Supreme People’s Court wields the Criminal Law “Big Stick” in the Anti-Coronavirus Battle

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Press conference at the Central-Political Legal Commission announcing the Opinions

As this blog has often commented, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) must serve the greater situation and deal with practical legal issues, so that the SPC itself and its senior leadership are correct, politically and professionally. One of those ways is by providing properly calibrated guidance to subordinates at the SPC, the lower courts and other related authorities that provide appropriate political signals.  Some guidance is politically more important than others. In recent days (early February 2020), the SPC has done so through the following documents:

This blogpost will give a quick introduction to the first document.  Its importance can be seen from the photo above, of the press conference at the Central Political-Legal Commission on 10 February, at which the Punishing Crimes and Violations of Obstruction Opinions was released and explained to select members of the press. That document was issued with the participation of the Commission on Comprehensive Governance of the Country by Law (Comprehensive Governance Commission, further explained here), Party Central Political-Legal Committee, SPC, Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Fu Zhenghua, Minister of Justice and deputy head of the Comprehensive Governance Commission spoke first. Representatives from the other institutions also spoke.

The National Health Commission, SPC, SPP, and MPS issued the second document.

Both of them guide those in the criminal justice system to properly wield the “Big Stick” of the criminal law (and related administrative offenses) in the anti-coronavirus battle. The first document sends signals to the political leadership that the political-legal institutions are doing their part to fulfill the objectives that General Secretary Xi Jinping set in his 3 February speech

It is necessary to maintain a high-pressure situation, severely crackdown on illegal and criminal activities that disrupt social order, such as using the epidemic to drive up prices, hoarding, and looting, and severely crack down on the production and sale of counterfeit drugs, medical equipment, and medical and health materials. It is necessary to pay close attention to and resolve promptly all kinds of emerging problems, and to prevent all kinds of contradictions from overlapping and forming a chain reaction. (要保持严打高压态势,依法严厉打击利用疫情哄抬物价、囤积居奇、趁火打劫等扰乱社会秩序的违法犯罪行为,严厉打击制售假劣药品、医疗器械、医用卫生材料等违法犯罪行为。对各种苗头性问题,要密切关注、及时化解,严防各类矛盾交织叠加、形成连锁反应。)

What these documents are

The Punishing Crimes and Violations of Obstruction Opinions and the Ensuring Positive Medical Order are intended to provide guidance on certain violations of the criminal law and other related administrative offenses.  They do not create new legal rules but signal to the lower criminal justice institutions how the relevant criminal (and public security administration penalty) laws should be applied in the politically sensitive anti-coronavirus battle.  As a technical matter, both documents are classified as judicial document/judicial regulatory documents /judicial normative documents/judicial policy documents (司法文件, 司法规范性文件, 司法指导性文件, 司法正常性文件)(which I have written about previously).

As I have mentioned before, the SPC editors of a collection of those documents commented that “although judicial guidance documents are not judicial interpretations and cannot be cited in a court judgment document as the basis of a judgment, it is generally recognized that they have an important guiding impact on the trial and enforcement work of the courts at every level.” Titles included in the collection include “Opinions” (意见), “Decisions” (决定), Summaries” (纪要), “Notifications” (通知) Speeches (讲话), etc..

Some local high courts are starting to issue complimentary local guidance, with more detailed provisions, with the Jiangsu Higher People’s Court one of the early movers.

Section 1

The document is divided into several sections.  The first one, analogous to the opinion I analyzed recently, gives the political background, calling for the raising of the readers’ political stance, the strengthening of their “four consciousnesses,” the upholding of “four self-confidences,” and the implementation of the spirit of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important instructions and Party central policies and arrangements.

Section 2

The second section of the Punishing Crimes and Violations of Obstruction Opinions (which appears to have been primarily drafted by the SPC, judging by the document reference 法发〔2020〕7号, indicating it is from the SPC), is the substantive part of the document. It is further divided into 10 subsections, nine of which describes a particular type of crime that is to be strictly punished according to law. They include:

  • crimes of resisting epidemic prevention and control measures; violence against medical personnel,
  • making or selling fake protective goods, supplies, or medicines;
  • fabricating or spreading rumors etc.

The first nine subsections describe one or more illegal acts that may occur. One example is subsection three, on the production or sale of shoddy prevention and protection goods or supplies or the production or sale of fake or shoddy medicines used in preventing the coronavirus. The Opinions state that where the requirements of the Criminal Law are met, the act should be punished as the crimes of production and sale of shoddy goods or medicines.  So it is giving prosecutors and judges a steer on how the Criminal Law should be applied but does not in itself create new law.

Subsection 10 gives guidance on how the law is to be applied. If the acts listed in subsections 1-9 do not constitute a crime (based on existing criteria), the public security authorities are to impose public security administrative punishments under the Public Security Administration Penalties Law.  The Opinions point to the following provisions:

false information disrupting public order; disrupting order at a unit or public venue; provocation; refusing to implement decisions and orders in an emergency; obstructing the performance of public affairs; breaking through police lines or instruments; striking others; intentional harm, insulting others, fraud, illegally digging or gathering gravel near railways, stealing or destroying public facilities near roads, destroying railway facilities and equipment, intentionally destroying property, looting public or property, and so forth; or the relevant departments are to give administrative punishments.

Importantly, when crimes or violations of the Public Security Administration Penalties Law occur during the period of epidemic prevention and control, it should be considered as an aggravating factor )(for punishment purposes). The stated purpose is to deter bad conduct  “to lawfully embody the requirements of the crackdown policy, to forcefully punish and deter violations and crimes, to preserve the authority of the law, to preserve social order, and to preserve the security of the people’s lives and their physical health.”

For those in the criminal justice charged with enforcing these provisions, they need to refer to relevant judicial interpretations and other guidance (or in the case of public security officials, their regulations and other relevant documents)–the Opinions do not set out the elements of the relevant crimes.

Since this document was issued, some of the professional Wechat accounts on criminal law issues have published authoritative commentary pointing out practical problems with the legislation (law and judicial interpretations). The deputy head of the SPP’s research office published this (on the crime of obstructing contagious disease efforts), while a local procurator (nationally recognized) wrote this on several of the crimes (including refusal to comply with quarantine or leaving quarantine without permission). Judges and prosecutors (procurators) are concerned about making “mistakes,” as the responsibility system imposes expansive responsibility (described by two judges as “the sword of Damocles” over judges’ heads).

Section 3

The third section relates to the relationship among the institutions involved, principles to be followed and gives apparently mixed signals which need to be understood together.

  • Promptly investigate cases;
  • Strengthen communication and coordination;
  • Safeguard procedural rights;
  • Strengthen publicity and education;
  • Emphasize safety in handling cases.

The first is directed to the public security authorities, directing them to promptly investigate cases but also be civil, while the last subsection concerns the personal safety of those in the criminal justice system. The second subsection encourages the criminal justice authorities to communicate and coordinate better but cautions the public security organs to pay attention to the comments and recommendations by the procuratorate. It requires the authorities to focus on public opinion guidance in cases that have caught the attention of the public.  Subsection three is one that contains apparently mixed signals, on the one hand emphasizing that defendants have the right to legal counsel, but at the same time,  all levels of judicial administrative organs should strengthen guidance and oversight of lawyers’ defense representation. The fourth subsection illustrates some ongoing techniques of the Chinese justice system, in using typical/model cases to educate the public and deter them from criminal or illegal behavior, and voluntarily comply with the law and the authorities. The document says explicitly: “the broader public should be guided to obey discipline and law, to not believe and spread rumors, and to lawfully support and cooperate with epidemic control work.”

Supreme People’s Court updates its Belt & Road policies

Screen Shot 2019-12-29 at 9.15.50 PMAt a press conference on 27 December (2019) the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC) #4 Civil Division (the division focusing on cross-border commercial issues) announced it had issued three documents: a judicial interpretation and two judicial policy documents. The documents are connected directly or indirectly to the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and improving China’s foreign investment environment.

  1. Interpretation on Several Issues Regarding the Application of the “People’s Republic of China Foreign Investment Law” (FIL Interpretation) (最高人民法院关于适用〈中华人民共和国外商投资法〉若干问题的解释);
  2. Opinion on providing services and guarantees for the Belt & Road (BRI Opinion #2) (关于人民法院进一步为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的意见); and
  3. Opinion on providing services and guarantees for Construction of the Lingang area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone (Lingang FTZ Opinion) (关于人民法院为中国(上海)自由贸易试验区临港新片区建设提供司法服务和保障的意见).

The two Opinions update two of the SPC’s two major policy documents on cross-border issues: the 2015 Opinion on Providing Services and Guarantees for the Belt & Road (BRI Opinion, and Opinion on Providing Guarantees for the Building of Pilot Free Trade Zones (FTZ Opinion). Policy documents do not have the force of law. They are examples of how the SPC supports the Party and government by issuing documents to support important strategies or initiatives (serving the greater situation (服务大局). In the New Era, the SPC has issued over dozen policy documents that provide “judicial services and guarantees” for major government strategies or initiatives, many more than before.  These Opinions are intended to harmonize the two earlier policy documents with post 19th Party Congress developments and priorities, including those mentioned in the Fourth Plenum Decision. I had previously reviewed the two earlier documents in detail.  My analysis of the Pilot FTZ Opinion can be found here and I have previously written and spoken about the BRI Opinion.  This blogpost draws on correspondence I had recently with Professor Vivienne Bathof the University of Sydney, but I am solely responsible for the views expressed here.  This blogpost discusses BRI Opinion #2.

2.  Belt & Road Opinion #2

This document is longer than the other two put together and has much more substantive and political content. Comments on the first section will focus on the political issues, while comments on the rest of the document will discuss the other content in the document:

  • political signaling on discrete issues;
  • judicial policy changes;
  • signaling to various audiences;
  • instructions and guidance to the lower courts;
  • highlighting future possible changes to SPC positions on legal issues;
  • promoting or supporting certain government initiatives within the courts;
  • reiterating basic policies.

New requirements and tasks (Section 1)

In keeping with post 19th Party Congress trends and the spirit of the 2019 Political-Legal  Work conference, BRI Opinion #2 has more politically oriented content and references than the 2015 BRI Opinion. As it must be harmonized with the latest Party and government policy, it includes the latest judicial policy jargon, such as “improving the business environment” and “creating an international, law-based and convenient business environment with stability, fairness, transparency, and predictability.”

The first section includes a long paragraph on working principles. For the casual reader, the principles are an odd hotpot of political, substantive, procedural, and administrative matters but in keeping with its role in the document. It is all about political signaling. To the person unfamiliar with these documents, it gives the reader the impression that if she put her chopsticks in one place in the hotpot, she would pull up support for international arbitration and if in another, support for constructing litigation service centers.

Policy changes and signaling (section 2)

This section contains seven apparently unconnected provisions. They are linked by their political and practical importance: judicial cooperation in criminal law; protecting the right of domestic and cross-border parties; supporting multilateralism; supporting the development of international logistics; supporting opening up in the financial sector; supporting the development of information technology, intellectual property, and green development. This section is a combination of signaling to the political authorities and the lower courts.

One notable provision is on judicial cooperation in the area of criminal law. Article 4 mentions the Beijing Initiative for the Clean Silk Road, and zero tolerance for corruption.  Doing something about cross-border corruption offenses is not a matter primarily of the SPC, as this analysis notes and has greater implications for state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This provision calls for the people’s courts to work with the judicial organs of other countries and regions along the “Belt and Road” to build jointly a judicial anti-terrorism mechanism, and curb the spreading of terrorism.  The link to the SPC is that we can anticipate that some staff from the SPC would be involved in negotiating regional or bilateral arrangements relevant to anti-terrorism (along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Public Security Ministry). In an indirect way, it illustrates how the SPC works with other Party and government departments on legal issues, one of the distinctive functions of the SPC that rarely receives much attention.

On signaling to the lower courts, in addition to the section on financial cases, discussed in the previous blogpost, Article 6 is a reminder to the lower courts to apply the relevant rules of determining contract validity and liabilities in civil and commercial cases involving free trade agreements or cooperation documents signed between China and other countries. In any case, it is their obligation in applying relevant law.  Perhaps the SPC has issued the reminder because lower courts have failed to do too often.

Although Article 11 (on environmental protection) has received attention from a prominent environmental lawyer who saw the inclusion of cross-border environmental public interest litigation in the Opinion as ground-breaking, knowledgeable persons suggested it is a merely a reminder to local courts that they can take such cases provided current legal requirements are met, such as jurisdiction over the defendant, location of the pollution, and the social organization meeting specified requirements.

Specific policy (Section 3)

Section 3 contains signals on changes to specific judicial policies, reminders to the lower courts and also political signals, including highlighting SPC accomplishments. Article 13 signals to the lower courts some new policy on contract interpretation. It addresses situations that commonly arise when one party alleges fraud or collusion to avoid contract liability. The SPC reminds lower courts that evidence should be reviewed carefully, and the evidentiary standard should be beyond a reasonable doubt(根据排除合理怀疑的证据规则严格认定欺诈、恶意串通).  Article 13 directs courts to apply foreign law if the choice of foreign law would uphold contract validity.

This section has quite a few reminders to the lower courts to do what they should already be doing, such as: actively applying international conventions applicable to China; respecting international practices and international commercial rules; fully respecting parties’ governing law choice and explaining how they determined it; taking a restrictive approach towards declaring contracts invalid. Governing law is a sore spot in certain maritime matters, where the Chinese courts in a number of cases have set aside parties’ choice of law for a failure to have an actual connection.

Extending the influence of Chinese law abroad is a policy that received new impetus in the November, 2019 Decision of the 4th Plenum of the 19th Party Central Committee, and therefore it is found in Article 20 and again in Article 21 (in the following section).  Linked to this is language on increasing the prestige of the Chinese courts and the China International Commercial Court in particular. The language echoes and extends the 4th Plenum of the 18th Party Central Committee and BRI #1 Opinion, by calling on the people’s courts to extend the influence of Chinese law, publish typical cases tried by Chinese courts in multiple languages, lay a solid foundation for courts and arbitration institutions to correctly understand and apply Chinese laws, and strengthen the understanding and trust of international businesses of Chinese law. From the fact that the SPC envisions Chinese courts as having a role in assisting foreign courts and arbitration institutions to “correctly understand and apply Chinese law” shows that the SPC has a distinctive understanding of the role of a court.

On related accomplishments, one relates to typical cases in foreign languages and the other to the creation of the foreign law ascertainment platform. In 2019, the SPC published typical cases on cross-border issues in English, by publishing a pair of books on China Foreign-Related Commercial Cases and Maritime Cases (in China). It has also published a book of Chinese cases translated into English through Springer. On foreign law ascertainment, the accomplishment is the SPC having established a bilingual foreign law ascertainment platform, that assembles in one platform the available resources for ascertaining foreign law and a number of cases that involve ascertaining foreign law. There has been discussion in China as to whether courts should take such an active role in ascertaining foreign law, but the SPC has made a policy decision that it should.

International Commercial Court and One-Stop Dispute Resolution (Sections 4 and 5)

The BRI Opinion #2 contains several provisions related to the China International Commercial Court (CICC), with some mention of its expert committee.  Article 23 mentions working with international commercial courts outside of China to establish various types of exchanges and cooperation, including training judges. It is unclear whether this a reference to increasing cooperation under the Standing International Forum of Commercial Courts or other future initiatives.

These two sections also signals to the lower courts policy changes and policies to be stressed. One policy to be noted is implementing the policy of mediating first (贯彻调解优先原则), which is already incorporated into the CICC rules.  Some of the difficulties in mediating cross-border disputes involving state-owned enterprises were discussed in this earlier blogpost and at the workshop on implementing the Singapore Mediation Convention that I attended in December (2019).

Some new developments underway are mentioned in this section, linking to the central government’s policy of supporting Hong Kong’s role as an international dispute resolution center. Article 34 calls for support for increased cooperation with the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre and other Hong Kong-based arbitration institutions, and appropriately involving Hong Kong-based institutions in CICC’s one-stop model. Article 35 mentions supporting offshore arbitration institutions being able to hear cases in China. (a development underway in recent months).

An important practical issue is raised in Article 31, which mentions improving the mechanism of coordinating cross-border bankruptcy (insolvency), and exploring (探索) applying the systems of the principal bankruptcy procedures and the center of the debtor’s main interests. This is likely linked to domestic development of bankruptcy law and the recognition that with BRI and thousands of Chinese companies investing abroad, some number will (or have) gone into bankruptcy (insolvency) proceedings. “Improving” and “exploring” mean that they are on the agenda of the SPC. It appears that the first related development occurred in Hong Kong in January 2020, when Judge Jonathan Harris granted recognition and assistance to mainland liquidators of CEFC (description of the case and link to judgment found here).  He concluded his judgment by stating” the extent to which greater assistance should be provided to Mainland administrators in the future will have to be decided on a case by case basis and the development of recognition is likely to be influenced by the extent to which the court is satisfied that the Mainland, like Hong Kong, promotes a unitary approach to transnational insolvencies.”

As I discussed in a recent blogpost and earlier, the SPC is seeking to use the CICC and its decisions (judgments/rulings) to guide the lower courts and to pilot reforms that are replicable (a Chinese judicial reform concept), as stated in Article 22 and 25: “the role of cases in determining rules and guiding behavior…and the role of the CICC in providing models and guidance shall be developed.  (发挥国际商事法庭示范引领作用…发挥好案例的规则确定 和行为指引作用).

Article 24 concerns presumptive reciprocity and mentions gradually promote reciprocity between commercial courts. This may signal that the judicial interpretation on enforcement of foreign court judgments is further delayed and that the SPC is taking a gradual approach by working towards mutual recognition and enforcement of international commercial court judgments, which would involve a smaller group of foreign judgments.

Themes that are not new in this section include supporting parties’ right to choose an appropriate dispute resolution forum.  It can be imagined that the #4 Civil Division judges considered that this basic principle needed repeating. Another ongoing theme, with more political coloration, is encouraging BRI dispute resolution, including investor-state dispute resolution to be heard in China. This is mentioned explicitly in Article 28, which lists measures “so that more international commercial disputes can be efficiently resolved in China.”  This is not new, but is part of a push that this blog noted as early as 2016, to move the locus of China-related dispute resolution from London and other centers in Europe (or elsewhere) to China, where Chinese parties will encounter a more familiar dispute resolution system.

Article 32 mentions investment dispute resolution, and supporting “relevant departments in improving international investment dispute resolution mechanisms and organizations, respecting the dispute resolution clauses in bilateral and multilateral investment agreements, and resolving international investment disputes in a fair and efficient manner.”  This appears to be an acknowledgment that the SPC is in discussions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions on dealing with difficult issues related to enforcing international investment dispute arbitration awards in China (discussed here).

Personnel & Institutional Matters

The concluding section includes a notice in Article 37 to the lower courts that they shall “strengthen and improve the mechanism of coordination and guidance, and step up communication and cooperation with the relevant entities and departments.” This is a theme seen in many of the opinions issued by the SPC and reflects one of the many functions of the Chinese courts.

As discussed in the preceding blogpost, references in Article 38 and 39 to exchanges and training send signals within the SPC and its institutions, as well as lower courts about the types of programs that may be promoted, permitted or explored. It is likely that the National Judges College, its provincial branches, and its partners will continue to train foreign judges, as has expanded greatly in recent years. It appears that there could be greater possibilities for Chinese judges to go on exchange with other countries than has been possible in recent years. From my own contacts and experience with It may also provide the basis for a local court or division of the SPC to apply for funding to hold a legal roundtable or host an international exchange.

Concluding remarks

This Opinion is typical of New Era SPC policy documents providing guarantees and support for specific Party and government strategies and initiatives.  For a reader from outside the Chinese government system (体制), it takes knowledge of a constellation of related policies and practices to decode. This blogpost has been able to identify some of them.

BRI Opinion #2 has a great deal of content, not all discussed in this blogpost. Some have practical importance for practitioners in China and elsewhere.  But a larger question to consider, that likely was not in minds of the drafters, is whether this type of policy-oriented document is useful in reassuring foreign governments, foreign state-owned companies, and commercial entities that their dispute is best heard in China?  From my discussions with practitioners in various parts of the world, they may not be aware that BRI Opinion #2 even exists.

 

 

 

 

How are Supreme People’s Court Opinions structured?

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27 December SPC Press conference:from left, Li Guangyu (spokesperson); Justice Luo Dongchuan (vice president); Judge Wang Shumei (head of #4 Civil Division); Gao Xiaoli (deputy head, #4 Civil Division)

When the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issues an “opinion” (意见), it is not issuing a judgment or ruling.  It is issuing a policy document, without the force of law.  In the New Era, the SPC has issued over dozen policy documents that provide “judicial services and guarantees” for major government strategies or initiatives, many more than before. They are examples of how the SPC supports the Party and government by issuing policy documents to support important strategies or initiatives (serving the greater situation (服务大局). What few, if any have written about is the structure of these opinions that support important strategies or initiatives as they relate to civil and commercial law issues. Understanding the structure is key to understanding the documents. Understanding opinions is important for understanding current issues in the courts and the future direction of judicial policy.

This blogpost uses the two opinions announced at the 27 December 2019 press conference pictured above, at which Justice Luo Dongchuan and Judges Wang Shumei and Gao Xiaoli (head and deputy head of the #4 Civil Division) introduced the two opinions (and a judicial interpretation). A subsequent blogpost will highlight what is new in these three documents. All three are connected directly or indirectly to the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) and improving China’s foreign investment environment. The two opinions are:

  1. Opinion on providing services and guarantees for the Belt & Road (2) (BRI Opinion #2) (关于人民法院进一步为“一带一路”建设提供司法服务和保障的意见); and
  2. Opinion on Providing Services and Guarantees for Construction of the Lingang area of the Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone (Lingang FTZ Opinion) (关于人民法院为中国(上海)自由贸易试验区临港新片区建设提供司法服务和保障的意见).

The Opinions update two of the SPC’s two major recent policy documents on cross-border issues: the 2015 Opinion on Providing Services and Guarantees for the Belt & Road (BRI Opinion, and Opinion on Providing Guarantees for the Building of Pilot Free Trade Zones (FTZ Opinion).

The BRI Opinion #2 and Lingang FTZ Opinion are intended to harmonize the two earlier policy documents with post 19th Party Congress developments and priorities, including those mentioned in the  2019 19th Party Central Committee Fourth Plenum Decision. I had previously reviewed the BRI Opinion and FTZ Opinions in detail.  My analysis of the Pilot FTZ Opinion can be found here and I have previously written and spoken about the BRI Opinion.

Lower courts may issue documents that supplement the SPC’s policy documents, as is true with these Opinions.  This is a subject that I have written about on this blog and elsewhere before. The Shanghai Higher People’s Court has already issued a guidance document that provides related services and guarantees, with important content.

The two Opinions also link to three different events or matters–the promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law; the Second Belt & Road Forum for International Cooperation; and Xi Jinping’s visit to Shanghai and establishment of the Lingang Special Area of the Shanghai FTZ.

Structure of these Opinions

The structure of the two opinions is typical for SPC civil and commercial opinions “providing judicial services and guarantees” for major government strategies and initiatives.  Opinions often (but not always) start out with a first section with titles analogous to the section titles of these two Opinions:

I. Comprehensively grasping the new requirements and new tasks in serving the “Belt and Road” Initiative

I. Enhance understanding and get aligned with the mission of offering judicial services and guarantees to the New Area

A sample of the language of the first section is quoted below, from the second paragraph of the BRI Opinion #2:

Keeping committed to the concept of further providing judicial services and
guarantees by the people’s courts for the “Belt and Road” Initiative: The people’s courts shall firmly take the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as the guideline; study and fulfill the spirit of the 19th CPC National Congress and the Second, Third, and Fourth Plenary Sessions of the 19th CPC Central Committee, as well as the essence of the key speech of General Secretary Xi Jinping on the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation; strengthen consciousness of the need to maintain political integrity, think in big-picture terms, follow the leadership core, and keep in alignment…

The purpose of this initial section is two-fold. The first is to notify the lower courts of the political goals, background, and principles of the Opinion. The second to signal to the political-legal hierarchy that the policies that the SPC sets out in the body of the opinion are harmonized with the latest Party/government policies.

There are no hard and fast rules concerning the body of opinions, as analogous sections may occur in different order.  It may depend on the drafters and the topic involved.

The second section of the BRI Opinion has its counterpart in the third section of the Lingang FTZ Opinion:

II. Further performing the role of judicial trials, and serving and guaranteeing the joint construction of the “Belt and Road” with high quality in all aspects

III. Strengthen judicial trial function and maintain an institutional regime in the New Area focusing on investments/trade liberalization

These sections are meant to notify the lower courts about current relevant judicial policy, and implicitly inform them of any changes from previous policy and what the lower courts must do in support of that policy goal. The policies are likely to be linked to current Party/government policy.  From the BRI Opinion #2:

The people’s courts shall support the opening-up policy in the financial sector; the exemplary role (示范作用) of financial courts shall be maximized; eligible courts shall be encouraged to build special trial teams for financial cases; the application of law in foreign-related financial cases shall be further regulated and standardized;…valuable experiences of foreign countries in efficiently hearing financial cases shall be drawn upon…

Article 10, in Section III of the Lingang FTZ Opinion calls for

closer ties and communication mechanisms with the financial regulatory authorities shall be built to facilitate the construction of an integrated and efficient financial management system, in a bid for a better environment for doing business, for prevention of financial risks and for better national financial security.

In support of the opening-up policy in the financial sector, the SPC is promoting the role of financial courts (currently Shanghai, others to follow) in providing new mechanisms or methods in hearing cases or in their operations.  That is visible from the Shanghai Financial Court’s innovations in class actions in the sphere of securities law claims (claims against issuers, underwriters, directors and management, control parties, etc. for false and misleading disclosure upon initial issuance or in periodic reporting).  The Shenzhen intermediate court has established a special trial team for financial cases but not a separate court. From Article 10 of the Lingang FTZ Opinion, it can be anticipated that the Shanghai Financial Court has or will establish special communication channels with the financial regulators.

The titles of the third section of the BRI Opinion #2 is:

III . Further improving the application of law in cases involving the Belt and Road Initiative, and building a stronger rule-based business environment that is governed by law

From BRI Opinion #2:

13. The people’s courts shall vigorously carry forward the contract spirit and the good faith principle, and determine the acts of fraud and malicious collusion based on the rules of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. If, in a civil or commercial case involving the construction, operation, purchasing, or bidding process of a project, there is a discrepancy on contract validity between the laws of the relevant countries, the people’s courts shall apply the law that holds the contract valid without damaging the honest party or benefiting the dishonest one, and promote mutual trust and benefits between the participants in the Belt and Road Initiative.

Each article in the third section of the BRI Opinion #2 focuses on a specific policy that the SPC wants the lower courts to promote.  In article 13, the SPC is seeking to control the tendency of lower courts to find a contract invalid because of allegations of fraud or malicious collusion, likely made by a Chinese litigant seeking to avoid contractual liability.  The Lingang FTZ Opinion does not have an exact counterpart to section III of the BRI Opinion #2, but has articles that focus on specific policies to be promoted, such as “properly handling cross-border bankruptcy cases….”

The title of the final section of BRI Opinion # 2 is:

VI. Further strengthening the organizational structure and team building to coordinate efforts to serve and guarantee the Belt and Road Initiative.

The last section relates to institutional and personnel matters. Take the following paragraph in the BRI Opinion #2 as an example:

39. The role of international exchange and research platforms such as international forums, legal roundtables..shall be further strengthened, and the exchanges and cooperation with the judicial systems of other countries shall be conducted. Training and studying programs for foreign judges shall be supported, and foreign legal service providers and think-tanks for the Initiative shall be invited to China to exchange views with Chinese counterparts so as to promote the formation of a diverse and interactive platform for legal exchanges….

Content in the last paragraph of the Lingang FTZ Opinion has some analogous provisions:

Establish a study training program and talent cultivation mechanism in line with international standards…Efforts shall be made to…(2) further expand international judicial communication channels, organize international judicial forums….

These provisions send signals within the SPC and its institutions, as well as lower courts about the types of programs that may be promoted, permitted or explored.  It is likely that the National Judges College, its provincial branches, and its partners will continue to train foreign judges, as has expanded greatly in recent years.  It appears that there could be greater possibilities for Chinese judges to go on exchange with other countries than has been possible in recent years.   It may also provide the basis for a local court or division of the SPC to apply for funding to hold a legal roundtable or host an international exchange. For the Lingang FTZ Opinion, it gives the Shanghai courts priority in organizing international programs and establishing programs to send outstanding young judges focusing on cross-border commercial issues on educational programs either in China or abroad.

The official report states that the SPC Party Group approved the two Opinions.  It appears from my previous research that pre-19th Party Congress, SPC policy documents did not necessarily require SPC Party Group approval. I surmise since the Party Political-Legal Work Regulations were promulgated in January 2019, it has now become a requirement, because Article 15 requires Party Groups/Committees to be responsible for setting major policies and directions.

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My thanks to a knowledgeable person for triggering my thinking about this and for insightful comments on an earlier draft.

Central Inspection Group gives feedback to the Supreme People’s Court (2020 edition)

Photo of CIG feedback meeting

In September, 2019, this blog reported that Central Inspection Group (CIG) #4 would inspect the work of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Party Group for approximately two months.  On 10 January 2020, Chinese media reported on CIG #4’s feedback to the SPC’s Party group. The summary and brief analysis below is based on the press release published in state media, rather than the full report given to the SPC.  Palpably better judicial transparency does not include Party documents of this nature. This process signals to the world outside of China that the SPC has a different role in the Chinese political system from the supreme courts of other major jurisdictions.

Chen Xi, Politburo Member, head of the Organization Department, and deputy head of the Leading Small Group on Central Inspections chaired the meeting. In the audience was: the head of the CIG #4 Group and its leader; members of the supervision office ( 监督检查室) of the CCDI/National Supervision Commission, leaders from relevant bureaus of the Party Organizational Department, leaders from the CCDI/Supervision Commission office stationed at the SPC, leaders of the SPC, and other responsible persons from the SPC. The results and the recommendations of what needs to be improved, as in 2017, were conveyed to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. The inspection group found that:

the study and implementation of Xi Jinping’s new era of socialist thinking with Chinese characteristics are not deep enough, the implementation of the Party’s line, direction, and policies and the Party’s central decision-making and deployment were not satisfactory.  There is insufficient focus on Party political construction;  the strengthening of political ideology and professional ethics of the cadre team (加强干部队伍思想政治和职业道德建设还不够到位) is not satisfactory; it insufficiently fulfills the duties and mission of the state’s highest judicial organ (履行国家最高审判机关职责使命还不够). The requirements of “justice for the people and fair justice” have not fully penetrated the entire court work process.   In every aspect, the trial management system and the supervision mechanism for the operation of judicial power are incomplete (各方面,审判管理体制和审判权力运行监督机制还不够健全完善). The strict implementation of the Party’s main responsibilities has not been put in place in a comprehensive manner, and minor problems are ignored; there are still problems with violations of the spirit of the Central Eight Point Regulations. There are still gaps in implementing the Party’s organizational policies for the New Era; leadership building and cadre construction are not in place. Party-building work of the institution and at the basic level is weak. Issues identified in the last inspection have not been corrected and corrective mechanisms are not in place.

In 2017, the CIG found: “four consciousnesses” need to be further strengthened; political discipline and political rules are not implemented strictly enough; the leadership role of the Party group is insufficiently developed;  there are some gaps in the coordination of the advancement of the system of judicial system reform; the implementation of responsibility system for ideological attitude (意识形态责任制落实不够有力); there are weak links in Party construction; organizational construction is not systematic enough; internal Party political life is not strict enough; relevance of ideological-political work is not strong; some Party leading cadres’ Party thinking is diluted (有的党员领导干部党的观念淡漠); the role of the basic level Party organization as a fighting fortress is insufficient; comprehensive strict governance of the Party is not strong, the implementation of the central eight-point regulations is not strict enough; formalism and bureaucratic issues still exist; tourism using public funds, abuse of allowances and subsidies still occurs; personnel selection is not standardized; cadre management is not strict enough; there are some areas of clean government risk.

This report revealed that some information involving leaders had been referred to the CCDI/National Supervision Commission, Party’s Organization Department, and other departments for further handling. The 2017 report contained similar language as well.

Chen Xi made demands of Zhou Qiang and other members of the SPC Party leadership. Among those is to implement the Party’s absolute leadership over the work of the courts, strengthen its “service and guarantees” to the work of the Party and state (see my 2019 article on one aspect), and implement judicial reforms. One of the demands he made with significant practical significance (flagged by a Wechat account popular among judges) is for measures for SPC judges (and likely lower court judges as well) that further restrict the employment of judges who have resigned and stricter conflict of interest rules for relatives of judges who are lawyers. [It is unclear whether these future measures will slow the resignation of SPC (or lower court) judges.]

He called upon the Party Group to raise their political position (提高政治站位) and arm their brains with Xi Jinping New Era Socialism with Chinese Characteristics thinking (用习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想武装头脑–a current slogan, for those not aware of recent developments).

Comments

For the outside observer, handicapped by a limited ability to decode Party jargon, the summary of the feedback raises many questions but also provides insights.

Although the feedback appears to be devastating criticism of the SPC, a quick comparison to CIG feedback to the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Justice indicates that the language (at least in the press reports) is standard for CIG feedback to Party and state institutions. It thus provides insights into the thinking of the political leadership about how it views the law and legal institutions, including the courts.  It appears to treat the SPC as just another Party/state institution to be inspected.

Part of current Party policy seeks to bolster domestic and international confidence in the SPC and the lower courts.  At the same time, this press release describes the SPC as insufficiently fulfilling the duties and mission of the state’s highest judicial organ, and that some of its operations are inadequate.  No specific examples are provided. What are the qualifications of the CIG members to make this decision and what type of evaluation mechanism have they used?  What will be the impact of this feedback within the institution, within the Chinese legal community, and on the views of people in and outside of China towards the SPC?

The feedback also reveals continuing concern about Party building, political ideology, the Party thinking of senior SPC personnel, and implementation of Party policy.  It can be seen from my recent blogpost that SPC leaders seek to craft their policies, actions, initiatives, and other decisions to hit the target of being politically correct (post 19th Party Congress and post 4th Plenum) while being “problem-oriented” (坚持问题导向) that is, addressing relevant practical issues facing the court system.  The practical issues facing the court system are primarily civil disputes. We do not have overall statistics for the number of cases in the Chinese courts in 2019, but if the Shenzhen courts are any indication, the number of cases they accepted increased by 24%, with most of the cases being civil or commercial disputes. That means a substantial part of the work of the SPC must be directed towards creating a framework for dispute resolution in which domestic (and international) civil and commercial litigants can have greater trust.

 

The China International Commercial Court & the development of case law with Chinese characteristics

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Article in 30 December edition of People’s Court Daily

On 30 December 2019, I was quoted in an article that appeared in Supreme People’s Court (SPC) media (see the screenshot above).

“中国国际商事法庭的运作时间不长,但从迄今为止的运作中可以清楚看到,其受理案件非常慎重,会选择对中国相关法律发展产生影响的案件。”最高人民法院国际商事专家委员、北京大学国际法学院常驻知名学者Susan Finder表示,从首批案件的裁判文书可以明显看出,中国国际商事法庭的判决和裁定对于下级法院的法官和法律界人士来说,可能是重要的“软先例”,即权威性的裁判。

The CICC has been in operation a short time…What is clear from its operations so far is that it is carefully choosing its cases, only selecting cases that will have an impact on the development of relevant Chinese law. What seems evident from the initial rulings, at least, is that the judgments and rulings of the CICC are likely to be significant for lower court judges and members of the legal community as “soft precedents,” authoritative decisions….

It is an excerpt from a brief article that I am setting out below as I wrote it in English (I have added (Chinalawtranslate.com’s) translation of excerpts from certain documents) and Chinese translation (many thanks to a knowledgeable person who took a break from year-end case closing to do this elegant translation).

I am honored to have this opportunity to comment on some of the first rulings and judgments of the China International Commercial Court (CICC). This brief commentary will address the significance of CICC judgments and rulings and the CICC arbitration-related rulings.

The CICC has been in operation a short time and it is early days to provide a more detailed analysis of its operations. What is clear from its operations so far is that it is carefully choosing its cases, only selecting cases that will have an impact on the development of relevant Chinese law. What seems evident from the initial rulings, at least, is that the judgments and rulings of the CICC are likely to be significant for lower court judges and members of the legal community as “soft precedents,”  authoritative decisions that are highly persuasive although not binding on the lower courts. Authoritative commentators in China and abroad have noted that the arbitration rulings fill a gap in Chinese arbitration law. The rulings are also consistent with the position taken by courts in some major jurisdictions that also find that the parties expressed their intent to arbitrate any dispute although their contract was never finalized. In the view of this commentator, they are part of China developing its own case guidance system, highlighted in item #26 of the 5th Judicial Reform Outline, in particular the phrase “Improve working mechanisms for mandatory searches and reporting of analogous cases and new types of cases” “完善类案和新类型案件强制检索报告工作机制” . It was previously mentioned in Opinions on Putting a Judicial Responsibility System in Place and Improving Mechanisms for Trial Oversight and Management (Provisional) –“on the foundation of improving working mechanisms such as consulting similar cases and judgment guidance a mechanism is to be established requiring the search of similar cases and relevant cases, to ensure a uniform judgment standard for similar cases, and the uniform application of law “最高人民法院关于落实司法责任制完善审判监督管理机制的意见(试行), (六) 在完善类案参考、裁判指引等工作机制基础上,建立类案及关联案件强制检索机制,确保类案裁判标准统一、法律适用统一 .

Moreover, thus far, five judges formed the members of the collegial panel, all of whom are the Chinese court’s most outstanding specialists on cross-border issues, including the judicial review of arbitration. This indicates the importance to which the Supreme People’s Court attaches to CICC cases.

In this commentator’s view, addition to CICC cases, other cases decided by or selected by the Supreme People’s Court would be classified as such. For example, cases decided by the Supreme People’s Court Intellectual Property Rights Court 最高人民法院知识产权法庭 would also be allocated to the category that I call “Supreme People’s Court soft precedents.” Other Supreme People’s Court soft precedents would include cases in the Supreme People’s Court Gazette 最高人民法院公报案件,  cases in the trial guides published by the various operational divisions 各个业务庭发表的审判业务指导丛书选的案件,and cases of the specialized judges committees of the SPC operational divisions 和各个业务庭专业法官会议案件。

In my view, cases decided by the collegial panels of the Supreme People’s Court are also persuasive, but not as persuasive as Supreme People’s Court cases in the categories described above. Supreme People’s Court circuit court cases are very persuasive to the courts within their jurisdiction. This case law is needed to supplement law and judicial interpretations and guide the lower courts correctly, as many new issues come before the courts before the legislative organs have time to amend legislation. I see China evolving its own case law, looking to traditional law and foreign jurisdictions for reference, but settling upon rules that fit China’s special situation, that may include some of the points I mention above. CICC decisions, whether rulings or judgments, will send important signals to the market, and are likely to be significant worldwide, as there is a documented increase in international arbitration cases where either the contract in dispute is governed by Chinese law or Chinese law is relevant in various ways.

The Chinese version:

中国国际商事法庭与有中国特色判例法的发展

我很荣幸有这个机会就中国国际商事法院(CICC)的首批裁定和判决发表意见。本短评将侧重中国国际商事法庭的判决和裁定以及仲裁司法审查裁定的重要性。

中国国际商事法庭的运作时间不长,对其运作进行更详细的分析还为时过早。 但从其迄今为止的运作中可以清楚看到的是,中国国际商事法庭选择其受理的案件非常慎重,只选择会对中国相关法律发展产生影响的案件。 至少从首批裁定可以明显看出,中国国际商事法庭的判决和裁定对于下级法院的法官和法律界人士来说,可能是重要的“软先例”,即权威性的裁判,虽然对下级法院没有约束力,但具有很强的说服力。 国内外权威专家均指出,这批裁定填补了中国仲裁法的一项空白。 这些裁定也与一些主要法域法院的立场保持了一致,也即尽管双方当事人的合同并未最后敲定,但双方都表示有意将争议提交仲裁。 在本文作者看来,这些裁判构成中国发展自己的案例指导制度的一部分,正如第五个司法改革纲要第26项所强调的,特别是“完善类案和新类型案件强制检索报告工作机制” 。 此前,最高人民法院关于落实司法责任制完善审判监督管理机制的意见(试行)曾提及“(六) 在完善类案参考、裁判指引等工作机制基础上,建立类案及关联案件强制检索机制,确保类案裁判标准统一、法律适用统一 。”

此外,到目前为止,合议庭均由五名法官组成,全部都是中国法院在跨境问题(包括仲裁司法审查)方面最杰出的专家。 由此可见最高人民法院对国际商事法庭案件的重视程度。

本文作者认为,除国际商事法庭案件外,最高人民法院审理或选取的其他案件也将被归入此类案例。例如,最高人民法院知识产权法庭判决的案件,也可归为所说的“最高人民法院软判例”,最高人民法院其他软判例还包括最高人民法院公报案例、各个业务庭发表的审判业务指导丛书选的案例和各个业务庭专业法官会议案例。我认为,最高人民法院合议庭判决的案件也具有说服力,但是没有上述几类案例的说服力强。 最高人民法院巡回法庭案例对其辖区内的法院具有很强的说服力。 由于立法机关往往来不及修改立法,许多新问题就摆在了法院面前,因此需要以判例来补充法律和司法解释以正确指导下级法院。 我看到中国正在发展自己的判例法,参考传统法律和外国司法管辖区的做法,但最终确定适合中国特殊国情的规则,这可能包括上文提到的一些要点。 国际商事法庭的裁判,无论是裁定还是判决,都将向市场发出重要信号,而且很可能在全球范围内产生重大影响,因为已有相关文件显示,争议合同适用中国法,或者中国法在不同方面予以适用的国际仲裁案件不断在增加。

Happy New Year!

Challenges for Supreme People’s Court leaders in the new era

Screenshot 2019-12-21 at 2.07.48 PMOne of the little-discussed aspects of being in a leadership role in the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) in the New Era is ensuring that policies, actions, initiatives, and other decisions hit the target of being politically correct (post 19th Party Congress and post 4th Plenum) while being “problem-oriented” (坚持问题导向) that is, addressing relevant practical issues facing the court system.  This is true for President Zhou Qiang as well as the vice presidents (each of whom is responsible for several divisions (主管), according to bureaucratic principles), the division heads, deputy heads, and equivalents in the affiliated institutions of the SPC, whether they be the circuit courts, National Judges College, or the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence (CIAJ).

After the recent Central Economic Work Conference, Party Secretary and President Zhou Qiang convened a meeting of the SPC’s Party Committee, to discuss the implications for the courts, all of which appear to be the major initiatives of the SPC.  I have added numbers and deleted some provisions (translation thanks to Google translate). He said:

We must:

  1. deepen the comprehensive supporting reforms of the judicial system;
  2. vigorously promote the construction of smart courts;
  3. continuously improve the quality and efficiency of court work, and create a stable, fair, transparent, and predictable business environment for the rule of law.
  4. continue to strengthen judicial protection of intellectual property rights and intellectual property rights;
  5. improve the rule of law environment that supports the development of private economy, implement comprehensive, legal, and equal protection of property rights, protect the legitimate rights and interests of private enterprises and entrepreneurs in accordance with the law, and allow entrepreneurs to concentrate on starting a business..and operating with peace of mind.
  6. It is necessary to increase the judicial protection of intellectual property rights and provide strong judicial services and guarantees for the implementation of the innovation-driven development strategy. It is necessary to serve to ensure the healthy and rapid development of the digital economy, handle the relationship between the protection of digital rights and the development of the digital economy, protect personal information in accordance with the law, properly handle legal issues related to the digital economy platform, and better serve and guarantee the development of the digital economy.
  7. …Strengthen research on new situations and issues in the economic and financial field; do a good job in financial and bankruptcy trials; and effectively improve capacity of the people’s courts in risk prevention and resolution.
  8.  …It is necessary to serve a high level of opening up to the outside world, strengthen foreign-related commercial and maritime trials, protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese and foreign parties on an equal basis in accordance with the law, and provide powerful judicial services and guarantees for a wider, wider, and deeper opening.
  9. It is necessary to severely punish crimes in accordance with the law, actively participate in the special struggle to combat crime and eliminate evil, resolutely safeguard national security and social stability….

So what more specific measures hit the target? They include the following:

  • In November, Vice President Luo Dongchuan, when he made comments at the SPC Intellectual Property Court (Tribunal) on establishing a diversified technical fact investigation mechanism–see the language  in the Chinese version of the article (“raise political stance, fully recognize the importance of establishing and perfecting a technical fact investigation mechanism 罗东川强调,要提高政治站位,充分认识建立健全多元化技术事实查明机制的重要意义);
  • In December, Vice President Jiang Bixin, said such measures included improving environmental protection of the Yellow River Basin and high-quality development;
  • In December, head of the administrative division, Judge Huang Yongwei (mentioned on this blog when he was president of the National Judges College), said it included the judicial interpretation on administrative agreements, which he characterized as “having a positive effect on effectively protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the people in administrative agreements, advancing the government of the rule of law, building a credible government, optimizing the rule of law to do business, improving the ability of government administration, and advancing administrative trials in the people’s courts.”
  • For Yang Yongqing, deputy head of the #2 Civil Division, and one of the drafters of the recently promulgated 9th Civil and Commercial Trial Work Conference Summary (draft discussed here, the Conference Summary to be discussed in a future blogpost) (and Cao Shibin, head of the CIAJ, it meant going to one of the provincial courts to give lectures on civil and commercial issues.  Judge Yang explained what the conference summary means for trying cases involving a company that has provided security to a third party, as well as cases involving applications for relief by third parties.  Cao spoke on “Ethics and Judgment -Application of Judicial Reasoning in Civil and Commercial Trial Work”, starting from the challenges and difficulties facing the profession of judges.
  • Jiang Huiling, vice president of the National Judges College (NJC), in charge since Judge Hu Yunteng has retired: in November he addressed what implementing the 4th Plenum decision means for the NJC: “continuously promoting the modernization of education and training systems and education and training capabilities. The NJC should effectively translate its efforts into practical actions to promote development, gather the wisdom of all faculty and staff, study and judge the situation, … study in-depth the implications of constructing an “international first-class judicial institution (建设‘国际一流司法学府’)” [the goal that President Zhou Qiang has set for the National Judges College in its new five-year plan).”

This critic will “stay out of the region of immediate practice” (quote of Matthew Arnold, see a screenshot of a caricature that was one of my (late) father’s favorites).

 

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Singapore Mediation Convention & China (2)

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photo of the workshop in session

I was very honored to be able to participate in a workshop held on 4 December by the International Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)  to discuss some of the complex issues involved in implementing the United Nations (UN) Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Singapore Mediation Convention or Convention) in China.  It was linked to the previous workshop held in March, described in this earlier blogpost.  This time the workshop included participants from the Supreme People’s Court (SPC),  National People’s Congress (NPC), China Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade (CCPIT), as well as some other academics and professionals.  The workshop could not have taken place if not for the efficient work of Professor Liu Jingdong and assistant research fellow Sun Nanxiang. As I mentioned in the previous blogpost, I had gotten to know Mr. Wen Xiantao, of the Department of Treaties and Law of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and official Chinese negotiator of the Convention. Several others who had participated in the earlier workshop, such as Sun Wei, Zhong Lun partner and participant in the Convention negotiations as part of Beijing Arbitration Commission’s delegation to the negotiations as with observer status, had previous engagements and were unable to attend. The closed-door and invitation-only format of the workshop enabled a positive and interactive discussion among all participants.

Part of the purpose of the workshop was to discuss a research report  (not publicly available) that Professor Liu and his team had prepared for MOFCOM, discussing a number of issues related to implementing the Convention in China. Additionally, from the brief remarks each participant made, it was possible to obtain a greater understanding of the more specific implications and issues involved that otherwise would be impossible for a person outside that system to recognize. For example, Judge Guo Zaiyu of the SPC #4 Civil Division (and CICC) spoke about certain court-related issues.  I drew on my August blogpost and my discussions earlier that day with a prominent lawyer to discuss state-owned enterprise-related issues.

Among the many issues discussed were the implications for the courts, preventing the enforcement of fraudulent mediation settlements, promoting the growth of commercial mediation and legislative issues.

It was also an opportunity to gain a bit more understanding, as a participant and observer, about the complex process of implementing an international convention in China.

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Group photo of the workshop participants

 

 

How the Supreme People’s Court guides the lower courts through cases in its publications (1)

IMG_6372The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) guides the lower courts in many ways.  One way is by publishing “trial guides”(审判指导丛书) and other related specialized publications.  I have recently spoken about the cases in some of these publications.  The cases published in these trial guides are for the most part not “guiding cases” (指导性案例) and therefore may not be cited in a court judgment.  However, because they have been specially selected by the SPC, they are quite persuasive to the lower courts and therefore important to legal professionals.  The SPC sees them as a supplement to legislation, judicial interpretations, various types of judicial normative documents/judicial documents/(司法规范性文件/司法文件) and useful in providing a source for judicial interpretation drafting. I have called these cases ”stealth” guidance or “soft precedents”, as they are used without citation in judgments. This blogpost introduces cases found in several of these trial guides.

The series Reference to Criminal Trial (刑事审判参考), edited by a team from the five SPC criminal divisions is invaluable to anyone wanting a detailed understanding of the issues in the criminal justice system, as seen by insiders (and approved for general distribution).

As can be seen from the photo from a recent issue, the first section is a collection of guidance cases (指导案例). These are not guiding cases as approved by the SPC judicial committee and translated by the Stanford Project. These are cases selected by the editors. Issue #115 has a number of cases related to the crime of organizing, providing premises, and introducing prostitution. Several others discuss whether the death penalty should be applied in the circumstances described.  As the editors describe them: “these are typical cases selected for their research value in the determination of facts, adoption & application of evidence, law, and criminal punishment, to provide guidance & reference for those in criminal justice” “选择在认定事实,采行证据,法律适用和裁量刑罚…为了刑事司法工作人员处理类似案件提供具体指导和参考.”

Screenshot 2019-12-09 at 9.54.08 PMAnother specialized publication is the Guide to Foreign-Related Commercial and Maritime Trial, edited by the #4 Civil Division. As can be seen from the photos (and discussed in an earlier blogpost, some of the cases in the issue are entitled replies (some  called 答复 and others entitled 复函), while others are called cases (案例).  As mentioned in that earlier blogpost, the replies are from the SPC to a request from instructions (请示) from provincial-level courts (including the higher courts of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing), as required by the SPC’s Prior Reporting system for cross-border arbitration matters (for example, as when a lower court intends to refuse the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award).  The #4 Civil Division publishes both the request for instructions as well as their response, while the SPC Administrative Division (in their publication Administrative Law Enforcement and Administrative Adjudication (行政执法与行政审判) (pictured below) only publishes their responses to the lower courts.

admin litigation publication

The cases published in these publications are ones that the editors consider significant. The editors of the Guide to Foreign-related Commercial and Maritime Trial describe the cases as providing powerful guidance”– “cases provide methods of thought for resolving similar issues” (具有较强的指导意义”“为了…遇到类似问题提供了解决思路”).  The editors of Administrative Law Enforcement and Administrative Adjudication describe their selected cases as being typical and guiding significance (具有典型和指导意义的审判案例. Lower court judges take the cases in these publications as providing very useful reference materials when they are presented with similar issues.  It is part of a larger effort by the SPC to use prior cases to guide the lower courts in applying their discretion.

 

 

Supreme People’s Court’s 2019 judicial interpretation agenda (II)

photo from an unrelated press conference at the SPC

As discussed in two blogposts in 2018, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has a yearly plan for drafting judicial interpretations, as set out in its 2007 regulations on judicial interpretation work. The plan is analogous to the legislative plans of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. Judicial interpretations, for those new to this blog, are binding on the SPC itself and the lower courts, and fill in some of the interstices of Chinese law (further explained here).  On 29 April 2019, the SPC’s General Office issued a document setting out a list of 47 judicial interpretation projects, 36  with an end of 2019 deadline (see the previous blogpost), and 11 with a deadline set for the first half of 2020 (set out below).  The list details the projects for which the SPC judicial committee had given project initiation/approval (立项), designating one or more SPC divisions/offices with primary drafting responsibility (this process to be detailed in a forthcoming article).  It appears to be the second time this type of document was publicly released.  If so, it is a concrete step in increasing the SPC’s transparency. The projects, deadlines, and some brief comments (some longer than others) follow below

(“Project initiation”/”project approval” is a procedure well-known to those of us who have been involved in foreign investment projects in China, where it involves approval from the planning authorities, primarily for infrastructure projects, but is an initial procedure used by regulatory authorities of all types, Party and state. For the SPC, it reflects one of the “planned economy” aspects of the way it operates.

Deadline of the first half of 2020:

  1. Provisions on Issues Concerning the Electronic Service of Legal Instruments (关于电子送达法律文书若干问题的规定). Responsibility of the Case Filing Division. This has been flagged for some years.
  2. Amending the 2013 joint SPC and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases Involving  Food Safety (关于修改《关于办理危害食品安全刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释》的决定). Responsibility of the #1 Criminal Division.
  3. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases Involving the Administration of Tax Collection (关于办理危害税收征管刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释). Responsibility of the #4 Criminal Division.
  4. Interpretation Concerning the Application of Law in Cases of Disputes over the Infringement of Trade Secrets (关于审理侵犯商业秘密纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的解释). Responsibility of the #3 Civil Division. This judicial interpretation is flagged in the recently issued (November, 2019) Party/State Council document on improving intellectual property rights protection (Explore and strengthen effective protection of trade secrets, confidential business information and its source code etc. Strengthen criminal justice protection and promote the revision and the amendment and improvement of criminal law and judicial interpretations 探索加强对商业秘密、保密商务信息及其源代码等的有效保护。加强刑事司法保护,推进刑事法律和司法解释的修订完善). (“Brother” blogger Mark Cohen’s comments on the document found here.)Given the worldwide attention to this issue, I would expect that a draft will be issued for public comment.
  5. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning Punitive Damages for Intellectual Property Infringement (关于知识产权侵权惩罚性赔偿适用法律若干问题的解释). Responsibility of the #3 Civil Division. Although recent publicity by the Chinese government has linked implementing punitive damages to the recent Party/State Council document on protecting intellectual property rights and the draft implementing regulations for the Foreign Investment Law, the 2018 Party/State Council document on improving intellectual property litigation had already mentioned this.  Given the worldwide attention to this issue, I would expect that a draft will be issued for public comment.
  6. Provisions on Issues Concerning the Application of the Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China (I) (关于适用《中华人民共和国外商投资法》若干问题的规定(一)). Responsibility of the #4 Civil Division. Given the worldwide attention to this issue, I hope that a draft will be issued for public comment.
  7.  Provisions on Several Issues Relating to Open Court Sessions of the People’s Courts on the Internet (关于人民法院互联网公开庭审过程若干问题的规定).  Responsibility of the Trial Administration Office.  I have an unpublished article on issues involved with the streaming of court hearings, prepared for an academic conference at which I gave a presentation three years ago. The paper (drawing on research within the court system) raises problems I have not seen mentioned by anyone writing in English.
  8. Interpretation Regarding the Application of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (关于适用《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》的解释). Responsibility of the Research Office.  I have a forthcoming academic article on the procedure underlying the drafting of this judicial interpretation, derived from a conference presentation I made almost two years ago.  The article was finalized early this year. I’m hoping it will be published next year.  I trust it won’t be out of date…
  9. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Realization of Security Interests (.关于担保物权实现程序若干问题的解释). Responsibility of the Research Office. A practical issue for financial institutions, lawyers, and others.
  10. Issues in the Handling of Judicial Technology Cases (关于办理司法技术案件若干问题的规定). Joint Responsibility of the Research Office, Trial Administration Office, and Judicial Equipment Administration Bureau.
  11. Issues Concerning the Forensic Identification and Evaluation of the People’s Courts (关于人民法院司法鉴定若干问题的规定). Joint Responsibility of the Research Office, Trial Administration Office, and Judicial Equipment Administration Bureau.

I’d welcome comments by persons with further information about any of the above draft judicial interpretations.

Supreme People’s Court’s 2019 judicial interpretation agenda (I)

photo from an unrelated press conference at the SPC

As discussed in two blogposts in 2018, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has a yearly plan for drafting judicial interpretations, as set out in its 2007 regulations on judicial interpretation work. The plan is analogous to the legislative plans of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee. Judicial interpretations, for those new to this blog, are binding on the SPC itself and the lower courts, and fill in some of the interstices of Chinese law (further explained here).  On 29 April 2019, the SPC’s General Office issued a document with a list of 47 judicial interpretation projects, 36  with an end 2019 deadline (set out below), and 11 with a deadline set for the first half of 2020 (set out in this blogpost).  The document details the projects for which the SPC judicial committee had given project initiation/approval (立项), designating one or more SPC divisions/offices with primary drafting responsibility (this process to be detailed in a forthcoming article).  It appears to be the second time this type of document was publicly released.  If so, it is a concrete step in increasing the SPC’s transparency. The projects, deadlines, and some brief comments (some longer than others) follow below. Some of the interpretations listed below are ones that Jiang Qibo, head of the Research Office, mentioned in 2018, as being linked to socialist core values (see my 2018 blogpost), although as I commented then, many are linked to the SPC’s need to “serve the greater situation” while at the same time seeking to deal with many of the difficult legal issues that face the courts.

(“Project initiation”/”project approval” is a procedure well-known to those of us who have been involved in foreign investment projects in China, where it involves approval from the planning authorities, primarily for infrastructure projects, but is an initial procedure used by regulatory authorities of all types, Party and state. For the SPC, it reflects one of the “planned economy” aspects of the way it operates.

Close observation reveals that some interpretations were listed last year, indicating that drafts were not ready for approval last year.  Some of the reasons for slippage are likely to be:

  • the issues turn out to be more complicated (substantively or otherwise);
  • judges have less time to work on judicial interpretation drafting with an increased caseload and document study;
  • many experienced SPC judges have been dispatched to circuit courts, leaving fewer at headquarters to work on judicial interpretations; and
  • timing may also be a factor.

Deadline of end 2019

  1. Regulations on pre-filing property protection provisional measures (关于办理诉前财产保全案件适用法律若干问题的解释 ), a type of pre-filing injunction.  These regulations are for non-intellectual property (IP) cases. Responsibility of the Case Filing Division.
  2. Provisions on Several Issues Concerning Preventing and Punishing False Lawsuits, Malicious Lawsuits, and Vexatious Litigation (关于防范和惩治虚假诉讼、恶意诉讼及无理缠诉若干问题的规定). Responsibility of the Case Filing Division.
  3.  Provisions on Regulating the Execution of Death Penalties and Related Issues (关于规范死刑执行及相关问题的规定) (Responsibility of the #1 Criminal Division).  The original deadline was the first half of this year. Apparently, this will focus on more setting out more detailed guidelines concerning how the death penalty is implemented, linked to the Criminal Procedure Law and the SPC’s interpretations of the Criminal Procedure Law;
  4. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Handling of Criminal Cases Involving Corruption and Bribery (II) (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理贪污贿赂等刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释(二). Responsibility of the #2 Criminal Division. It likely updates the 2016 interpretation to reflect the establishment and operation of the National Supervisory Commission and addressing issues that have arisen in practice.  Issues to be covered likely include ones discussed in issued #106 of Reference to Criminal Trial (刑事审判参考,the journal of the SPC’s five criminal divisions, mentioned here).  Responsibility of the #2 Criminal Division, but it is likely that the supervision commission will be/is one of the institutions providing input.
  5. Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Dereliction of Duty (II) (最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理渎职刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释(二)).  Was on last year’s list with an end 2019 deadline. I noted last year that it was likely updating interpretation (I) in light of the anti-corruption campaign and the establishment of the National Supervision Commission. Issues likely flagged in Reference to Criminal Trial.
  6. . Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Criminal Cases Involving Concealing and Harboring Criminals (关于审理窝藏、包庇刑事案件适用法律若干问题的解释). These provisions occur in various parts of the Criminal Law and are also mentioned in the organized crime opinion discussed in this earlier blogpost. Drafting responsibility of the #4 Criminal Division;
  7. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases Involving Restrictions on Commutation of Suspended Death Penalties (关于审理死刑缓期执行限制减刑案件适用法律若干问题的解释), Interpretation on limiting commutation during the period of the suspension of death sentences. See related research in English and Chinese. The #5 Criminal Division is responsible for this.
  8. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases Involving Enforcement Objection Actions (关于审理执行异议之诉案件适用法律若干问题的解释). It previously had a deadline of the end of 2018, related to the campaign to basically resolve enforcement difficulties within two to three years. Drafting this is a task for the #1 Civil Division. A draft of this interpretation was issued for public comment on 30 November (the draft and details of how to submit comments found here.)
  9. Interpretation on Evidence in Civil Procedure, Responsibility of the #1 Civil Division (关于民事诉讼证据的解释).  Another interpretation deadline has slipped by one year. A draft was distributed in 2016. Many new issues have arisen because of the prevalence of electronic evidence.
  10. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases of Civil Disputes over Food Safety (关于审理食品安全民事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释). Responsibility of the #1 Civil Division. The deadline has slipped by one year.  A draft was recently issued for public comment.
  11. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases (V) (关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干问题的解释(五)).   It likely dealing with some of the most pressing labor law issues facing the courts that are not covered by the preceding four interpretations or relevant legislation. The #1 Civil Division is in charge of drafting. Judge Xiao Feng of that division posted his slides from his lecture at the National Judges College earlier this year flagging the three principal issues in that draft. His slides provide an overview of those three issues: linking of labor arbitration with litigation; substantive law issues; procedural law issues. Substantive law issues include determining whether the parties are in a labor relationship; procedural issues include the burden of proof concerning overtime.
  12. Issues Concerning Civil and Commercial Disputes over Bank Cards (关于审理银行卡民商事纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释), Responsibility of the #2 Civil Division. Another interpretation that previously had a 2018 year-end deadline.
  13. Interpretation on Financial Asset Management Companies’ Acquisition, Management and Disposal of Non-performing Assets (关于审理金融资产管理公司收购、管理、处置不良资产案件适用法律若干问题的解释).  The legal infrastructure related to non-performing assets is inadequate, as has been pointed out by all participants, including judges. The Shenzhen Intermediate Court has run several symposia bringing together leading experts from the market. Responsibility of the #2 Civil Division. Another interpretation that previously had a 2018 year-end deadline.
  14. Interpretation on Issues Relating to Internet Financial Disputes (civil aspects) (关于审理互联网金融纠纷案件适用法律问题的解释), as existing judicial interpretations inadequately address the issues facing the lower courts. Drafting this is a task for the #2 Civil Division. Another interpretation that previously had a 2018 year-end deadline.
  15. Company Law Interpretation (V) (关于适用《中华人民共和国公司法》若干问题的规定(五)) (Issued in late April, text found here, official commentary here).
  16. Extending the Time Limit for Trial & Postponing Hearing of Civil and Commercial Cases (关于严格规范民商事案件延长审限和延期开庭问题的规定), issued at the end of March, 2019.
  17. Interpretation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (III), issued at the end of March, 2019, commentary by a leading global firm here and Chinese firm here.
  18. Intellectual Property Rights Evidence Rules (关于知识产权民事诉讼证据的若干规定).  These rules are linked to a 2018 Party/State Council policy decision on the reform of intellectual property litigation, (II (1), mentioning disclosure of evidence, burden of proof, and destruction of evidence. have been on the SPC agenda for some time. From several conferences involving leading judges (in Shanghai and Chongqing), it is possible to understand judicial thinking on these issues. Responsibility of the #3 Civil Division.
  19. Judicial interpretation on administrative cases involving patent authorization and confirmation (关于审理专利授权确权行政案件若干问题的解释). It appears to be the counterpart in the patent area of a 2017 judicial interpretation relating to trademarks. Responsibility of the #3 Civil Division. Another interpretation that previously had a 2018 year-end deadline.  A draft was issued for public comment in the summer of 2018.  Comments by US trade organizations were submitted, among others.
  20. Interpretation on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments by Foreign Courts (关于受理申请承认和执行外国法院民商事判决案件若干问题的解释). Original deadline of first half of 2019.  This issue has been flagged since at least 2014.
  21. Regulations on maritime labor service contracts (关于审理船员劳务合同纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释), likely connected with China’s accession to the 2006 Maritime Labor Convention and a large number of disputes in the maritime courts involving maritime labor service contracts. The linked report from the Ningbo Maritime Court mentions evidentiary problems and disputes involving foreign crew, among others. Responsibility of the #4 Civil Division.
  22. Scope of Acceptance of Environmental Resource Lawsuits (关于受理环境资源诉讼案件范围的规定). As is usual practice, local courts have issued guidance (link is to guidelines issued by the Chongqing Higher People’s Court) that is likely to provide information to the SPC. Responsibility of the Environmental and Natural Resources Division.
  23. Application of Law in the Trial of Cases of Compensation for Ecological Environmental Damage, issued in June, 2019. SPC press conference and model/typical cases released.
  24.  Disputes over forestry rights, apparently an area with many disputes.  Responsibility of the Environmental and Natural Resources Division. Original deadline was the first half of 2019.
  25. Provisions on Several Issues Concerning Administrative Compensation Cases (关于行政赔偿案件若干问题的规定).  I have not seen reports on a draft, but see a recent case on issues concerning the calculation of direct losses has been posted. Responsibility of the Administrative Division.
  26. Regulations on responsible persons of administrative authorities responding to lawsuits, (关于行政机关负责人出庭应诉若干问题的规定), relating to new requirements in the amended Administrative Litigation Law. and the 2018 judicial interpretation of the Administrative Litigation Law. Responsibility of the Administrative Division. Original deadline of the first half of 2019.
  27. Regulations on the consolidated review of normative documents in administrative cases (关于审理规范性文件一并审理案件若干问题的规定).  Responsibility of the Administrative Division. Original deadline of the first half of 2019.
  28. Regulations on the consolidated hearing of administrative and civil disputes (关于一并审理行政争议和民事争议若干问题的规定), apparently related to this item in a previous blogpost. Responsibility of the Administrative Division. Original deadline of the first half of 2019.
  29. Interpretation on procedures for the hearing of administrative cases (关于行政案件庭审程序若干问题的规定). Responsibility of the Administrative Division. Was mentioned in last year’s document.
  30. Interpretation related to agency issues in retrial (再审) cases.  With the many governance problems of Chinese companies, these issues frequently arise.  Drafting responsibility with the Judicial Supervision Division. Original deadline of end 2018.
  31. Interpretation relating to the enforcement of cases involving company shareholding.  Given the complexities of shareholding in China, including the frequent use of nominee arrangements, these are difficult issues for judges to deal with.  See a presentation by one of the circuit court judges on this issue.  Responsibility of the Enforcement Bureau.
  32. Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Criminal Cases Involving Organizing Cheating in Examinations, issued in early September, jointly with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), to ensure the two institutions have harmonized approaches.  The Research Office (which coordinates interactions with the SPP), was responsible.
  33. Interpretation on Issues Concerning the Trial of Criminal Cases Involving Crimes of Illegally Using an Information Network or Providing Aid for Criminal Activities in Relation to Information Network (link to the Chinalawtranslate.com translation), also a joint interpretation with the SPP, for which the Research Office was responsible;
  34. Personal information rights disputes judicial interpretation (审理个人信息权纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释), linked to the Civil Code being drafted.  Implications for individuals and entities, domestic and foreign. Responsibility of the Research Office.
  35. Amending (i.e. updating) ()the 2001 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Certain Issues Concerning Application of Urging and Supervision Procedure, relating to the enforcement of payment orders by creditors.  Responsibility of the Research Office.
  36. Interpretation on cases involving both civil and criminal issues (关于办理民刑交叉案件适用法律若干问题的解释). This is a longstanding issue, and with the crackdown on the private lending sector, this has come to the fore.  Among the many issues include: if the defendant is criminally prosecuted first and assets are confiscated, how can affected borrowers or other parties be compensated.  Responsibility of the Research Office, likely involving several civil and criminal divisions. Originally with a 2018 year-end deadline.

I’d welcome comments by persons with further information about any of the above draft judicial interpretations.

Update from #1 China International Commercial Court

The Monitor at the #CICC/#1 Circuit Court, December 2018

In recent days, I had the opportunity to meet with  Zhang Yongjian, chief of the #1 China International Commercial Court (CICC) who provided some updates about the cases accepted by that court.  In addition to the three rulings (posted on the CICC website) that the #1 CICC had issued, he mentioned that a ruling in one of the cases was forthcoming, as was a judgment in another. He mentioned that in considering some of the cases, certain members of the expert committee have provided expert opinions, as is authorized by the CICC rules.  Additionally, the #1 CICC has accepted a sixth case, filed directly with the court. Zhang Yongjian mentioned the issues in that case relate to entrusted/nominee shareholding. The other cases accepted thus far are ones that had been referred by lower courts.

Supreme People’s Court Establishes a Mechanism for Resolving Inconsistent Decisions

 

Screenshot 2020-01-17 at 12.11.48 PM

On 11 October, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)  issued brief guidance establishing a mechanism for resolving its inconsistent decisions, entitled “Implementing Measures on Establishing a Mechanism for Resolving Differences in the Application of Law (Implementing Measures) (关于建立法律适用分歧解决机制的实施办法).  The guidance did not appear in Chinese legal media until the end of October. The intent of the guidance is to create a mechanism to resolve the old problem of inconsistent court decisions concerning the same issue (same cases decided differently 同案不同判) made by Chinese courts and even within the SPC. Widespread use of the SPC’s judgments database has brought this phenomenon to greater public attention.  With the explosion in the number of cases in the Chinese courts and in the SPC in particular in recent years, the issue of divergent views within the SPC on the same issue is likely to be occurring even more frequently.  The concern about uniformity or consistency of judicial decisions has its roots in the traditional Chinese legal system and is an ongoing topic of discussion among Chinese judges, legal practitioners, legal academics, and law students.

For those with an interest in the details of how the SPC operates, this document does not have the status of a judicial interpretation but the SPC’s judicial committee has approved it, as is evident from the title of the document (measures/办法 and the document number 法发〔2019〕23号 (Fa Fa (2019) #23.  Judicial interpretations must have one of four titles and have a document number with  Fa Shi 法释.  The reason that the SPC judicial committee approved it is linked to Article 7 of the recently released guidance on judicial committees: “the adjudication [judicial] committee of the Supreme People’s Court is to unify law through means such as adopting and drafting judicial interpretations and normative documents (规范性文件), and publishing guiding cases.”

This mechanism has its antecedents in several previous judicial reform documents, and is one that is contained reform measure #23 of the last round of judicial reforms and reform measure #26 of the current round::

#23….Complete and improve working mechanisms for the uniform application of law.

#26 Improve mechanisms for the uniform application of law. Strengthen and regulate work on judicial interpretations, complete mechanisms for researching, initiating, drafting, debating, reviewing, publishing, cleaning up, and canceling judicial interpretations, to improve centralized management and report review mechanisms. Improve the guiding cases system, complete mechanisms for reporting, selecting, publishing, assessing, and applying cases. Establish mechanisms for high people’s courts filing for the record trial guidance documents and reference cases. Complete mechanisms for connecting the work of case discussion by presiding judges and collegial panel deliberations, the compensation commission, and the judicial committee. Improve working mechanisms for mandatory searches and reporting of analogous cases and new types of case. (完善统一法律适用机制。 加强和规范司法解释工作,健全司法解释的调研、立项、起草、论证、审核、发布、清理和废止机制,完善归口管理和报备审查机制。完善指导性案例制度,健全案例报送、筛选、发布、评估和应用机制。建立高级人民法院审判指导文件和参考性案例的备案机制。健全主审法官会议与合议庭评议、赔偿委员会、审判委员会讨论案件的工作衔接机制。完善类案和新类型案件强制检索报告工作机制)

A brief summary of the mechanism is set out, followed by my preliminary thoughts on the mechanism and related issues.

The mechanism

The Implementing Measures, which went into effect on 28 October,  provide that if certain SPC entities or lower courts discover that the SPC has issued valid judgments (判决) or rulings (裁定) (the Chinese term is “生效裁判”) which apply the law differently (存在法律适用分歧), or an ongoing case may result in the later decision applying the law differently from that in a previous SPC case, the matter should be brought to the attention of the SPC judicial committee through an application process managed by the Trial Management Office.

Article 1 of the Implementing Measures designates the SPC judicial committee (also translated as adjudication committee 审判委员会) as the institution to resolve and guide differences in the application of law.

Article 2 authorize  operational divisions of the SPC (业务部门), the higher people’s courts and specialized people’s courts to submit an application to the SPC’s Trial Management Office which may be eventually considered by the SPC’s judicial committee if either:

  1. there is a discrepancy in the application of law of judicial decisions of the SPC that are already effective (最高人民法院生效裁判之间存在法律适用分歧的);
  2. or there is a difference in the application of law between the conclusions in a case being tried and principles or standards on the application of law already determined in effective decisions of the SPC  (在审案件作出的裁判结果可能与最高人民法院生效裁判确定的法律适用原则或者标准存在分歧的).

Article 3 authorizes the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence  (CIAJ) to submit an application to the Trial Management Office if it encounters differences in the application of law in effective judgments of the SPC that it encounters during its focused research work on like cases decided consistently (类案同判专项研究).

If the Trial Management Office determines the matter should be accepted (project initiation) (立项), that office is required to refer the matter to the CIAJ, which is required to provide an initial view to the Trial Management Office within five working days.  Presumably, they will do little additional research and will focus on reviewing the materials submitted by the entity involved.  In some situations, it appears to put CIAJ in the odd position of reviewing its own work.  The Trial Management Office forwards the initial view of the CIAJ to the SPC operational division involved for further review and response.  The operational division involved may involve experts in needed. The operational division should draft a response (复审意见) in a timely manner to the Trial Management Office, which should submit a request to an SPC leader (presumably the relevant SPC vice president) to place the matter on the judicial committee agenda.  Once the judicial committee makes a decision, the entity that applied for a determination is to be informed.  The Trial Management Office is required to provide a proposal containing the form and scope of the decision by the judicial committee for approval (提出发布形式与发布范围意见).  It can be anticipated that determinations on non-sensitive topics may be made public, while those on more sensitive topics will be distributed either solely within the court system or to a relevant category of judges. Article 11 of the Implementing Measures requires SPC operational divisions, local courts, and specialized courts to make reference and implement (参照执行) the SPC judicial committee’s decision in the course of their work. Presumably that will depend on how widely distributed the determination is.

Some preliminary thoughts

In my view, the mechanism is a microcosm of themes reflecting how the SPC operates.  As mentioned above, the SPC decides (either through judgments or rulings) large numbers of cases yearly, and the SPC responds to an unknown number of requests for instructions (请示), mostly on legal issues, which means that in practice that issues on the same body of law may be determined by different divisions of the SPC or different teams of SPC judges. So differences in legal issues may arise either through litigation or court administrative-type procedures. While SPC judges in practice (as I understand it) search for similar cases, it is inevitable that different people have different views on legal issues.  Unlike some other legal systems, the SPC has not evolved an en banc or enlarged panel of judges (this description of how France’s highest court operates provides a good example) as the final institution for resolving these issues.  Designating the SPC’s judicial committee reflects the traditional administrative way (官本位) that SPC makes major decisions concerning legal issues.  As I described in a recent blogpost, the members of the SPC’s judicial committee are its senior leaders.

I surmise that many of the differences in views will be resolved before the matters reach the judicial committee.  In comments made on the Implementing Measures, Justice He Xiaorong (head of the #2 Circuit Court) mentions that he has inaugurated a system of enlarged panels of judges that include those with a public law and private law background, and familiar with civil, criminal, and administrative law, to consider cases involving difficult issues. That system will reduce somewhat the pipeline of issues possibly entering this mechanism.  For those issues that enter the mechanism, it is possible that opposing views may be harmonized when the operational division of the SPC needs to respond to the points summarized by the CIAJ.  I predict that relatively few questions will go to the SPC judicial committee itself.  The mechanism may have been designed with that goal in mind or may have that impact.

Additionally, from my reading of the Implementing Measures, the drafting could have benefited from more input from greater input either within the SPC or without, which could have avoided some of the problems I point out below. I surmise that the drafters were so used to the terminology used within the SPC, they did not realize that lack of clarity will confuse the lower courts and the greater legal community, for whom this system may have practical implications. In particular, the Implementing Measures:

  1.  do not define what is meant by differences in the application of law (法律适用分歧).  Presumably, a major difference in the application of law is intended and the SPC judicial committee (and its gatekeeper, which appears to be the Trial Management Office) will consider carefully which inconsistencies merit a determination by the judicial committee. My understanding is that the judicial committee is reluctant to reverse its determinations on particular legal issues within a short time, as it seeks to provide legal certainty on particular issues through judicial interpretations and other documents.  As I described in my 2019 article on the SPC and FTZs, rules or policies included in SPC judicial policy documents may eventually be crystallized in SPC judicial interpretations and eventually codified in national law, but that process is slow and cannot meet the needs of the lower courts, which need to deal properly (politically and legally) with outstanding legal issues pending a more permanent stabilization.
  2. do not define the term “裁判,” which generally refers to judgments (判决) and rulings (裁定). To a casual reader, at least, it is not clear whether it is intended to include responses to requests for instructions (requests for advisory opinions, 请示).  As I wrote in a blogpost earlier this year, some responses to requests for instructions are entitled fuhan 复函 and others dafu 答复. The editors (from the SPC) of a two-volume collection of responses described them as ‘usually called quasi-judicial interpretation documents’ (往往被称为准司法解释性文件) and ‘a necessary supplement to judicial interpretations’ (它是对司法解释一种必须的补充).  It is not unusual for these responses to conflict with one another, as reasonable people can disagree and multiple institutions within the SPC issue responses on the same or related bodies of law.  I have not noticed a document (at least one that was made public–I’d be grateful to be informed otherwise) describing an existing mechanism requiring the drafters of these responses to review related responses issued by other divisions. Differences in the application of law could also arise between an existing response and later judgment, or draft judgment.
  3. do not define what is meant by “业务部门” (operational departments/divisions).  Does it include the SPC’s Research Office (which one knowledgeable person described as a comprehensive operational department (综合业务部门)), which often issues responses to requests for instructions?  Research into another issue has led to an authoritative answer to this question.  The knowledgeable person was citing “chapter and verse” from a 1995 SPC reply:”研究室是一个综合性的审判业务部门 ” (see Reply of the Supreme People’s Court as to Whether the Research Office is an Operational Department (最高人民法院关于人民法院研究室是否属审判业务部门的复函).
  4. are very weak on specific procedures for when a question of law should be referred to this mechanism.  Consider, for example, a case that is being considered by one of the divisions of the SPC.  2017 SPC regulations on the SPC’s responsibility system mention professional  (presiding) judges meetings (as discussed in a 2017 blogpost and again several times this year.  The Implementing Measures do not specify whether the issue should be reviewed by the division’s professional judges meeting before it is submitted to the Trial Management Office. Presumably that will be the case, as the judicial committee guidance requires it. In Justice He Xiaorong, clarifies that the professional judges meeting is an important institution for resolving differences in the application of law.   As a practical matter, will this procedure suspend civil litigation procedures?  It is unclear.
  5. do not clarify what will be included in the package of documents that goes to the Trial Management Office. Will it be similar to the documents that go to the judicial committee under its new guidance on judicial committees? It appears that the Implementing Measures are not well integrated with the new guidance on judicial committees.   I surmise (please message me if I am mistaken) that the drafting of the Implementing Measures and the guidance on judicial committees was siloed, a frequent problem in the Chinese and other bureaucracies, so that the drafters of the Implementing Measures were unaware of the details of the new judicial committee guidance. As I wrote last month, those contain more specific requirements concerning the content of the report that the judges are required to prepare for the judicial committee, including arguments by both/all parties, prosecution/defense counsel and a clear listing of the issues on the application of law that require discussion and decision by the adjudication committee, the opinions of the professional (presiding) judges meeting.  The guidance also requires judges preparing these reports to search for similar or related cases. I surmise that these requirements will be consolidated in practice.
  6. give special authority to the CIAJ in the course of its research work on like cases. It is also possible that CIAJ could encounter major inconsistencies in its other work, such as compiling its Selection of People’s Court Cases (mentioned in my 2017 Tsinghua China Law Review article). Moreover, it is curious that the CIAJ is given this special authority but not an analogous institution in the National Judges College. Article 3 authorizes the CIAJ to submit an application relating to differences in the application discovered in the course of its work, while the Judicial Case Academy of the SPC (under the National Judges College) (see a list of its 2018-2019 research projects) has no such authority, giving the careful reader the impression that the CIAJ led the drafting of the Implementing Measures.  It appears to be a version of a phenomenon I described in a draft article, that because the SPC is a large organization, with many entities competing for top leadership attention, policy documents are sometimes drafted with  consideration of institutional interests, as a policy document approved by the SPC judicial committee can be seen as representing an undertaking by SPC leadership to the institutional goals of division or entity involved.

Supreme People’s Court President’s Zhou Qiang’s virtual mailbox

One of the more unusual features of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC)’s website is the “Court President’s mailbox,”  by which individuals can send an email to SPC President Zhou Qiang (to yzxx@court.gov.cn), and where selected responses are published. President Zhou Qiang established it in 2013, almost exactly six years ago. As to why the SPC has a letter to the court president function, the answer is on the SPC website and the article announcing the launching of the mailbox:

it is to “further develop the mass education and practice campaign [mentioned in this blogpost six years ago] and to listen to the opinions and suggestions of all parts of society (the masses).

Listening to the opinions and suggestions of society is also required of Zhou Qiang as a senior Party leader.  It was part of the mass education and practice campaign and continues to be a fundamental principle in the current “Don’t forget the Party’s original aspirations and firmly remember your mission” campaign.

President Zhou Qiang listed establishing the Court President mailbox as an accomplishment in his 2018 report to the National People’s Congress.

Local courts have followed the SPC’s model by establishing their ownCourt President’s mailboxes.” From my own experience, not all [non-spam] emails either to President Zhou Qiang’s or a local court president’s email box are considered to merit a response.

The language of the responses is surprising for the reader used to the very formal language of SPC documents.  (One follower of this blog was so surprised that he ask.ed me about this). Many of them start with

Hello! We received your proposal (or query), and after consideration, we respond as follows:您好!《关于…..》收悉。……经研究,答复如下:

And end with this language:

Thank you for your support of the work of the Supreme People’s Court! 感谢您对人民法院执行工作的关心和支持!

A  quick but unscientific survey of recently published responses follows. As to why people write, judging from my own experience and the content of published responses, it appears that it is one of the few ways to bring a problem (unrelated to a dispute) to the attention of the court authorities.  I have no way of determining whether the responses are representative of the letters submitted, but I surmise that the letters are typical (典型).

Proposals

Some responses relate to specific proposals. Among recent proposals include anonymizing references to HIV infected persons, stipulating the ceiling interest rate in private lending disputes, and uniforms for judges and judges assistants (specific recommendation not described).

Queries

Some responses relate to queries on specific practical issues for litigants, such as whether a plaintiff must provide the defendant’s identity card number when filing a lawsuit, and the deadline for an administrative agency to enforce an administrative penalty or fine.

 Issues with the social credit system

Responses to persons seeking to lift restrictions against them imposed by the judgment debtors part of the social credit system seem to constitute a substantial number of responses. In 2019, those included letters published on 8 October. 28 June, 12 June, 17 April, 31 January, among others. If affected persons need to write to Zhou Qiang to resolve their problem, it means that the mechanism in the social credit system for lifting restrictions on judgment debtors once they have complied does not work as well in practice as advertised, to the disadvantage of affected persons.

Issues with the operation of the SPC’s case database (裁判文书网)

Letters raising problems with the operation of the SPC’s case database (China Judgments Online) include letters published on 20 August, 16 July, 28 February. Users complain about problems with the search function, slow loading of pages, and other technical problems.  In one response the SPC complains about the database being used by companies using webcrawler or web scraping software, and their efforts to combat this by installing software to prevent it.  The SPC does not explain why this should be an issue.

(Complaints about the operation of the SPC’s case database are heard worldwide, judging by comments made at a recent international academic conference on Chinese law at 40 years and other academic conferences.)  As a consequence many researchers use alternative providers that offer better search functions and loading times.  I understand that the SPC has met with some of these alternative providers, but frustrations with the official database continue.

Who writes the responses?

Most responses lack a specific author. Occasionally a response is published in the name of the SPC’s Research Office or Data Center.  The careful reader detects inconsistencies in the way that letters are answered, with some persons addressed as Comrade, others by name, while others by Mr./Ms.

A natural question for legal professionals to ask is about the legal authority of these responses, as some of these responses are republished on Wechat public accounts focusing on law or legal information websites.  The answer seems to be “it depends”.  One recent response to a question concerned the time limit for an administrative agency to apply to a court to enforce an administrative penalty or fine was given by the SPC’s Research Office.  The Research Office is the SPC’s “gatekeeper” for judicial interpretations and is involved in drafting or coordinating the drafting (depending on the topic) of judicial interpretations (an academic article stuck in the production pipeline will provide more details).  Although the response is not legally binding (unlike a judicial interpretation), a Research Office response is likely to be highly persuasive guidance.  It is one of many tools in the the SPC’s guidance toolbox.

 

SPC Updates its Guidance on Judicial (Adjudication) Committees

2016 meeting of SPC judicial committee, to which NPC, CPCC representatives, and certain experts were invited

On 22 September the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) updated its guidance to the lower courts on judicial committees (关于健全完善人民法院审判委员会工作机制的意见). (also translated as “adjudication committees”) (审判委员会). For those new to this blog, these committees are made up of certain senior members of a court, and they have special decision-making authority, as detailed below. They decide cases that are too difficult or important for an individual judge or judicial panel to decide, to ensure the optimal substantive result (as seen from the institutional perspective of the courts).

The document is a policy document (explained here), as indicated by its document number 法发〔2019〕20号). Lower courts (and the specialized courts) can issue further detailed guidance, have in the past and will do so.  In 2010 the SPC issued guidance on judicial committees (2010 guidance), which I analyzed in this article, Reforming-judicial-committees.  The article includes some insights from a number of judges with whom I spoke at the time.  Reforming judicial committees has been on the SPC’s agenda since the prior round of judicial reforms, as my 2014 blogpost discusses. I predicted that reform would occur “in the medium term.”  There are is a great deal of writing about judicial committees in English and especially in Chinese.  My 2014 blogpost links to some of the English language research, and other insights about how judicial committees work can be found in Embedded Courts, the prize-winning book by NG Kwai Hang and He Xin.

The broad consensus on judicial committee reform can be seen in Articles 36-39 of the Organic Law of the People’s Courts, as amended in 2018 (2018 People’s Courts Law), but the 2019 guidance sets out more detailed rules.

This blogpost will highlight some of the issues that come to mind in a quick review.

A quick list of what is new follows:

  • There are some changes in the format of SPC Opinions (意见) so that it is usual for them to begin with a list of basic principles.
  • As to be expected, Party leadership and related principles are listed at the top of both the 2019 and 2010 guidance.  Both stress upholding Party leadership of the work of the people’s courts, with the 2019 guidance referring to “upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over the work of the people’s courts.”  This should not at all be surprising, as the phrase has been used repeatedly since the 2019 Political-Legal Work Conference. The Party Regulations on Political-Legal Work use the phrase “Party’s absolute leadership.” As I mentioned earlier this year, Li Ling (of the University of Vienna) sees this as indicating a complete and unambivalent severance from the judicial independence framework.
  • On membership of judicial committees, The 2018 People’s Courts Law and the new guidance retain the old system of having the court president and vice-presidents, but no longer requires division heads (庭长) to be members, but refers to “experienced”(资深) judges and to the possibility of having full-time members.  The  SPC already does this.  Justices Hu Yunteng, Liu Guixiang, Pei Xianding, and He Xiaorong are full-time members of the judicial committee, which gives them a bureaucratic rank equivalent to being an SPC vice president, with attendant privileges. It is likely that the Central Staffing Commission regulates the number of persons who can be SPC vice presidents.  Judging by the SPC website, some SPC judicial committee members are not SPC Party Group members, although of course there is some overlap.
  • Another innovation in the 2018 People’s Courts Law, repeated in the 2019 guidance, is having specialized judicial committees, to focus on more specialized issues, and to deal with the problem of having non-specialist judges making decisions on issues regarding which they are not familiar.  This provision consolidates ongoing practice in both the SPC and lower courts  My understanding is that the Shenzhen Intermediate Court was one of the earlier courts to establish specialist judicial committees.  The roots of this innovation lie in the 2004-2008 Second Judicial Reform Five Year Plan Outline. (This also illustrates the time it takes for some judicial reforms to be adopted.)
  • On the functions of judicial committees, new language mentions “sensitive, major, and difficult cases such as those involving national security, diplomacy, or social stability.”  That language is new as compared to the 2010 guidance.  It is not new to the SPC, as it appears in the SPC’s 2017 judicial responsibility regulations, about which I wrote.  I surmise that this is just spelling out what had been the general practice.   Most of the other functions are consistent with previous guidance.
  • The operational language is more detailed than before and gives a glimpse into the bureaucratic nature of the Chinese court system ( a collegial panel or single judge who thinks a case should go to the judicial committee  “submit an application and report it up to the court president for approval level by level; and where an application is not submitted, but the court president finds it necessary, they may request that the adjudication committee deliberate and make a decision. The language enabling a court president to designate a case for judicial committee discussion likely represents a consolidation of practice, rather than something new.
  • Other procedures in the operational section are new, reflecting the new institution of the professional judges committee and much more specific requirements concerning the content of the report that the judges are required to prepare for the judicial committee, including arguments by both/all parties, prosecution/defense counsel and a clear listing of the issues on the application of law that require discussion and decision by the adjudication committee, the opinions of the professional (presiding) judges meeting. In a clear signal about how the SPC sees the importance of case research, it also requires judges preparing these reports to search for similar or related cases.
  • The 2019 guidance requires judicial committee members with a conflict to recuse themselves  (the language is unclear about whether a party can apply to do that).  This is new, and reflects many years of criticism of the failure to have a recusal mechanism.
  • The 2019 guidance also imposes a quorum requirement on judicial committee meetings, both the plenary and specialized committee meetings. Certain outsiders (people’s congress delegates, scholars, etc) may attend, as well as the chief procurator at the same level or his delegate (this latter provision is not new).
  • Decisions are made by at least half of the members attending and dissenting opinions must be recorded in the case file. It does not mention that dissenting opinions will be mentioned in the judgment issued to the parties and the public. As before, the decision of the judicial committee is binding on the judge or judges who heard the case (principle of democratic centralism).
  •  The 2018 People’s Court Law and new guidance require the decision and reasoning in cases discussed by the adjudication committee to be disclosed in the judgment documents unless the law provides otherwise, so a significant step forward in judicial committee transparency.  The lack of judicial committee transparency had been criticized for many years.
  • Judicial committees at all levels of the courts are now required to create an audio or visual recording of the entire process of judicial committee meetings and keep them confidential. Judicial committee proceedings are required to be incorporated in a court’s caseflow management system. It is not clear from the guidance who or which entity would have access.
  • Those not involved in judicial committee proceedings (outside leaders, senior judges not involved) are forbidden from involving themselves in judicial committee proceedings.  If this didn’t happen in practice, it wouldn’t have been included in this guidance.
  • Similarly, the language in the 2019 rules on judicial committee members and other maintaining confidentiality and work discipline, and not leaking trial work secrets (I discuss this in my article published earlier this year.  If this didn’t happen in practice, it wouldn’t have been included in this guidance.

Although for many years proposals have been made to abolish the judicial committee, I have rarely heard anyone who has worked in the Chinese judicial system agree with that proposal.  It seems more likely that the SPC thinking is maintaining the judicial committee system is appropriate for China at this time, given the level of professionalism nationwide, the need to share/avoid responsibility for making difficult decisions, and the greater political environment.  This guidance appears to be designed to deal with some of the abuses of the judicial committee system, have greater (but not complete) transparency, incorporate new court institutions, and generally improve how the committees operate.

 

Central Inspection Group inspecting the Supreme People’s Court (again)

Screenshot 2019-09-11 at 8.45.00 AM
Mobilization meeting for the Central Inspection Group’s inspection of the SPC

This week the Supreme People’s Court’s (SPC’s ) media outlets are carrying this 10 September report of the Central Inspection Group (CIG) #4’s mobilization meeting to inspect the SPC’s Communist Party group.  The same group is also inspecting the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP). Senior leaders (that with a bureaucratic rank of deputy bureau chief and above 副局级以上干部) of the SPC and its institutions attended in person (as well as related personnel). Those in the SPC’s six circuit courts  (巡回法庭) attended by videolink.  Zhao Fengtong is heading  (this English biography is outdated) the inspection group. He gave a speech at the mobilization meeting. President Zhou Qiang, who chaired the meeting, spoke as well. A search of Caixin’s website reveals that Zhao Fengtong has headed many such inspection groups. News of the inspection was announced on the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) website last week and other media outlets. The inspection is part of the current round of CIG inspections, which total 37 Party, government, and other entities.  A CIG group last inspected the SPC almost three years ago. The previous mobilization meeting and inspector results were previously mentioned on this blog.

The China Law Society (a mass (government-organized non-government organization)) and the Ministry of Justice are being inspected in this round of inspections. Each has held its own mobilization meeting.

The inspection appears to be one example of the strengthening of Party leadership in the SPC. The inspection appears to be linked to language in earlier documents to strengthen the leadership of the Communist Party (加强党的领导) and to strengthen Party political construction (党的政治建设).  The Party Center issued a document on political construction earlier this year.

The remarks that Zhao Fengtong made are consistent with the document on political construction. Some of the points that Zhao Fengtong and Zhou Qiang made are highlighted below (along with my brief comments in italics):

  • the SPC, as a central organ, assumes a major political responsibility and glorious historical mission (重大政治责任和历史使命).  This phrase is to be found in SPC policy documents supporting important government initiatives;
  • Inspections are political supervision and a comprehensive political examination of the implementation by the Party Group of a Central and national organ of its political responsibility and duties (巡视是政治监督,是对中央和国家机关党组织履行政治责任和职责使命情况的全面政治体检). The term “political inspection” appears to be used frequently since earlier this year–the report on the previous mobilization meeting did not use this term.
  • The focus is on inspecting how the SPC is implementing the Party line, direction and policies and the major decisions that the Party Center has announced (重点监督检查落实党的路线方针政策和党中央重大决策部署情况);
  • The inspection will search out political deviance (深入查找政治偏差).  This phrase is found in the document on political construction–“put efforts into discovering and correcting political deviation” (着力发现和纠正政治偏差).

President Zhou Qiang stated that the Party group fully supports the work of the inspection group, will correct the problems found, will not delay or blame.  He mentioned that the institution will combine support for the work of the inspection group with current work (要把配合做好巡视工作与抓好当前工作结合起来).  The SPC is a court, to whom the public looks for justice. Informal inquiries indicate that the SPC has an even larger civil and commercial caseload this year.  Although earlier this year it raised the minimum amount in dispute for cases that it will take, the current state of the economy means that the SPC is facing a large increase in civil/commercial disputes. Domestic cases have a six-month deadline for resolution, placing a great deal of pressure on judges to resolve them timely, either by encouraging settlement or issuing judgments (or rulings).  

As in the previous round, the CIG is inspecting the SPC for approximately two months. The inspection group has provided an email and telephone number for those wishing to provide further information.

Background on CIGs and how they operate can be found in a 2016 New York Times article (focusing on the Ministry of Public Security’s inspection) and this scholarly article by Professor Fu Hualing of the University of Hong Kong’s law faculty.

Rooting the Singapore Mediation Convention in Chinese soil

Screenshot 2019-09-01 at 3.15.52 PM
tree planting in Fujian ©xinhua

The signing of the  UN Convention on Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements (Singapore Mediation Convention) in early August by the United States, China, and 44 other countries is one of the significant events for international commercial lawyers, although it has been lost in the roar of more major geopolitical events.  Signing the convention appears to have been a last-minute decision by the government of the People’s Republic of China, as this post by Zhong Lun partner Sun Wei in the third week of July does not give a clear signal as to whether China would sign. In several events at which I spoke or attended this month, the topic of the Singapore Mediation Convention came up.  So I’d like to draw on the wisdom of others (and add some of my own thoughts) to talk about the challenges to be faced in rooting the Singapore Convention in [mainland] Chinese soil.

I’ll note that Professors Peter Corne and Matthew Erie have written about the same topic recently for the well-regarded blog Opinio Juris about the background and some of the challenges that China faces in implementing the Singapore Mediation Convention.  I appreciate their link to my March, 2019 blogpost on the closed-door workshop held at the International Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences on the Singapore Convention. They have written in detail about the lack of commercial mediation legislation, inconsistencies between the Convention and domestic PRC law, and the lack of private-sector or other robust mediation centers.  I’ll add to the analysis several (generally unrecognized) factors:

  • taking a more flexible approach to mediation legislation;
  • changing state-owned enterprise (SOE) and SOE senior manager metrics and performance indicators to facilitate mediated settlements;
  • convincing senior SPC personnel that settlement agreements (as defined by the Singapore Mediation Convention) are more likely to lessen rather than increase the workload of the courts (this has been flagged by Sun Wei in one of his posts);
  • having persons committed to making change within bureaucratic institutions.

Flexible approach to mediation legislation

A number of people have written (and even more have spoken) about the obstacles posed by the lack of a Chinese commercial mediation law or general mediation law.  But perhaps it is best to follow the usual Chinese legislative approach, and test what is needed through [possibly temporary] [State Council] regulations. Once the outlines of what needs to go into a law are clear, drafters can look to China’s own experience, the 2018  UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Mediation and International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation and experience abroad (characterized as beneficial foreign experience).

Implications for SOEs

On changing SOE (and manager) metrics and performance indicators, Professors Jack Coe, Jr. (Pepperdine University School of Law) and Lucy Reed (National University of Singapore(NUS)) made the comments below on investor-state mediation earlier this year in a conference in Hong Kong on investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Although they were not speaking specifically of China, in my view, the principles are also applicable to China and also apply to settlement agreements of SOEs with commercial entities in other jurisdictions:

Relatedly, governments ought to more fully embrace principles of resource management and prudent stewardship in considering how in a given case mediation might bring an end to a risk-laden dispute, allowing the government officials legitimately to declare victory, and then return to the State’s other business. Additionally, we need to study domestic corruption laws and other municipal disincentives to government settlements with foreign investors. State officials [and senior SOE managers] ought to be free to end disputes without fear of corruption charges later being brought against them, in turn putting the settlement itself at risk.

Professor Lucy Reed discussed a 2016 survey that NUS’ Centre for Investment Law (which she headed) conducted on obstacles to settlement in ISDS (for those who aren’t familiar with her, she is one of the leading international commercial and investment arbitrators):

the top obstacle to settlement in ISDS, by far, is the State’s desire to avoid responsibility for a settlement and to defer decision making to third-party arbitrators. The second greatest obstacle is the political risk involved. The third one is the difficulty of getting budget approval when there is a voluntary settlement instead of an arbitral award. Fourth is,as Jack Coe mentioned, a fear of public criticism, media criticism,
and even allegations of corruption in taking a bribe in order to settle a case with a potentially hated investor. Fifth was the fear of setting a precedent, meaning opening the floodgates to being sued again and again because you make a settlement. Then there are structural inefficiencies; because there are so many agencies involved, it is just hard to get approval.

The survey also looked at what might incentivize governments to invite a mediator to participate. Professor Reed said:

By far the most important factor was the desire to save time and money, so, please remember this one.  Second, obviously, is when the case is known to be weak and might be lost. Third is appreciating the certainty of a settlement, over which they have some control, as compared to the uncertainty of an arbitration decision, which you might win but you also mightlose and lose big. And the fourth factor actually was the desire to preserve a long-term relationship, if the relations are not already fractured as they often are in big investments.

All of these obstacles and incentives have their Chinese characteristics. One incentive, a variation of the fourth factor that Professor Reed identified, is that it enables a Chinese contractor that has a dispute with a host country (or state-owned company) to resolve a dispute (to its satisfaction) without losing its eligibility for future work in that market. This is a real concern for Chinese contractors, who are major players in the international construction/contracting market.

Resolving issues for SOEs is likely to require a commitment by multiple institutions involved in administering SOEs and its managers (State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), the Communist Party’s Organization Department (组织部), and the Ministry of Finance among others. In a mock mediation session (based on an actual case) that was part of a Great Britain China Centre event that I attended this spring, the benefits of mediated settlements in achieving the goals of all parties involved in a BRI project was brought home.  Convincing the SOEs and their regulators will be an important part of making the Singapore Mediation Convention work in China.

Implications of the Singapore Convention for the Chinese courts

As Sun Wei wrote earlier, the Chinese courts are concerned that overworked [I would add, and very studious] Chinese judges will need to deal with a flood of enforcement cases when China ratifies the Convention. He cited data to show that generally parties comply with a mediated settlement and rarely seek compulsory enforcement proceedings. Another major concern of the Chinese courts is that Chinese judges will need to review claims of fraudulent cross-border mediation as well as fraudulent litigation and mediation. But the evidence so far would indicate that the Singapore Mediation Convention would reduce rather increase the workload of the Chinese courts. But the deeper question is the reliability of that data and relevance to China’s legal environment and the legal environment outside of China in which Chinese companies operate. There are more minor issues, such as an additional cause of action (if I understand Chinese civil procedure law correctly), but those aren’t the principal concerns.

Who is committed?

Planting the Singapore Convention in Chinese soil requires work by many related government institutions.  The hard work in determining what needs to be done cannot be done one person (or even a team of people) in one institution, but requires persuasion and appeals to institutional self-interest of multiple institutions, and persons committed to making the Singapore Convention work in their regulatory area.

Many thanks to a knowledgeable person for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this blogpost.

Supreme People’s Court Monitor at the Supreme People’s Court (III)

I am prefacing this blogpost with a statement that nothing in it (or future blogposts, for that matter) represents the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), the China International Commercial Court (CICC), or the  International Commercial Expert Committee (Expert Committee).

On the afternoon of 21 August, Professor Liu Jingdong of the International Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (pictured below) and I spoke at the SPC, invited by the #4 Civil Division.  Ms. Long Fei, Deputy Director (Person in Charge) of the CICC Coordination and Guidance Office. chaired the proceedings and Judge Wang Shumei, head of the #4 Civil Division, gave concluding remarks.  Professor Liu had previously been a guazhi scholar (seconded/temporarily assigned) in the #4 Civil Division (appointed as a deputy division chief, as is the practice). He felt the event was a reunion with his former colleagues.  This was the first event to involve lectures by CICC Expert Committee members to judges and other staff at the SPC, including several members of the CICC.  I trust that other Expert Committee members will have the same opportunity in the future.  I am grateful to all those involved in making all the arrangements needed for the event to take place and to all of those who took time away from dealing with difficult cases and other work to listen to and interact with Professor Liu and me.

 

The audience of about 40 people (pictured below) included Hu Shihao, head of the Judicial Reform Office, Li Xiao, deputy director of the Research Office, Judge Guo Zaiyu (of the CICC), and many others, including a group of students interning in the #4 Civil Division (seated in the back row).  After the formal part of the lecture (and a question and answer session), I was very happy to be able to take a few minutes to share with the students some of my thoughts about takeaways from their internships.

I spoke about the impact of the Belt and Road on the Chinese courts (about which I have previously spoken), market reaction outside of China to the CICC, and some modest suggestions relating to the Expert Committee.  I gave my presentation in Chinese, as I knew some in the audience would have difficulty understanding English, although my “foreigner’s Chinese” (洋式中文) may have been a challenge to understand. Professor Liu spoke on the “legalization” of the Belt & Road”  (the subject of his 2017 article in 政法论坛). One of my suggestions was that this not be a one-off event. The official report on the event (in People’s Court Daily), is also on the Chinese version of the CICC website.

 

 

 

The National Civil Commercial Trial Work Conference Draft Conference Summary or how the SPC guides the lower courts through issuing conference summaries

 

Screenshot 2019-12-25 at 5.30.17 PM
Screenshot of the explanation accompanying the draft conference summary

In early August, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issued the National Civil Commercial Trial Work Conference Conference Summary (Draft of the SPC #2 Civil Division for the Solicitation of Opinions from the Public) 全国法院民商事审判工作会议纪要 (最高人民法院民二庭向社会公开征求意见稿. The draft, which sets a comment deadline of 25 August and includes a brief (but useful) introduction, provides a summary of current critical legal issues in domestic commercial law. As explained below, this document provides an excellent example of one of the ways that the SPC guides the lower courts through issuing judicial normative documents 司法文件 or 司法规范性文件 (also called judicial regulatory documents and judicial guidance documents (司法指导性文件) and uses national court conferences to derive a consensus on critical legal issues. The 123-article draft document relates to legal issues, rather than the political issues discussed at length in Justice Liu Guixiang’s speech (as described in a recent blogpost). The fact that this draft was issued for public comment and so quickly shows that guidance from the SPC to the lower courts is needed quickly at a time where the domestic Chinese economy is facing downward economic pressure.  I  explain what this document is, why it was issued for public comment, and its implications. The planned summary of the issues will need to wait until time permits (perfect is the enemy of the good).

Collection of Guidance Documents of the SPC

Conference Summary

It is a fact that the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) issues a broad range of documents that guide the lower courts in addition to its judicial interpretations.  Several recent posts on this blog (and two of my recent book chapters) have focused on several of those documents. One of the documents that the SPC issues is entitled “conference summary/meeting minutes” (会议纪要), which is also a type of Party/government document (as mentioned in earlier blogposts).

As I explained “earlier” (25 years ago) in my 1993 article, the SPC uses specialized court conferences as a way of transmitting central legal policy, unify or harmonize court practices in accordance with that policy, and obtain an overview of court practices and problems.  Although conference summaries do not have the status of a judicial interpretation, the lower courts will generally decide cases according to its provisions. “Harmonizing court practice” means in Chinese judicial parlance that judges are applying the law similarly.

The SPC entitles conference summaries “judicial normative documents”(司法文件) judicial guidance documents (司法指导性文件) and sometimes judicial policy documents” (司法政策性文件).  As I’ve written before, this fuzzy use of terminology is not unusual. An (authoritative) follower has proposed using the English translation “judicial regulatory document” for 司法规范性文件.  An authoritative person (who cannot be named), concurred with the follower’s proposal. The book pictured above, edited by a group from the People’s Court Press (affiliated with the SPC),  includes a number of conference summaries (some with commentary by drafters). The editors commented that “although judicial guidance documents are not judicial interpretations and cannot be cited in a court judgment document as the basis of a judgment, it is generally recognized that they have an important guiding impact on the trial and enforcement work of the courts at every level.”

Public Consultation

This conference summary appears to be one of the few that has been issued for public consultation (the previous civil/commercial conference summary was also issued for public comment (see here).  My understanding is that the usual practice has been to solicit the views of certain experts outside the court system in the drafting process (as well of many in the court system).  As to why this draft has been issued for public comment, a knowledgeable person said it was to “hear views from all parts of society (听取社会各界的意见). I surmise that the #2 Civil Division (the division that took the lead in drafting the conference summary) took the view that it was useful to understand the views and comments that “the market” (the legal professional community) has relating the rules in the conference summary before finalizing it. This way the conference summary can be amended before it is finalized to account for any useful comments and the #2 Civil Division can anticipate issues that may arise when the conference summary becomes effective.

Purpose, Implications and Drafting Procedures

In the introduction to the draft, the SPC described its purpose in issuing this conference summary.  “The main purpose is in relation to various problems encountered in the process of trial practice, to provide some resolution methods that judges can use as a reference when discussing reasoning in the application of specific laws, to unify judicial thinking, and limit judicial discretion, work hard to have the masses feel justice in every case”   (主要目的是就审判实践中遇到的一些问题,提出解决方案,作为法官在具体法律适用、进行说理论证时的参考,统一全国法院的裁判思路,约束法官自由裁量空间,提高司法公信力,稳定当事人、法律工作者及社会的预期,努力让人民群众在每一个司法案件中感受到公平正义).  The conference summary has implications for the legal professional community as a whole (particularly lawyers and in-house counsel) because it signals what approach the lower courts are likely to take to current controversial issues.

According to the notice, the drafters of the conference summary combined the legal issues set out in Justice Liu’s report with issues raised by delegates at the conference and issues derived during the process of preparing for the conference.  As described in the book chapters mentioned above (and in great detail in a book chapter stuck in the production pipeline), this is representative of judicial interpretation and judicial document drafting.

Substantive Content

From the number of articles relating to specific issues, it is possible to see where the inadequacies in current legislation exist and where the courts lack consensus on important commercial law issues.  Since the draft was issued, Chinese law firms have published articles focusing on specific issues. Time does not permit me to explain its provisions now.

  1. Issues related to the application of the General Principles of Civil Law and its relationship with other legislation (5 articles)(《民法总则》适用的法律衔接问题(5条))
  2. Trial of company disputes (22 articles) (关于公司纠纷案件的审理(22条))
  3. Trial of contract disputes (26 articles) (关于合同纠纷案件的审理(26条)
  4. Trial of security disputes (18 articles)(关于担保纠纷案件的审理(18条)
  5. Financial consumer rights protection disputes (6 articles)(关于金融消费者权益保护纠纷案件的审理(6条)
  6. Trial of securities disputes (11 articles)关于证券纠纷案件的审理(11条)
  7. Trial of business trust dispute cases (7 articles)(关于营业信托纠纷案件的审理(7条))
  8. Property insurance disputes (6 articles)(关于金融消费者权益保护纠纷案件的审理(6条))
  9. Trial of commercial paper disputes (4 articles)(关于票据纠纷案件的审理(4条)
  10. Bankruptcy cases (13 articles) (关于破产纠纷案件的审理(13条)
  11. Trial of cases involving third party objection to enforcement and withdrawal of a case (5 articles) (关于案外人执行异议之诉和第三人撤销之诉纠纷案件的审理(5)
  12. Cases with both civil and criminal aspects (2 articles) 关于民刑交叉纠纷的处理(2条)
  13. Etc. (1 article)

CICC Expert Committee Office Renamed

A brief notice appeared on the China International Commercial Court (CICC)’s websites on 9 August, announcing that the Office of the International Commercial Expert Committee (Expert Committee) of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) (国际商事专家委员会办公室) had been renamed the Coordination and Guidance Office (协调指导办公室) for the CICC from 21st June 2019. The main duties of the Office are described as directing and coordinating construction, adjudication management and external exchange (负责指导协调国际商事法庭建设、审判管理、对外交流; 负责国际商事专家委员日常工作等) of the CICC, and also in charge of the routine work of members of the Expert Committee. I surmise that these functions are meant to convey that the office will not only support activities related to the Expert Committee but also be responsible for a variety of matters, such as coordinating the drafting of rules and the wide variety of administrative matters that go along with any administrative entity in China, particularly one that deals with foreigners. The notice also announced that from 23rd July 2019, Ms. Long Fei, who has a Ph.D. from China University of Political Science and Law, has been appointed as the Deputy Director (Person in Charge) of the Coordination and Guidance Office. She had formerly been the Director of Department of Guidance Service, Judicial Reform Office of the SPC. She brings to the new role many years of work on diversified dispute resolution related issues.

Signals from the Supreme People’s Court’s national civil/commercial trial work conference

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Justice Liu Guixiang in a photo from some years ago

During the first week of July,  the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) held its civil/commercial work conference (民商事工作会议), at which senior SPC and lower court leaders (and other leaders) gathered to hear about the latest SPC policies concerning civil and commercial cases.

As this blog has noted, most of the work of the Chinese courts involves civil and commercial disputes, not criminal cases. President Zhou Qiang gave an important speech which set the tone for the conference, but the one that the practitioners (judges and lawyers) are paying close attention is the keynote speech by Justice Liu Guixiang, full-time member of the SPC Judicial Committee and organizer of the conference. From the content of Justice Liu’s speech, it appears that the focus was domestic commercial cases.  For those who want to review the text in full, it is available here and here (the second version was published on the Wechat account Empire Lawyers (法客帝国)and includes an introduction and highlighting by the lawyer who has the account.) (The last conference was in December 2015.) This blogpost highlights some of the many issues his speech raises.

(For those not familiar with SPC work conferences, the description I provided 25 years ago remains accurate: “Another important way through which the [SPC] uses these meetings is to transmit central legal policy, unify court practices in accordance with such policy, and obtain an overview of current court practices and problems.”)

Justice Liu Guixiang is a senior member of the SPC and one of a relatively few senior judges who graduated from the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) (formerly affiliated with the predecessor to the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM)) and so is familiar with cross-border issues in particular (and was earlier head of the #4 Civil Division, in charge of cross-border issues). He is well known to the international community. Justice Liu has been given responsibility for the SPC’s campaign to basically resolve enforcement difficulties within two or three years (as the former head of the Enforcement Bureau).  Because problems in the Chinese economy means that many more business deals in China are ending up as disputes in the Chinese courts, the SPC needs to signal to the lower courts how important issues should be handled and to the senior political leadership that the courts are supporting the Party and its core.

Justice Liu conveyed messages on two types of issues to two parts of the audience for his speech.  The two parts of his audience were (are) the political leadership and tens of thousands of judges involved with civil and commercial issues, as well as others in the court system.   The two types of issues are political issues and legal issues, both on substantive law and procedural law.  People outside of China might be tempted to dwell on the political messages (as this analysis does, as time doesn’t permit better analysis of the legal issues), but the messages on legal issues are those ones that will have the greatest impact on the court system and on practitioners. The speech will be reviewed, discussed, and used as the basis for further work in the court system, and attentive lawyers and in-house counsel know that the content of the speech will affect their litigation strategy and business. I’ve spotted one synopsis on the takeaways from the conference from one of Beijing’s prestigious law firms and more are following.

Political issues

The first part of his speech addressed political issues, but that part also includes some highlighting of critical legal issues. He states that politics is the most important. Justice Liu repeats some of the “innovative” language from January’s Political-Legal Work Conference that I mentioned in a blogpost earlier this year (with which his speech is harmonized).  “As a political and legal organ, the people’s court is first and foremost a political organ. It must put political construction in the first place and clearly talk politics” )人民法院作为政法机关,首先是政治机关,必须把政治建设摆在首位,旗帜鲜明讲政治 )(I was tested on the phrase “talk politics/讲政治“ recently by some persons in the system with a sense of humor).

Principle #1 (of four)–“To uphold the absolute leadership of the Party. The leadership of the Party is the fundamental requirement of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and it is the root and soul of the people’s court.”…However, “the erroneous thoughts of so-called “constitutionalism”, “separation of powers” and “judicial independence” of the West must be resolutely resisted. This is a major issue of political principle and we cannot be vaguely ambiguous.” One commentator noted that this principle is greater than any ordinary principle of law.

This language harkens back to that used by President Zhou Qiang in January 2017. Why this was included, when the audience would know these principles clearly?  Likely for senior political leadership to see that the courts are harmonized with the Center and to ensure that the Center knows that SPC leadership is doing everything to ensure court cadres (judges and other court officials) are as well.

Principle #2, serve the Party and the greater situation.

Justice Liu reminds his audience that “it is necessary to fully realize that there is no rule of law that does not have political positions or political views” (没有不具有政治立场、政治观点的法治). In civil and commercial trials, we must have a stable political stance, determine the political direction correctly, pay attention to the political effect, consider the political influence (impact), and be good at analyzing complicated issues from the perspective of politics, from the perspective of the fundamental interests of the people, and from the perspective of the overall economic and social development of the party and the country, integrate politics in civil and commercial trial work.” (在民商事审判中必须站稳政治立场,把准政治方向,注重政治效果,考虑政治影响,善于从政治角度从人民群众根本利益角度、从党和国家经济社会发展大局的角度分析处理错综复杂的民商事矛盾纠纷,把政治融入具体的民商事审判业务中.

Interestingly, he notes that the system of recording interference by senior court leaders and other Party/government leaders has not been effective, and this must be implemented as well as the judicial responsibility system (问题在于我们在审判实务中没有不折不扣地落实好,非法过问案件登记制度的功能没有得到有效发挥。必须采取有效措施把这项与司法责任制相配套的改革措施落到实处).  This appears to be a reflection of the concern of many judges that they will be held responsible for judicial decisions that they made because they were under pressure to do so from senior court officials or local officials.

American civil (and criminal) procedure law professors would be intrigued to know that “so-called long-arm jurisdiction” merited mention in Justice Liu’s speech (“Pay close attention to the United States’ all-around suppression in the fields of economy, politics, science and technology, etc. and the implementation of so-called ‘long-arm jurisdiction”‘to bring new challenges to our country’s judiciary;高度关注美国从经济、政治、科技等领域对我国进行全方位打压,实施所谓“长臂管辖”给我国司法带来的新挑战.

Justice Liu includes in this section several legal issues and highlights the way that Chinese judges should think when hearing cases:

When making judgments, we must fully consider the overall situation of economic and social development, political effects, and social effects.  When dealing with major and sensitive cases, we must pay attention [carefully listen] to the opinions of financial supervision departments, state-owned asset management departments, and social organizations such as  small and medium enterprise associations to accurately grasp the overall situation of social stability, social impact, and political impact. 我们在作出判断时,要充分考虑经济社会发展大局、政治效果、社会效果. 在处理重大敏感案件时,要注意听取金融监管部门、国有资产管理等部门以及中小企业协会等社会组织的意见,精确把握社会稳定大局、社会影响、政治影响。

Justice Liu called for more work on bankruptcy law, particularly strengthening coordination with government, resolving obstacles in bankruptcy liquidation and reorganization, and introduce judicial interpretations to deal with the legal issues. In order to prevent and resolve major risks, the people’s courts should issue judicial interpretations or judicial policies on issues such as bond defaults that directly affect financial security and social concerns, equity pledges of listed companies, and Internet lending.

He calls for deepening supply-side structural reform and promoting high-quality economic development; clearing out “zombie enterprises”; preventing financial risks, protecting the legitimate rights and interests of private enterprises, establishing a legalized business environment, and other civil and commercial matters, and mentions the “Fengqiao Experience,” but in relation to the 2018 SPC Joint Opinion with the China Securities Regulatory Commission on increasing diversified dispute resolution for securities disputes and a single dispute resolution platform linking litigation and other forms of dispute resolution.  He flags future work in using other forms of dispute resolution to resolve financial/securities disputes.

Legal issues

Substantive legal issues are the ones that have attracted the interest of judges and other legal professionals. Politics is also visible in the way that Judge Liu phrased his summary of the legal issues briefly noted below  (particularly his use of dialectical analysis, consistent with Party Center language). (This analysis will be expanded later as time permits). The issues that he is highlighting are the major ones, particularly regarding commercial issues.  He is providing the view of the SPC (likely drawing on the views of the #2 Civil Division, the division focusing on domestic commercial issues), and is signaling where Chinese courts are in disagreement and should conform.

As to why Chinese courts disagree or are unclear on these issues, and why this speech will unify courts’ approaches, it has to do with Chinese legislation and judicial interpretations. Judge Liu’s speech is a type of judicial policy document, in essence. As I mentioned in a recent blogpost, rules or policies included in SPC judicial policy documents may eventually be crystallized in SPC judicial interpretations and eventually codified in national law, but that process is slow and cannot meet the needs of the lower courts. The lower courts need to deal properly (politically and legally) with outstanding legal issues pending a more permanent stabilization of legal rules. This is true for judicial policy documents in all areas of the law, not only in commercial law.  Therefore Justice Liu used this conference to convey the SPC’s views:

  1.  He flags the issues where Chinese courts disagree: validity of external guarantees given by companies; the validity of a contract if a fake chop is used; scope of the security rights when a security contract and registrations are inconsistent; guarantee contracts linked to shareholding (让与担保); how to adjust damages, how to implement the right to terminate a contract (如公司对外担保的效力问题、盖假章合同的效力问题、合同约定与登记簿记载不一致的担保物权的范围问题、让与担保问题,甚至连违约金如何调整、解除权行使的条件等一些常见问题);
  2. Methodology–in trying difficult and new civil and commercial issues, judges should search for “similar cases” and determine whether prior cases have derived related principles.  This links with my recent blogpost flagging the SPC’s development of its case law system (with Chinese characteristics). Justice Liu does not use the word “precedent.” He directs judges to consider whether principles in prior cases are applicable, if not, reasons should be given, and if an old principle is to be reversed, reasons should be given and these should be discussed by either the specialized judges committee or judicial committee. He stresses what I had mentioned previously, that principles are needed on what the scope of “similar cases” are.
  3. On disputes involving Value Adjustment Mechanisms (VAMs), judges should seek to coordinate the conflicts of interest between investors, companies and creditors. and implement the principle of capital maintenance and the principle of protecting the legitimate rights and interests of creditors, and to balance the interests of investors, shareholders, the company, and its creditors;
  4. He repeats SPC policy on an old FAQ (frequently asked question)–what if a contract violates a local policy, normative document, or ministerial rule–should a court invalidate the contract? The answer is no, the court needs to consider whether there is a violation of public order (公共秩序), which he says is mostly seen in violations of law or State Council administrative regulations;
  5.  How to protect all types of entities equally and provide special protection to groups such as minority shareholders and financial consumers;
  6. He gives practical guidance to for judges grappling with a theoretical legal issue–how to understand the status of the relevant law when the General Principles of Civil Law (2017) is inconsistent with earlier legislation such as the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law,  the 1999 Contract Law, the Company Law (last amended in 2018). The new law supersedes inconsistent prior law, but if provisions of the 2017 law are inconsistent with the special part of the Contract Law, the Contract Law prevails (on the theory that specialized provisions prevail)
  7. Issues related to the validity of contracts, including contracts that never went into force,
  8. Corporate guarantees to third parties–an issue regarding which there has been a great deal of litigation and court rulings have varied widely,  He sets down some rules;
  9. How to correctly understand a provision of the Company Law Judicial Interpretation #2, that gives creditors the right to seek the liquidation of a company in certain circumstances;
  10. Private lending (particularly interest-related issues);
  11.  Issues related to a debtor or guarantor using company shares to secure an obligation, and the related rights of the company and its creditors, voting rights and rights to dividends in the company., and whether the creditor has a priority right. Justice Liu notes the law is silent on the validity of such agreements but the SPC takes the view that these agreements are valid, as long as no mandatory provisions of law are violated;
  12. Remedies for a third party–raising objections in enforcement proceedings, requests for retrial, and applying to proceedings.
  13. How to deal with cases with both civil and criminal aspects–if civil and criminal case involves the same facts, it should be referred for criminal investigation first, and if there is some dispute, it can be coordinated by the local political-legal committee.  The major issue in practice is how to determine whether “the same facts are involved.”  Justice Liu points his audience to several factors. This is also an old issue in the Chinese courts, but has taken on new importance now that the Chinese government is using criminal prosecution to deal with abuses in the financial system that affect the interests of consumers and investors.

Not said in Justice Liu’s speech is whether the broad substantive content will be reissued in a form more useful to frontline judges (and other members of the legal community).  If practice is any guide, that is likely we will see a conference summary (会议纪要)–the SPC issued a conference summary based on the 2015 conference 11 months after the conference itself, on one set of issues.

 

 

A blog discussing China's highest court