In September, 2019, this blog reported that Central Inspection Group (CIG) #4 would inspect the work of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Party Group for approximately two months. On 10 January 2020, Chinese media reported on CIG #4’s feedback to the SPC’s Party group. The summary and brief analysis below is based on the press release published in state media, rather than the full report given to the SPC. Palpably better judicial transparency does not include Party documents of this nature. This process signals to the world outside of China that the SPC has a different role in the Chinese political system from the supreme courts of other major jurisdictions.
Chen Xi, Politburo Member, head of the Organization Department, and deputy head of the Leading Small Group on Central Inspections chaired the meeting. In the audience was: the head of the CIG #4 Group and its leader; members of the supervision office ( 监督检查室) of the CCDI/National Supervision Commission, leaders from relevant bureaus of the Party Organizational Department, leaders from the CCDI/Supervision Commission office stationed at the SPC, leaders of the SPC, and other responsible persons from the SPC. The results and the recommendations of what needs to be improved, as in 2017, were conveyed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The inspection group found that:
the study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s new era of socialist thinking with Chinese characteristics are not deep enough, the implementation of the Party’s line, direction, and policies and the Party’s central decision-making and deployment were not satisfactory. There is insufficient focus on Party political construction; the strengthening of political ideology and professional ethics of the cadre team (加强干部队伍思想政治和职业道德建设还不够到位) is not satisfactory; it insufficiently fulfills the duties and mission of the state’s highest judicial organ (履行国家最高审判机关职责使命还不够). The requirements of “justice for the people and fair justice” have not fully penetrated the entire court work process. In every aspect, the trial management system and the supervision mechanism for the operation of judicial power are incomplete (各方面，审判管理体制和审判权力运行监督机制还不够健全完善). The strict implementation of the Party’s main responsibilities has not been put in place in a comprehensive manner, and minor problems are ignored; there are still problems with violations of the spirit of the Central Eight Point Regulations. There are still gaps in implementing the Party’s organizational policies for the New Era; leadership building and cadre construction are not in place. Party-building work of the institution and at the basic level is weak. Issues identified in the last inspection have not been corrected and corrective mechanisms are not in place.
In 2017, the CIG found: “four consciousnesses” need to be further strengthened; political discipline and political rules are not implemented strictly enough; the leadership role of the Party group is insufficiently developed; there are some gaps in the coordination of the advancement of the system of judicial system reform; the implementation of responsibility system for ideological attitude (意识形态责任制落实不够有力); there are weak links in Party construction; organizational construction is not systematic enough; internal Party political life is not strict enough; relevance of ideological-political work is not strong; some Party leading cadres’ Party thinking is diluted (有的党员领导干部党的观念淡漠); the role of the basic level Party organization as a fighting fortress is insufficient; comprehensive strict governance of the Party is not strong, the implementation of the central eight-point regulations is not strict enough; formalism and bureaucratic issues still exist; tourism using public funds, abuse of allowances and subsidies still occurs; personnel selection is not standardized; cadre management is not strict enough; there are some areas of clean government risk.
This report revealed that some information involving leaders had been referred to the CCDI/National Supervision Commission, Party’s Organization Department, and other departments for further handling. The 2017 report contained similar language as well.
Chen Xi made demands of Zhou Qiang and other members of the SPC Party leadership. Among those is to implement the Party’s absolute leadership over the work of the courts, strengthen its “service and guarantees” to the work of the Party and state (see my 2019 article on one aspect), and implement judicial reforms. One of the demands he made with significant practical significance (flagged by a Wechat account popular among judges) is for measures for SPC judges (and likely lower court judges as well) that further restrict the employment of judges who have resigned and stricter conflict of interest rules for relatives of judges who are lawyers. [It is unclear whether these future measures will slow the resignation of SPC (or lower court) judges.]
He called upon the Party Group to raise their political position (提高政治站位) and arm their brains with Xi Jinping New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics thinking (用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想武装头脑–a current slogan, for those not aware of recent developments).
For the outside observer, handicapped by a limited ability to decode Party jargon, the summary of the feedback raises many questions but also provides insights.
Although the feedback appears to be devastating criticism of the SPC, a quick comparison to CIG feedback to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Justice indicates that the language (at least in the press reports) is standard for CIG feedback to Party and state institutions. It thus provides insights into the thinking of the political leadership about how it views the law and legal institutions, including the courts. It appears to treat the SPC as just another Party/state institution to be inspected.
Part of current Party policy seeks to bolster domestic and international confidence in the SPC and the lower courts. At the same time, this press release describes the SPC as insufficiently fulfilling the duties and mission of the state’s highest judicial organ, and that some of its operations are inadequate. No specific examples are provided. What are the qualifications of the CIG members to make this decision and what type of evaluation mechanism have they used? What will be the impact of this feedback within the institution, within the Chinese legal community, and on the views of people in and outside of China towards the SPC?
The feedback also reveals continuing concern about Party building, political ideology, the Party thinking of senior SPC personnel, and implementation of Party policy. It can be seen from my recent blogpost that SPC leaders seek to craft their policies, actions, initiatives, and other decisions to hit the target of being politically correct (post 19th Party Congress and post 4th Plenum) while being “problem-oriented” (坚持问题导向) that is, addressing relevant practical issues facing the court system. The practical issues facing the court system are primarily civil disputes. We do not have overall statistics for the number of cases in the Chinese courts in 2019, but if the Shenzhen courts are any indication, the number of cases they accepted increased by 24%, with most of the cases being civil or commercial disputes. That means a substantial part of the work of the SPC must be directed towards creating a framework for dispute resolution in which domestic (and international) civil and commercial litigants can have greater trust.
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