Judge Xi Xiaoming and his vanishing assets

Although Chinese judicial reforms include establishing a trial-centered judicial system that provides better protection for human rights (including property rights), under Party disciplinary regulations senior Party officials (such as former Supreme People’s Court Vice President Xi Xiaoming, subject of an earlier blogpost),  often have property confiscated or other property punishments imposed at the conclusion of Party disciplinary proceedings. This means that confiscation of assets occurs before an official’s case is transferred to the procuracy and heard by the courts.  According to the official statement on the disposition of Judge Xi’s case:

(He) was ordered to make restitution of certain amounts that were in violation of discipline;the issues related to his suspected crimes and related amounts are transferred to the judicial organs for handing.责令退赔违纪款;将其涉嫌犯罪问题及涉款物移送司法机关依法处理.

The wording  is similar to official statements issued in relation to other senior officials investigated by the CCDI and the same language is to be found in reports on the dispositions of local Communist Party disciplinary investigations.

Han Jinping, director-general of the CCDI’s case coordination department and a former judge in the #2 criminal division of the Supreme People’s Court, provided more details on the CCDI’s authority to impose property punishments in a July, 2015 interview she gave to Chinese Central Television.

(A 2014 profile of Ms. Han reveals that she was involved in guiding some of the lower courts in recent high profile corruption cases and has been involved in some of the thinking behind China’s initiatives to pursue corrupt officials abroad).

She mentioned that more than half of the assets recovered since the beginning of the anti-corruption campaign have been confiscated by the CCDI itself (RMB 20.1 billion) and handed over to the national treasury, while 18.6 billion has been recovered through the formal legal system.  Ms. Han explained that according to applicable rules (set out below), CCDI is authorized to:

  • confiscate assets (没收);
  • recover assets(追缴);
  • order restitution (责令退赔)

relating to violations of Party and government rules and orders.

She noted the following rules guide their authority:

Related to the rules she cited are additional regulations issued by the General Offices of the Central Committee and the State Council on the handling of money and property management in criminal cases earlier this year, focused on coordination between departments (and less explicitly with CCDI).

Assets of officials determined by CCDI to have violated Party rules are confiscated in closed proceedings (subject to Party Committee approval at the relevant level), but the handling of the property must be in accordance with the above procedures. The official under investigation does not have access to counsel, and there does not seem to be a procedure by which a third party can oppose the property punishments imposed by CCDI. ( 2014 regulations of the Supreme People’s Court, by contrast, give third parties that right when property punishments are imposed in criminal proceedings.) For the family members, friends, and associates of an official subject to CCDI proceedings, it appears that any recourse they have is very limited.  A good proportion of the assets recovered in the current anti-corruption campaign have been recovered by skirting the procedural protections of the persons involved under the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law.  It appears to be a modern day version of the traditional legal system’s punishment of officials.

(Please use the comment function if there are errors in the above analysis.)





Educating Chinese judges for new challenges

National Judges' College

National Judges’ College

Buried in the depths of documents issued in the course of this year are the outlines of the way the Supreme People’s Court (Court) intends to create a corps of judges in which litigants, domestic and foreign, have faith will provide justice.  The many measures set out in the 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan raise the competency bar for judges.  A more litigious and rights conscious public, the increasingly complex economy and greater number of cross-border transactions and interaction, as well as smaller number of judges to hear more cases means that judicial training is an important part of of preparing Chinese judges for the new normal.

The broad outlines of the Court’s plans for judicial training are set out in the following documents:

  • the Court’s latest 5 Year Training Plan, for 2015-2019, issued in June, the framework document;
  • the September 17, 2015 Communist Party Central Committee/State Council document on the open economy, calling for improving foreign-related competence in the judiciary; and
  • the September 25 White House press release, in which the  United States and China commit to conduct high-level and expert discussions commencing in early 2016 to provide a forum to support and exchange views on judicial reform and identify and evaluate the challenges and strategies in implementing the rule of law.

The training plan

The training plan is linked to the 4th Plenum and 4th Five Year Judicial Reform Plan Outline, the Communist Party Central Committee’s five year training plan for Party cadres (as stated in the plan itself, which means that judges are treated as a type of Party cadre), the Court’s regulations on judicial training,  as well the Court’s 2013 policy document on creating a new judicial team (队伍) in the new situation. Team (or work team) derives from “classical” Party terminology (as Stanley Lubman highlighted in an article last year)).

The Training Plan stresses ideological, ethical, and professional training, for judges and other judicial personnel.  Ideological education is required to be a part of the required training described below, so that judges will comply with Party discipline (a modern day counterpart to Confucian cultivation of virtue) and oppose the osmosis of mistaken Western values (抵制西方错误思想观点的渗透).

Who’s being trained

The focus of the training is:

  • Court leadership, particularly at the basic level. The training plan requires senior personnel of lower level courts to participate in training organized by the the Court and higher people’s courts, with newly appointed basic level and intermediate court management to participate in training session within their first year in office, and higher people’s courts to organize training for at least 20% of lower court senior management annually;
  • Front-line judges, particularly those in the basic level courts:  continuing legal education, with a minimum of 10 days a year,  and in the 2016-2018 period, a new training program is to be implemented, including the heads of people’s tribunals (branches of basic level courts dealing with minor disputes). Training materials are to be compiled by the Court.  The second aspect of the training program is to pilot a  judicial training program (apparently drawing from the practice in Taiwan and Japan) for new judges in designated areas for judicial reforms (as highlighted in point 50 of the judicial reform plan).
  • Professionally outstanding judges: the Court is to continue its program of cooperating with certain universities and research institutes to provide master’s and doctoral training (the Chinese University of Political Science and Law seems to be one of the Court’s partners); the National Judges College is to run training programs for outstanding young/middle aged judges for a minimum of one month.  Additionally, a corps of outstanding judicial trainers at the provincial level is to be created.  The September, 2015 measures to improve foreign-related competence in the judiciary are likely linked to this, as are some of the programmatic outcomes from the US-China initiative on judicial reforms.
  • Judges bilingual in Mongolian, Tibetan, Uygur, Kazakh, Korean, Yi and Zhuang.  This target was mentioned  in the Fourth Plenum and Fourth Five Year Judicial Reform Plan, and is linked to an arrangement by the State Ethnic Affairs Commission, Organizational Department of the Communist Party Central Committee, and the Supreme People’s Court to train 1500 bilingual judges by 2020.  This will also involve more and higher quality translation of legal materials into local languages. Press reports from Uighur and Tibetan areas, for example, describe civil litigants who do not understand Mandarin and find the justice system inaccessible for resolving business disputes, as well as criminal defendants who are unable to understand criminal proceedings, such as a Tibetan who did not understand what a “suspended death sentence” was.  In Xinjiang, for example, only 40% of judges described themselves as bilingual.

How training will be implemented

Judicial training is to focus on active and practical methods, including the case method (no less than 30%), moot courts, and other interactive methods.  The intellectual influence of exchange and training programs with offshore counterparts is apparent from the more interactive methods required.  Previous training programs (often funded by foreign NGOs) have enabled judges from the Supreme People’s Court and other Chinese courts to receive training in China with noted international experts while others have received training outside of (mainland) China.  Will this continue under the new normal?

The language of architecture of the courts, mainland China and Hong Kong


Supreme People’s Court building, Beijing


#1 Circuit Court building, Shenzhen

jinan court

Jinan Intermediate Court building

I had the opportunity to visit the Supreme People’s Court #1 Circuit Court in Shenzhen recently (thank you to all involved for arranging the visit, about which I will discuss further in another post).  The visit, recent events in China and a recent article in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post (by my friend and former student, Simon Ng, of the University of Hong Kong)  on the newly renovated Court of Final Appeal building in Hong Kong (over one hundred years old, and one of the first purpose-built British court buildings in Asia) got me to thinking about the language of architecture, in particular the steel gates around Chinese courts. The #1 Circuit Court, as all Chinese courts I have visited or seen, has steel gates surrounding it and police protection.

Among the reasons for the steel gates is incidents such as the one detailed in this article in the English language version of Caixin.  A factory worker in the city of Shiyan, Hubei Province attacked four judges, angry about the outcome of his case against his employer.  This case is not exceptional–in a 2010 case, reported here, three judges were killed and several others injured in Hunan province, by a man disgruntled by the property settlement in his divorce case. Professor Bi Yuqian of  the Chinese University of Political Science and Law commented on the Shiyan case: “The public authority of judges has not yet been founded in China… It is not shocking that a judge is stabbed in China.”

For that reason, the Fourth Plenum Decision sets as a goal: raise judicial credibility…strive to have the people feel fairness and justice in every judicial case.”

The architecture of modern Chinese courts borrows some elements from the traditional architecture of a yamen, while the language of the architecture of the courts of Hong Kong  is very different.yamen


Court of Final Appeal building

Simon Ng recently published the following comments about the Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal Building, “It is an icon of Hong Kong’s judicial independence, which has been practised for over a century and is preserved under the solemn pledge of “one country, two systems”.

The blindfolded Themis standing right above the royal coat of arms is a visual reiteration of the centuries-old ideal of rule of law that even the sovereign must be subject to the law and reason. The administration of justice under the dome has to live up to that spirit.

Over the years, the architecture has helped to shape public understanding and expectations of the legal system. Fairness and impartiality, as symbolised by Themis, are the legal values that people treasure most.

With the reoccupation by the Court of Final Appeal, the building will continue to convey the meaning of rule of law across time through its language of architecture, the practice of judicial independence, and the upholding of justice and equality.”

The language of architecture conveys the status of the judiciary at this time and public expectations of the  legal system.  We can only hope that some day, the steel gates surrounding Chinese courts will be unneeded.

(©Court of Final Appeal building, SCMP; Jinan, Getty images; SPC, BBC)

Official interference or leadership?

Interference in cases forbidden!(©Xu Jun, Xinhua)

In late August, the Supreme People’s Court (Court) issued a pair of regulations, aimed at reducing the phenomenon of officials, within and outside a court, involving themselves in cases.

Translations of the regulations are available, thanks to Chinalawtranslate.com: (the Chinese originals are available on the Court’s website here and there):

  • Implementing Measures for People’s Courts Carrying Out the ‘Provisions on Recording, Reporting and Pursuing Responsibility of Leading Cadres Interfering with Judicial Activities or Tampering with the Handling of Specific Cases (Leading Cadres Measures); and
  • Implementing Measures On Pursuing Responsibility In Cases Of Internal Judicial Personnel Prying Into Cases (Judicial Prying Measures).

This blogpost takes a quick look at the first one.

What do the Leading Cadre Measures say?

The Leading Cadre Measures (which implement State Council/Central Committee (General Office) regulations issued in March are directed at officials outside the judiciary who seek to influence court decisions, and require judges (who are other subject to penalties for not doing so) to  record all communications relating specific cases made by entities and individuals other than those in courts, and retain the relevant materials. These Measures implement language in the 4th Plenum Decision (Establish a system for recording, reporting, and investigating the responsibility of instances wherein leading cadres interfere in judicial activities or get involved in the handling of certain cases.)  The reports are to be submitted to the local political legal committee (or next higher political legal committee, depending on the status of the offending individual) and the next highest court, generally on a quarterly basis. If the conduct is serious, and might cause unjust, false and wrongfully decided cases or other “serious consequences,” the court is directed to report immediately.

Article 7 of the Leading Cadre Measures lists some of the most frequently used techniques, many of which have a economic, rather than political motivation:

The Leading Cadre Measures place the views of certain organizations in a different category:

“Party and government organs, professional associations, social public interest organizations and public institutions with administrative functions in accordance with law retained or permitted by people’s courts to follow the working procedures to submit consultative opinions in cases of national interest or societal public interest, may be not entered into information archive on prying, but relevant materials shall stored in the case file for future reference.”

Professor He Haibo of Tsinghua University explains what this means:

the courts must accept these materials, and it gives those organizations a chance to participate and speak; placing the materials in the case file gives the other party as well as possibly the public an opportunity to understand and evaluate them. This is consistent with the requirements of due process…

Will documents issued by Political Legal Committees at various levels really be placed in case files and made accessible to lawyers?

How do officials and judges interact?

The patterns of behavior that these regulations are aimed at changing are long-standing. From Doing Business in China, a leading book for practitioners (chapter by Harry Liu, Meg Utterback, Yu Simin):

Informally, judges are occasionally given instructions by political leaders on individual cases. Intervention by Party leaders in individual cases remains acceptable…The forms of interference vary: sometimes oral instructions are given, or sometimes the instructions are incorporated into official documents, with a requirement that the judge report back on the outcome. As to the content, the instructions may (1) tell courts to emphasize a case or handle a particular case “according to law,” (2) express an opinion on certain aspects of the case, or (3), recommend certain action to the court in lieu of dictating the outcome.

Professor He Haibo of Tsinghua University School of Law, writing in the People’s Court Daily–the line between “coordination in accordance with law” and interference with judicial activities is very hard to draw (什么是“统筹协调依法处理”、什么是“干预司法活动”,界限似乎难以划得清清楚楚)。

Comments from an unscientific sampling of judges

  • How the regulations work out in practice will depend to a large extend on how the officials undue intervention recorded will affect their future career or have legal liability.  If yes, the leaders will refrain from intervening. It will also depend on whether the judges would suffer from recording the intervention, particularly if he institutions are not administratively or financially independent from the agencies the officials represent or are able to influence.  In the latter case, judges wold be reluctant to record the intervention. It is likely that court leaders will interfere less frequently and with less success.
  • It will be of some help, when the interference is from strangers. But if from old friends, direct leaders, those won’t be reported, because it would betray the relationship.

More autonomy under Party leadership

The Leading Cadre Measures are not a magic bullet that will change the way the Chinese courts operate. The intent is to reduce the involvement of local officials in court cases to achieve fairer outcomes, while maintaining central policy leadership (and recognizing current reality by having a framework for Party officials to provide their views “for consideration”).

How well will the Measures work during the transitional period that the local judiciary remains under the control of local authorities? And how should the line be drawn between interference, leadership, and coordination?

A model case?

In late August, the Jinhua Intermediate Court (Zhejiang province) used the March regulations to call the attention of the press (and higher authorities) to a local official who threatened a judge with physical harm, when local courts ruled against the official’s wife in a shareholding dispute, although the case led one Zhejiang University law professor to comment that it wasn’t typical of official interference. According to the latest reports, the Jinhua Intermediate Court has withdrawn the notice, and both the judge and official in question are being investigated by the relevant CCDI organization.  A local Jinhua lawyer was quoted as saying that the local court staff had erred in making the matter public at this point.

The Jinhua case, while perhaps not a typical interference case, is typical of the widespread lack of civility confronting Chinese judges (and doctors), that in too many cases means a threat to their physical safety, and could indicate how difficult it will be to actually implement the Leading Cadre Measures.

Supreme People’s Court and its normative documents

Court reply

Court reply

This blogpost discusses some of the documents that the Supreme People’s Court (Court) issues and what they mean, particularly to foreign legal professionals who may encounter them in practice. They reflect the bureaucratic way the Court operate (about which I (and others) have written). It is not a complete list, but a description of some of the ones I’ve written about on this blog.

The 4th Five Year Plan anticipates some reform in this area: “improve the Supreme People’s Court’s methods of trial guidance, increase the standardization, timeliness, focus and efficacy of judicial interpretations and other measures of trial guidance.”

Terminology–Some of these are described on the Court website as judicial documents (司法文件) or judicial normative documents (司法规范性文件).  They are not cited in judgments or rulings (unlike judicial interpretations), but judgments or rulings should be consistent with them. There do not seem to be clear rules on which of these documents should be made public.  Some of those documents include:

  1. Opinions (意见), issued by the Court and other institutions not authorized to issue judicial interpretations.

 Example:  Opinion on Handling Criminal Cases of Domestic Violence in Accordance with Law (Supreme People’s Court,(Law Release (2015) No. 4), The Supreme People’s Procuratorate, The Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice), discussed here, with normative provisions (instructions to the lower courts–“please implement conscientiously”).

2.  Opinions (意见), issued by the Court, but setting out judicial policy.

Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court on Fully Strengthening Environmental Resources Trial Work to Provide Powerful Judicial Safeguards for Promoting Eco-civilization Construction (最高人民法院关于全面加强环境资源审判工作 为推进生态文明建设提供有力司法保障的意见) and Opinions on Providing Judicial Services and Safeguards for the Building of One Belt One Road by People’s Courts” (关于人民法院为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的若干意见) (Instructions to the lower courts– “the following guiding opinion is set out”).

These may require further implementing regulations but judgments should be consistent with these opinions.

3. Conference summaries often address new issues or areas of law in which the law is not settled.  Conference summaries are not required to be made public, although with the internet and social media, they are now more widely available than in the early 1990’s, when I first wrote about them.

Example–the 2015  one on drugs (全国法院毒品犯罪审判工作座谈会纪要). (instructions to the lower courts-please implement this as reference, combined with the actual situation of trial work, if in implementation problems are encountered, please report in a timely manner to this Court) 请结合审判工作实际参照执行。执行中遇到问题,请及时报告我院)

4. Replies (请示复函).  Arbitration lawyers see these in published replies to the lower courts, such as those done under the Court’s reporting system relating to judgments/rulings concerning foreign-related and foreign arbitral awards.The response is binding on the lower court regarding the particular case.  The Court publishes these replies (and the report from the lower courts) in its periodical China Trial Guide: Guide on Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial, from which the following example is taken:

Example: This 2012 response to a report from the Hubei Higher People’s Court: SPC reply to Hubei High Court.

In the area of arbitration practice, the principles set out in these responses are persuasive, but not binding in later cases, and arbitration lawyers discuss these responses as a particular form of case law, such as this law firm client alert.

Replies (批复).  These are seen in requests for lower courts for approval of certain matters, such as having basic level courts hear foreign-related cases, based on relevant law and judicial interpretations.

Example, a 2013 reply by the Court to a request from the Anhui Higher People’s Court.  These are binding on the lower courts.

5. Decision (决定).  These are seen when the Court issues documents setting out an administrative approval.

Example: a 2015 decision designating certain courts as model courts for diversified approaches to dispute resolution, mentioned here.

Supreme People’s Court regulates private (shadow) lending


private lending

On August 6, the Supreme People’s Court issued its long-awaiting judicial interpretation on private (shadow) lending.  Its provisions are applicable to P2P funding platforms and other lenders not under the jurisdiction of the financial regulators. My article in The Diplomat summarizes the judicial interpretation and its significance.

Updated musings on Supreme People’s Court Vice President Xi Xiaoming

Vice President Xi XiaomingThis updated blogpost muses on Judge Xi Xiaoming, and:

  • phenomena of “assumption of guilt” and trial in the press
  • political factors in Chinese judicial decision-making;
  •  judicial corruption;
  •  implications for related parties;
  •  investigation-centered criminal justice system
  •  effect on lower court judges;
  • the intellectual legacy of Judge Xi;
  •  effect on the credibility of the judicial system.

The comments below are made with no further information about Judge Xi’s case than what is publicly available.

The background

In the late afternoon of 12 July, Xinhua news issued a statement reporting that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced that Supreme People’s Court (Court) Vice President Xi Xiaoming, was under investigation for violation of Party discipline and law.  Judge Xi has worked in the Court for over thirty years and is well known for his expertise in civil and commercial law. The announcement caused shockwaves in the Chinese legal community. Chinese press reports have linked the allegations to a case involving a 420 million RMB dispute over shareholding in a Shanxi coal mine, but the allegations have not been confirmed by the CCDI.

On 20 August, Meng Jianzhu, head of the Central Political Legal Committee, made the following statement about Judge Xi: “Xi Xiaoming has shamed the judiciary, as a experienced judge who has worked in the Supreme People’s Court for 33 years, who has colluded with certain  illegal lawyers, judicial brokers, and lawless business people by accepting huge bribes. “作为在最高法院工作33年的老法官,奚晓明却同个别违法律师、司法掮客、不法商人相互勾结,收受巨额贿赂,这是司法界的耻辱。”

 “Presumption of guilt” and trial in the press

Judge Xi is under investigation by the CCDI and it has not yet been reported that the procuracy has yet filed a case against him.  It does not seem that the lawyers involved in the Shanxi case have been prosecuted or penalized for illegal activity.  Meng Jianzhu’s statement evidences two phenomenon in Chinese criminal justice–the presumption of guilt and “trying” suspects in the press

As Zhu Zhengfu, the vice-chairman of the All China Lawyers Association warned earlier this year, there is a widespread and dangerous “presumption of guilt” among mainland law enforcers.”  Zhu proposed a law be enacted to fully protect each citizen’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

“An arrest is made on one day, then the next day you have the suspect confessing on television, and some are forced to confess,” Zhu said.

“After the confession, [law enforcers] immediately say the case has been solved and they celebrate their achievement. So you can imagine how much pressure the court is under if it wants to pass an innocent verdict.”

As Si Wejiang of the Debund Law Firm pointed out, CCTV often declares a person guilty even before the procuracy has approved his arrest and does not give his defense lawyer a chance to speak.

Complex politics of large commercial disputes in China

In private comments, several senior Chinese lawyers and other Chinese legal experts have suggested that Judge Xi’s case is not a simple case of corruption, but is tied to more complex political factors.
As two DLA Piper lawyers commented in a Practical Law publication, “large commercial disputes between Chinese parties are usually settled with the help of political influence and/or commercial pressure, with the rule of law methods such as litigation and arbitration either not used at all or used as a bargaining tool.”

They further noted that in recent years “there has been a return to non-rule of law methods of settlement, particularly in relation to disputes involving over CNY100 million.”

The senior lawyers noted that judges hearing cases involving politically powerful litigants (called interest groups in Chinese political jargon) may be under pressure to decide the cases in particular way (as further described in the next section). As time goes on, the litigants may not be as politically powerful as before, and the judgment (and the judges who made decisions) may be called into question.

Corruption in the courts

The corruption allegations are said to be connected to the Shanxi case, reported in further detail in the Caxin report.  But the corruption allegations may be more complicated than they appear.  As several  academic studies have noted, judicial corruption in China has several root causes related to the nature of the judicial system.  In her 2014 book,  The Judicial System and Reform in Post-Mao China, Li Yuwen, Professor of Chinese Law at Erasmus University stated:

First, the lack of judicial independence leaves room for corruption.In practice, when a case is brought to court or assigned to a judge, court officials or the responsible judge are often contacted by various people–the most influential ones are those with government positions….In addition, the lack of recognition of the nature of the judiciary to enforce law fairly and efficiently also results in a puzzling perception of courts and judges….

Secondly, judicial corruption cannot be divorced from its social context…It is unrealistic to expect judges to operate completely outside the social environment, especially in the absence of a workable system to reduce the incidence of judicial corruption….

Thirdly, certain shortcomings of the court system leave the door open for corruption. For instance, the flexible use of the re-trial system leads to the easy re-opening of cases if influential people wish to interfere in the case. This not only diminishes the finality of the case but also creates opportunities for using personal networking to change a court’s judgment. Furthermore, the relatively law judicial salary makes judges an easy target for corruption…In modern-day China, a profession’s income is too often linked to the profession’s social status. Judges’ low salaries are not conducive to building self-respect amongst the profession and, moreover, they constitute a major ground for fostering judicial corruption.

So returning to the social context of 2011. A number of Chinese lawyers and academics have privately noted that at the time of the case in question, it would not be unusual for supplemental payments to be made to Court judges in connection with commercial disputes involving large amounts of money, and refusing payment could also have been awkward for those involved.  Whether this was in fact the case for Judge Xi is not known.

Implications for related parties

It is likely that the anti-corruption investigation into Judge Xi will touch on parties, including other judges, related to the case(s) in question.  It is also likely that the full extent of the investigation will not be made public.

Investigation-centered criminal justice system

Judge Xi is now experiencing the Chinese investigation-centered criminal justice system, in which Party members are generally subject to shuanggui, where they are subject to long periods of interrogation outside the formal criminal justice system, followed by repeated interrogations if and when the case is transferred to the procuracy. His case is part of the current anti-corruption campaign.

As Professor Fu Hualing of the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong has written:

The anti-corruption campaign is also a highly politicized process. Investigations are selective, politically motivated, and aim to achieve particular political consequences….

Xi’s campaign further shifts power from legal institutions to the Party’s disciplinary mechanism. Compared with anti-corruption work under the previous government, the current campaign more decisively bypasses legal procedures and institutions. After a brief moment in which law seemed to be able to play a central role in the anti-corruption process, legal institutions have been effectively marginalized to the role of initiating anticorruption
purges of ‘tigers’. There is no longer any meaningful discussion
on the end goals and limits of shuanggui, the Party’s power to detain its own delinquent members and little mention of the creation of a more neutral anti-corruption body.

Effect on other judges?

What will be the effect of Judge Xi’s case on judges in the lower courts, who may not want to find themselves involved in local parallels of his case? Will it lead to further departures of experienced judges?

The intellectual legacy of Judge Xi

Judge Xi has been a major force in the area of civil and commercial law, involved in many major legal developments in China over the past thirty years. He has been involved the drafting of major judicial interpretations, edited many books, and been involved in other major legal initiatives, including, most recently, the drafting of the Civil Code and the establishment of an environmental law research center affiliated with the Court.  The many technical legal reforms in which he has been involved are crucial to the operation of the Chinese judicial system. The initiatives in which he has been involved are likely to go on with other talented people, but he is sure to be missed.

Effect on the credibility of the judicial system

Improving the credibility of the Chinese judicial system is said one of the goals of the Chinese judicial reforms.  We will need to wait and see how Judge Xi’s case progresses, and how both official and unofficial commentators, as well as members of the Chinese public and international community view his case.