  According to my classification, the SCV Guiding Opinion should be classified as Opinion Type 1, although the criteria I mentioned don’t fit perfectly.

As I defined it, that type of Opinion is one issued solely by the SPC, which create and transmit to the lower courts new judicial policy, update previous judicial policy, and establish new legal guidance that may be eventually crystallized in judicial interpretations and direct the lower courts, but cannot be cited in judicial judgments or rulings. They are generally linked to an important Party or state strategy or initiative. 

The SCV Guiding  Opinion is linked to an important Party and state strategy or initiative, that of promoting socialist core values. As a “guiding opinion,” it is intended to push policy forward. Article 17 of this document directs the SPC itself and lower courts to issue occasionally socialist core value-related model cases. From a quick search of recent lower court model cases, local courts have taken account of this.

Socialist Core Values in Chinese court judgments 

Chen Liang, one of my current students, sampled cases from basic level courts in various parts of China as set out in this spreadsheet. He originally found over 6000 cases that used “socialist core values.”In his research, he found three ways that courts invoke socialist core values:

  1.  elaborating a legal standard (such as Case No. 1), a trend that I had found in my own research);

In this case, the defendant (a government branch) rejected the plaintiff’s application to recognize his father, a KMT military officer, as a martyr who died in the Anti-Japanese War, and the plaintiff sued to correct this decision. The Court invoked the SCV to emphasize the importance of the recognition of someone as a martyr, and then affirmed the defendant’s strict scrutiny of the application.

2.invoking socialist core values as a way to allocate liability (such as Case No. 9); 

The plaintiff was hit by the defendant, and was in hospital. After 15 days in hospital, the doctor recommended him to leave, but he refused by claiming he had headache. Then, the plaintiff stayed in hospital for 110 days, and sued the defendant for compensation of medical fees of 110 days. When considering the exact duration to be compensated, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s action was wasting public medical resources, which was a violation of the SCV, and then confirmed that the defendant only had to compensate for the medical fees of 15 days in hospital.

3. invoking socialist core values as a way to educate people (or to promote total social welfare) (such as Case 10).

The plaintiff and defendant agreed to jointly operate a restaurant, and they had disputes during the operation. The plaintiff sued for damage. During the trial, the parties insulted with dirty words against each other. Given that, the Court asked the parties to contemplate on their behaviors considering the whole society was promoting SCV.

This use of cases to educate the public, noted in the academic articles mentioned above, also links to a more recent line of documents about which I wrote in July 2020, relating to using cases to explain the law and the popularization of law responsibility system (普法责任制). As mentioned in that blogpost, Sue Trevaskes has also written about the history of the popularization of law (pufa).

In my view, following this document, we are likely to see many more cases mentioning socialist core values, likely falling in all three categories mentioned above.

Vision of the Chinese Court System

This Guiding Opinion can be seen as a part of the “socialist core valueization” of Chinese law and the legal system, and in particular, the judiciary. It is one important piece of how the judiciary is being further transformed in the Xi Jinping era.

Article 1 is part of official legal ideology so that the drafters of this Guiding Opinion (the  SPC’s Judicial Reform Office) must incorporate those principles. The Party Center requires this to be done.   As  Sue Trevaskes and Delia Lin mentioned in their writings, as in the traditional legal state, “morality here is treated in a particular normative sense whereby claims are made about the unified nature of socialist values held by China’s rulers and the ruled.”  This long-time observer of Chinese society would question whether the moral values across Chinese society are as unified as this ideal has it. 

An aspect the drafters of this document may not have considered is  whether this approach to law and court judgments is consistent with China’s desire to promote the use of Chinese law overseas, which the SPC has promoted in its Opinion on Further Providing Judicial Services and Guarantees by the People’s Courts for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI Opinion #2, discussed in this blogpost).  The fusion of law and morality in cases involving multinational commercial parties seems problematic. 

These principles see the public as a body to be educated, and that judgments need to further incorporate socialist core values to be better accepted by the public.  Writing judgments in language the public can understand–plain language judgments–is a worldwide concern of domestic courts, but incorporating socialist core values may or not be the way to achieve that.

As I mentioned above, a significant part of the SCV Guiding Opinion contains guidance to lower court judges. I surmise that the Judicial Reform Office decided that this guidance was needed for less experienced and educated judges in less developed parts of China. The more experienced judges, with many years of experience and training, both substantive and ideological, are unlikely to need such guidance set out in an SPC document.

The reality of Chinese society that Chinese judges face, particularly at the local level, is not the one that matches the socialist core values ideal. That can be seen from cases discussed in the Chinese professional media (and some cases that have caught Chinese media attention) about some of the difficult issues that they face when needing to incorporate socialist core values. A few of those cases could include:

cases involving the status of children whose parents are not married under the Chinese legal definition of marriage to one another. That may be gay or lesbian couples or one in which a married man fathers a child with a woman with whom he is not married;

Cases involving disputes between a gay or lesbian couple that has split over mutually-owned property; 

Cases involving the rights of single women who wish to have children without being married.

The SCV Guiding Opinion can be seen a signal of the direction towards which the Chinese courts are being guided.  The more sophisticated judges will know how to balance the above requirements with the need to issue a judgment that parties in cases that involve fundamental personal rights find acceptable.

 

 

How the Supreme People’s Court Coordinates With Other Party & State Organs

3rd meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Conference Combatting Illegal Trade in Wild Plants and Animals

A little-discussed aspect of the work of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) is coordinating with other Party and state organs to better serve the greater situation and resolve specific policy issues.   At some point, I will set out a fuller description of this distinctive function of the SPC and its background history, but that will need to wait until I have plumbed the SPC’s past regulatory documents and conducted a more complete survey of practices in SPC divisions.   I examined one aspect of the way that the SPC coordinates with other departments in a book chapter to be published in the fall of 2021. That chapter focuses on the drafting of criminal procedure judicial interpretations. The  “never-ending” academic article that I am writing touches upon one aspect, briefly. This blogpost highlights some formal frameworks for coordination and at least some of what is involved. 

 Coordination with other central Party and state organs regarding specific legal issues is one of the unrecognized functions of the SPC. It  is hard to assess how much coordination work is done in comparison to other functions of the SPC, such as hearing cases or drafting judicial interpretations.  Because the Collection of the Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Rules, a handbook for judges, places the principle “establish coordination mechanisms, properly resolve administrative disputes” in the section of general principles of administrative law, I surmise that coordination is a very important function of the administrative division. From my research below and discussions with knowledgeable persons,  some judges in the civil and commercial divisions are involved in work under these frameworks, and likely also the Research Office. Some issues involve multiple divisions of the SPC.

My understanding is that coordination with other central Party and state organs is a customary function of the SPC that is being repurposed, in part, in the New Era. For that reason, I surmise that more of this will take place in SPC headquarters in the future. This is based on two factors. The first is that SPC hears most commercial and administrative cases in the circuit courts. Second, coordination with other central organs appears to be an increasingly important part of New Era governance.  That was flagged in several statements of Liu Zheng, deputy head of the SPC’s Judicial Reform Office, in a February, 2021 press conference, where the SPC released its report on online mediation. Liu Zheng stated:

promote the improvement of the social governance pattern of joint construction, co-governance and sharing…(促进完善共建共治共享的社会治理格局)

In describing the accomplishments of the SPC in promoting diversified dispute resolution, he stated:

We strengthened our communication and coordination with Central departments (ministries) and commissions, we held three coordination meetings at the ministry level, and established a joint action mechanism (加强与中央部委的沟通协调,3次召开部委层面协调交流会,建立联动机制 ).

  At the central Party level, clearly coordination occurs at the level of broad policy through the Central Political Legal Commission and the Building Ping’an (peace and safe)-China Coordination Small-Group about which Li Ling wrote last year.  Other coordination occurs through leading small group offices (工作领导小组办公室).  I describe one below.  This blogpost will focus on State Council Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences because it is through those that much of the more specific coordination occurs.  Thankfully for the researcher, State Council transparency is quite good and I found many approval documents for Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences. From my research thus far, the SPC participates in many Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences established by the State Council. I note that some other jurisdictions have Inter-Ministerial Council Conferences as well, not involving the judiciary. In some instances, ministries or commissions of the State Council create coordination mechanisms with the SPC, while the SPC initiates some.  Some coordination is done more formally on an as-needed basis, as Liu Zheng mentioned and that requires separate research. It is understood that within the framework of the formal structures, interaction and coordination occur at the staff level.

Leading Small Group Coordination Offices

As mentioned above, the Party Center has established some leading small group coordination offices to coordinate specific central Party and state organs policies and measures. Because of the nature of the matter, the SPC is a member. One example is the following office.

The Pursuit of Fugitive [Officials] Pursuit of Stolen Assets Working Office of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Leading Small Group (中央反腐败协调小组国际追逃追赃工作办公室), established in 2015, of which the SPC is a member.  The 2017 judicial interpretation on asset recovery is likely related to the SPC’s work in this group.  The SPC is involved in the yearly Skynet operation. Through this office,  the SPC  participates in related campaigns under this mechanism, such as a 2015 one against offshore companies and underground banks.

Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences

The State Council has established many Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences (部际联席会议), in which other Central-level ministries take the lead (牵头) and the SPC is one of many other Party and state organs involved. For those unfamiliar with Inter-Ministerial Conferences in China, the Office of the Central Staffing Commission has an authoritative explanation (amended Google translate):

The inter-ministerial joint conference  is established to negotiate and handle matters involving the responsibilities of multiple departments of the State Council. It is established with the approval of the State Council. The member units communicate in a timely manner and coordinate differing opinions. It is a work mechanism for enabling the smooth implementation of a task (responsibility). It is the highest-level joint meeting system of administrative agencies. The establishment of inter-ministerial joint conferences should be strictly controlled. For matters that can be resolved through coordination between the sponsoring department and other departments, inter-ministerial joint conferences are generally not established. The establishment of inter-ministerial joint conferences must be submitted to the State Council for approval. The lead department shall ask for instructions, clarify the name, convener, lead unit, member unit, work tasks and rules, etc., and submit it to the State Council for approval after approval by relevant departments. After the task of the inter-ministerial joint conference is completed, the lead department shall submit an application for cancellation, stating the establishment time of the inter-ministerial joint conference and the reasons for its cancellation, etc., and submit it to the State Council for approval after the approval of the member units. The newly established inter-ministerial joint conference which is led by the leading comrades of the State Council, may be entitled ” State Council… ” , and the other joint conferences are collectively referred to as ” inter-ministerial joint conferences . ” The inter-ministerial joint conference does not engrave a seal or formally issue documents. If documents must be formally issued, the name of the leading department and the seal of the leading department may be used, or the relevant member units may jointly issue a document.

SPC and Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences

Sometimes the SPC is a founding member of an Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference. In other situations, it is recognized that the expertise of the SPC is needed and the SPC is invited to join after the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference has been in operation for several years. Some examples are:

  1. The Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on the Implementation of the Intellectual Property Strategy of the State Council,  headquartered at the China National Intellectual Property Administration, of which the SPC is one of many members. It is directed towards achieving the National Intellectual Property Strategy and unusually, has its own website.  A previous version was established in 2008, but that was superseded in 2016 when the State Council revamped the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference, likely to better achieve China’s Intellectual Property Strategy.  Justice Tao Kaiyuan is designated as a member of the Joint Conference on behalf of the SPC.  The Joint Conference meets from time to time and issues an annual plan, allocating responsibilities to members according to their authority.  Among the matters allocated to the SPC in the 2020 plan is promoting three-in-one hearing of intellectual property cases and drafting a Guiding Opinion for Three-in-one Work ( 深入推进知识产权审判“三合一”工作,制定“三合一”工作指导意见。(最高人民法院). ” (For those unfamiliar with Three-in-one hearings,” they refer to integrating jurisdiction over civil, administrative and criminal intellectual property cases. It is understood that discussions occur at staff level to coordinate and promote policies. 
  2.  The Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference on Combating Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade (打击野生动植物非法贸易部际联席会议), established in 2016. The SPC (and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP)) was invited to join the conference in  2020., which likely means that the organizer, the State Forestry Administration, did not realize that the expertise of the SPC and SPP were necessary. The SPC is one of 27 Central-level organs. It is likely that the 2020 Guiding Opinions on Punishing the Illegal Trade of Wild Animals issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice is a product of this Inter-Ministerial Mechanism.
  3. The Inter-Ministerial Conference on Money Laundering (反洗钱工作部际联席会议制度).  The State Council established it in 2004.  The People’s Bank of China takes the lead. National Money Laundering Strategies are drafted under its auspices. The role of the SPC is to supervise and guide the trial of money laundering crimes and formulate judicial interpretations in a timely manner in response to relevant legal issues encountered (督办、指导洗钱犯罪案件的审判,针对审理中遇到的有关适用法律问题,适时制定司法解释)It is understood that at a staff level, discussions take place regularly, and the SPC has issued several judicial interpretations as a result.
  4. As mentioned in a blogpost in 2020, in 2017 the State Council approved an Inter Ministerial Joint Conference on the Popularization of Law, with Zhang Jun, then head of the Ministry of Justice, as head and the SPC as one of the parties.

SPC established coordination mechanisms

The SPC establishes coordination mechanisms with other government and Party departments such as:

  1. The family trial method and work joint conference mechanism (家事审判方式和工作机制改革联席会议), established in 2017 with Central Political-Legal Commission consent; and
  2. Under the framework of Inter-Ministerial Joint Conferences, specific coordination mechanisms may be established. One likely product of ongoing policy discussions under the framework of the Intellectual Property Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference discussed above was the January 2021 establishment of a mediation coordination mechanism between the SPC  and the China National Intellectual Property Administration.

Legal basis

The legal basis of coordination appears to be Article 2 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts in which the courts are called upon to “guarantee the smooth progress of the building of socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Comments

In the New Era, we can expect to see more and more coordination by the SPC, much of it invisible to those of us outside the system.  It appears to be a recognition of the technical competence of the SPC in resolving a broad range of technical issues required to be resolved in furtherance of the governance of the country.  The State Council and its ministries and commission need the SPC’s expertise to deal with a large variety of legal issues–criminal, civil, administrative, enforcement.  The SPC coordinates with other central Party and state organs because it needs them to resolve specific issues. Given China’s state-run governance model, establishing mechanisms to better coordinate and promote national strategies and targets, and better draft policies and measures are considered an efficient way to accomplish governance targets and serve the needs of the Party and country.

 

 

Happy Niu 🐂Year!

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Happy Niu 🐂Year to all blog followers and readers! Best wishes to all for good health, success in work and study, and all else!

In recent weeks I have been focusing on several longer pieces of writing and am still in “focus mode.”

While most of the Supreme People’s Court  (SPC) has been taking a break, based on previous year’s reports, it is likely that the team of people working on drafting President Zhou Qiang’s speech to the National People’s Congress (NPC) are hard at work.  I surmise that they will draw on January’s Central Political-Legal annual work conference, where responsibilities for implementing this year’s major tasks were allocated, and guidance from President Xi was transmitted. At that time, the Party leadership heard work reports from the SPC’s (and Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s) Party Group, so it seems likely that the report to the NPC will draw on that report as well.

Among the content that I expect to be included in the report is:

  • successful transition to the Civil Code, including review  of old judicial interpretations (and other judicial normative documents), canceling and amending old ones;
  • successes in meeting the challenges that Covid-19 meant for the courts, including the increased use of online proceedings;
  • smart courts and informatization;
  • accomplishments of the Supreme People’s Court’s Intellectual Property Court, including its first anti-suit injunction;
  • the issuance, for the first time, of reports on the judicial review of arbitration in 2019 and judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters between the Mainland and Hong Kong.  The full text of the two reports has not yet been released to the public, so I surmise that they will be released during the NPC meeting;
  • In the area of criminal law, likely the effective use of criminal proceedings in the battle against Covid-19;
  • successes in the saohei (organized crime) campaign;
  • successes in the area of environmental law, such as the recent signing of a framework agreement between the SPC and the leading small group on the protection of the Yellow River and the June, 2020 policy document on providing judicial services and guarantees to the protection and high quality development of the Yellow River;
  • furthering of socialist core values, such as the guiding opinion issued on 18 February on integrating those values into judgments (最高人民法院印发《关于深入推进社会主义核心价值观融入裁判文书释法说理的指导意见) and
  • judicial reforms such as the recently approved establishment of the Beijing Financial Court (the Shanghai Financial Court has been very busy since it was established) and the piloting of reforms to separate simple and complicated cases (the SPC recently submitted a midterm report to the NPC Standing Committee on the pilots).

We’ll see next month how accurate the above guesses are. In the meantime, additions or corrections are welcome.

______________________________________

The SPC New Year’s greetings are ©the SPC, found in this short video 

Supreme People’s Court’s new guidance on similar case search

Screenshot 2020-07-27 at 8.49.14 PMOn 27 July 2020,  the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)  issued Guiding Opinions Concerning Strengthening Search for Similar Cases to Unify the Application of Law (Guiding Opinions) (关于统一法律适用加强类案检索的指导意见(试行)),  effective on 31 July.  It is not a judicial interpretation, rather it is guidance intended to make judicial decisions more consistent, an ongoing issue in the Chinese court system.  The SPC is approving the practice of judges using principles derived from prior cases to fill in the gaps in legislation and judicial interpretations.  The Guiding Opinions codifies many of the practices of the Chinese courts and imposes some new requirements. It does not mean that China has become a common law legal system.  As explained further below, although the Guiding Opinions do not address this question, comments by an SPC judge suggest that the special status of cases selected by the SPC by its operational divisions remains in place.

It also illustrates two larger points–that discrete judicial reforms aimed at more consistent judgments continue to be implemented even as the role of Party leadership and oversight continues to be stressed. It is also an illustration of how long it can take judicial reforms to be implemented. in my view, this discrete, technical reform has implications greater than the drafters of the Guiding Opinions realized, including a possible impact on Chinese legal education. It has the potential to make litigation a more predictable process for parties.

Case Search Requirements

What are similar cases?

Article 1 defines that–the cases that are already effective and are similar in their basic facts, disputed points, issues of law, etc. (指与待决案件在基本事实、争议焦点、法律适用问题等方面具有相似性,且已经人民法院裁判生效的案件).

When is similar case search required? (Articles 2 and 7)

  1. When a case is proposed to be submitted to a professional or specialized  (presiding) judges meeting (generally all the judges in a division) or the judicial/adjudication committee for discussion;
  2. Relevant judicial principles are unclear or conflicting;
  3. A court president or division head requires it under his or her supervision authority;
  4. Other relevant situations.

That is, similar case search is not required in all cases, only when the relevant “law” is unclear.

Similar case search should be set out in the trial report for the case or in a separate precedent (similar case) report (类案检索报告) and included in the case file. As noted in my earlier blogpost, trial reports are confidential and not accessible to parties or their lawyers. Article 8 requires that the search report must include details on the platform, means of search, etc. and how the search was used.

Who searches and how?

The judge in charge of the case (承办法官) is in charge of undertaking the search and is responsible for doing it accurately and properly, using either the SPC’s database or other case databases, focusing on cases from the last three years, except for guiding cases.

Judges can use methods such as keyword search, legal provision (article of the relevant law), or related case search.

What must be searched?

These rules (in Article 4) are in line with what I have previously written:

  1.  SPC guiding cases;
  2. SPC typical (model) cases (典型案例) and judgments or rulings of the SPC;
  3.  Reference cases issued by provincial-level higher people’s courts  and decisions by those courts;
  4.  Higher-level courts in the jurisdiction in question and judgments of that court.

Except for the guiding cases, priority is given to the search of cases or cases in the past three years; if a similar case has been searched in the previous order, no search is required. Article 5 provides that judges can use methods such as keyword, legal article-linked, and case-based searches.

My understanding is that these are general principles, but the specific scope of cases that need to be searched will depend on the specifics. As I have previously written, the SPC Circuit Courts have issued cases that guide the lower courts in their circuits.  The special authority of those cases remains in place. Judges reviewing issues related to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in China will need to look to a special set of cases (described here), for example.

I had previously written about cases selected by the operational divisions of the SPC providing guidance to the lower courts.  Those retain their special authority, as indicated by comments by Senior Judge Yu Tongzhi, an editor of Reference to Criminal Trial (the joint publication of the SPC’s five criminal divisions). He noted in an article published on 31 July, that as far as criminal justice is concerned, without a doubt, the first choice for searching similar cases is to search the guidance cases contained in their publication, setting indices to the guidance cases for the convenience of readers.

Are precedents binding?

Precedents are not binding, but guiding cases should be 参照 “referred to” (the link is to SPC Research Office Deputy Director  Judge Guo Feng’s authoritative explanation) unless the case conflicts with subsequently issued law or judicial interpretations. Other types of cases are not binding, but for judges to consider(参考).

How judges must respond

Article 10 imposes a new requirement on courts, if procurators, parties, their representatives (their lawyers) submit guiding cases or other cases in support of their legal position (as I had previously written had been the practice).  For guiding cases, courts are required to state in the reasoning section of their judgments whether or not the guiding case was referred to and why.

For all other types of cases, the court can use its power of clarification/explanation and other means (释明等方式) to respond.  It is understood that this is meant to give judges flexibility in responding to (non-guiding) judgments provided by parties–so the court may respond in its court’s judgment or in other ways. Those other ways may include:  responding to the cases submitted pre-hearing, during a hearing, after a hearing, as the court considers most appropriate.  We will need to observe what is done in practice, for example, whether courts respond primarily in their judgments or orally.  This will be the way that a party can monitor whether the search accurately reflects prior cases, as neither a party or its counsel has access to the trial report. Other unknowns are how this system will influence administrative proceedings such as those at the Trademark Review and Adjudication Board.

Link to Inconsistent Decision Mechanism

Article 11 contains a link to the inconsistent decision mechanism discussed here, which I described as a microcosm of themes reflecting how the SPC operates, given its high bureaucratic nature.

Why case law reform?

As this blog has discussed, in the New Era, the role of Party leadership and oversight continues to be stressed (see this blogpost, for example).  This discrete judicial reform is aimed at more consistent judgments. It is a critical tool that judges are already using because Chinese legislation lags behind the needs of the courts, and judicial interpretations are insufficient as well. Party policy would have an indirect impact on those cases, as would foreign law principles (mentioned here).

“Slow-cooking” judicial reform

The issuance of these rules shows the strength of the case law system and how long it can take a single judicial reform to be implemented. As mentioned in the June, 2019 blogpost, when Professor Hu Yunteng(until recently Justice Hu Yunteng, formerly a full-time member of the SPC’s judicial committee, now retired) recollected the history of the case system with Chinese characteristics, he mentioned that Jiang Huiling, then his colleague at the China Institute for Applied Jurisprudence (now Dean of the Tongji University School of Law) had looked to jurisdictions outside of China to advocate that China establish a case law system. Professor Hu Yunteng doesn’t specify whether Dean Jiang Huiling was looking to case law systems in civil or common law jurisdictions in the “West.”).  In his 2016 Harvard Law Review student note, Mark Jia (now clerking on the Supreme Court), cited Li Shichun of the China Law Society to the effect that it was the National People’s Congress that opposed those seeking to establish a Chinese case law precedential system. That opposition has been overcome by widespread professional usage (as described in my 2017 Tsinghua Law Review article). It is unusual in that the practice came first and was not a top-down reform (顶级设计).

Concluding Comments

This discrete, technical reform is an important one for the rules relating to judicial decision-making better harmonized with judicial practice.  There are a number of unknowns.  One is whether it will result in judges feeling more comfortable in setting out their reasoning,  knowing that other judges may look to it.  An important question is how the practice of responding to cases will evolve–will judges tend to respond in their judgments, or as I suspect, do it orally. (As to why I think that–it is related to the desire of Chinese judges to reduce their risk under the judicial responsibility system).

In my view, this reform has the potential to make Chinese litigation a more predictable process. It is a bit of evidence of the gradual harmonization of the operations of the Chinese courts with the rest of the world,  as current circumstances permit.

 

Supreme People’s Court’s Bench Memoranda?

Screenshot 2020-07-17 at 2.05.58 PM
Trial report and criminal judgment, from a Shantou district court

Justice Ginsburg’s article “Workways of the United States Supreme Court” and recent correspondence with brother blogger Mark Cohen has led me to reflect on what is known (and what I know) about how cases progress through the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). It is from the small details that it is possible to obtain greater insights about a judicial system.

In discussing the sources of law (meant broadly) to which SPC judges look when considering cases,  some knowledgeable persons reminded me of the existence of something called a “trial report (审理报告 or 审查报告 (for retrial cases)).  I analogize these to bench memoranda (as used in United States appellate courts),  although the analogy is imperfect. It seems also somewhat analogous to the Votum of the German Constitutional Court, although the analogy is imperfect. Perhaps a search through Soviet (or Russian) civil procedure legislation will reveal a better counterpart.

As to what a trial report is, it is a memorandum prepared by the judge in charge of the case ( 承办人), prepared for internal discussion within the court. That internal discussion is in the first instance by the collegial panel that heard the case.  If the collegial panel feels they need greater guidance (or other related factors are relevant, such as the case being “difficult” or “important”), the trial report may be used in discussion by the specialized judges meeting or if necessary, among the documents included in the package of documents submitted to the judicial (adjudication) committee (or specialized judicial (adjudication) committee).

A search of the Chinalawinfo (北大法宝) database revealed that the same term is used for internal memoranda prepared in the course of administrative penalty proceedings and Party disciplinary and other analogous proceedings.

The outside observer is handicapped in analyzing trial reports in great detail because few examples are available to those outside the system, as explained further, with a few found in specific databases. As for the reason for the handicap, that relates to a number of regulations that keep trial memoranda confidential, some mentioned in my article on judicial transparency.  Those include:

  • 2013 joint regulations by the SPC and the National Archives Administration (State Secrecy Bureau) requiring such memoranda to be placed in the supplemental file (副卷). Items in the supplemental file are confidential, as discussed in that article.  The article also discusses proposals within the Chinese court system for public access to the supplemental file;
  • regulations on work secrets, also discussed in my article.

Trial reports are mentioned in a number of SPC regulations and in documents issued by the SPC’s Judicial Reform Office. It is clearly one of the many discrete matters about which reform is being considered.

The trial report is a memorandum in which the judge in charge of the case sets out the facts of the case, evidence provided and facts determined; prior rulings or decisions in the case; issues in dispute; background information; proposed resolution of the case and rationale. The judge is not bound by the restrictions in the sources of law that may be cited, with some judges stating that the results of discussions with experts or foreign principles of law or cases are sometimes included.

Some reports I have seen have a section on “issues to explain” (需要说明的问题)–that raises non-legal factors, such as the impact of enforcement of an international arbitral award on the local economy. The rationale in the report may be more detailed than that in the judgment or ruling that is issued to the parties. As has been mentioned in earlier blogposts, only certain sources of law may be cited as the basis of a judicial ruling or judgment. The trial report apparently can take a broader approach to legal sources, which would be in keeping with the holistic approach that Chinese judges take to deciding cases. The trial report, unlike the judgment or ruling, is confidential. The SPC has issued forms of trial reports, such as this one for administrative retrials; others for first-instance administrative cases; second instance administrative cases; state compensation cases.

SPC rules of operation call for a judge‘s assistant to be responsible for preparing a draft of a trial report, with the judge in charge of the case responsible for it.  Interns may be involved in preparing a preliminary draft for the judge’s assistant to whom they are attached (as I know from my own students who have interned at the SPC). The judge’s assistant will review the intern’s draft thoroughly. There are proposals to require search of relevant prior cases, but this is something that likely is general practice at the SPC (see my article on case law).

A recent article by an experienced Chinese judge (at the local level) points out problems with the trial report system (at the local level). In his experience, since the last round of judicial reforms, most judges do not care much about drafting a trial report, in their rush to process cases on time. They, therefore, fail to provide a holistic report on the case. That complicates matters for the second instance judge reviewing the case file. Because the trial report does not describe fully the scope of factors that entered into judicial thinking, the second instance judge lacks a full understanding of the case. He says that for a Chinese judge, in addition to the facts and law, among the other factors to consider include:  judicial policy; petitioning and stability maintenance; the impact of media; the impact of the decision; interference and inquiries from either inside or outside the court; value judgments of individual judges.  In his experience, at least, the responsible second instance judge will meet face to face with the lower court judge to seek to understand the whole picture, rather than solely relying on the case file.  He points out that this practice has its drawbacks.   The author suggests using a system that he entitles “explanation of the situation regarding the decision” (裁判情况说明) rather than a trial report.

Concluding comments

The fact that little is known about trial reports speaks to how little scholars (in China or elsewhere) focus on the details of how the Chinese legal system operates.

As to whether judges would favor making trial reports public–an unscientific sample says no. One suggestion that I have heard was that a broader approach should be taken to sources that could be cited in a judgment, so that a judge could cite to persuasive scholarly works. But what if it is revealed that judicial thinking on a particular issue has been influenced by foreign theories?  The thoughtful Chinese judge wants to be both politically and legally correct.

Using cases to explain the law in the New Era

Screen Shot 2020-07-08 at 3.32.23 PM
News conference to announce the issuance of 10 exemplary cases promoting socialist core values

As readers of this blog know, I have a special interest in the use of cases in the Chinese court system. I wrote most recently on the SPC’s use of cases in December, 2019, when I wrote How the Supreme People’s Court guides the lower courts through cases in its publications (1). In this blogpost, I am taking another look at two aspects of this topic in the post 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress New Era. A consolidated version will need to wait for an opportunity to write on this at greater length.

The SPC uses case law in two broad ways.  The first is to guide the lower courts, as previously mentioned in several previous blogposts and my 2017 academic article. Those developments are continuing. I’ll discuss one new example.  What I have not previously discussed very much, and will be the focus of this blogpost is how the SPC uses case law to popularize law (普法).

Guiding the Lower Courts

One example that I have not previously discussed, but is relevant to many practitioners, is the case law of the SPC’s Intellectual Property Court (SPCIPC, literally the SPC’s Intellectual Property Tribunal). A measure of the importance that the SPCIPC attaches to its cases in that the following paragraph was the first substantive section of its 2019 annual report [scroll to the bottom of the link for English]:

Ⅰ. Focus on the function of trial [court hearings] to strengthen typical exemplary effect of model cases and further unify the standards for adjudicating technology-related IP cases
Unifying the standards for adjudicating patent and other technology-related IP cases is the primary goal of the IP Court. In 2019, the IP Court focused on the function of trial and concluded a number of closely technology-related IP cases justly and efficiently in accordance with the law. A number of model judgments that have typical exemplary effect were made, and the “systematization project to unify judicial standards” has been implemented, further promoting the unification of judicial standards for technology-related IP cases. ( 一、立足审判职能,加强典型示范,进一步统一技术类知识产权案件裁判尺度
统一专利等技术类知识产权案件裁判标准,是法庭设立的重要目标。2019年,法庭立足司法审判职能,依法公正高效审结了一批专业技术性较强的知识产权案件,形成了一批具有典型示范作用的标杆性判决,建设实施“统一裁判标准系统工程”,进一步推动了技术类知识产权案件裁判尺度的统一。

In 2020, we can expect the SPCIPC to continue to use case law to unify judicial standards in technology-related IP cases.  This is one small example of the SPC’s work in this area.  The report speaks of its contribution of Chinese wisdom to the development of international IP law, but a person taking a closer look at some of the SPCIPC decisions will see that research of foreign law by SPC IP judges and interaction with persons with foreign law expertise has contributed to the development of Chinese wisdom.

Popularizing law (普法)

The second development is the popularization of law, an old development repurposed in the post 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress New Era. The close observer of these documents, implementation, and related activities can detect a repurposing of popularization for specialist purposes.

Popularizing law is mentioned in the policy document Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Thoroughly Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress to Advance the Modernization of the Judicial System and Judicial Capacity (Implementing the 4th Plenum of 19th Party Congress Opinions), the subject of my May, 2020 blogpost. The last sentence in section 5 of the opinion, on improving the implementation of socialist core values and the ideological responsibility system stated:

Conscientiously implement the responsibility system for publicizing knowledge about law (普法) of “whoever enforces the law, explains the law”; strengthen public opinion guidance, perfect the mechanism for issuing typical cases; establish rules of conduct through fair decisions [judgments and rulings], promote [positive] social customs, and create a good environment for the rule of law.”认真落实“谁执法谁普法”普法责任制,加强新闻舆论工作,健全完善典型案例发布机制,以公正裁判树立行为规则、弘扬社会风尚,营造良好法治环境.

The responsibility system for publicizing knowledge about law (普法) of “whoever enforces the law, explains the law” relates to pufajiaoyu (普法教育) (educating the public about law).(For those with access to an academic library I recommend Susan Trevaskes’ related book chapter) on how pufajiaoyu has developed over time).

Background to this system

This pufajiaoyu responsibility system is mentioned in section V of the 4th Plenum Decision of the 18th Party Congress and is one of many different types of responsibility systems mentioned in that Decision. This responsibility system for publicizing knowledge about law is linked to broader Xi Jinping era Party initiatives to expand the responsibility of Party and government cadres.   In this context the SPC appears to be treated as any other state or Party organ.

The phrase in the 4th Plenum Decision has been built into a responsibility system for the courts through two documents and a joint ministerial system. The framework was set out in a joint Party-State Council document in 2017  “General Offices of the Party Central Committee and State Council Opinions on a Popularization of Law Responsibility System of State Organs Regarding “whoever enforces that law, explains the law.” (中共中央办厅 国务院办公厅印发《关于实行国家机关“谁执法谁普法”普法责任制的意见》Section 6 calls for judge, procurators, administrative enforcement personnel, and lawyers to establish a “using cases to explain the law” system (建立法官、检察官、行政执法人员、律师等以案释法制度). The document calls on judges, etc. to collect, sort, research and issue cases and establish a database, using exemplary/model/typical cases to guide, standardize, and as prevention  and for education.  典型案例的收集、整理、研究和发布工作,建立以案释法资源库,充分发挥典型案例的引导、规范、预防与教育功能。So from this one line in document it is possible to see popularization used for specialist purposes (standardization).

Later in 2017, the State Council approved the establishment of an interministerial joint conference on the popularization of law, with Zhang Jun, then head of the Ministry of Justice, as head and the SPC as one of the parties. At the end of 2017, the SPC issued its own document to implement the Party-State Council document, 人民法院贯彻落实〈中共中央办公厅 国务院办公厅关于实行国家机关“谁执法谁普法”普法责任制的意见〉的实施意见》(SPC Explaining the Law Opinions).   This document is the one guiding the work of the SPC most closely.

Section 9 of the Explaining the Law Opinions focuses on the use of cases for both popularization and specialist purposes.  It calls for establishing a system for judges to explain the law in the cases they hear (as a form of popularization). On the specialist side, it calls for judges to upload cases to the SPC case database according to regulations and increase the reasoning (说理) in their judgments. The latter can have both specialist and popularization and “rule of law” impacts.  If parties or the general public are convinced by the reasoning in a judgment, they are more likely to accept it as fair. However many factors (to be explored in a later blogpost and my students’ forthcoming articles) lead to judgments with thin reasoning. This document also calls for collecting, sorting, researching and issuing exemplary cases and organizing news conferences if useful. These exemplary/model/typical cases can have both specialist and popularization impacts.  One example, that I would recommend is a recent article by an SPC judge who studied at the University of Vermont, who published an article in the Vermont Journal of Environmental Law article on a case that was designated one of the ten top mining rights typical cases.

So it seems that the Implementing the 4th Plenum of 19th Party Congress Opinions will be further implementing the provisions in the responsibility system for publicizing knowledge about law (普法) of “whoever enforces the law, explains the law” for both specialist and popularization purposes. In a later blogpost, I’ll explore the provisions in the pufajiaoyu 普法教育 responsibility system relating to judicial interpretations and judicial transparency.

Supreme People’s Court’s New Vision for the Chinese courts

Screenshot 2020-05-02 at 6.35.07 PM
Publicity related to the document analyzed below

The month of April saw the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issue many judicial policy documents, consistent with the commitment made in January 2020 to Party leadership to better serve the Party and state.

To the outside observer, a document issued on 1 April appears to signal the way that the Chinese judicial system will develop in the post-19th Chinese Communist Party (Party) Congress Fourth Plenum New Era.  The document is entitled Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Thoroughly Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 19th Party Congress to Advance the Modernization of the Judicial System and Judicial Capacity (最高人民法院关于人民法院贯彻落实党的十九届四中全会精神推进审判体系和审判能力现代化的意见) (Implementing the 4th Plenum of 19th Party Congress Opinions). It implements “Implementing Opinions on Comprehensively Deepening Reform in the Political-Legal Field” (the text of this January 2019 document 关于政法领域全面深化改革的实施意见 has not been issued publicly) and “The Fifth Five-Year Reform Outline of the People’s Court (2019-2023) and obviously, the Decision of the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress (4th Plenum Decision). The fact that the first document has not been issued publicly means that outside observers can identify its implications only through summaries in the press and implementing documents. The Party’s regulations on transparency (explained here) do not cover documents of this sort.

The Implementing the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress Opinion is a framework document in which the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) identifies principles and goals for the Chinese judicial system and judicial capacity after the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Congress. This blogpost will identify some of them and their link to the 4th Plenum, with related comments in italics. I expect that the SPC will issue specific judicial policy documents and judicial interpretations, as appropriate, to implement specific measures.

New Era Governance

The document needs to be seen as part of the larger picture for China’s governance set out in the 4th Plenum Decision.  Section 1 states that  “modernization of the judicial system and judicial capacity is an important part of the modernization of the national governance system and governance capability” and is needed, among other matters, to provide judicial services and guarantees for societal and economic development. One aspect of the importance of its judicial services is the fact that there were 28 million cases in the Chinese courts in 2018, most of them civil and commercial.

Political correctness

Several sections relate to political correctness.  This is linked to the clear requirement in the 4th Plenum Decision,  under the topic “perfecting the comprehensive leadership of the Party  (健全党的全面领导制度.)”  The 4th Plenum Decision also requires implementing the ideological responsibility system integrating socialist core values into law and social governance. This document, therefore, contains corresponding provisions.

Party leadership

Consistent with last year’s National People’s Congress report and other documents, this document states that the most important goal is to uphold and implement the Party’s absolute leadership of the courts and persist in putting the Party’s political construction first. It restates tasks for the courts, some of which were earlier flagged on this blog:

  • effectively implementing the Party’s leadership in all areas and aspects of the work of the people’s courts and ensuring the independent and fair exercise of judicial power under the leadership of the Party.  Related language is found in the 4th Plenum Decision. This requirement is found in the latest judicial reform plan and elsewhere, including judicial training (as discussed here);
  • Improve the system for implementing major decisions of the Party Center (完善党中央重大决策落实机制) (found in the 4th Plenum Decision and documents thereafter);
  • strictly implementing the [Party] system of reporting and seeking approval for major matters [also known as requests for instructions](严格落实重大事项请示报告制度)(the Party regulations on reporting and seeking approval for major matters) (mentioned here);
  • strengthening improvements from political inspection (see my blogpost on the inspection of the SPC) and judicial inspection (强化政治巡视和司法巡查整改) (discussed in my forthcoming article) (related content found in the 4th Plenum Decision. Judicial inspection is an old institution repurposed in the new era);
  • implementing the Party’s reporting and inspection system (督察落实情况报告制度, mentioned in the 4th Plenum report and thereafter).

As mentioned in a recent blogpost, this means implementing Party principles concerning the appointment of personnel, particularly those in a leadership position. These trends are linked to broader policies related to civil servants (this recent academic paper by Holly Snape has good insights).

Socialist Core Values and the Ideological Responsibility System

Section 5 focuses on socialist core values and the ideological responsibility system, both of which the 4th Plenum Decision stressed.

  • On the ideological responsibility system, this (authoritative) article (the author was then at the Party’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau), unfortunately behind the publisher’s high paywall), sets forth an authoritative explanation of this concept in Xi Jinping New Era Governance that some of us need. The author defines the ideological responsibility system as follows:  it “is part of the political reforms and aimed at maintaining and improving the loyalty of the Bureaucracy, as well as maintaining their ideological unification…Under the current Xi administration, the CCP wants its cadres to be politically reliable, professional and competent, morally self-regulated, and preferably trusted by the people…
  • Resolutely prevent and oppose the eroding influence of Western mistaken thinking (坚决防范抵制西方错误思潮侵蚀影响).  This phrase has evolved from the one used several years ago and mentioned on this blog: “resolutely opposing erosion by the mistaken Western rule of law viewpoint” (坚决抵制西方错误法治观点侵蚀).  Related language appears in the 4th Plenum Decision: have a clear-cut stand opposing various types of erroneous views (旗帜鲜明反对和抵制各种错误观点 ). This observer surmises that this phrase appeared in the 2019 Party document mentioned above. This does not create obstacles to Chinese judges continuing to consider useful “Western” legal concepts and mechanisms and the SPC continuing to have exchanges and cooperation projects with major “Western” jurisdictions.
  • Implement socialist core values in the work of the courts. This has multiple aspects and continues an ongoing theme, including in judicial interpretations–see my 2018 blogpost). Some high-level conferences organized by the Case Research Institute of the National Judicial College have been on the subject of promoting socialist core values through cases.

Practically oriented

The more practically oriented sections (4, 6-8) reveal priority areas of SPC leadership concern. Those particularly relate to economic development, social stability, judicial reform, and technological upgrading, all topics found in the 4th Plenum Decision., while the section on public health emergency management relates to Party decisions and Xi Jinping speeches during the Covid pandemic.

These sections mention short, medium, and long-term areas of concern and development.

Section 4 of the document lists some of the priority matters relating to economic development facing the SPC and the lower courts, many of them mentioned in this year’s judicial interpretation list or recently announced judicial reforms. A curated version (translation is modified Google translate):

  •  Improve risk monitoring and the early warning mechanism in financial trials,  properly hearing financial disputes, and actively preventing and resolving financial risks (therefore we have seen the establishment of the Shanghai Financial Court and specialized financial tribunals in certain major cities. More detailed observations on this will come in the future);
  • fully implement the environmental public interest litigation system, improve the environmental remediation system, improve the environmental protection injunction system, improve the jurisdiction provisions in environmental cases. (The 4th Plenum Decision had a section on environmental protection and a July 2019 press conference linked to the fifth anniversary of SPC’s Environmental and Natural Resources Division mentioned these measures.)
  • Use evaluation indicators such as “enforcing contracts” and “handling bankruptcy”,  to improve trial management, mechanism, quality, and efficiency to create a stable, fair, transparent, and predictable legal business environment. (This is linked again to the 4th Plenum Decision and China’s ranking on the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business scorecard).
  • Intensify the review of the legality of administrative actions, strengthen the substantive resolution of administrative disputes (also linked to the strengthening of administration by law in the 4th Plenum Decision, therefore also on the 2020 judicial interpretation agenda).
  • Strengthen the judicial protection of property rights. See earlier blogposts on this.
  • Formulate judicial interpretations for cases of infringement of trade secrets, and continuously improve the level of judicial protection of intellectual property rights (IPR). (Improving trade secrets protection is mentioned in the 4th Plenum Decision. Also see Mark Cohen’s recent blogpost on this).
  • Formulate judicial interpretations of punitive damages for intellectual property rights, promote the establishment of a tort damages compensation system that reflects the market value of IPR (IPR is stressed in the 4th Plenum Decision and punitive damages in IPR cases is mentioned. Also see Mark Cohen’s blog on this.  This also relates to evidentiary issues in IPR cases).
  • Mediation and diversified dispute resolution (including giving non-litigation methods of dispute resolution priority, improving the separation of disputes and the creation of one-stop dispute resolution and litigation service that is efficient and low cost) is mentioned in this document as well.  It is unclear what this means for the development of a commercial mediation system in China.  Local courts have been working on better cooperation with institutions that can mediate specialized disputes, such as the Shanghai Financial Court’s arrangements with the Shanghai Stock Exchange and other institutions. The provisions here derive from language in the 4th Plenum Decision on improving an effective system in the new situation for the correct handling of internal contradictions among the people (完善正确处理新形势下人民内部矛盾有效机制) as well as the Fengqiao Experience. Xi Jinping has mentioned the Fengqiao Experience since 2013, if not earlier. The phrase about internal contradictions appears to derive from the 1959 Mao essay, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People.
  • Promote capacity building for foreign-related commercial and maritime trials, equally protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign parties in accordance with law, improve the diversified dispute resolution mechanism for international commercial disputes, serve the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” and the construction of free trade pilot zones and free trade ports ( The 4th Plenum Decision promotes a high-quality Belt & Road Initiative, so these measures implement the 4th Plenum Decision. Also, see my earlier blogpost on this.  To better improve diversified dispute resolution in cross-border cases, China needs to work on institutional arrangements enabling it to ratify the Singapore Mediation Convention. Those are many and complex, as I had a chance to learn in December, 2019. One matter that would assist foreign parties litigating in the Chinese courts (and Chinese parties litigating outside of China) would be for China to accede to the Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents.  The SPC’s new evidence rules reduce the scope of documents that a foreign litigant (or domestic litigant providing foreign evidence) must notarize and legalize, but it is a troublesome and expensive process.
  • Improve the adjudication mechanism involving Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, build a centralized and professional trial system, explore and improve the diversified settlement mechanism for [civil/commercial] disputes involving Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. (The centralized system seems to be analogous to foreign-related cases. The intent is to have more competent judges consider these. Another issue is parallel proceedings in these cross-border cases. These issues deserve further analysis.)
  • Deepen the international judicial exchange and cooperation mechanism, participate in the reform of the global governance system and formulate rules of international law, and contribute more Chinese wisdom to the maintenance of the multilateral trading system and the international rule of law. (See my earlier blogpost on this).

Public health emergency management

Section 6 relates to the role of the courts in the public health emergency management system, in the short and long terms.  It mentions the courts providing judicial services to the joint prevention and control system, preventing mass events, and group prevention and control (群防群治工作机制, an old system to which Xi Jinping has given new meaning during the pandemic. That section mentions shorter-term issues, such as punishing the manufacturing and sale of fakes during the pandemic and longer-term issues, such as the courts being involved in improving the legal system in the area of public health.

Judicial Reform

Section 7 highlights some of the tasks in the current judicial reform plan. Those include:

  • Deepening the judicial responsibility system, for judges hearing cases solely or in a collegial panel, the members of a judicial committee, and the supervision of judicial power.  As mentioned on this blog several times, judges are concerned about the scope of the judicial responsibility system, and recent cases that have appeared in the Chinese press would only amplify those concerns. I have more on this in a forthcoming book chapter.
  • Improving the disciplinary mechanism for judges. The forthcoming book chapter is on this. The SPC is working on related regulations.
  • Promoting the improvement of the policies relating to the selection of judges level by level. The controls on the number of “quota judges,” judges with the title of “judge,” in many courts, means that some number of qualified personnel have become judges assistants. It has created a fair amount of frustration.  Another issue is that the new policies mean it takes longer for judges to be promoted, but at the moment, most judges need to retire at 60, so that the pool of judges eligible to be promoted eventually to the SPC will shrink. We can expect related policies issued in the medium term.
  • Improving the working mechanism of the circuit courts and promote the Supreme People’s Court’s Intellectual Property Court (SPCIPC) and the China International Commercial Court (CICC). Promote the strengthening of the organization system of intellectual property courts, and improve the specialized trial system so that it complies with the principles for the judicial protection of IPR. (It is understood that the circuit courts are hearing most SPC cases.  But it still leaves unanswered what the role of the SPC in hearing cases is.  Should it best focus on considering a smaller number of cases more thoroughly, as other supreme courts do? The SPCIPC and CICC both have captured SPC leadership attention (and the attention of the outside world). It is clear that the SPC has provided much more support to the SPCIPC than the CICC (most obviously the SPCIPC operates full time, while the CICC does not). China’s IPR enforcement system is a topic of worldwide concern (the Phase 1 Trade Agreement and the United States Trade Representative Office’s recent 301 Report both evidence this), so it is likely that this means the SPC leadership will focus more on intellectual property issues.
  • Deeply promote the reform of the trial-centered criminal justice system (this is a continuation of reforms initiated in the previous round of judicial reforms).  This topic requires a separate analysis, to consider the impact of the National Supervision Commission, among other issues.
  • Improve and deepen the judicial transparency mechanism including promoting the transparency of judgment documents, court hearings, trial process information, and execution information. See my earlier blogpost and Mark Cohen’s more recent one on his concerns in the area of intellectual property law.  Professor He Haibo has done important empirical work on judicial transparency.

Technology

Section 8 relates to technology and implementing the courts’ five-year plan on informatization (人民法院信息化建设五年发展规划).  It mentions promoting AI, big data, cloud computing, blockchain, and 5G. Litigants should know that the SPC is promoting online case filing, litigation, mediation, judicial blockchain, and the mobile micro-court.  A reality check is needed for China’s online litigation publicity.  One is provided by a popular Wechat article published last month “A month of online court hearings, judges and lawyers have all gone crazy” 云庭审上线一个月,法官律师都疯了Technology is an important area of SPC leadership concern, as it sees it as an area in which China can take the lead.

Take-aways?

What is the impact of this vision and program for the Chinese courts, for litigants (in China or elsewhere), and for others, including judiciaries in other countries and jurisdictions. Is this a “China model” for courts, as raised by some? It does not appear to be so, but rather an outline for the courts to be conveyed within China, rooted in the Chinese political, cultural, and social environment of 2020, which will change along with Party priorities and events.  Some aspects described above are common to judiciaries around the world, such as the trend towards greater online justice.  Will it deliver the results it promises?

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Many thanks to certain anonymous readers for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this blogpost. They are not responsible for any errors or “erroneous views.”

Controlling Judicial Headcount in the New Era

Screenshot 2020-03-19 at 4.32.02 PMIn the middle of March 2020, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Party Group convened a meeting (pictured above) to discuss the topic of “strengthen the awareness of the system, maintain the authority of the system, make stricter the management of the system, build a tougher court team, and work hard to build a model organization on which the Party Center can rely and that satisfies the masses (强化制度意识,维护制度权威,严格制度管理,打造过硬法院队伍,努力建设让党中央放心、让人民群众满意的模范机关).  Part of this phrase appeared in several of my blogposts in the past year (not surprisingly), and also can be seen across used by other Party and state institutions in 2019 (not surprisingly).  Although the discussion at the meeting centered around two topics–judicial headcount (bianzhi 编制) and selecting leaders (领导干部选拔任用, nomenklatura)–this short blogpost will focus on judicial headcount (bianzhi).

Chinese law, unlike legislation in many countries (see German legislation, for example), does not state clearly how many judges are on its highest court. It is also unclear how many persons work in the operational divisions of the SPC (the ones that decide cases) vs. the administrative (general, 综合部门) of the SPC.  As I wrote in an earlier blogpost, it is unclear how many judges in the SPC have been “borrowed” from the lower courts.  And as I wrote earlier about the SPC judicial committee, it appears that likely that the Central Staffing Commission regulates the number of persons who can be SPC vice presidents. I surmised that Justices Hu Yunteng, Liu Guixiang, Pei Xianding, and He Xiaorong were given the title of  “专委“ (full-time members of the judicial committee) to give them a bureaucratic rank equivalent to being an SPC vice president, with attendant privileges. The bianzhi system supplies the reason.

The bianzhi system provides insights into the thinking of the Chinese political leadership about how it views legal institutions, including the courts. It appears to treat the SPC as just another Party/state institution whose functions, internal institutions, and personnel the Party must set (the jargon in Chinese is the “three sets”(“三定”)(职能配置、内设机构和人员编制). It also shows the bureaucratic nature (官本位) of the SPC.  The bianzhi system illustrates that the SPC has a different role in the Chinese political system from the supreme courts of other major jurisdictions. This discussion and other ongoing discussions within the SPC on its “three sets” plan illustrates how the Party is reshaping legal institutions in the New Era. The Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) has already been reshaped. This is part of the post-18th Party Congress (and 19th Party Congress) reshaping of Party and state institutions, to ensure the correct implementation of Party leadership.

The bianzhi system

The bianzhi system is a system for creating and eliminating Party/government/state-owned enterprise/institutional posts by identifying the necessary functions the system needs to fulfill. Those in the SPC are part of the government (政务) civil service/Party/government) system.  The bianzhi system is administered by the Central Staffing Commission. The Central Staffing Commission has an office (常设办事机构) that administers staffing matters, and it, in turn, is administered by the Party’s Organization Department.  Those whose posts are within the bianzhi system have civil service benefits and are said to “eat imperial grain.” (More scholarship on the bianzhi system can be found here and here). I should mention, however, that since 1982 the bianzhi system has given those in the political-legal institutions special status and special (专项) bianzhi. In 2015, the Central Staffing Commission issued a document on reforming the treatment of political-legal staff, including judges, which I mentioned in my 2019 article on transparency.

As to why the SPC Party Group discussed bianzhi in March, 2020, it is linked to new regulations on bianzhi work issued by the political leadership in August, 2019 (中国共产党机构编制工作条例) and apparently ongoing work on reshaping the internal institutions of the SPC, linked to those new regulations. (For those interested in cross-straits comparisons, please see analogous legislation from Taiwan.

In 2018, the SPC and the Central Staffing Commission issued regulations on the bianzhi of the lower courts, and some of the same principles in those regulations can be expected to applied when the SPC draws up its own “three-set” plan.  Those regulations were intended to control the number of internal institutions within a court, allocate more personnel to operational divisions, and standardize the functions and titles of internal institutions across provinces and nationally.  From my informal discussions with leaders in some busy local courts, they say that relying on bianzhi staff does not give them enough personnel to run their court, and contract staff are needed.

The principles for bianzhi work, as highlighted in the 2019 regulations are: 1) Upholding Party leadership over bianzhi work, the Party shall exercise centralized and unified leadership over bianzhi work, upholding and protecting General Secretary Xi Jinping as the core…( 坚持党管机构编制。坚持党对机构编制工作的集中统一领导,坚决维护习近平总书记党中央的核心); high quality in coordination with efficiency; the binding nature (like steel) of bianzhi (坚持机构编制刚性约束); and bianzhi must be slim and healthy.

The press report only vaguely hints on what the reshaping of the SPC will look like. President Zhou Qiang mentions a “trial centered” internal institutional model and personnel model, strengthening internal responsibility and operational matters, to ensure that the people’s courts can fulfill the demands of their responsibilities according to law.  Whether this means that more headcount will be allocated to the operational divisions of the SPC rather than the General Office and other administrative offices is unclear.  Whether it means that some of the smaller divisions of the SPC will shrink further is unclear. And whether it means that fewer people will be “borrowed,” I have my grave doubts.

Another unknown is whether the SPC’s “three sets” plan will be made available to the general public.  My guess is no (some approved plans are posted on the Central Staffing Commission’s website), but we are likely to see President Zhou Qiang issue a press release or discuss it at a news conference, as Chief Procurator Zhang Jun did last year, but not for some time.

A fundamental question not raised by the reports, but perhaps was in the minds of the participants in the meeting, is whether the bianzhi system, implementing the above principles, is consistent with some of the  SPC’s policy goals. One that comes to mind is being able to accommodate changes in where personnel is needed–a policy of rigidly enforcing bianzhi restrictions would be unhelpful.  After all, SPC leaders need to be “problem-oriented” (坚持问题导向), that is address relevant practical issues facing the court system as well as being politically correct, so that may mean that headcount needs to shift among divisions from time to time.

 

Supreme People’s Court updates its Belt & Road policies

Screen Shot 2019-12-29 at 9.15.50 PMAt a press conference on 27 December (2019) the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) #4 Civil Division (the division focusing on cross-border commercial issues) announced it had issued three documents: a judicial interpretation and two judicial policy documents. The documents are connected directly or indirectly to the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and improving China’s foreign investment environment.

  1. Interpretation on Several Issues Regarding the Application of the “People’s Republic of China Foreign Investment Law” (FIL Interpretation) (最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国外商投资法〉若干问题的解释);
  2. Opinion on providing services and guarantees for the Belt & Road (BRI Opinion #2) (关于人民法院进一步为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的意见); and
  3. Opinion on providing services and guarantees for Construction of the Lingang area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone (Lingang FTZ Opinion) (关于人民法院为中国(上海)自由贸易试验区临港新片区建设提供司法服务和保障的意见).

The two Opinions update two of the SPC’s two major policy documents on cross-border issues: the 2015 Opinion on Providing Services and Guarantees for the Belt & Road (BRI Opinion, and Opinion on Providing Guarantees for the Building of Pilot Free Trade Zones (FTZ Opinion). Policy documents do not have the force of law. They are examples of how the SPC supports the Party and government by issuing documents to support important strategies or initiatives (serving the greater situation (服务大局). In the New Era, the SPC has issued over dozen policy documents that provide “judicial services and guarantees” for major government strategies or initiatives, many more than before.  These Opinions are intended to harmonize the two earlier policy documents with post 19th Party Congress developments and priorities, including those mentioned in the Fourth Plenum Decision. I had previously reviewed the two earlier documents in detail.  My analysis of the Pilot FTZ Opinion can be found here and I have previously written and spoken about the BRI Opinion.  This blogpost draws on correspondence I had recently with Professor Vivienne Bathof the University of Sydney, but I am solely responsible for the views expressed here.  This blogpost discusses BRI Opinion #2.

2.  Belt & Road Opinion #2

This document is longer than the other two put together and has much more substantive and political content. Comments on the first section will focus on the political issues, while comments on the rest of the document will discuss the other content in the document:

  • political signaling on discrete issues;
  • judicial policy changes;
  • signaling to various audiences;
  • instructions and guidance to the lower courts;
  • highlighting future possible changes to SPC positions on legal issues;
  • promoting or supporting certain government initiatives within the courts;
  • reiterating basic policies.

New requirements and tasks (Section 1)

In keeping with post 19th Party Congress trends and the spirit of the 2019 Political-Legal  Work conference, BRI Opinion #2 has more politically oriented content and references than the 2015 BRI Opinion. As it must be harmonized with the latest Party and government policy, it includes the latest judicial policy jargon, such as “improving the business environment” and “creating an international, law-based and convenient business environment with stability, fairness, transparency, and predictability.”

The first section includes a long paragraph on working principles. For the casual reader, the principles are an odd hotpot of political, substantive, procedural, and administrative matters but in keeping with its role in the document. It is all about political signaling. To the person unfamiliar with these documents, it gives the reader the impression that if she put her chopsticks in one place in the hotpot, she would pull up support for international arbitration and if in another, support for constructing litigation service centers.

Policy changes and signaling (section 2)

This section contains seven apparently unconnected provisions. They are linked by their political and practical importance: judicial cooperation in criminal law; protecting the right of domestic and cross-border parties; supporting multilateralism; supporting the development of international logistics; supporting opening up in the financial sector; supporting the development of information technology, intellectual property, and green development. This section is a combination of signaling to the political authorities and the lower courts.

One notable provision is on judicial cooperation in the area of criminal law. Article 4 mentions the Beijing Initiative for the Clean Silk Road, and zero tolerance for corruption.  Doing something about cross-border corruption offenses is not a matter primarily of the SPC, as this analysis notes and has greater implications for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This provision calls for the people’s courts to work with the judicial organs of other countries and regions along the “Belt and Road” to build jointly a judicial anti-terrorism mechanism, and curb the spreading of terrorism.  The link to the SPC is that we can anticipate that some staff from the SPC would be involved in negotiating regional or bilateral arrangements relevant to anti-terrorism (along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Security Ministry). In an indirect way, it illustrates how the SPC works with other Party and government departments on legal issues, one of the distinctive functions of the SPC that rarely receives much attention.

On signaling to the lower courts, in addition to the section on financial cases, discussed in the previous blogpost, Article 6 is a reminder to the lower courts to apply the relevant rules of determining contract validity and liabilities in civil and commercial cases involving free trade agreements or cooperation documents signed between China and other countries. In any case, it is their obligation in applying relevant law.  Perhaps the SPC has issued the reminder because lower courts have failed to do too often.

Although Article 11 (on environmental protection) has received attention from a prominent environmental lawyer who saw the inclusion of cross-border environmental public interest litigation in the Opinion as ground-breaking, knowledgeable persons suggested it is a merely a reminder to local courts that they can take such cases provided current legal requirements are met, such as jurisdiction over the defendant, location of the pollution, and the social organization meeting specified requirements.

Specific policy (Section 3)

Section 3 contains signals on changes to specific judicial policies, reminders to the lower courts and also political signals, including highlighting SPC accomplishments. Article 13 signals to the lower courts some new policy on contract interpretation. It addresses situations that commonly arise when one party alleges fraud or collusion to avoid contract liability. The SPC reminds lower courts that evidence should be reviewed carefully, and the evidentiary standard should be beyond a reasonable doubt(根据排除合理怀疑的证据规则严格认定欺诈、恶意串通).  Article 13 directs courts to apply foreign law if the choice of foreign law would uphold contract validity.

This section has quite a few reminders to the lower courts to do what they should already be doing, such as: actively applying international conventions applicable to China; respecting international practices and international commercial rules; fully respecting parties’ governing law choice and explaining how they determined it; taking a restrictive approach towards declaring contracts invalid. Governing law is a sore spot in certain maritime matters, where the Chinese courts in a number of cases have set aside parties’ choice of law for a failure to have an actual connection.

Extending the influence of Chinese law abroad is a policy that received new impetus in the November, 2019 Decision of the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Central Committee, and therefore it is found in Article 20 and again in Article 21 (in the following section).  Linked to this is language on increasing the prestige of the Chinese courts and the China International Commercial Court in particular. The language echoes and extends the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee and BRI #1 Opinion, by calling on the people’s courts to extend the influence of Chinese law, publish typical cases tried by Chinese courts in multiple languages, lay a solid foundation for courts and arbitration institutions to correctly understand and apply Chinese laws, and strengthen the understanding and trust of international businesses of Chinese law. From the fact that the SPC envisions Chinese courts as having a role in assisting foreign courts and arbitration institutions to “correctly understand and apply Chinese law” shows that the SPC has a distinctive understanding of the role of a court.

On related accomplishments, one relates to typical cases in foreign languages and the other to the creation of the foreign law ascertainment platform. In 2019, the SPC published typical cases on cross-border issues in English, by publishing a pair of books on China Foreign-Related Commercial Cases and Maritime Cases (in China). It has also published a book of Chinese cases translated into English through Springer. On foreign law ascertainment, the accomplishment is the SPC having established a bilingual foreign law ascertainment platform, that assembles in one platform the available resources for ascertaining foreign law and a number of cases that involve ascertaining foreign law. There has been discussion in China as to whether courts should take such an active role in ascertaining foreign law, but the SPC has made a policy decision that it should.

International Commercial Court and One-Stop Dispute Resolution (Sections 4 and 5)

The BRI Opinion #2 contains several provisions related to the China International Commercial Court (CICC), with some mention of its expert committee.  Article 23 mentions working with international commercial courts outside of China to establish various types of exchanges and cooperation, including training judges. It is unclear whether this a reference to increasing cooperation under the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts or other future initiatives.

These two sections also signals to the lower courts policy changes and policies to be stressed. One policy to be noted is implementing the policy of mediating first (贯彻调解优先原则), which is already incorporated into the CICC rules.  Some of the difficulties in mediating cross-border disputes involving state-owned enterprises were discussed in this earlier blogpost and at the workshop on implementing the Singapore Mediation Convention that I attended in December (2019).

Some new developments underway are mentioned in this section, linking to the central government’s policy of supporting Hong Kong’s role as an international dispute resolution center. Article 34 calls for support for increased cooperation with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre and other Hong Kong-based arbitration institutions, and appropriately involving Hong Kong-based institutions in CICC’s one-stop model. Article 35 mentions supporting offshore arbitration institutions being able to hear cases in China. (a development underway in recent months).

An important practical issue is raised in Article 31, which mentions improving the mechanism of coordinating cross-border bankruptcy (insolvency), and exploring (探索) applying the systems of the principal bankruptcy procedures and the center of the debtor’s main interests. This is likely linked to domestic development of bankruptcy law and the recognition that with BRI and thousands of Chinese companies investing abroad, some number will (or have) gone into bankruptcy (insolvency) proceedings. “Improving” and “exploring” mean that they are on the agenda of the SPC. It appears that the first related development occurred in Hong Kong in January 2020, when Judge Jonathan Harris granted recognition and assistance to mainland liquidators of CEFC (description of the case and link to judgment found here).  He concluded his judgment by stating” the extent to which greater assistance should be provided to Mainland administrators in the future will have to be decided on a case by case basis and the development of recognition is likely to be influenced by the extent to which the court is satisfied that the Mainland, like Hong Kong, promotes a unitary approach to transnational insolvencies.”

As I discussed in a recent blogpost and earlier, the SPC is seeking to use the CICC and its decisions (judgments/rulings) to guide the lower courts and to pilot reforms that are replicable (a Chinese judicial reform concept), as stated in Article 22 and 25: “the role of cases in determining rules and guiding behavior…and the role of the CICC in providing models and guidance shall be developed.  (发挥国际商事法庭示范引领作用…发挥好案例的规则确定 和行为指引作用).

Article 24 concerns presumptive reciprocity and mentions gradually promote reciprocity between commercial courts. This may signal that the judicial interpretation on enforcement of foreign court judgments is further delayed and that the SPC is taking a gradual approach by working towards mutual recognition and enforcement of international commercial court judgments, which would involve a smaller group of foreign judgments.

Themes that are not new in this section include supporting parties’ right to choose an appropriate dispute resolution forum.  It can be imagined that the #4 Civil Division judges considered that this basic principle needed repeating. Another ongoing theme, with more political coloration, is encouraging BRI dispute resolution, including investor-state dispute resolution to be heard in China. This is mentioned explicitly in Article 28, which lists measures “so that more international commercial disputes can be efficiently resolved in China.”  This is not new, but is part of a push that this blog noted as early as 2016, to move the locus of China-related dispute resolution from London and other centers in Europe (or elsewhere) to China, where Chinese parties will encounter a more familiar dispute resolution system.

Article 32 mentions investment dispute resolution, and supporting “relevant departments in improving international investment dispute resolution mechanisms and organizations, respecting the dispute resolution clauses in bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, and resolving international investment disputes in a fair and efficient manner.”  This appears to be an acknowledgment that the SPC is in discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions on dealing with difficult issues related to enforcing international investment dispute arbitration awards in China (discussed here).

Personnel & Institutional Matters

The concluding section includes a notice in Article 37 to the lower courts that they shall “strengthen and improve the mechanism of coordination and guidance, and step up communication and cooperation with the relevant entities and departments.” This is a theme seen in many of the opinions issued by the SPC and reflects one of the many functions of the Chinese courts.

As discussed in the preceding blogpost, references in Article 38 and 39 to exchanges and training send signals within the SPC and its institutions, as well as lower courts about the types of programs that may be promoted, permitted or explored. It is likely that the National Judges College, its provincial branches, and its partners will continue to train foreign judges, as has expanded greatly in recent years. It appears that there could be greater possibilities for Chinese judges to go on exchange with other countries than has been possible in recent years. From my own contacts and experience with It may also provide the basis for a local court or division of the SPC to apply for funding to hold a legal roundtable or host an international exchange.

Concluding remarks

This Opinion is typical of New Era SPC policy documents providing guarantees and support for specific Party and government strategies and initiatives.  For a reader from outside the Chinese government system (体制), it takes knowledge of a constellation of related policies and practices to decode. This blogpost has been able to identify some of them.

BRI Opinion #2 has a great deal of content, not all discussed in this blogpost. Some have practical importance for practitioners in China and elsewhere.  But a larger question to consider, that likely was not in minds of the drafters, is whether this type of policy-oriented document is useful in reassuring foreign governments, foreign state-owned companies, and commercial entities that their dispute is best heard in China?  From my discussions with practitioners in various parts of the world, they may not be aware that BRI Opinion #2 even exists.